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FOREWORD
September 11, 2001 changed many things in the United States
not the least of which was our national defense policy and military
strategy. The challenges facing the defense establishment in the
United States at the beginning of the 21st century are daunting
indeed; however, the thoughtful essays included in this volume
by students at the U.S. Army War College provide insights into
those trials that will prove useful to policymakers both in and out of
uniform.
Officers who participated in the Advanced Strategic Art Program
(ASAP) during their year at the U.S. Army War College wrote these
chapters. The ASAP is a unique program that offers selected students
a rigorous course of instruction in theater strategy. Solidly based in
theory, doctrine, and history, the program provides those students a
rich professional experience that includes staff rides, exercises, and
the best instructional expertise available. The program is designed
to provide the Joint team with the military’s best theater strategists.
Our ASAP graduates have already begun to make a difference.
They and their fellow graduates of the U.S. Army War College will
continue to serve the Army and the nation for many years to come.

DAVID H. HUNTOON, JR.
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant
U.S. Army War College
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CHAPTER 1
TRANSFORMATION AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY
EDUCATION:
PAST AS PROLOGUE TO THE FUTURE
Dr. Williamson Murray
This book represents the third in a series that began in the Army
War College’s academic year 2000-01. As in the past, it contains the
papers of the students of the Advanced Strategic Arts Program, a
special program within the war college dedicated to the study of the
strategic and joint environment within which America’s military will
fight in the 21st century.1 This year’s essays, however, cover a wider
variety of subjects than has been the case in the past. The students
of the 2002-03 academic year were not asked to address the single
theme of army transformation, but rather were allowed to address a
wide range of issues and problems confronting the United States in
a fractious and difficult world.2
Those essays range in subject matter from basing in Europe,
to several addressing the critical issues in Homeland Security. All
of them raise critical issues with regards to national security and
the nature of war itself. One of the essays won a prize at this year’s
graduation ceremonies. That honor suggested a great deal about
the quality of the students in the Advanced Strategic Art Program
(ASAP) as well as the importance of intellectual excellence in the
curricula of America’s war colleges. The very breadth of the essays,
covering topics from the implications of a nonlinear world on the
conduct of military operations to close examinations of the strategic
framework of U.S. strategic policy in Europe and Asia, underline the
character and intellectual breadth of the best students at the Army
War College.
Now more than ever, it would appear that America needs
officers who possess a deep understanding of the difficulties
involved in the use of force in the international arena as well as
understand the complex problems involved in the political and
strategic challenges confronted by the United States in the post-Cold
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War World. Over the past decade, a number of major study groups
in Washington―to include the Defense Science Board, the National
Defense Panel, and the Hart Rudman Commission―have all argued
that the United States needs officers, more widely educated not only
in the profession of war, but in understanding foreign cultures,
languages, international affairs, and military history.
Moreover, a number of senior civilian officials in the Department
of Defense (DoD) as well as in the Congress have become interested
in the subject of professional military education. It would appear
then, that an examination of the period when professional military
education rendered signal services to the armed forces of the United
States in their preparation for war would be useful in thinking about
how serious education could contribute to the preparation of officers
for an uncertain and ambiguous future. That is the subject of this
opening chapter.
PAST CONTRIBUTIONS
Professional military education in the United States appeared
in the late 19th century for a number of reasons, quite different from
those lying behind its appearance on the European Continent.3 For
American military reformers of the late 19th century, education
represented a tangible sign that their profession fit within the larger
context of the systemization through education of other professions
in the United States. That process included the professions of
medicine, law, and even business. If officership in either the Navy
or the Army were a profession, then the services needed some form
of serious professional education. The fact that even the British
had seen fit to establish a staff college in the 1850s to educate their
officers also suggested to American reformers the need for serious
professional military education.4 However, it was not until the 1920s
that professional military education came into its own in the United
States as a major factor in preparations for war. And because the
contribution of professional military education was so significant, it
is well worth examining the attitude of the services in the interwar
period towards professional military education as well as the nature
of that contribution.
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THE MARITIME SERVICES AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY
EDUCATION IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
The Development of the Carrier.
Almost from the period immediately after the end of World
War II, historians have understood the importance of professional
military education in the development of the Wehrmacht’s battlefield
capabilities.5 What, however, has only become clear in the 1990s,
as the result of recent research by scholars, was the extraordinary
role that professional military education played in the processes of
transformation and innovation that took place within the American
armed forces during this period. The most interesting and important
case was that of the Naval War College―an institution that provided
the intellectual engine for the Navy’s transformation efforts and
innovation from the early 1920s through to the start of World War
II. In the interwar Navy, not only attendance, but teaching on the
faculty, was considered career enhancing for officers. Virtually
every admiral of note in World War II was a graduate of the college,
while the future admiral Raymond Spruance served not one, but
two, tours on the faculty.6
The impact of this emphasis on professional military education
showed directly in the Navy’s efforts to transform its combat
capabilities. If it had had little opportunity to test its battle fleet in
combat during World War I―only one squadron of U.S. battleships
made it to Scapa Flow well after the Battle of Jutland―the Navy
had at least had the chance to observe what the British were doing.
Moreover, the admiral in charge of U.S. naval efforts in European
waters, William S. Sims, was one of the most intelligent and
innovative officers ever to wear the Navy’s uniform. Interestingly
in terms of his priorities, Sims chose to return from Europe to the
presidency of the Naval War College rather than to a fleet command.7
There at Newport, he set about adapting the war games at the
college to educate naval officers not only in current capabilities, but
in those that the future might hold. The games provided surrogate
decisionmaking experience in naval warfare and examined the
operational and strategic possibilities open to the Navy with the
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advent of significant new technologies. Thus, Newport probed
the framework of emerging concepts and technological change. In
particular, the games tested the possibilities that aircraft carriers
might offer to revolutionizing the conduct of maritime operations.8
Serious honest red teaming lay at the heart of the approach to the
wargaming and testing of these new capabilities.9 There was virtually
no effort to validate preconceived notions; rather the emphasis was
on the testing of ideas and concepts until they failed. The resulting
culture of intellectual honesty was to carry over into the Navy’s fleet
exercises throughout the interwar period.
The most important operational insight in these wargames
was that the dynamics of offensive carrier operations would differ
fundamentally from those involved in battleship engagements.
When battle lines of dreadnoughts engaged, the fires from the two
sides involved more or less steady streams of shells. Each side could
redirect its “streams” of fire on the enemy’s surviving ships as the
engagement progressed. However, the wargaming of the air power
assets that carriers would bring to the fight suggest a very different
picture. The execution of potential carrier operations suggested that
air strikes should come in discrete pulses of combat power rather
than in continuous streams. Thus, the effectiveness of such strikes
on the enemy would be a function of the number of aircraft that the
attacking carrier or carriers could launch in a given pulse.10
Crucial to this insight was the fact that those running the war
games at Newport were open to new ideas and approaches:
As [Captain Harris] Lanning [the director of the Tactics
Department at Newport] noted in his memoirs, “a group of the
cleverest tacticians among the students came to see me and said
that . . . they believed there were better methods and intended
to find them.” Instead of being offended Lanning backed them.
As he recalled, “In investigating aircraft [in the war games] we
gave the officers commanding miniature fleets a rather free hand
in the use of aircraft . . . the only restriction being that planes had
to operate in accordance with the capabilities and limitations as
established by aviators familiar with planes.”11

A game at the end of 1923 suggests the willingness of those
designing the fleet games at Newport to experiment with the
possibilities that could come with significant changes to the
4

composition of the fleet. In this exercise the Blue (American) fleet
possessed five carriers; the Red fleet, four. While much of the
game emphasized the maneuvers of the battle fleets, the Blue fleet
launched 200 aircraft at Red and damaged all of Red‘s carriers and
one of its battleships. Besides pointing to the need for concentrated
strikes against the enemy fleet, the game suggested the need for a
coherent air defense plan and the importance of gaining control of
the air―thus the conclusion that the enemy’s carriers must be the
first target of carrier strikes.12
The insight that the number of aircraft launched by a carrier
would be the critical factor in naval combat in the future had far
reaching implications for the development of naval aviation. It
suggested that in fleet engagements, striking first with one’s aircraft
would confer considerable advantages. It also indicated that, range,
payload, and sustainability of aircraft would be essential enablers in
the future naval equation.13 Newport’s relatively simple wargaming
also suggested that the more aircraft a carrier could take to sea, the
better, and that reduction of aircraft launch, recovery, and on-board
handling times would have a significant impact on the carrier’s
effectiveness. And all of these insights were gained before the U.S.
Navy possessed a single operational aircraft carrier in the fleet.
What was particularly impressive about the Navy’s
transformation efforts was the direct connection between concept
development at the Naval War College and the exercises and
experiments that its fleet units carried out throughout the interwar
period. In turn, the lessons learned from the exercises more often than
not were fed back directly to the school, where real world experience
could refine doctrine and concepts. The insight that air power on the
carriers should come in pulses had an almost immediate effect on
experimentation in the fleet.
In 1925, the future admiral Joseph M. Reeves went to sea in
command of the Navy’s first carrier, the USS Langley. Significantly
Reeves had attended the senior officers’ course at Newport in 1923
and after graduation had become the head of the tactics department,
where he supervised the 1924-25 games.14 Reeves immediately set
about shortening take off and landing times for ever larger numbers
of aircraft. In the period of a year, Reeves, his officers, and the crew
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of the Langley figured out how to use arresting cables to maximum
effect, had invented crash barriers, developed the concept of a deck
park, and developed procedures and equipment to refuel and rearm
aircraft at much faster speeds. The result was, that while the Langley
had only taken to sea 14 aircraft when Reeves assumed command, it
was handling 48 aircraft a year later in simulated combat conditions.15
By the early 1930s, the Lexington and Saratoga, newly arrived in the
fleet
eet, were handling nearly 100 combat aircraft each in exercises. It
is doubtful whether the United States military has ever seen a more
impressive use of low-cost resources than the inexpensive games
that Sims had created at Newport to examine the possibilities open
to the use of new technologies like air power.
Strategic and Other Insights.
The war gaming and examination of new concepts at Newport
involved more than just the insights that involved the potential use
of carriers and aircraft. They created a mind set that prepared the
Navy and eventually the Marine Corps to deal with a number of
significant problems that a future war in the Pacific would raise.
The future fleet admiral and commander of the great drive across
the Cental Pacific from 1943 through to the end of the war, Admiral
Chester Nimitz, noted the following in his 1923 thesis at the Naval
War College about the operational and strategic framework of a
future war in the Pacific:
[T]he operations imposed [in a future Pacific war] on Blue [the

United States] will require the Blue Fleet to advance westward
with an enormous train, in order to be able to seize and establish
bases en route. . . . The possession by Orange [Imperial Japan]
of numerous bases in the Western Pacific will give her fleet a
maximum of mobility while the lack of such bases imposes on
Blue the necessity of refueling at sea en route or of seizing a base
from Orange for this purpose, in order to maintain even a limited
degree of mobility.16

Thus, the games and strategic analysis at Newport led to the
conclusion that the fleet would have to capture a number of islands
in the Central Pacific to support a drive on the Japanese Home
Islands. And that task would require amphibious capabilities.
6

Here the Marines, and their emergence as a significant military
force, became a significant part of the interwar story of professional
military education.
Almost immediately after the demobilization following World
War I, the Marines had begun focusing on the possibilities offered by
amphibious warfare―partly to survive as an independent military
organization. The Commandant of the Marine Corps in the early
1920s, General John Lejeune, who proudly wore the combat patch
of the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division on his right shoulder, charted
the way ahead. The foremost historian of the Corps has noted the
following about Lejeune’s attitude toward professional military
education and its importance in preparing the Corps for the future:
The Commandant intended that Marine officers study their
profession, and he also intended that school completion be
regarded as part of an officer’s fitness for key assignments. It
might also serve as a moral equivalent of promotion and the key
to rapid advancement if the Corps went to war again.17,18

Thus, the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico became the one
place in the world where the implications of the British assault on
the Gallipoli Peninsula were studied, not only for their failures, but
for what might have gone differently, had the British possessed a
more aggressive and better trained force.19 Between the mid-1920s
and the mid-1930s, the Schools at Quantico saw an increase in the
proportion of the curriculum devoted to the study of amphibious
operations from 25 percent to 60 percent.20 Thus, Gallipoli became
one of the major foci with an increasing emphasis on the tactical and
operational movements once the amphibious force had achieved a
beachhead. Significantly, the Marines placed a number of their finest
officers and future leaders on the faculty at Quantico. Among others,
the faculty included in 1938 Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., O. P. Smith,
Merill B. Twining, David M. Shoup, and Gerald Thomas.21
Again as with the development of carrier aviation, experiments,
exercises, and their connection with Newport and Quantico had a
considerable impact on the development of the amphibious warfare
capabilities, though these developments came more slowly than did
those for carrier warfare. Part of the explanation, undoubtedly, lay in
the fact that the Marine Corps spent much of the 1920s policing the
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Caribbean for the United Fruit Company. But with the withdrawal of
Marine units from that role in the early 1930s and their redesignation
as the “Fleet Marine Force,” the maritime services began an active
program of designing the fleet exercises―FLEXs in the acronym
of the time―to experiment with the possibilities of amphibious
landings. By 1934 the Marines had developed a manual for such
operations, entitled the “Tentative Manual for Landing Operations,”
while increasing tensions in the Pacific made it increasingly likely
that there would be a great conflict between the United States and
Imperial Japan in the not too distant future.
The result of these efforts was that the Marine Corps and the
Navy explored most of the difficulties that they would confront in
launching amphibious operations, and if they did not have answers
to many of these problems, at least they knew what they had to solve.
By the outbreak of the war, the FLEXs had laid out the principles of
the amphibious doctrine which would play such an important part
in the winning of World War II.
In the course of the FLEXs the Navy and Marine Corps
experimented with about every imaginable amphibious technique
and tactical approach allowed for by their equipment. They tried
day and night landings, smoke screens, varieties of air and naval
gunfire support, concentrated assaults and dispersed infiltration,
the firing of all sorts of weapons from landing craft, and an array
of demonstrations, feints, subsidiary landings, and broad front
attacks.22

All the while, debates went on throughout the maritime services,
fueled by the experiences gained in the FLEXs. By 1940 the parallel
development of doctrine in the schools and experimentation in
the fleet where well on their way to creating serious amphibious
capabilities. Those capabilities would eventually play a crucial
role in Allied victory in World War II in both the Atlantic and the
Pacific.
The Army.
Like the maritime services, the Army placed considerable
emphasis on the education of its officers, although there was a less
coherent focus on transformation, innovation, and the development
8

of new capabilities. On paper the school system for officers was even
more impressive than that possessed by the Navy. For example, the
staff college at Leavenworth was a 2-year course for a considerable
period of time during the interwar period. Nevertheless, the length
of the staff college’s curriculum had more to do with the fact that
promotion through the army’s grades proceeded at a glacial pace,
while there were not enough positions for the officers the army
had. For much of the interwar period the Army War College
displayed little intellectual vigor. Yet, one should note that academic
performance at Army schools was considered important enough in
an officer’s evaluation, for Dwight Eisenhower to expend great effort
to graduate first in his class at Leavenworth.23
The real intellectual engine of the Army’s efforts at
transformation in this period came at Fort Benning’s Infantry School
during the 5-year period that George Marshall served as the assistant
commandant. One hundred and fifty of the Army’s future generals
in World War II attended the school during this period, while an
astonishing 50 future generals worked for Marshall on the faculty.24
An observer noted the following about the atmosphere of the school
under Marshall’s leadership and encouragement:
An infantry lieutenant colonel . . . in 1930 . . . was struck by the
opportunity given officers to disagree at times on questions
of military education, regardless of rank, and an attitude of
tolerance of ideas which encourages free and open discussion.
[The faculty was] thinking seriously about matters, old and new,
that may find application in our Army of the future. They are not
afraid to look outside the field of what is generally considered
military education for ideas to help in solving the problems of
national defense.25

One can find Marshall’s own summation of his belief in the
importance of history and education to the military profession in the
forward he wrote to the classic book on infantry tactics, Infantry in
Battle:
By the use of numerous historic examples which tell of the absence
of information, the lack of time, and the confusion of battle, the
reader is acquainted with the realities of war and the extremely
difficult conditions under which tactical problems must be settled
in the face of the enemy.26
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Marshall’s support for institutions like the Army War College in
his first year as the Army Chief of Staff―at a time when the United
States, and the Army in particular, were confronting the massive
problems occasioned by rearmament in the face of the looming
Japanese and German threats―suggests a great deal about how he
felt about professional military education. Out of the seven senior
officers teaching at that institution over the 1939-40 academic year,
Colonel W. H. Simpson would go on to command the Ninth Army
in the European Theater of Operations, while Major J. Lawton
Collins would become one of the Army’s most distinguished corps
commanders in World War II and eventually, after the war, the
Army’s Chief of Staff. The following year would see Alexander
Patch, soon to be a three-star general in the coming war, teaching on
the faculty.
In some respects the Army Air Corps may have done even
better than the Army as whole in its respect for professional military
education. To a great extent, this may have been driven by a desire
to achieve an independent air force that would be free of its ties to
the Army. Its main school, the Air Corps Tactical School, located
for much of the 1920s at Langley Field, moved to Maxwell Field in
Alabama in the early 1930s. That professional school for airmen was
the essential driver in the creation of the doctrinal concepts of highaltitude, precision attacks against the enemy’s industrial web―to
all intents and purposes the precursor to today’s conceptions of
effects-based operations.27 And like its parent, the Army Air Corps
was willing to put a number of its best officers on the faculty of that
institution. Among other future Army Air Forces (and Air Force)
generals, George Kenney, Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Claire Chennault,
Harold George, Kenneth Walker, and Hoyt Vandenberg, all served
tours on the faculty.
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
The Present Landscape.
There are a number of things that the services are doing right in
professional military education at present, but the overall attitude
at best appears to be that education is a luxury for the American
10

military rather than a necessity.28 What is going right emerged
mostly in 1970s and 1980s when senior officers, most of whom
had been badly burned by their experiences in Vietnam, turned to
professional military education as a means of addressing what they
saw as the glaring deficiencies in how the American military―and
system―had performed in the war in Southeast Asia.29 The revolution
at the Naval War College, driven by the Chief of Naval Operations,
created a truly graduate level approach to educating officers in
strategy. That was followed in the early 1980s by the creation of the
School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), an intensive secondyear program at the Army’s Command and Staff College.30 SAMS
was in turn followed by similar programs at the Air Command and
Staff College and by the Marine Corps Staff College. All of these
second-year programs have maintained their vibrancy.31 Finally, in
the late 1990s, the Commandant of the Army War College created
the Advanced Strategic Arts Program. All of these programs involve
intensive education at a graduate level for their students. They
should serve as a model for the other institutions of professional
military education. Unfortunately, they do not.
Two substantial problems lie at the heart of the difficulties
that marginalize the staff colleges, war colleges, and professional
military education in general: The first major problem is that the
Services have failed since World War II to enunciate a clear vision
of why they believe professional military education to be important.
Without a vision or a philosophy, it is relatively easy to follow almost
any path. As that old country saying runs, “If you don’t know where
you are going, then almost any path will do.” The second has to do
with personnel systems that to all intents and purposes still rest on
laws drawn up in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
The failure to enunciate clear goals for professional military
education has had a number of deleterious effects. To begin with,
it has helped to enshrine the “Pecos River” approach―a mile wide
and an inch deep. Pedagogically, a year is a very short period of time
for a student to grasp a serious subject in any sort of depth. Thus,
without a clear educational sense as to what officers absolutely have
to know, it becomes all too easy to justify a wide range of subjects,
all of which it would be nice to have officers know something about,
but which in fact are not essential to the military profession.32 The
11

result is that important subjects often get short shrift: Thucydides or
Clausewitz in an hour’s seminar with 20 pages of reading to back up
seminar discussion.
In fact, the lack of clear goals often reflects a benign neglect for
professional military education on the part of the senior leadership.
If professional military education doesn’t matter, then any generic
colonel can serve on the faculty.33 And a faculty that does not have
a reasonable claim to intellectual expertise is not likely to have
much self-respect, much less the respect of the student body. The
combination of a lack of interest in professional military education
at the top with faculty who have no clear intellectual focus can be
deadly. It often leads to a student attitude that their purpose at
the war college is to work on their athletic skills; students have
often jokingly commented that “they are at the war college on an
athletic scholarship.” Such attitudes are only reinforced when senior
generals comment on the speakers platform that they had had a
great time playing soft ball and golf at the war college and wish the
students a restful year.
There are, however, a considerable number of students attending
such institutions who are deadly serious about their profession. As
one Marine Corps Lieutenant General commented to this author in
the late 1990s: “Since you studied law when you went to law school,
and medicine when you went to medical school, I believed that I
would study war when I went to the war college. Boy was I wrong!”34
It is this group of officers, who deserve the very best in serious
professional military education, because they are the ones who
will provide the intellectual leadership for the American military
in the 21st century. Without a challenging educational experience
at staff college or war college, some of the brighter students can
become suspicious of what serious academic pursuits can contribute
to widening their horizons as well as those of their fellow officers.
Others find their own way to some coherent intellectual vision of the
world, but the road is more often than not tortuous and difficult―a
road populated by as many wrong turns and dead ends as highways
to learning.
The second problem that blocks the development of a more
coherent and wider-ranging program of professional military
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education has to do with the nature of the personnel systems and,
as suggested above, those are driven by laws that were designed
in the industrial age for industrial age organizations. If the Services
are to develop officers who possess greater intellectual agility and
flexibility, then professional military education should become
much more than an obligatory year of attendance at a staff college,
followed eventually by another year at a war college. Professional
military education must become a cultural attribute that the services
inculcate in their officers from the beginning of their career through
to the end.35
Moreover, serious professional military education must in
many, rather than a few cases, involve serious graduate level study
in the major graduate schools of the United States. It should involve
the study of military history, foreign languages, area studies, and
international relations. It must also involve professional reading lists
that officers take seriously.36 But few officers can afford to widen out
their careers at present by following such a career path because of
the iron laws of personnel systems and the myriad jobs officers must
hold in order to climb the ladder to higher ranks.
What Is to Be Done?
The most important element in improving professional military
education in order to create a more open and flexible military culture
demands a massive overhaul of the personnel systems, starting with
Title 10’s entire framework. Such an overhaul represents the only
possible path towards providing avenues of graduate education
that would stretch the intellectual framework of the best officers
throughout their careers. The task of addressing a reform of the
personnel systems, however, lies beyond the scope of this chapter.
There are, however, a number of things that the services could do
without such a reform that would substantially improve military
education and create climates within their organizations that would
be more conducive to the kind of transformation and innovations
that took place in the 1920s and 1930s.
To begin with, one should note that the current situation
of professional military education represents a considerable
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improvement over what existed in the 1980s.37 At that time only
the Naval War College possessed both the pretensions and the
academic excellence to be considered a first rate academic institution
of graduate education. The remainder of the landscape represented
an academic wasteland.38 The creation of second-year programs and
other programs have filled some of the gaps. Moreover, the reforms
initiated by Congressman “Ike” Skelton have had an impact in
improving the general level of military education. Unfortunately,
for the most part the system has atrophied over the past decade. So
what needs to be done?
First, the services and the joint world need to form a larger
vision, a basic philosophy if you will, of what professional military
education should represent in its contribution to the preparation of
American officers to the professional of arms. Admiral Stansfield
Turner, the reformer of the Naval War College in the early 1970s,
best expressed how to think about both the whats and the hows of
professional military education:
War Colleges are places to educate the senior officer corps in
the large military and strategic issues that confront America . . .
They should educate these officers by a demanding intellectual
curriculum to think in wider terms than their busy operational
careers have thus far demanded. Above all the war colleges
should broaden the intellectual horizons of the officers who
attend, so that they have a conception of the larger strategic and
operational issues that confront our military and our nation.39

What is needed at present is a basic philosophy of professional
military education that encompasses its purposes and aims for the
entire Department of Defense―not just in terms of the staff and war
colleges, but rather for career-long efforts by officers.
Second, the services need to select only the very best of their
officer to attend their staff colleges and war colleges. Such a process
of selection needs to involve much more than selection boards.
Rather the American military needs to follow what virtually every
military in the first-world is at present doing: a selection process
that involves an intellectual hurdle as well as selection boards. Such
a hurdle could involve examinations (which was the method used
to gain entrance to the Kriegsakademie in Germany), performance
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in a nonresident course, involving both examinations and papers,
performance in branch schools, or some combination of the above.
The aim would definitely not be to select pointy headed
intellectuals from the officer corps, but rather to select those officers,
who have managed to combine tactical and operational excellence
with intellectual curiosity in their careers. As Lieutenant General
Don Holder, U.S. Army retired, commented in an article written
jointly with the author: “Requiring officers to qualify for attendance
at the staff and war colleges would shock the officer corps at first,
then stimulate great improvement.”40 In every respect entrance to
staff and war colleges must become an attainment towards which
officers strive.
Third, the size of the institutions of professional military
education needs to be scaled down. Smaller institutions, with a
student body limited to the best and the brightest, would make it
far easier to assemble first class faculties. For the most part, the staff
and war colleges contain too many military faculty who are simply
riding out their time until retirement. Moreover, while there are a
considerable number of first-class, intellectually motivated officers
who would make wonderful teachers at staff and war colleges, there
are few incentives for them to remain on active duty. The Army War
College has recently begun to address this problem, by selecting a
small number of its best students to attend some of the nation’s best
graduate schools to earn doctorates in subjects like military history
and international relations. Those officers then return to the war
college to finish out the remainder of their careers on the faculty.
The fourth element of a reform of professional military
education would be that the academic performance of student
officers would play a direct role not only in their eventual
promotion, but in assignments as well. As in all other assignments,
officers would receive a regular fitness report on their performance
in school. That fitness report would not be limited to generalities,
but contain how the officer actually performed in the classroom, in
his written assignments, and in his examinations. It would remain
as a basic report card on his or her intellectual suitability for further
assignments and promotion. Would such a system result in a grade
grubbing?41 In some cases perhaps, but in fact virtually everything
else in an officers career is judged or graded by his superiors―why
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not his intellectual acuity?
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important enabler of transformation and
innovation in the past has been the culture of the military organizations
that have grappled with an uncertain and ambiguous future, a
future made more complex and difficult by tactical, operational, and
technological changes, the impact of which are almost impossible to
predict under peacetime condition.42 Yet, the evidence is clear that
those military institutions that developed organizational cultures
where serious learning, study, and intellectual honesty lay at heart
of preparation of officers for war, were those best prepared for the
challenges that they confronted on the battlefield.43 The example of
the American military in the 1920s and 1930s underlines this point
in spades. The example of an officer corps, where honest, intellectual
efforts to deal with intractable problems characterized many of its
officers and virtually all of those who led so well in the coming war,
should provide the American military of the 21st century with an
incentive to follow a similar path. An officer corps, where not only
learning but teaching in schools of professional military education is
career enhancing, is an officer corps that is preparing itself, at times
unconsciously, for the challenges of the future.
Transformation and innovation are not a matter of just
technology. At best technology can yield modernization, and it is
well to remember that in 1940 the French Army possessed tanks
that were for the most part far superior to those possessed by the
Werhrmacht. But with a doctrine that almost entirely misinterpreted
the lessons of the last war, the French suffered a catastrophic
military defeat on the banks of the Meuse in May 1940.44 And the
American military should not forget that its nation’s worst defeat
resulted largely from a military and civilian leadership that prized
modern technology over the lessons of the past; a leadership that
was not only contemptuous of the Vietnamese enemy, but largely
ignorant of his motivations, culture, and ideology. Thus, it was the
enemy of the United States, who was willing to “bear any burden,
pay any price,” and who understood his American enemy far more
coherently and effectively than Americans understood him. If the
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American military does not desire to repeat the mistakes of the
past, then it needs to create a learning culture, where intellectual
preparation is as prized as tactical preparation.
There is, of course, another road, down which it can choose to
go. The performance of America’s military institutions from 1991
to the recently completed war with Iraq represent the triumph of
a systematic approach to training and education that the services
put in place in the 1970s and early 1980s. And yet its very success
carries with it considerable dangers. At present the leadership of
the American military have grown up within the current system.
They know no other approach. Yet one can ascribe the results of the
present system to any number of other causes than the schoolhouses
that educate America’s officers. In the recent past, senior civilian
leaders have written memos suggesting that the services can replace
entirely in-residence schools with distance education, all at immense
savings in funding, personnel moves, and faculty salaries. There are
many among current senior military leaders who believe that serious
education is simply a waste of an officer’s time―an attitude the Navy
has enshrined in its complete disinterest in sending its officers to
schools of professional military education.45
The difficulty with any such dismissal of the educational system
of the past 30 years is that we will not know the results of a radical
wasting of the current system until it is too late. As one of the most
respected professors At the Army War College suggested in a recent
e-mail to the author:
Consider now, that even as the educational successes of the past
twenty-five years are on display, there are those who would
dismantle the Army’s educational programs in pursuit of shortterm economies of questionable worth based on unproved or
unfounded assertions. All across the Army there are initiatives
afoot to curtail time in school for all grades, officer and enlisted,
to save money and increase numbers of personnel out with the
fielded force. In place of the months and years in the school house
the Army seeks to leverage technology and supplant the resident
educational experience with distributed learning or distance
education. In this information age there is a belief that approaches
a theology that one can learn as much by sitting at a computer as
in a classroom. . . .
At risk in this exercise is the future.46
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“At risk in this exercise is the future.” But should we go down
such a road, it will be another generation that will bear the burden
and pay the price of a military leadership no longer possessing the
intellectual depth or wisdom to address intelligently the questions of
strategy and complex operations that the U.S. military will confront
two or three decades in the future.
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CHAPTER 2
BALANCING TYCHE:
NONLINEARITY AND JOINT OPERATIONS
Colonel Stuart A. Whitehead
Preparing for the future will require new ways of thinking,
and the development of forces and capabilities that can adapt
quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances. The
ability to adapt will be critical in a world defined by surprise and
uncertainty.
Donald H. Rumsfeld1
Secretary of Defense

The unforgettable events of September 11, 2001, awoke, once
again, a “sleeping giant.” In response to terrorist attacks, recent and
ongoing operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated effective
innovation against a complex, distributed, and adaptive enemy. But
as the war on terror continues, the enemy will respond to coalition
actions in unexpected ways. Unfortunately, the world of the terrorist
will never be one of isolation. State sponsors will continue to finance,
train, and resource non-state actors as their surrogates in pursuance
of national interests. As the United States and its allies confront such
states, the complexion of nations and possibly entire regions may
evolve in unforeseen directions. In anticipation of this prospect,
long-term U.S. success will lie in institutionalizing a culture that
values adaptation so that tomorrow’s creative solutions will not be
the exception, but rather the rule.2 The challenge facing the armed
forces of the United States is to develop an effective military doctrine
that meets their needs as well as the needs of government agencies
and multinational organizations. Such an effort represents a
significant departure from the past and encompasses a fundamental
change in the way the American military must think about war and
its prosecution.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that centuries of
linear thought have and continue to shape war fighting doctrine,
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despite the fact that nonlinearity is more reflective of the actual
nature of war. First described as “Tyche,” the personification of
fortune by Thucydides,3 more recently nonlinearity has become an
important paradigm for understanding warfare.4 By recognizing
and incorporating key aspects of nonlinear theory in a 21st century
American approach to warfare, the U.S. military can overcome many
of the theoretical limitations it currently faces in formulating Joint
doctrine.
The Nature of Paradigms.
Since the dawn of time, man has sought to understand the world
around him and his place within it. For Plato, man’s cognitive
world was always an approximation of a paradigm (a clear and
indisputable example, or standard against which to judge other
instances).5 But as Thomas Kuhn argued in his theory of scientific
progress, scientific knowledge is more than purely objective; it
rests on “’dominant paradigms,’ accepted theories that reflect and
uphold a certain viewpoint.”6 As an example, consider that Europe
in the Middle-Ages functioned according to an elaborate system,
linking natural phenomena to theology and government. That
system represented an earth-centered Ptolemaic taxonomy: precise,
observable, and wrong. Yet for centuries, it defined European man’s
universe and his role within it.
Like many systems of the past, Aristotelian physics and
cosmology reacted sensitively to seemingly minor inputs. Among
these stimuli were the ideas offered by the scientist Galileo Galilie in
his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems.7 Galileo observed
inconsistencies in the Ptolemaic universe, ones that reinforced
earlier observations by Johannes Kepler and Tycho Brahe. Through
personal genius and advances in technology, Galileo documented
nature through the use of a telescope. Thus, he advanced further the
argument of a heliocentric universe. In short, by moving the sun to
the center of the universe, he challenged over a thousand years of
Catholic dogma and irrevocably changed the relationship between
man, science, religion, and nature.8 As Kuhn would suggest, the
Ptolemaic system was the dominant paradigm. Nevertheless, while
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it represented a generally accepted explanation of things, it suffered
from observable anomalies. The strength of any paradigm rests in
its ability to overcome anomalies; as scientists began to question
the veracity of the Ptolemaic universe, the idea of a heliocentric
universe gained favor.9 Paradigms, however, do not give way easily,
especially when societal structure, sources of power, institutions of
learning, and professional careers rest on the propagation of their
precepts: enter what Kuhn coined, “the paradigm shift.” Once a
dominant paradigm becomes so overloaded with exceptions, forced
upon it by a growing number of observable anomalies, another
replaces it. It is during the unstable transition period, when the
old paradigm erodes against the onslaught of new thinking that
“revolutionary science” appears.10 Thus, the paradigm shift yields a
new Weltanschauung and the ability to explore new possibilities with
fresh thinking.11
In much the same way as Galileo sought to understand the
universe, militaries have devoted much effort to understanding
their particular environment: war. This is especially true in the wake
of the ultimate “paradigm shift,” defeat. In such circumstances,
having experienced first hand the fury of a new technology, tactics,
or operational art, defeated militaries typically conduct detailed
analysis of change.12 Carl von Clausewitz is perhaps the supreme
example of this phenomenon. His was an intellectual journey, born
of the Napoleonic throttling of Prussian forces at Jena-Auerstadt
and culminating in a theory of war unique to the literature of armed
conflict.13 By his example, through the study of history, generations
of military officers have sought to understand their profession; yet
many only manage to take from it superficial analysis, dogma, and
false conclusions.14 Why this has occurred is due in great measure to
the tools with which the legions of well-intended professionals were
equipped, namely their education, culture, and the contemporary
paradigm.15 Today, U.S. officers are no less challenged.
Linearity.
At an early age children learn, in geometry for example, that
the shortest distance between two points is a straight line. Linear
equations exhibit a character described by the conditions of
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proportionality and additivity. Proportionality means that changes in
the system’s input are proportional to its output. Additivity refers
to the idea that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts.16 Together
these concepts suggest that if one knows a line’s equation, one can
determine the exact value of each variable, as well as their proportion
to each other. More importantly, one can, therefore, accurately
predict the path of the line into the future. All of this assumes the
equation is free of external influence and that its elements are precise
and remain in isolation. From an analytical point of view, linearity
also means that one can understand “the whole” by an examination
of its parts. Much like the Ptolemaic Universe and Newtonian
Physics, the linear paradigm proved, and in many ways continues to
prove, valuable in both understanding and predicting phenomena.
Turning to the conduct of war, linearity is endemic to the
theory and prosecution of the American way of war. Beginning
with Henry Halleck’s translation of Jomini in 1846, generations of
American officers have studied the concepts of a theater of war,
base of operations, key and objective points, lines of operations,
and interior, exterior, concentric, and eccentric lines, among a host
of linear examples.17 As a consequence, such concepts have played
prominent roles in U.S. military history, whether in the Allied
campaigns in Europe, in DESERT STORM, or even today. Current
Joint doctrine, for example, reflects Jomini’s influence in its definition
of lines of operation: “Lines which define the directional orientation
of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect
the force with its base of operations and its objective.”18
Linearity’s attraction and durability in military affairs owes
much to its quantifiable nature and the fact that it is reasonably
precise and predictive of capability and outcome. When and where
anomalies occur, scientists usually attempt to find mathematical and
or technological solutions. Typically, the technological approach
focuses on gaining more accurate information about the enemy and
the operational environment. This approach was recently manifest
in the slogan, Lifting the Fog of War
War, in which one influential former
senior officer suggested a radical restructuring of the U.S. military
to take advantage of the potential of information technology.19
Mathematics, on the other hand, is a tool to predict outcomes more
accurately. For example, the integration of probability equations and
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sensitivity formulas has, to a degree, overcome the specter of the
inexplicable outcome. Leaders, then, are able to determine results
of automated wargames to within an acceptable margin of error. In
their respective spheres, both mathematics and technology attempt
to solve the “knowledge conundrum.” This is the idea that the failure
of the linear approach (that war is not predictable) results from the
lack of some key element of information.20 Without that information,
the system acts sensitively and unpredictably to its input. For this
reason, by the standards of linearity, the solution to overcoming
friction in war is access to better information, thereby improving
situational awareness.
With this in mind, modern operational design applies concepts
such as “systems” and “nodal analysis” to pursue improved
situational awareness. In practice, however, the attempt often
reflects merely a refinement of the linear approach.21 Systems
theory strives to understand the structure of an opponent through
an analysis of its parts. Colonel John Warden’s “Five Ring Model,”
as an example, reflects such an approach. Acknowledging that
each situation exhibits potentially different vulnerabilities, Warden
ascribes five basic centers of gravity or (rings of vulnerability) that
are “absolutely critical to the functioning of the state.”22 The rings
include the fielded military, the population, the infrastructure,
organic essentials, and leadership. In prosecuting a campaign the
goal is to apply actions against the mind of the enemy command
or the system as a whole.23 Thus, action may occur directly against
the enemy leadership, or take a more indirect approach, chipping
away at weaker points until the path of least resistance leads to the
collapse of a major vulnerability.
In the best of circumstances “parallel attack” leverages the model
by preventing the enemy from responding effectively to multiple,
simultaneous attacks. However, much like a linear equation, his
concept implies both an external and internal structural immutability
and isolation. That means the operational design selected before
the start of a campaign can actually capture reality. “The trick,” as
Michael Howard observed, “is not to get it too wrong.”24 Regardless,
such an approach requires extremely detailed and accurate prior
knowledge and situational awareness of the entire structure and its
parts. It also requires confidence that the selected course of action is
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in fact correct and will remain applicable until the conclusion of the
campaign. Most importantly, the Five Ring Model assumes that the
enemy is incapable of significant change throughout the duration of
a conflict. It is perhaps with such assurances in mind that an ancient
Sufi text cautions, “You think because you understand one you must
understand two, because one and one makes two. But you must also
understand and.”25
Nonlinearity.
In war games, as in combat, seemingly insignificant events
can have unanticipated and serious consequences; thus, “for
want of a nail,” a wholly disproportional outcome can ensue. The
theory of nonlinearity reflects reality. It disregards the qualities of
proportionality and additivity, in that resulting outcomes may be
erratic.26 More to the point, disproportionally small or large outputs,
relative to the inputs, flies in the face of the Western philosophical
tradition, which postulates that truth resides in the simple, rather
than in the complex.27 But as Mark Twain said, “For every complex
problem there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong.”28
As a concept, nonlinearity describes the world as it is, with its
inherent complexities, rather than confining its perspective to the
proportionally small, but quantifiable portions of existence.
By modern characterization, nonlinearity falls under the rubric
of “new sciences” (including quantum physics and chaos theory).29
All that not withstanding, Clausewitz was one of the first to capture
many of the essential aspects on nonlinearity. As Alan Beyerchen
has observed: “Interconnectedness and context, interaction, chance,
complexity, indistinct boundaries, feedback effects and so on, all
leading to analytical unpredictability―it is no wonder that On War
has confused and disappointed those looking for a theory of war
modeled on the success of Newtonian mechanics.”30 Clausewitz
understood that attempting to achieve exact analytical solutions
was impossible given war’s nature. Therefore, the ability to predict
accurately the course or result of any particular conflict is severely
limited.
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Sensitivity.
Only since the advent of computers have scientists succeeded in
physically demonstrating what Clausewitz attempted to capture in
On War. By attacking nonlinear problems numerically, computers
have also highlighted patterns of instability. For example, in “chaos
theory,” chaos results when a system is both nonlinear and sensitive
to initial conditions. In such a case immeasurably small differences in
input produce surprisingly different outcomes for the system and to
a degree of complexity that exhibits characteristics of randomness.31
However, over time systems can exhibit at least three outcomes: they
can eventually settle to some single state and remain there despite
further iterations (long term stability); they can settle on a series of
states, through which they cycle endlessly (periodic behavior); or
wander aimlessly or unpredictably (so-called “chaotic” behavior).32
This third state illustrates dramatically what some scientists have
termed, a “strange attractor,” demonstrating that perhaps there is
indeed a pattern to “chaotic” behavior.33
Military history possesses numerous examples of such behavior,
ranging from institutional inertia and entrenchment to an enthusiastic
commitment toward radically new thinking. In 1870, for example,
despite their best intentions, the French failed to employ properly
a form of early machine gun they had developed in the FrancoPrussian war. This error, combined with both a flawed command
and control system and doctrine, resulted in French defeat at the
hands of the North German Confederation.34 After World War I,
the British Army’s leadership, wishing to present their performance
in the most favorable light, suppressed and distorted analytical
conclusions concerning that conflict, while institutionalizing an antiintellectual culture.35 Conversely, in an environment of technological
parity, theoretical developments, accompanied by modest resource
investment and innovative doctrine, allowed the Germans to achieve
extraordinary results through Blitzkrieg.36 The nonlinear aspect of
war offers the prospect of a variety of outcomes, not necessarily
apparent in the period preceding conflict. The key, however, is
to recognize and positively exploit such potentialities before they
become the tools of an opponent.
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Role of Variables.
Within a nonlinear system, it is not possible to isolate variables
effectively from each other or from their context. Thus, not only do
truly dynamic interactions ensue within the system, but they are a
defining characteristic.37 Unlike the cause and effect characteristics
of linearity, nonlinearity embodies a more holistic universe, in
which one must view elements not only as a whole but within the
context of each other. Just as the human body consists of complex
groups of interdependent systems (nervous, respiratory, muscular,
digestive, endocrine, skeletal, urinary, reproductive, integumentary,
and circulatory), a break down of a critical organ can have a
disastrous effect on the body as a whole. Thus, a human can die as
easily from improper field sanitation as from a projectile. From a
broader military perspective, the same is true of the many essential
and interrelated subsystems that contribute to combat capability:
intelligence, command and control, air defense, combat power (land,
air, and sea), and sustainment, among others. A failure in any one
key area could spell disaster for the entire system. Knowing what
is vital and how to seek protection, while exploiting an enemy’s
vulnerability, is a basic factor to success.38 The degree that one can
achieve destruction against an opponent with an economy of force
represents nonlinearity in action.
Interaction.
Clausewitz observed that, “War is never an isolated act.”39 As
a phenomenon, it represents the interaction of antagonists played
out within the realm of temporal dynamism. Consequently,
understanding war requires an understanding of the nature of
interaction. On War captures the interactive nature of war by way of
three increasingly sophisticated definitions: First, “the duel . . . an act
of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” In this metaphor war is
not just each opponent’s sequence of intentions and actions, but the
pattern generated by their mutual interaction. Moreover, Clausewitz
contends that actual war never occurs without a context and that its
results are never absolutely final. By context he means the unique
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political and cultural situation that surrounds a given war. As an
example, he uses the nonlinear image of combustion to exemplify
how a simple quarrel can have a disproportionate effect―a real
explosion (such as the wars of the French Revolution).40 That wars
are never final refers to the fact that at its conclusion (if not before),
war has an effect. It will generate an outcome, perhaps even one
that is unintended, and this will feed back into the political context.
Wars, therefore, are inseparable from their context, which is always
characterized by feedback.
Second, “war is merely the continuation of policy by other
means.”41 Here Clausewitz attempts to capture the continuously
changing aspect of war, one that he describes as being a true
chameleon that exhibits a different nature in every concrete instance.
In other words the ends-means relationship does not always work
in a linear fashion. The constant interplay is an interactive feedback
process wherein war’s character changes continually and from that
process, other outcomes flow.42
Finally, in his third definition Clausewitz introduces the famous
model of the trinity (violence, hatred, and chance manifested as
people, government, and army) explained through the use of a
scientific metaphor: a magnetic pendulum suspended between
three powerful magnets. Not readily apparent in reading On War
is the physical result of the experiment and hence its true heuristic
value. When one releases a pendulum in such a case, it darts about
in a seemingly random fashion, sometimes kicking out hard enough
to continue swinging in a long and intricate pattern. One can never
repeat the pattern, however, because man is physically incapable of
replicating the experiment with exact precision. In effect, Clausewitz
uses this physical phenomenon to describe the modern concept of
chaos theory, pointing to the difference between pure theory (with
exact measurements) and the real world (filled with friction). The
power of this example lies in the idea that the trinity is not made up
of three passive points, but three interactive points that simultaneously
pull war in different directions, forming a complex interaction each
with the others.43 It is not possible to isolate the points from either
their context or chance; hence both complexity and probability
characterize the movements.
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Moving from a scientific to a philosophical example, the idea of
interaction is rooted in the ideas of two British philosophers. George
Berkeley and David Hume believed that man did not passively
observe and absorb knowledge; rather, by the process of observation,
man creates knowledge and molds the world through his own
consciousness.44 This idea has found an echo in the contemporary
words of physicist John Archibald Wheeler, whose perspective
is one of a participative universe “where the act of looking for
certain information evokes the information we went looking for―
and simultaneously eliminates our opportunity to observe other
information . . . [This is] a participatory process, where we create not
only the present with our observations, but the past as well.”45 For
example, the purpose of a command post is to acquire and transmit
information. In particular, staff members within a command post
look for certain elements of information: an enemy signature unit,
an enemy action, status of unit and so on. Therefore, when engaged
in finding out particular information they are, by omission, not
looking for other indicators. In the process of acquiring and omitting
information, the command post creates its own reality. To the degree
that its reality reflects truth, it will be less susceptible to the forces
of friction. This phenomenon is an embedded aspect of nonlinearity,
in that dynamic interaction is itself the catalyst for change. How
interaction occurs, or is prevented from occurring as foreseen
(through friction or chance), is the understanding (feedback) needed
for situational awareness.
Causality and Energy.
Power and causality, as Hume cautions, is dependent upon
knowledge, or “the relation of ideas in our minds.” Clausewitz
addressed the notion of causality in attempting to answer the ageold question of whether war was an art or a science. His reply was
that it is neither. “In war, the will is directed to an animate object that
reacts.”46 This idea springs from Hume’s investigation of causality
and its association with power. His conclusion was that only the mind
is the true active substance. Material substance is merely passive and
inert. Hume suggests that only through experience can one discover
facts; in some cases investigation yields understanding. Important
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to this idea is the temporal nature concerning the truth of facts: what
may be true today may not be true tomorrow. Science is not all a
priori, Hume contends; rather, even causality exhibits randomness.
This notion is found today in the expression, “The truth changes,” or
as Clausewitz argues, it is the very nature of human interaction itself
that makes war unpredictable.47
Another frequently cited metaphor used to describe the
unpredictable nature of causality involves the science of
thermodynamics (the physics of the relationship between heat and
other forms of energy).48 In the Second Law of Thermodynamics
(“the condition of a system in which the resultant of all acting
forces is zero”) friction is the nonlinear feedback that leads to heat
dissipation of energy in a system “a form of increasing degradation
toward randomness, the essence of entropy.”49 To monitor friction,
scientists develop negative feedback mechanisms which signal when
the system veers from its established course. This approach is useful
in maintaining the status quo. If the environment changes while
the system remains constant; however, the system over time may
continue to function as desired, but it may also become irrelevant.
A more holistic approach takes advantage of positive or
amplifying feedback. Rather than signaling a deviation in the system,
amplifying feedback triggers a signal upon detecting changes in the
environment. Thus, rather than adjusting the system to maintain
its designated function or direction, positive feedback triggers the
need to change the system in an effort to respond to changes in the
environment. At a basic level these distinctions appear in the military
adage of “fighting the enemy, not the plan.” Negative feedback
signals when a plan is going astray. Positive feedback, on the other
hand, identifies changes in the battlefield that may generate new
dangers or new possibilities. In combat, both types of feedback are
necessary precursors to effective, adaptive behavior.
Taking the example of causality in combat a step further,
consider that battlefield interaction takes many forms. One of the
most fundamental relationships is between offensive and defensive
operations. Herein, as Clausewitz demonstrated, lies a paradoxical
relationship, highlighted by the concept of culmination. Specifically,
the further a force prosecutes the offense, the weaker it becomes.
Once the offensive force culminates, it reverts to the defensive
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and becomes paradoxically stronger against counterattack. In a
thermodynamic sense, active energy is exchanged for potential
energy. Thus, when viewed as a system, a military force in combat
defies equilibrium; it is typically either gaining or losing strength.
Given that the preservation of one’s own force while achieving the
destruction of the opponent’s defines the acme of success, military
force tends to respond as a “self-organizing system.”50 That means
that throughout the dynamism of combat, successful military forces
continually take stock of their interaction within the environment. By
modifying their “ways” in order to increase their strength relative to
their opponent’s and by adjusting those areas requiring protection,
as the situation changes, they are able to exploit opportunities
and avoid culmination. Above all, the continuous assessment of
capability against that of the enemy yields an understanding of the
possible within the realm of chance.
Chance.
It is the realm of chance that offers the strongest contemporary
argument for embracing nonlinearity. There are three possible
manifestations of chance: “random phenomenon, the amplification
of a micro-cause, or a function of analytical blindness.”51 Clausewitz
addressed the first two manifestations using the metaphor of a
game of cards. In that game, random phenomenon results from
initial inputs and the impossibility of knowing with any certainty
the ultimate outcome. The fact that the game does not always react
in a wholly unpredictable manner is the phenomenon that has
historically strengthened the argument of those who would view war
as a science rather than an art. In more recent times, mathematicians
have used equations of probability to capture chance, particularly
in the areas of computer modeling. Nevertheless, as one scholar has
pointed out, even computer programming has difficulty replicating
incompetence.52 Perhaps a less damning, but equally salient
perspective is the idea of prosecuting a bankrupt strategy―where
the misapplication of overwhelming resources, as Harry Summers
demonstrated, simply fails to accomplish desired ends. 53 As to
the second manifestation, by recognizing that a slight cause can
determine a considerable effect, Clausewitz captures the idea of
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amplification.54 This is the basis of nonlinearity.
Regarding the final characterization of analytical blindness,
mathematician Henri Poincare warns, that “weakness forbids us
from considering the entire universe.”55 As a consequence, there is
a natural tendency to divide the problem and address the pieces
singularly. This of course is reflective of a linear approach to war
and negates the linkages endemic to any system. For example, even
when applying new ideas for prosecuting war at the strategic level
in Warden’s Five Ring Model, the fourth ring (population) can be
the least susceptible to direct attack; yet paradoxically it is often the
most important consideration.
Regardless of which manifestation chance assumes, the goal is
not simply to identify it, but rather to understand it. To overcome
chance, then, intelligence, combined with education and training,
is necessary to comprehend what one sees. The better one side
understands an adversary, the less susceptible that side will be to
uncertainty. Nevertheless, no matter how much effort a military
organization applies to the collection of intelligence, it is simply
impossible to know all there is about an environment, or, perhaps
more importantly, accurately predict the impact of interaction
within it.56
Change.
War is an open system, and one cannot isolate it from its
environment. At the most basic level, armies recognize this fact.
Commanders attempt to evaluate their capability against that of
their enemy to ascertain, if they are winning. Headquarters of all
types are replete with status charts and environmental assessments,
describing the status of friendly and enemy unit strengths and
dispositions. Even as “digitization” brings to command posts the
possibility of more accurate and timely information, however, the
outcome is generally just the automation of manual, linear processes.
This is important in so far that determining combat power is the
physical result of battlefield interaction. More critical, however, are
the collective responses to combat and the questions they generate.
How have the antagonists changed? How has the nature of the war
changed? What are the implications? These questions are not so
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easily (or often quickly) answered and are only exacerbated by the
nature of high tempo operations, in which windows of opportunity
open and shut rapidly, often with little warning.
A further complexity at the strategic level is the fact that all the
elements of national power bear on a conflict. How to recognize the
effect of ongoing diplomacy during combat, for example, is germane
to understanding both changes in the political climate, as well as
military effectiveness. If the political nature of the conflict changes,
chances are the military approach must also change. However, war is
not the sole domain of the ever changing chameleon. More apparent
is the “shape shifting” nature endemic to military operations other
than war, as operations move from peace enforcement, to peace
building and peace keeping, or reversion to any previous state in
the spectrum of operations. The more players involved, the more
complicated the environment. What is essential, regardless of the
nature of the operation, is that as leaders attempt to understand the
nature of their conflict, they cannot simply divide responsibilities
into discrete, “manageable pieces.” The pieces still react to each
other and as they do, they shape the nature of the environment.
The Soviet Sponsored Paradigm Shift.
A nonlinear approach addresses war holistically. By imagining
possible outcomes and the sensitivity of the system, it is possible
to design both positive and negative feedback loops that permit
the system to deal with friction, or self organize in response to
environmental change. Feedback loops account for the interaction
of the component subsystems and with respect to external agents. In
practice, this approach can appear radical rather than evolutionary;
however, history suggests that it is achievable and effective.57
Arguably the single best example of a nonlinear, holistic attempt
to understand a future war fighting environment occurred in the
Soviet Union immediately following World War I. That country’s
ambitious efforts to examine the nature of war by way of a systems
approach and project the implications of its research into force
design, stands as a model of applied theory.58 What is more, the
Soviet “new thinking” still contributes greatly to an understanding
of the possibilities offered by embracing nonlinearity. From the
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onset, the Soviets applied a nonlinear template to their analysis. At
its heart was the idea of neutralizing an enemy system’s ability to
attain its goals. This provided the abstract, yet logical, framework for
a ground breaking approach toward operational maneuver.59
When committed to paper, the concept of operational maneuver
included three major parts: fragmentation, simultaneity, and
momentum. First, the “fragmenting strike” was a penetrating
column created from succeeding echelons. Each echelon had a
specific function: break in, break through, break out, and advance to
an operational depth.60 The aim of deep penetration was to achieve
a center of gravity, which would provide a position of advantage
when reverting to the defense. Once again Clausewitz’ thoughts on
the nature of culmination ring true:
Far from being idle sophistry, we consider it to be the greatest
disadvantage of the attack that one is eventually left in the most
awkward defensive position.…This is why the great majority of
generals will prefer to stop well short of their objective rather than
risk approaching it too closely, and why those with high courage
and an enterprising spirit will often overshoot it and so fail to
attain their purpose. Only the man who can achieve great results
with limited means has really hit the mark.61

The “fragmenting strike” serves two purposes. In the form of a
“dividing strike” it can sever an operational entity from its broader
strategic complex; this included isolation from the environmental
context, or the isolation of a subsystem from the super-system. As
a “sundering strike” the goal is to separate the operational system
into discrete compact tactical segments, then isolate, encircle, and
destroy those segments.62
The second aspect of operational maneuver involved
“simultaneity,” which Soviet theoreticians believed could yield
synergy. The holding actions of a frontal echelon, combined with
an air-mechanized desant echelon (operating at the extreme end of
the operational depth) and a mobile maneuvering echelon, would
achieve the effect.63 By operating in the areas behind the enemy’s front
lines and achieving success in depth, the Soviets expected to achieve
enemy paralysis. Imbedded in the idea of achieving synergy were
three design features: tactical synthesis (the creation of combined
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arms units to overcome battlefield complexity), synchronization
(achieved through a common consciousness shared by commanders
of all echelons), and finally, coordination (communications, briefings,
and counsels focused on achieving the linear aspects of interaction).64
The importance of this architecture is that the Soviets designed a
concept that addressed both the linear and nonlinear aspects of war.
By forming combined arms teams, the Soviets also created a “fractal
structure” that was adaptive to the changing nature of combat. The
idea of a shared consciousness responded to the cybernetic aspects
of interaction by way of feedback. Lastly, coordination design
acknowledged that linear processes were still very much within
the nature of war and required attention, albeit within the greater
environmental context.
The third aspect of operational maneuver was momentum. It
rested on a concept of velocity, articulated in terms of depth, time
and mass, and relation to striking power, which one produced
by attacking the system at every point in time in the course of the
operation.65 Much like synergy, momentum comprised four design
elements, captured by the expression “tempo of the operational
advance”: depth (provided the special setting for the operation),
resistance (represented attrition and affected momentum directly
through slowing of velocity or reducing mass), mass (achieved
through the echeloned structure that ensured the succession of strike
and increased the pace of operations), and operational mobility
(the key to preserving striking mass, defined by tactical velocity,
logistical support and successive operations).66 From a nonlinear
perspective, momentum helped to overcome the sensitivity of the
enemy system. By adopting an offensive approach that achieved
paralysis quickly and in depth, momentum prevented the enemy
system from mutating. Simply put, one denied the opposing system
time to respond to the attacker’s interaction. To the extent that
one side could affect multiple subsystems simultaneously and in
depth, that side could also achieve paralysis all the faster. Once
again, however, the Soviets did not turn their backs on linearity.
“Resistance” acknowledged the interaction of the offense and
defense, as well as their potentially linear paradox: culmination.
Similarly, the recognition of logistical support and successive
operations suggested the need for sequential operations.
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Allied to all of this was an innovative approach to command
and control as an integral part of operational maneuver. The Soviets
addressed command and control by recognizing that attrition and
randomness were the principle factors that determined the character
of the tactical level.67 Thus, they believed, they could overcome
friction through execution of battle drill: simple, immediate, and
effective responses, implemented by the tactical decisionmaker.
Command and control at higher levels included an approach
comprising the designation of the operational aim, immediate
mission, and subsequent mission. This was an attempt to galvanize
the striking echelon’s unity of effort and in some respects served
as a “mission type order.” Nevertheless, despite this admittedly
scientific approach, the principal quality required from a Soviet
operational director was still creativity; and the setting of command
and control systems at the Army and Front levels called for planned
improvisation.68 So, it was that the Soviets clearly articulated both
the type of decision making required at each major echelon and the
necessity to transmit and translate instructions between echelons.
Finally, the Soviets did not limit their overall approach merely to
paralysis. They expected the strike echelon to “encircle” and destroy
components of the enemy defense.69 As an example, the isolation
and destruction of the enemy’s air defense system augmented
dislocation and facilitated airborne operations, thus exploiting the
connectivity between subsystems. The nonlinear implications of
this idea suggest that, while non-lethal or precision strikes may
achieve an asymmetrical result, those same efforts may also require
destruction to yield the complete psychological, morale breaking, if
not incapacitating effect at the highest levels.
Nonlinear Implications for Joint Doctrine.
One can trace the American approach to jointness at least as
far back as Winfield Scott’s sea and land operations in the Mexican
War.70 However, cooperation not command was the order of the day.
Even the U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II, at best, coordinated
its efforts with ground maneuver.71 Taken to the extreme, U.S. Air
Force operations in Vietnam occurred not under the control of a Joint
Force Air Component Command (JFACC), but were rather divided
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by a convoluted “Route Package” system which separated control
between Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).72 All of this should
not be surprising. From a purely spatial dimension perspective,
the laws of physics and limitations of weapon systems historically
prevented services from interfacing except on the margins. Only in
recent years, notably during Operation DESERT STORM, has the
convergence of technologies yielded a more coherent meshing of
service areas of operations into a truly Joint Theater of Operations.
Like it or not, U.S. military history is one of compartmentalized
excellence, marked today by the world’s premier Army, Navy,
Air Force and Marine Corps. However, outright merger is not an
answer. Unlike the Ford Motor Company, which from 1958 to 1960
attempted to combine the best design qualities of several popular
cars into a distinctively new model, the United States Department of
Defense cannot afford to create a “Joint Edsel.”
Current Joint doctrine describes Joint warfare as “team
warfare.”73 Like most metaphors, the term “team” can be misleading.
In war, unlike sports, only the victor can enforce the rules, while a
true genius makes his own. Likewise, in today’s vernacular the word
“team” can represent a collection of specialists working together.
While this may translate easily into a vision of a multi-service
organization working with a unity of effort under the direction of
a visionary coach, it is in the end a linear approach to warfare, one
not up to the demands of the future. From a physical standpoint the
dictionary describes the word Joint as “the configuration by which
two or more things are joined.”74 But is a collection of disparate
organizations bound together to achieve a common purpose the
type of force needed for the future? Perhaps more importantly, is
U.S. Joint doctrine sufficiently strong, yet elastic enough to ensure
both unified and flexible operational employment?
The answer to both questions will remain negative as long
as current Joint doctrine reflects a pedestrian understanding of
nonlinearity. By limiting the comparison of linearity and nonlinearity
to the confines of geography, Joint doctrine fails to capture a holistic
approach to warfare, one of dynamic interaction between systems
and subsystems. Instead, Joint Publication 3-0 describes nonlinear
operations in simplistic and misleading terms as an objective
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oriented approach, prosecuted simultaneously along multiple lines
of operations from selected basis.75 Jomini’s influence lives on!
Theory and Strategy―The Clausewitzian Litmus.
Few strategists view the theory of war in the same fashion;
perhaps it is due to the nature of the subject. From a broad U.S.
perspective, thoughts about war are largely borrowed, sometimes
plagiarized, from European sources. Theoretical sound bites of past
masters sprinkle across the pages of U.S. doctrinal publications;
some ideas are transient, others abide. Clausewitz appears to have
the greatest impact on current doctrine, perhaps because he wrote in
the general rather than the specific, or because his work continues
to be freshly interpreted. What is comfortable about Clausewitz is
that his ideas appear to fit Americans like a glove. The supremacy of
political authority over the military, the will of the people, and quick,
decisive battle reflect not only U.S. society, but how the American
people like to fight. Yet, Clausewitz also clearly underlined the role
of nonlinearity in the doctrinal approach to warfare. In this regard,
there are three fundamental lessons to be learned from the Prussian
philosopher and nonlinearity: first: theory should avoid prescriptive
doctrine - leaders must develop intuition; second: every military
act will have political consequences―one cannot isolate variables;
and lastly, adherence to unchanging principles is dangerous―what
matters is adaptability.76
Taken as a whole, there has been a mixed American reaction
to Clausewitz’s nonlinear doctrinal lessons. Few would accuse the
United States of being dogmatic in the application of Joint doctrine,
perhaps because that doctrine is the result of interservice compromise
and therefore by its very nature nonprescriptive. Conversely, to the
degree that U.S. forces continue to train under realistic conditions,
combat leaders develop intuition. But this is primarily at the tactical
level. As to the political consequences of military operations, Joint
doctrine does articulate the process of developing strategy and
recognizes that nations fight wars for political goals. But it falls short
of recognizing the political consequences of military operations.77
And with respect to unchanging principles, the one thread of
continuity that does run through Joint and Service doctrine is that
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of the “principles of war.” Although a recent addition to some
services’ lexicon, they serve as “the enduring bedrock of US military
doctrine,” the principles that “guide warfighting at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels.”78 This is assuredly more than
Clausewitz had in mind, since he viewed principles as useful in
the study, not prosecution of war. As for their applicability from
tactical to strategic levels, the current doctrine falls far short of
applying Clausewitz’s lessons of nonlinearity. Joint Publication 3-0,
for example states that “[t]he purpose of maneuver is to place the
enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application
of combat power.”79 Such a positional, kinetic approach may well
apply at the tactical level; but it does little justice to the nonlinear
aspects of seeking influence at the strategic level.
Incorporating the lessons of nonlinearity into the current Joint
doctrine does not represent an easy task. Colin Gray argues that
war is by its very nature complex and therefore offers complex
solutions. He suggests that there are (at least) seventeen dimensions
of strategy. More importantly he argues that these are merely
“distinctive dimensions of a whole entity…each influences the
other.”80 He then groups the seventeen under three headings:
people and politics, preparation for war, and war proper, a holistic
approach that in many ways shares portions of Warden’s Five Ring
assessment. But Gray’s approach goes well beyond the linearity of
Warden’s concept, emphasizing instead that war is a human activity
and can therefore be input sensitive. Strategy is eternal because it
reflects human nature; likewise, perception of the past as much
as the facts themselves shape the lessons of historical experience.
This is a significant argument because the consideration of human
interaction quickly moves the dimensions of strategy beyond the
physicality of linear warfare, to the sensory, intuitive, cognitive,
cultural, and the metaphysical that plays such an important role in
the nonlinear approach. Suddenly the nature of conflict appears far
more abstract, than the predominately physical, linear character of
Warden’s model.
Sensitivity, Variables, and Interaction.
Since nonlinearity represents recognition of the holistic nature of
war, a corresponding American approach to Joint doctrine should
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focus on interaction, rather than simply cause and effect. Future
war may be distributed, nodal, and geographically isolated. It may
just as well be asymmetrical, socially imbedded, and motivated
by abstract religious or political doctrine. It is not possible from a
nonlinear perspective to separate these variables from each other or
from their context. Above all, nonlinearity captures a system’s (or
strategy’s) outcome in response to inputs. Even small differences
in these inputs can produce entirely different outcomes, some even
approaching randomness, for the system. For example, if the United
States adopts a strategy of forward presence punctuated by power
projection, its strategists might well remember that it is, in the end,
an offensive doctrine prosecuted in someone else’s back yard.
A possible counter to such an approach, as an example, is
found in the American Revolution, where the British fought in the
southern colonies against a partisan force led by Nathaniel Greene.
That conflict was first and foremost a mismatch of objectives. On the
British side was the limited objective of achieving stability in North
America. From the colonial perspective, completely eliminating
British power in the colonies was their unlimited objective.81 The
British, seeking sympathetic colonists, moved their operations to
the south and applied a system of outposts whereby they defended
key “nodes.”82 Meanwhile, patrols secured the countryside, often
in a heavy handed manner. Backed by an unmatched fleet, British
forces could deploy flexibly in response to threats. Moreover, they
could chose the time and place of their assault and lines of operation.
When regular Continental forces deployed to assist Greene, the
British defeated them handily. However, what the British could
not do was create a safe and secure environment for sympathetic
colonists or, for that matter, themselves.83 Over time, British forces
simply exhausted themselves from pursuing a partisan force that
avoided battle, unless to the patriots’ advantage.
The power of this vignette is that, although the British believed
they possessed freedom of action, secure bases, the capability to
mount simultaneous operations and both better command and
control and sustainment than the patriots, they failed to assess
accurately the nature of their interaction. British reprisals inflamed
the populace and eroded support for the crown, achieving just the

45

opposite effect from the example of security for which they had
hoped. Their chosen “system” was sensitive to the act of reprisals
and generated an unexpected outcome. Moreover, as the nature
of the war changed, they failed to adapt to the new environment.
The British, while appearing nonlinear, were in point of fact, just
the opposite. Nonlinearity therefore is more than simply a spatial
or temporal approach to war; it is holistic in the purest sense of the
word. It captures the idea of cognition, in many ways, as Clausewitz
described understanding the nature of the war.
Turning to strategy as a system, the British naval strategist Julian
Corbett defined it as “the art of directing force to the ends in view.”
He also defined the ends by their object: “Major Strategy, dealing
with ulterior objects: Minor Strategy, with primary objects.”84 While
admittedly current U.S. doctrine captures these ideas as “strategy”
and “operational art,” the significance of this approach lies in the
recognition that Major Strategy deals with the “whole resources of
the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship. It regards the
Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together; they
are instruments of war.”85 Corbett’s perspective was that achieving
a common understanding of a theory of war drives one to become
a single force. In other words education leads one to common
conclusion, and obviates the need for such externally driven
mandates as the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
This is not to suggest that America’s future envisions a single
military service as in Canada, but it is also more than simply the
lashing together of a guild of services while proclaiming unity.
Such action would serve no more purpose than covering the
services in a doctrinal fig leaf. Underneath they would remain
theoretically naked and alone, arguably as they have always been.
The implication of embracing a holistic theory is that a top down
understanding of interaction of inter and intra service relationships
will ultimately yield a broader, more flexible approach to warfare,
one that includes a unity of effort among all elements of national
power. The Joint approach must apply a “common grammar,” but
remain creative in its dialogue. For the United States, the time has
come to develop a theory of war for a new age and with it, a common
“Joint” grammar.
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Feedback, Change, and Causality.
Attempting to design a Joint doctrine that incorporates the ideas
associated with nonlinearity involves as complete an understanding
of the nature of war as is humanly possible. As Gray asserts, it
is a complex business. Nevertheless, identifying all the possible
dimensions (though situationally dependent) is the first step toward
addressing how the dimensions interact. Next, having identified the
dimensions, the construction and position of positive and negative
feedback loops would provide continual information at all levels
of war throughout the continuum of the conflict. Such a nonlinear
approach is essential because of the need to continually “sample”
information to determine the nature of interaction between each
strategic dimension and across the system as a whole. This is
especially important in attempting to overcome friction, since
the ability to recognize the nature and possible impact of that
phenomenon, and modify operations and future plans accordingly,
is essential to both relevance and success.
Feedback, as a process, means identifying intelligence
requirements that are more than simply linked to decision points.
They must be dimensionally evaluative. As the nature of the conflict
changes, the goal must be to recognize change and then foresee its
possible permutations across relevant strategic dimensions. This
may take time and run counter to the presumed nature of “Rapid
Decisive Operations.” Given the variety of dimensions, their often
nonmilitary nature and the complexity of dimensional interaction,
the sources of information must be broad. Lateral dialogue
between services, mediums, agencies, and allies, will be essential to
situational awareness and environmental understanding. There is,
of course, the potential for friction in such a complex methodology;
but friction, as Clausewitz long ago pointed out, is a fact of life in any
approach to war. More importantly, the relatively small frictional
advantage provided by nonlinear feedback can have enormous
outcomes in combat. But any advantage relies, in particular, on
the constraints imposed by human physical and cognitive limits,
particularly those dealing with informational uncertainties and
unpredictable differences resulting from spatially and temporally
dispersed information and most importantly, from the innate
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structural nonlinearity of the combat process.86
From a structural perspective, then, a nonlinear approach to war
will yield more than simply the superficial integration of services.
Developing a common theory of war, from which service strategies
evolve, is the first step of what will arguably be a long term process.
Current Joint doctrine is one of compromise and committee work:
a collection of principles, fundamentals, tenants, values, and
considerations that obfuscate the purpose of achieving shared
belief. Joint doctrine requires a common, not parallel, exploration of
future war, in which a “single force” seeks the capability to attack
the physical, mental and moral aspects of an opponent, in pursuit
of clearly articulated policy objectives. Although each service
contains the resident expertise to operate and dominate a particular
dimension, technology (if not theory) is driving the services
increasingly to share the battle space. The future debate of roles
and missions is long over- due, but will be futile without a common
understanding of war, the essence of Joint doctrine.
Human beings will always reach a limit of cognitive capability.
To the extent that a new generation of leaders is more attuned to
the dynamic, interactive nonlinear nature of war, the more likely it
will be both mentally creative and adaptable. Nevertheless, limits
in individual ability, experience, and training will always induce
friction in the force. That the military may have to cooperate with
other agencies or allies in the future will only further limit the
shared corporate consciousness. Distributed spatial and temporal
operations will only further exacerbate the friction induced by
differences in comprehension and capability. That is the nature
of the world. To the extent that U.S. forces can recognize such
challenges, develop an awareness of potential sources of friction,
and monitor the interaction of systems within the environment, the
Joint force will ultimately become a more adaptive, effective, and
durable organization.
Conclusion.
Centuries of linear thought continue to influence U.S. military
doctrine, education, and culture. Nonlinearity offers the American
armed forces the opportunity to reconsider how to fight, how to
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organize, and most importantly how to think about the challenges of
future war. The Soviets, faced with perceived threats and a changing
world nearly a century ago, embarked on a course which propelled
them to the forefront of innovative theory, manifest as doctrine,
structure, education, and procurement. Their journey was replete
with controversy, clashes of professional ego, and intense political
dialogue. Ultimately, Stalin suppressed these ideas through purge,
only to resurrect them again in the face of Blitzkrieg. Today, developing
a holistic theory that captures the contemporary environment, with
all its inherent complexities, will not be easy, but it is just as possible.
Embracing new thinking offered by nonlinearity, while continuing
to incorporate the “tried and true” will potentially change the entire
U.S. military culture, from training and education, doctrine and
equipment, to interagency and multi-national cooperation. But as
Colin Gray warns, “Change in form is ever confused with change in
kind. Possible revolutions in the character of warfare are mistaken
for revolutions in the nature of, or even from, warfare.”87
The concept of nonlinearity involves more than geometry; it is
recognition of the dynamic, interactive nature of warfare and the
complex connectivity of the human dimension. It is not simple.
Neither is war. But what nonlinearity provides is a construct for
understanding the changing character of war and allowing for the
recognition of friction before reaching culmination. The result is
intuition to recognize the implications of the changing situation
and adaptability to allow for appropriate action. The achievement of
success in both these abstract capabilities depends on the nature of
education, training, procedure, and finally structure. In that regard
nonlinearity offers a way to leverage the best of service cultures and
capabilities, while providing the opportunity to discard centuries
of unwanted baggage. In the end, however, the U.S. military’s
ability to understand the environment, its interaction within it and
the changing nature of conflict until conclusion, will ultimately
determine its success.
As America comes to grips with its new found role of global
“hyper-power,” the international stage will change with new, yet
unwritten dramas unfolding. New players will join the improvisation,
bringing with them challenge and intrigue, interests and alliances.
And above it all, “Tyche” will observe, like an interactive audience,
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whose fickle attention changes with the season and fashion.
Balancing her capricious moods and unpredictable nature will
require a presence of mind attuned to the nature of the environment,
the actors, and the audience. But that is what distinguishes the great
from the popular, and in the end determines who remains at center
stage, taking the final bow.
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CHAPTER 3
THE BEST OFFENSE IS A GOOD DEFENSE:
PREEMPTION, ITS RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Colonel Daniel L. Zajac
If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too
long . . . . Our security will require transforming the military you
will lead―a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s
notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will
require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be
ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty
and to defend our lives.1
George W. Bush

In the wake of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon, America’s security policy underwent
significant changes, particularly in regard to anticipating the acts
of terrorists and their supporters. On September 14, 2001, Congress
authorized the use of force against those that planned, or perpetrated
the 9/11 attacks as well as those who harbored the 9/11 terrorists.2
The President, in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address,
warned that the United States would not allow aggressors to strike
first.3 He reiterated his case for preemption in a commencement
address to the West Point Class of 2002.4 Finally, the National
Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002 included preemption as a
course of action.5
Anticipatory defense is not new to American strategic thinking.
However, thinking about preemptive or preventive strategies and
executing them are two different things. While reserving the right
to preempt or prevent, the United States has rarely exercised those
options. In the few cases of U.S. preemption, its operations have
been small in scale, for limited objectives, often clandestine, and
usually followed some provocative act. American leaders generally
considered the idea of striking first incompatible with their ideals
and thus not a legitimate course of action.6
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The President’s strategy is different, because it explicitly declares
that the United States will execute preemptive military operations
when necessary. His strategy includes preventative actions to
eliminate threats before they emerge―in other words before those
threats are imminent.7 He has implied that the United States, in
situations short of last resort, might employ preventative attacks or
preventative war. Moreover, his statements suggest that America
will hold other nations responsible for the acts of terrorists operating
within or from their territory and that it reserves the option to
preempt or prevent within those states. While other nations have
employed anticipatory strategies, the United States has never before
declared such a doctrine. The President has added a new course of
action to America’s National Military Strategy. Consequently, its
armed forces must respond.
This chapter seeks to identify the implications of the President’s
emerging strategy for the Department of Defense (DoD). Specifically,
it employs just war theory and strategic military theory to model
decision criteria for anticipatory self-defense, while utilizing the
ends-ways-means paradigm for strategy analysis. After offering
several definitions, the chapter will explore the theoretical
foundations of anticipatory defense. A brief survey of historical
examples of anticipatory defense sets the stage for analysis. After
identifying three likely preemption types, the chapter addresses
means, recommendations for DoD, and the threats and risks of such
a policy. While the author does not intend to justify anticipatory selfdefense, he does conclude that there are instances that justify such
action.
DEFINITIONS
Anticipatory self-defense or striking an enemy before he can
consummate an act of aggression, will take one of four forms.
The fundamental discriminators in these forms are the concepts
of imminent verses inevitable threats and attacks verses war. For
the purpose of argument, this chapter employs the following
definitions.
Preemptive Attack: An attack or raid initiated on the basis of
incontrovertible evidence an enemy attack is imminent.
60

Preemptive War: A war initiated on the basis of expectation and/
or evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.
Preventative Attack: An attack or raid initiated on the belief that
the threat of an attack, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to
delay would involve great risk.
Preventative War: A war initiated on the belief that armed conflict,
while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve
great risk.8
Unfortunately, President Bush, as well as advocates and critics
of his policy, often mixes all four forms into the term “preemption”
without drawing needed distinctions. Since the word “imminent”
appears in each form, it is worth reviewing the definition of
imminent: “. . . to project, threaten, . . . ready to take place; . . . hanging
threateningly over one’s head . . . danger of being run over . . . “9
Temporally, imminent appears to be a subjective call. For
example, combat forces set in attack positions could remain in
such a status for long periods of time. Thus, some divining of the
opponent’s intent is necessary. Nonetheless, it helps to distinguish
between forms of anticipatory defense. An imminent threat, ready
to take place, is closer in time than an inevitable one. The imminent
threat has immediate ramifications, if left unchecked. The 2002 NSS
states, “[The United States] must adapt the concept of imminent
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”10 This
statement represents an effort to push the time horizon associated
with imminent to a more distant point in time to accommodate
preventative action. Essentially, what the NSS indicates is the intent
to execute preventative attacks. To define “imminent” as a matter
of hours, days or weeks is illusory. In determining which threats
are imminent, there are no hard rules, and the President, perhaps in
consultation with Congress, will have to discriminate on a case by
case basis, supported by the best intelligence available.
Preemptive attacks possess limited objectives or discrete targets.
The aim is the elimination of a particular threat or capability. While
a preemptive attack is a war-like act, it is not a war in itself. U.S.
Military Doctrine defines attacks, raids, and strikes, outside of a
war, as military operations other than war (MOOTW). Preemptive
war is longer in duration than an attack and has as its objective the
imposition of the attacker’s will on an opponent, normally with
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limited ends in view. Convincing evidence of an imminent enemy
attack drives preemptive attack and preemptive war. In both forms
an imminent threat leaves little, if any, time to employ means other
than force, to decide, and to act. Ultimately, preemptive operations
react to an imminent attack, the character and timing of which are
determined by the threat.
Preventative attack is a term undefined outside of this paper.
There are no references to it in either theory or doctrine. Nonetheless
the concept of preventative attack is relevant and many of the
President’s statements suggest such a concept. Preventative attack
is similar to preemptive attack. However the former rests on a threat
judged to be inevitable, as opposed to imminent. Moreover, it differs
from preemptive attack in the time available to assess, decide and
act. It is premeditated and not an act of last resort. Proving the
inevitability of an attack is difficult, much more so than proving the
threat of an imminent attack. The same is true of preventative war.
Both preventative attack and preventative war are premeditated
acts aimed at eliminating an anticipated threat. The time available
before taking action should allow the exhaustion of diplomatic or
other means of national power to diffuse the underlying causes of
the confrontation prior to out-break of hostilities. Likewise, time
provides the opportunity for building domestic and international
consensus and legitimacy. In preventative actions, the attacker
possesses the initiative in terms of choosing the time, place, and
character of his initial attack. Part of the rationale for preventative
military actions rests on cost benefit analysis. “If an attack or war is
inevitable, why not fight at the time and place of my choosing, while I
have the initiative and before the enemy increases his strength?” This
logic is more relevant if the potential assailant possesses weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) or is about to obtain them. There is a moral
component to this argument as well. If the cause is just, preventative
actions may be more economical in terms of collateral damage and
loss of life.
FOUNDATIONS OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
The foundation for rationalizing anticipatory defense rests in the
legacy of Just War Theory and International Law stretching back to
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St. Augustine.11 An early Christian thinker, St. Augustine, and those
who followed him, tried to reconcile the competing moral principles
of nonviolence and the evil of taking human life with the need to
protect innocent human life through the use of force and violence.12
This tradition produced a construct that has come to be known as jus
ad bellum or “The Just War Framework.” The essential elements are:
• Just Cause;
• Legitimate Authority;
• Public Declaration;
• Just Intent;
• Proportionality;
• Last Resort; and,
• Reasonable Hope of Success.13
In the 16th century, Hugo Grotius, in his seminal work, The Law
of War and Peace (1625), developed a theoretical construct of
international law from just war theory. His theories formed the
basis of modern international law. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648
(ending the Thirty Years War and influenced by Grotius’ work) and
the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 established a set of international
norms that have endured to this day. These norms are the concepts
of the modern nation-state and sovereignty.14
The first diplomatic rationale for preemption based on selfdefense came from the United States. In the Webster-Ashburn
Treaty of 1842, Daniel Webster, America’s Secretary of State at the
time, created what has come to be known as the “Caroline Doctrine,”
a definition of the circumstances necessary for a nation to justify
preemptive hostilities in self–defense.15 Webster stated that there
must be a “necessity that self-defense is instant, overwhelming,
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.”16
This legacy endures today in Article 51 of the United Nations (U.N.)
Charter. Moreover it accommodates key elements of the “Just War
Framework.” Webster’s doctrine implies just intent, last resort, and
perhaps proportionality.
Over the past 4 centuries, the concepts of nation state, sovereignty,
just war, and the right to self-defense have coalesced in international
norms, codified in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Article 51 states,
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“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations.”17 The authors of Article 51 clearly intended it
for nation-states.18 Moreover, the concept of “armed attack” did not
anticipate terrorist attacks by nonstate actors such as those of 9/11.
Sean D. Murphy argues:
While there have been spirited debates over the right to engage
in “anticipatory self-defense,” most governments and scholars,
and the International Court of Justice, appear to agree that selfdefense is permitted under Article 51, but only when there has
been an “armed attack.” Yet the type of armed attack has been
less studied.19

Determining whether an armed attack is under way represents
a highly subjective decision. At what point under Article 51 would
the United States have been justified in attacking Nagumo’s aircraft
carriers, as they steamed toward Hawaii in 1941? Could America have
attacked them when they were leaving Japanese waters? When they
were transiting the Northern Pacific? Perhaps when combat loaded
Zeros, Kates, and Vals revved their engines on flight decks some
250 miles from Oahu? Article 51 implies that unless a nation could
determine with certainty that an attack was imminent and about to
commence, it would have to wait until the attack was in progress to
defend itself. The authors of Article 51 set an understandably high
standard for the justification of war-like acts, even when undertaken
in self-defense.
Given the demonstrated capabilities of international terrorists,
not to mention a world proliferating with WMD, it appears that
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter merits reconsideration. The only way
to completely reconcile a preemptive strategy with the U.N. Charter
is to equate imminent attack with the armed attack of Article 51.
Nonetheless, many international law experts believe Article 51
allows anticipatory self-defense.
Following 9/11 the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution
1373 (UNSCR 1373).20 It reaffirms that international terrorism is a
threat to international peace and states the need to combat terrorism
by “all means” in accordance with the U.N. Charter and the right
to self-defense.21 It further states that nations should work together
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to prevent and suppress terrorist acts within and across their
boundaries, while refraining from providing support to terrorism.22
Nonetheless, while UNSCR 1371 calls on member nations to act
and legitimizes preventative measures, it falls short of endorsing
unilateral or multi-lateral preemptive or preventative military
actions. President Bush has already stated that preemption and
prevention are methods that America will employ in the Global War
on Terror. However, short of specific Security Council Resolutions
authorizing such actions, preemption pushes the limits of Article 51
and UNSCR 1371.
Terrorist organizations have changed the way the world deals
with the concept of sovereignty. This is particularly true of failed
states, or those too weak or unwilling to deal with terrorists on
their territory. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is a case in
point. The Taliban, despite receiving an ultimatum from President
Bush, refused to extradite elements of al-Qaeda linked to 9/11 and
operating from Afghanistan. The United States, with support from
much of the world and in concert with the Northern Alliance, toppled
the Taliban and occupied Afghanistan to restore order and attack alQaeda. These actions constituted retaliation against terrorists who
attacked America. This was not preemption.
Most agree that Article 51 rules out preventative war.
Nevertheless, it appears that the U.N. may set a precedent in Iraq.
President Bush is holding Saddam Hussein responsible for his past
transgressions. Moreover, he is holding Saddam responsible for the
likelihood that he will produce and employ WMD or provide WMD
to terrorists. Driven by the United States, the U.N. has started down a
path that could provide a measure of legitimacy for preventative war.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 (UNSCR 1441) (November 8,
2002) states that Iraq, “will face serious consequences as a result of
its continued violations of its obligations.”23 Meanwhile the “United
We Stand” statement of January 30, 2003, signed by eight European
leaders, add further legitimacy for preventative war.24
If the United States prosecutes preemptive actions, it will do so
only by pushing the limits of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, while
accepting associated risks. Preventative actions, on the other hand,
would be best legitimized when executed within the framework of
Security Council resolutions or a willing coalition.
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ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE IN STRATEGIC
MILITARY THEORY
A survey of classic theoretical works offers little with regard
to preemption, preemptive war, or preventative war. Sun Tzu’s
platitudes, addressing the importance of surprise and knowing the
enemy, offer tenuous relation to preemptive strategies.25 Surprise
may play a role in striking an imminent threat or in choosing the
time and place of preventative strikes or war. However, knowing
the enemy’s intent is a crucial element in determining whether or
not to launch preemptive or preventative action. Likewise the theory
of the “indirect approach” offered by B.H. Liddell Hart bears some
similarity to preemption in that the defender attempts to catch his
enemy off guard by striking as the latter executes his attack.26 Clearly,
the whole idea of preemption implies an ability to gain some form of
advantage on the erstwhile attacker, even if only in a tactical sense.
Clausewitz’ “paradoxical trinity” possesses significant relevance
to the ‘Just War Framework’ and preemption.27 In his effort to
explain the phenomenon of war the Prussian theorist described
war’s dominant tendencies as
primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded
as blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within
which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of
subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject
to reason alone.28

He ties each part of this trinity to “the people . . . the commander and
army,” and “the government” respectively.29
Clausewitz’ trinitarian paradigm correlates with the “Just War”
construct and provides insights into some of its key elements. In
just war theory a government’s political aims are manifest in the
concept of legitimate authority. These political aims further relate
to the public declaration that the legitimate authority should issue.
Clausewitz describes war as an instrument of policy subject to the
realm of reason.30 Reason, in an ideal sense, should employ war only
with just intent, proportionality, and as a last resort. Moreover, the
rational leader should not launch a war without a reasonable hope
of success.
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Likewise, in Clausewitz’ description of the passions inherent in
the populace, he accounts for the importance of obtaining domestic
and international legitimacy.31 Certainly, in a democracy such as the
United States, and even more so in a coalition or body like the U.N.,
popular support offers not only legitimacy but also moral support
for a just cause. Conversely, preemptive and preventative military
actions may inflame the passion of those sympathetic to America’s
foes.
When Clausewitz speaks of the “commander and army,”
where the “the play of chance and probability within which the
creative spirit is free to roam,” he accommodates just war theory’s
proportionality, last resort, and reasonable hope of success.32
Political leaders depend on the military to create viable options
for the application of force. The military determines the lead-time
required for a preemptive strike and by default determines whether
there is time available to apply means other than force. It determines
the chance or risk involved and provides the leader with probability
of success. Likewise, the military will determine the chance of
minimizing collateral damage. The political leaders must then
consider the risks of the unintended consequences of military action.
Of course the Clausewitzian concept of friction is at play in all of
these calculations.
A superbly prepared military, capable of operational success,
is rarely a cure for faulty strategy resulting from a mismatch
between capability, strategy and aim. “[T]he most far-reaching act of
judgement that the statesman and the commander have to make is to
establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking;
neither mistaking it for, not trying to turn it into, something that is
alien to its nature.”33 Clausewitz’ admonition must be the point of
origin for strategists, as they plan for war. It demands rigorous and
realistic analysis of the object in view and the capabilities at hand.
No less important is the cost benefit analysis of the object desired
and the resources the state is willing to expend in pursuit of its aims.
This is true of preemption and prevention. When planners cannot
create viable ways with the available means, military leaders must
communicate that reality to their political leaders. Frequently political
leaders have reason to persevere despite a mismatch between ends,
ways, and means. Given the myriad of factors beyond their control,
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strategists often plan and execute operations as circumstances
demand as opposed to how they want to. Furthermore, military
leaders should rigorously explore alternative strategies, or branches
and present them to senior leaders. Adjustments to strategies and
perhaps the ends must rest on the circumstances of unexpected
operational opportunities and setbacks. However, when changes
occur to aims, a reassessment of strategy from ends to means is in
order. The harmonization of strategy and aims is no less critical
in the execution of preemptive and preventative actions. Planners
must carefully weigh the possible second and third order effects
of preemptive actions. Immediate success in preemptive actions
may have long-term unexpected or undesirable results. The risk
of unintended consequences, escalation, and successful conflict
termination come to mind. Clear criteria for action, developed prior
to acting, possess great value given the limited time available in
reacting to an imminent threat.
Early Cold War theorists provide the most direct analyses of
preemptive strategies. They directed their efforts at making sense
of nuclear warfare and explored preemptive concepts with greater
rigor than their predecessors. Nonetheless, one requires caution
when searching for contemporary utility in their writings, given the
differences between nuclear war―risking an end to civilization―and
the war on terrorism. One theorist who provides insights for current
students of preemption is Bernard Brodie. His landmark work,
Strategy in the Missile Age, produced an approach to nuclear strategy
that the United States employed through the end of the Cold War.34
Brodie traced the evolution of strategic thought from Clausewitz
to the 1950s, emphasizing the obsolescence of traditional concepts
in the missile age. He believed that nuclear weapons, with their
inherent destructiveness, were exclusively offensive instruments
with no defensive capability. Thus, the primacy of the defense as the
stronger form of war was invalid in the nuclear era.35 Paradoxically,
the traditional strength of the offense, seizing the initiative by
striking first at the time and place of the attacker’s choosing, no
longer held merit when the outcome might be mutual destruction.36
Moreover, with the risk of enormous losses in nuclear war, Brodie
believed that a victory in strategic nuclear war might provide little
advantage over defeat.37
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Advocating a strategy based on deterrence, Brodie argued
against strategies based on anticipatory defense. Attempting to
highlight the dilemma in anticipatory strategies he mused:
. . . the philosophy of “I won’t strike first unless you do,” though
the phrase should no doubt be edited to read, “unless you attempt
to.” Anyway there is the insistence that come what may, “I will
strike first!”—though the “I” agrees to wait long enough so that
my qualms on moral grounds are automatically resolved.38

Brodie felt that American values argued against preemptive
strategies. He believed such strategies placed an undue burden
for decision making on the shoulders of the President.39 Moreover,
he believed it was beyond America’s capability to divine the
inevitability of nuclear war.40
Despite his focus on nuclear warfare against a symmetrical
threat and his inability to predict a future populated by international
terrorists and rogue states, Brodie’s analysis of preemptive strategies
provides pertinent insights on current U.S. policy. For preemption to
be valid, Brodie emphasized the requirement for precise intelligence
to identify imminent threats with great certainty. That same quality of
intelligence was required to target and preempt threats. He envisioned
the President as the ultimate decisionmaker in determining whether
threats were truly imminent and whether attacking preemptively
was warranted. Finally, to justify preemption the President would
require strong evidence to persuade the American populace of just
cause when striking first.41 Just war theory and Clausewitz’ trinity
echo throughout his writings.
Michael Walzer adds useful insights on anticipatory self-defense
in Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer not only accepts preemption as a
legitimate form of self-defense, but he also criticizes views holding
an overly legalistic interpretation of imminent threat. Thus he
offers alternative approaches more sympathetic to the President’s
new policy. To Walzer, the legalists see Webster’s interpretation of
preemption as “a reflex action, a throwing up of one’s arms at the
very last minute.”42 Walzer believes such a view is too restrictive,
when the safety of the nation’s citizens and allies is at risk. He adds,
“The line between legitimate and illegitimate first strikes is not
going to be drawn at the point of imminent attack but at the point
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of sufficient threat.”43 Walzer defines sufficient threat as “a manifest
intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that
intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting,
or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.”44
His approach accommodates both preemptive and preventative
actions and simplifies the criteria for a just war to two fundamental
principles: it must be a defensively motivated last resort and
“its anticipated costs to soldiers and civilians alike must not be
disproportionate to (greater than) the value of its ends.”45 Walzer’s
thoughts on just war theory and anticipatory self-defense correlate
with President Bush’s strategy.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
Preventative War: Imperial Japan, 1941.
On December 7, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy struck
Pearl Harbor with a surprise attack of devastating proportions.
This unannounced initiation of war was the opening blow in a
war of conquest. Near simultaneous attacks stretching from the
Hawaiian Islands to the Indian Ocean followed in its wake. Japan
launched a preventative war intended to create a strategic situation
so intimidating to the United States that a negotiated settlement to
Japan’s advantage would result. Japanese strategists believed that
these surprise attacks were the only way Japan could prevail in a
war that the United States would inevitably thrust on them.
Between 1895 and 1941, radical nationalism dominated Japan.
Japanese leaders felt exploited in their dealings with Western
Powers.46 Nevertheless, it was Japan’s designs on China that led to
war with America. The League of Nations censured Japan after its
invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and Japan protested by withdrawing
from the League.47 On July 7, 1937, a minor engagement near Peking
between Japanese and Chinese forces escalated to another war.48 By
1939, after initial Japanese successes, the fighting in China devolved
into a war of attrition.49
To win the war, Japan endeavored to isolate China and obtain
additional resources in Indo-China. The fall of France and the
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Low Countries in 1940 provided an opportunity.50 In September
1940 the Japanese occupied northern French Indo-China.51 Despite
American warnings, the Japanese then occupied the southern half of
French Indo-China in July 1941.52 These moves triggered American
restrictions on oil and scrap metal trade with Japan.53 To continue
the war in China, Japan needed resources, particularly oil. Without
oil from America and without a change in policy Japan could only
obtain oil by seizing the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese estimated
their oil reserves at only 6 months without oil from the United States
or other sources. Their attempts to reverse America’s embargo
through negotiation were unsuccessful. In the meantime American
strength in the Pacific grew, while American industry began gearing
up for war.
Japan’s leaders decided to seize the resource areas they required.
On September 4, 1941, they chose a path leading to preventative war
with the United States. They decided on war because they believed
the seizure of resource areas would trigger American intervention.54
Our Empire will (1) for the purpose of self-defense and self
preservation complete preparations for war, (2) concurrently
take all possible diplomatic measures vis-à-vis the USA and
Great Britain and thereby endeavor to attain our objectives. (3)
In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met
by the first ten days of October . . . we will immediately decide
to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain and the
Netherlands.55

Eventually, the Japanese extended the deadline for decision to
November 30, 1941.56 However, on November 26 the United States
made it clear that Japan would have to withdraw from China and
Indo-China.57 Japan’s leaders determined that giving up their goals
in China was unacceptable and the equivalent of capitulation. On
November 30, 1941, with the Emperor’s authorization, they decided
on war.58 The attack on Pearl Harbor was by definition the opening
battle in what the Japanese leadership believed was a preventative
war. After Pearl Harbor, with most of the American battle fleet
neutralized and the British Pacific fleet heavily attrited and chased
from the Pacific, the Japanese Army and Navy accomplished nearly
all of their assigned objectives.59
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Preemptive War: Israel, 1967.
After the War of Independence in 1948 and the 1956 “100 Hour
War,” Israel lacked operational depth, surrounded as it was by
hostile nations. Israeli policy was simple and logical, given their
geopolitical situation. First, avoid war. To deter war, Israel would
maintain a credible military capability and demonstrate a willingness
to use it. In the event of war, Israel must win without outside help
and against all neighboring enemies simultaneously. Finally, Israel
would fight without losing a major battle, since the consequences of
a single defeat could be disastrous.60
Israel announced casi belli for which it would consider offensive,
anticipatory, or defensive wars against potential opponents. These
causes were a massive build up of threatening forces near Israel’s
borders; the closing of the Strait of Tiran; a high level of guerilla
attacks that passive defense or punitive raids could not contain;
preparation for a strategic air attack on Israeli population centers,
infrastructure, or facilities; the entry of Jordan into an alliance with
Egypt and Syria; the takeover of Lebanon or Jordan by hostile
powers; and a growing imbalance in the combat potential between
probable aggressors and Israel.61
From fall 1966 through summer 1967, a series of escalating
events and miscalculations led the United Arab Republic and Israel
toward war. These escalations boiled over in spring 1967. On April 7,
1967, Syrian artillery fired on Israeli settlements in the Galilee. Israeli
aircraft retaliated by bombing the artillery positions and then shot
down six Syrian aircraft that rose to intercept them. On May 14, 1967,
Egypt’s President Gamal Abdul Nasser publicly claimed that Israel
was mobilizing for war, and on May 16 he asked the United Nations
Emergency Force in the Sinai to withdraw from border areas.62 Israel
and Egypt started partial mobilizations. By the 23rd, most of the
U.N. Emergency Force had withdrawn; as they did, Egyptian forces
closed the Strait of Tiran.63 By May 27, most Arab nations pledged
support for any nation attacked by Israel.64 Meanwhile Jordan’s
King Hussein signed a pact with Nasser that placed Jordanian
forces under an Egyptian General and opened Jordan to Egyptian
and Iraqi forces.65 On June 4, Iraq joined the alliance of the United
Arab Republic and Jordan.66 Nasser declared, “We are eager for
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battle in order to force the enemy to awake from his dreams and
meet Arab reality face to face,” further evidence that an Arab attack
was imminent.67 Seven Egyptian divisions moved into the Sinai, and
Egyptian air activity increased dramatically, while the shelling of
Israeli settlements from the Golan and Gaza intensified. Meanwhile,
war rhetoric in the Arab media reached fever pitch.68
The Arabs had triggered five of the Israel’s six casus belli. Facing
what they believed to be an imminent attack, Israeli leaders decided
to strike first. Only preemptive war made sense to those responsible
for preventing disaster from overtaking their tiny nation. On June 5,
1967, at 0755, the Israeli Air Force launched a preemptive, surprise
attack. By noon its aircraft had destroyed the Egyptian Air Force.69
Spurred by messages from the Egyptians, Jordan committed its air
force and started long-range artillery attacks on Israel.70 In the Golan
the Syrians waited until the 6th, when they launched an abortive
ground attack.71
Employing speed and shock the Israeli Defense Force attacked
into the Sinai and Gaza Strip. By June 8 they secured a line along the
Suez Canal.72 Meanwhile, the Israelis pushed the Jordanians out of
the West Bank.73 Ignoring U.N. efforts to establish a cease fire on the
8th, the Israelis attacked to rid Galilee of the Syrian threat. By the
10th they achieved their objectives, and the fighting ended.74
Preventative Attack: The Osirak Reactor, 1981.
An example more analogous to the President’s new strategy is
Israel’s attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. At 1735 hours
on June 7, 1981, eight Israeli F-16s, flown by elite pilots, streaked
across the Baghdad sky to attack the heart of Iraq’s nuclear weapons
effort. In the span of a minute, they destroyed the Iraqi reactor, built
with French support, and indefinitely set back Saddam Hussein’s
nuclear weapons program. Making the 635-mile flight from Israeli
to Baghdad, the attackers violated Jordanian and Saudi Arabian
airspace at great risk of detection. The attackers achieved surprise
and met only ineffective anti-aircraft fire.75
The Israeli attack was a clear example of a preventative strike.
Between August 1979 and June 1981, Israeli intelligence had been
tracking Iraq’s attempts to obtain nuclear weaponry. With the
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assistance of France, Iraq began building a reactor in the late 1970s
with the intention of producing enough enriched uranium to build
nuclear weapons. By fall 1980 Israeli intelligence projected that the
reactor would go on-line within a year. They could not wait because
a strike after the reactor was on-line would produce a radioactive
disaster. As a result, the Israelis planned the attack for November 4,
1980. However, they postponed the attack three times. In the spring
of 1981, Israeli intelligence predicted the reactor would go on-line
between July and September; as a result, the Israelis launched the
attack on June 7, 1981.76
The Israeli rationale was simple. Israel’s enemies had sworn its
destruction and attempted just that in 1948, 1967, and 1973. Saddam’s
attempt to build an “Arab Bomb,” combined with his intense antiIsraeli rhetoric, was hostile intent. Rather than allow the Iraqis
to produce a WMD capable of hitting Israel’s urban area’s, they
would strike before Iraq could build a bomb.77 Despite Arab vows
to destroy Israel the activation of the reactor was not an imminent
threat. However, in the eyes of Israeli leaders, the threat was
inevitable and allowing the reactor to go on-line was not worth the
risk. With an operational reactor, Saddam Hussein would inevitably
produce a nuclear weapon, and the Israelis believed it would be
employed to threaten or strike them. Furthermore, an Iraqi nuclear
weapon would provide a deterrent to Israel’s nuclear capability. The
similarities with current events surrounding Iraq are obvious.
HISTORY AND THE JUST WAR CONSTRUCT
Applying the “just war framework” to these historical examples
provides numerous insights. Moreover, those insights contribute to
the construction of American decision criteria for anticipatory selfdefense.
Just Cause/Just Intent.
Japan couched its justification for war in preventative war
rhetoric. A warped sense of just cause was an excuse for war.
Nonetheless, its real aim was to subjugate, exploit, and enslave
the areas it conquered. Clearly the Japanese cause and intent were
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unjust. Most of the world saw Japan’s aggression for what it was,
and its example demonstrates the risks inherent in justifying a policy
of anticipatory defense. Assuming America’s motivations are just
in regard to anticipatory defense and that eventually most of the
world will accept the policy, how long will it take for a rogue state
to invoke a similar policy as an excuse for aggression? In both of
the Israeli examples, the cause was national survival and the intent
was the defeat or destruction of the immediate instruments of the
threat.
Legitimate Authority/Public Declaration.
Each nation acted under the legitimate authority of its national
leadership. In two of the examples, Israel issued public declarations
in the form of casi belli. In 1967 and 1981 threats triggered one or more
of these casi belli. The Imperial Japanese made no public declaration
of conditions that would trigger a war. Meanwhile, they carried
on normal diplomatic relations with their opponents up to the
moment of attack and concealed their intentions, while attempting
to negotiate a settlement.
Proportionality.
Japanese strategists ignored the concept of proportionality.
The conquest of China, Southeast Asia, Australia, and the Western
Pacific was an extreme course of action to ensure Japan’s survival.
The Israelis demonstrated proportionality and restraint in both of
their actions. In the 1967 War, the Israeli Defense Force limited its
objectives and refrained from seizing territory beyond the Suez
Canal, Jordan River, or the Golan. The Israelis refrained from
continuing the war to inflict even greater losses on their opponents.
Likewise, they limited the Osirak Raid to the reactor alone, when
additional air strikes to suppress Iraqi air defenses could have been
executed.
Last Resort.
In terms of “last resort,” Tojo had alternatives to wars of
aggression, and there was no evidence of an imminent American
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attack or even an inevitable entry into the war, if Japan refrained
from attacking American forces. The Japanese could have
withdrawn from China and Indo-China. They deemed such actions
unacceptable. They could have limited their attacks to the specific
resource areas they required. They determined this was too risky
and expected such attacks would trigger American intervention.
This is not to say that a future declaration of war and intervention
by the Americans was impossible. Despite a strong isolationist
sentiment in the United States, American efforts at mobilization and
their economic restrictions on precious war material were threats to
Japan’s security.
In 1967 the Israelis faced what they perceived as an imminent
invasion; preemptive war was a last resort. However, Osirak raises
interesting questions with regard to the imminent verses inevitable
nature of the threat. Israeli diplomacy garnered little international
support in its efforts to forestall nuclear proliferation in Iraqi. Had
the reactor gone on-line in 1981, an Iraqi bomb was still years away.
The threat was not imminent. However, if Israel waited to strike after
the reactor went on-line, the potential for disproportionate casualties
was unacceptable. Interestingly, Khidhir Hamza, one of the scientists
working on Iraq’s nuclear program, stated that Saddam intended to
use nuclear weapons against Israel.78 The Israelis believed the risk of
allowing the Iraqis to build a bomb was too great. Thus the Osirak
Raid was preventative. One can only speculate what the Middle
East would look like today, if Saddam had developed a nuclear
weapon in 1980s. Israel’s dilemma in 1982 is analogous to the Iraqi
problem President Bush is dealing with today, while North Korea
demonstrates the risk involved in allowing rogue states to obtain
WMD.
Reasonable Hope of Success.
Calculating the potential for success, the Japanese accepted
enormous risks. Military advisors predicting a successful conclusion
to the war within 3 months of Pearl Harbor left Emperor Hirohito
exasperated.79 The Japanese strategic assessments were flawed and
based more on wishful thinking and pride than hard calculations.
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The Israelis believed they would succeed in skillfully calculating
the risks involved in their operations and they applied measures to
mitigate those risks.
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE IN AMERICAN
STRATEGIC CULTURE
Americans see the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as a
dastardly sneak attack. Thus, when people speak of preemption,
many Americans conjure up images of an unjust, unannounced,
surprise attack. However, the United States has a tradition, albeit
a small one, of preemptive attacks. American presidents and senior
military leaders have seriously considered, planned for, and even
executed preemptive/preventative operations when they believed
such operations were necessary. Interestingly, as stated earlier,
Daniel Webster provided one of the earliest documented rationales
for preemptive attack.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, the USS Ward applied
defensive rules of engagement to execute a preemptive attack on a
Japanese midget submarine outside Pearl Harbor.80 Likewise, prior
to December 11, 1941, U.S. warships in the Atlantic engaged German
submarines.81 In the late 1930s the Marine Corps planned to seize
Caribbean and Atlantic Islands and littorals to preempt the Nazis
from gaining advantage they might obtain through diplomatic
means.82
During the Cold War, American leaders flirted with preemptive
strategies. While the United States rejected preventative war in
NSC-68 of April 1950, senior military leaders continued to advocate
anticipatory defense.83 Many believed that the measures required for
America to prevail in a long Cold War would exhaust the United
States while increasingly militarizing the society. Moreover, they
argued that, if war was inevitable, it made sense to strike before
growing Soviet strength made the risks prohibitive.
In September 1953 President Eisenhower considered preventative
war with the Soviet Union in correspondence to Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles.84 He reversed such thinking, and from 1954
until the end of the decade, U.S. nuclear doctrine explicitly ruled
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out preventative war, “although it continued to emphasize the
desirability of a preemptive strike if a Soviet attack was deemed
imminent and unavoidable.”85 In 1962, President Kennedy, his
cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff seriously contemplated a
preventative war in the early stages of the Cuban Missile Crisis.86
From the 1960s to the end of the Cold War, NATO strategy rested
on the first use of nuclear weapons if conventional forces could not
defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.
Throughout the Cold War the goal of some of America’s
small-scale interventions included the installation of governments
sympathetic to the United States. One can view such interventions as
preventative actions to remove left-leaning governments before the
Soviets could exploit them.87 Often these interventions were covert,
as was the case in Iran in 1953, Guatemala 1954, and Chile 1973.88
Occasionally they were overt, as with the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.89
Arguably, NATO’s brief war with Serbia in 1999 was a preventative
war on behalf of the Kosovar Muslims.90 Notwithstanding the
preventative nature of these endeavors none rise to the level and
scope that President Bush is now contemplating.
However, pundits musing that preemption is a radical break
with American tradition ignore significant portions of the nation’s
history. American senior leaders did not hesitate to give anticipatory
defense strategies serious consideration when they were the only
practical expedients in difficult national security situations. This
was particularly true in the Cold War when America’s survival was
at stake.
It is difficult to equate the arsenal of today’s terrorists and
rogue states with the destructive capacity of the former Soviet
Union. Nonetheless the Soviets, however threatening, never struck
the United States. Al-Qaeda attacked America with great cost to
the nation. Given the demonstrated ability of terrorists to strike
the United States and the potential wedding of WMD with future
terrorist attacks, the president’s anticipatory strategy is valid. The
question becomes one of when to act preemptively or preventatively.
However, such a strategy must be juxtaposed with the American
cultural bias against starting wars. Because of these dilemmas,
consideration of just war criteria and legitimacy could prove useful
to the effective application of the president’s strategy. With this in
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mind, it makes sense to find a paradigm that justifies and provides
decision criteria for an American strategy of anticipatory selfdefense.
PROPOSED DECISION CRITERIA FOR ANTICIPATORY
SELF-DEFENSE
The final tribunal is our own conscience . . . . We are fighting to
reestablish the rule of law . . . . Humanity rather than legality must
be our guide.91
Winston Churchill

Whenever possible, DoD should develop scenarios and
capabilities to counter potential threats. Moreover, it should
request presidential criteria for likely scenarios and thresholds
for preemptive and preventative actions. In the absence of such
criteria, DoD should wargame and recommend its own. With some
modification, the “just war” framework is a solid starting point.92 A
principled, moral approach to the problem based on a long-standing
ethical foundation that reflects most Americans’ sense of fair play
not only has value in deciding whether to attack preemptively but
would serve the nation well in justifying such actions.
While it seems evident that scenarios requiring preemptive
actions are a crisis, some cases, such as preventative war in Iraq,
will not require time constrained crisis response. In regard to crisis
action planning, the Department’s current joint doctrine remains
sound and applicable.93 However, criteria for the employment of
preemption would be useful in both crisis response and deliberate
planning.
Imminent/Inevitable Threat.
Imminent/inevitable threat is determined by the President on
a case-by-case basis with regard to imminent threats. When the
threat is deemed inevitable, Congress should be consulted, if not
asked for endorsement. There must be a high probability of a threat
attack inflicting significant damage to the United States or American
citizens.
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In Cases Involving WMD.
In cases involved WMD, the adversary possesses or is on the
verge of possessing WMD. The adversary intends to use WMD or
make them available to others who will. The risk of waiting for
absolute certainty is unacceptably high.
Legitimate Authority.
The president is backed by domestic and multilateral support
when possible. When he deems a threat inevitable, he should, as a
minimum, consult Congress, if not requesting their endorsement.
In preventative actions he should make every reasonable effort to
garner domestic and international legitimacy prior to acting.
Public Declaration.
Whenever possible, the United States should signal its intention
to preempt prior to acting. To some degree, America’s stated policy
in regard to anticipatory defense already signals this intent. If the
United States chooses not to signal prior to a specific action, it must
assume responsibility and provide evidence of the threat as soon as
possible following an attack. In the case of preventative actions it
should signal and issue a demarche.
Just Intent.
The U.S. objective must aim at eliminating imminent or inevitable
threats to the United States and its citizens and not make an attempt
at aggrandizement or material gain.
Proportionality.
The United States should employ sufficient force to accomplish
the mission. However, it should limit damage and casualties to
a level only required to destroy or defeat the threat. Its military
forces should develop and modify standing rules of engagement
as required based on the situation surrounding each operation.
80

Whenever possible, they should use nonlethal weapons, and, as a
general rule, they should confine anticipatory defensive actions to
nonnuclear forces.
Last Resort.
Preemptive action is the only course of action possessing a
reasonable chance of eliminating the threat prior to its inflicting
unacceptable harm to Americans or the United States. In the case of
preventative actions, the United States should apply every element
of national and international power possible prior to military action
or war.
Reasonable Hope of Success.
The actions undertaken by the United States must have a high
probability of accomplishing the mission of destroying the targeted
threat with minimal collateral damage.
This construct is not absolute or all-inclusive. As one
commentator notes, “Prescriptive approaches rarely meet the tests
of history, particularly in dynamic time periods.”94 However, such
criteria could represent a tool to guide the thoughts of the nation’s
senior decisionmakers. Ultimately each preemptive action will
require an estimate of the situation, however brief, and a decision
based on the information available at the point of decision.
The United States could publicize criteria or casi belli for
anticipatory self-defense. The announcement that a rational and
morally based paradigm was in place to guide U.S. actions would
reinforce domestic and international legitimacy. Furthermore,
explaining a preemptive action after the fact by employing the
criteria possesses value. However, one can make a strong opposing
argument against publishing criteria, as they would provide the
basis for criticism in the event that the United States failed to meet
one or more of the criteria. In any case such criteria should never
back the president into a corner.
The Department should recommend that the president exhaust all
viable efforts to win support of the international community through
a coalition, the U.N., or both before he commits to preemptive or
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preventative actions. At the same time the president should seek a
manifestation of support from the Congress and domestic populace.
While a declaration of war is the most demonstrable vehicle for such
support, a clear congressional resolution would add legitimacy. It
is instructive to note that Congress has declared war only five times
in some 200-270 armed conflicts involving U.S. Armed Forces.95
Arguably, the Joint Resolution of September 14, 2001, empowered
the president to order preemptive actions. Nevertheless, given
the gravity of a decision to act preemptively against or in another
nation state, Congressional endorsement is the best demonstration
of domestic legitimacy.
STRATEGY: THE ENDS-WAYS-MEANS OF ANTICIPATORY
SELF-DEFENSE
Prevention and preemption are . . . the only defense against
terrorism. Our task is to find the enemy and destroy them before
they strike us.96
Donald H. Rumsfeld

Ends.
With or without preemption in America’s National Military
Strategy, DoD must assure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries,
deter aggression and coercion, and defeat adversaries, if deterrence
fails.97 However, given the specific reference to preemption in the
latest NSS, the Department must prepare to defeat terrorist threats
with global reach and rogue states before they attack America.98 This
is one line of operations in the war on terror. The ends achieved by
preemptive measures will not in themselves bring victory. They
contribute to the overall ends. Such attacks will aim to destroy
terrorists by attacking their fighting elements in their sanctuaries,
as well as attacks on their leadership, command, control and
communications.99 Moreover, given the President’s statements, the
U.S. military must be able to execute preemptive or preventative
wars, when threats warrant such action.
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Ways.
Ways or courses of action to counter threats where anticipatory
self-defense applies will likely fall under one of three categories:
signaled, unannounced, and clandestine preemption/prevention.
Signaled Preemption/Prevention. At first blush, signaling would
appear to contradict the “imminent threat” context normally
associated with self-defense and justifiable preemption. However,
signaled preemption could include a public warning or demarche
to potential threats. Signals could include presidential statements,
Congressional hearings and resolutions, as well as a clearly
stated intent to strike by declaration at the United Nations. Media
diplomacy could send similar signals. The President and most of his
cabinet have already done this. Signaling, to some degree, mitigates
objections that might be raised to a surprise attack or lack of
“public announcement” in just war theory.100 Here America would
avoid much of the stigma attached to an unannounced initiation
of hostilities in the tradition of surprise attacks perpetrated by
aggressor nations throughout history.
In some cases the United States may have to solicit the support
of friendly, neutral, or unsympathetic nations to grant permission to
act on their territory for preemptive or preventative attacks. Other
situations might call for action within a coalition. All such cases
would fall under the signaled category. Some nations might agree to
American preemption in specified contingencies. Preemptive attack,
preemptive war, preventative attack, and preventative war are
conceivable in the context of the signaled category. In fact, given the
American ethos in regard to striking first, it is difficult to envision
preventative war in any other context. The president’s current
challenge in garnering legitimacy for a preventative war against Iraq
is a case in point.
Unannounced Preemption/Prevention. Unannounced action is a less
desirable course of action, but nonetheless one for which scenarios
can be envisioned. The President could order a preemptive attack
without warning, when it is imperative to eliminate an imminent
attack originating from a critical mobile target in a time-constrained
environment. In the extreme, this situation could manifest itself in
a nation loading and preparing to launch ballistic missiles armed
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with WMD at targets in America or its allies. At the other end of
the spectrum could be a terrorist cell transiting or staging in another
country in preparation for an imminent attack. It is entirely plausible
that there will be cases where there is little time to consult with
or obtain some form of international or domestic support before
preempting. Unannounced preemption does not obviate the need
for post strike justification. Once an attack is complete, America
must be prepared to provide convincing evidence of the necessity
for action. Preemptive and preventative attacks are conceivable in
the context of unannounced actions. However, given the American
ethos in regard to anticipatory self-defense, it is difficult to envision
preemptive or preventative war in this context.
Clandestine Preemption/Prevention. The discrete elimination of
impending attacks on America or U.S. citizens is the final type and
labeled clandestine preemption/prevention. Clandestine preemption
or prevention by their nature are exclusively the domain of attacks
or strikes against discrete targets. Preemptive war or preventative
war will not be considered as clandestine options.
It is not difficult to envision situations where the President may
have to act in the absence of international or domestic signals and
without an immediate acknowledgement of the strike. Some of these
cases may arise when the host nation of the target is uncooperative.
Moreover, the President may determine that the nature of the situation
requires an attack that remains secret for an extended period of time.
A myriad of factors may require secrecy. The military may desire
to protect intelligence sources or may have an operational security
requirement based on a sequel to the attack. Consider a legitimate
nation, whose leaders want to eliminate terrorists in their country.
However, they do not want to demonstrate overt cooperation with
the United States. In such a case, they may invite clandestine attacks
without acknowledging complicity. In this case the military working
independently or with a civil agency, such as the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), may act to eliminate imminent or inevitable threats.
Special Operations Forces are most likely to be employed in this
manner. However, conventional precision guided munitions
launched from aircraft, ships or submarines might be appropriate as
well.
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On November 4, 2002, the CIA destroyed an SUV transporting
six al-Qaeda members. They attacked it with a Hellfire missile
launched from a Predator Remote Piloted Vehicle. Operating inside
Yemen with the Yemeni Government’s permission, the CIA killed
all six personnel including Qaed Sinan Harithi, the man who had
planned the USS Cole Bombing. The Yemenis, the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA would neither
confirm nor deny complicity in the strike. However, individuals
speaking anonymously leaked details. Few nations objected. This
action represents a prototype for clandestine preemption and
prevention where post-strike denial is necessary.101
Deterrent Value of Preemptive/Preventative Strategies. Preemption is
unlikely to dissuade terrorists committed to martyrdom. However,
the anticipatory defense doctrine may dissuade some nations
from supporting or harboring terrorists. Such a doctrine induces
uncertainty in the decisionmaking cycles of threat actors and their
supporters. Nations contemplating support for terrorists must
weigh the risk of preemptive or preventative attacks. American
success in Afghanistan and Yemen sends a powerful signal to
rogue states. Meanwhile, demonstrations of America’s preemptive
potential in forward basing, flexible deterrent options, and show of
force missions all reinforce deterrence.
Juxtaposed against the deterrent value of the policy is the risk
that it will galvanize some nations to defy the United States and
strive to balance its power regionally. International legitimacy and
convincing evidence of the need to preempt will contribute to the
mitigation of this risk. Another risk in the President’s policy is an
increased motivation for rogue states to acquire WMD before the
United States can effectively execute preventative actions. North
Korea manifests such a dynamic.
Means.
America’s military means are impressive. Given the characteristics
of the terrorist threat, nuclear and large conventional forces are
less likely to be employed than Special Operations Forces (SOF).
However, conventional and SOF capabilities are suitable means in
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all three categories, particularly when rogue states are involved.
America’s nuclear capability remains sound and relevant. However,
while nuclear weapons possess utility as part of the traditional
deterrent, they possess little value in preemptive/preventative
strikes against terrorists or rogue states. Against the latter threat
SOF or conventional strikes are the first choice to eliminate small
WMD capabilities. Meanwhile, National Missile Defense offers hope
that small-scale weapon of mass destruction armed missile attacks
can be defeated. In any case, it is difficult to envision a government
so irrational as to risk American nuclear retaliation. Likewise, it is
difficult to envision the United States initiating a nuclear attack with
all of the associated second and third order effects to destroy small
nuclear stockpiles. The risks involved are too great. Nonetheless,
targeting updates will be essential as threats evolve―particularly
the threat of nuclear-armed rogue nations.
America’s conventional forces, including the Army’s legacy
force, remain relevant, particularly for interstate conflict in the
form of preemptive or preventative war. However, the Army’s
rotary wing aviation, Rangers, light infantry, and Advanced
Tactical Missile System (ATCMS) could be effective in preemptive
strikes. Moreover, the Army may play an enabling role in securing
forward operating bases for Air Force, SOF, and CIA operatives as
they stage for strikes. The interim brigades will add to the Army’s
deployablity and flexibility. The U.S. Air Force, with its global
reach, its growing array of precision guided munitions and stealth
platforms, is a key component of conventional preemptive means.
No less impressive are the flexibility, endurance, range, and over
the horizon capabilities of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Sealaunched precision guided munitions, carrier based strike forces,
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU
[SOC]) and the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Antiterrorism)
provide potent force to the preemptive arsenal. Likewise, the Navy’s
Sea Strike concept, featuring persistent intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance, time sensitive strike, and Tactical Tomahawk
will contribute considerably to preemptive strategies. Without
changing the course of transformation, the DoD should continue to
pursue the multidimensional extended range precision strike, global
strike task force, and the Army deep strike brigade concepts. Such
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concepts could significantly enhance preemptive and preventative
capabilities.
SOF are the most likely means for strikes against terrorists.
Their low signature and flexibility make them particularly wellsuited to these operations. Experience in Afghanistan demonstrated
both the effectiveness and the over-extension of America’s Special
Forces.102 DoD should give consideration to an expansion of these
forces, despite the challenges inherent in balancing end-strength,
maintaining quality, and optimizing reserve component roles.103
American leaders expect the war on terrorism to be long, and
transformation efforts may provide opportunity for such an effort.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Besides the recommendations already discussed this analysis
leads to five additional areas that merit attention in the context
of anticipatory self-defense. They are rules of engagement (ROE),
interagency operations, information operations, nonlethal attack,
and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Unfortunately, the limits
of this chapter preclude detailed examination of these topics.
The requirement to create rules of engagement (ROE) for forces
committed to preemptive and preventative attacks―particularly
in clandestine operations―is critical. 104 While DoD must develop
general rules of engagement for such actions, discrete rules of
engagement for each strike will have to be refined on a case by case
basis.105
The importance of C4ISR in the Global War on Terror and
preemption in particular is obvious. Focused, actionable intelligence
is the lynch pin of any preemptive or preventative endeavor,
particularly in terms of targeting, planning, and justification. In the
business of preemption, minutes could decide success or failure.
Streamlining the dissemination of intelligence, while maintaining
appropriate security must become a priority.106
Throughout the planning, preparation, execution, and post
operation phases of a preemption, DoD must be ready to deal with
the numerous agencies at America’s or its allies’ disposal. The
Federal Government must foster and expand the Joint Interagency
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concept as necessary to facilitate preemptive endeavors.107
Above all, the nation and the world will demand justification
for preemptive and preventative actions. A powerful information
campaign can provide this justification. Well-informed American
and world publics are critical to legitimacy. DoD must develop a
responsive capability to accurately record and document preemptive
and preventative actions undertaken on behalf of the nation.108
Nonlethal weapons could be useful in preemptive and
preventative attacks.109 Employing these weapons could pay great
dividends in justifying attacks, reinforcing legitimacy, demonstrating
proportionality, and facilitating the capture of terrorists.110 The DoD
should continue research in non-lethal weaponry and its application
in anticipatory defense.
CONCLUSIONS
The world is a dangerous place to live, not because of the people
who are evil, but because of the people who don’t do anything
about it.111
Albert Einstein

President George W. Bush’s break with a long American
tradition is a dramatic change in stated policy. Preemptive and even
preventative strategies are not new to American strategic thought,
but they were never so clearly codified in a declaratory policy. In
a world where terrorists, with demonstrated global reach, have the
potential to obtain and employ WMD an unprecedented response
was required. With Churchillian and Reaganesque determination
and clarity, George W. Bush is weathering the criticism of his
detractors to pursue an unprecedented response to the evil of his
time.
The President’s strategy is as risky as it is bold. Anticipatory
self-defense, even when immediately successful, will incur risks.
Preemptive military action against imminent threats will probably
gain acceptance from most of the free world. However, preventative
actions will carry a far greater burden of justification, and, in the
eyes of many, preventative actions will never be justified. Moreover,
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the precedent of the new policy may inspire rogue states, with evil
intentions, to declare or employ similar policies as an excuse for
aggression. Meanwhile, the clearly stated intentions of this policy
will only reinforce the impression for many at home and abroad
that America will act unilaterally and imperialistically. Most of
those holding such views will probably never think otherwise, while
the policy will add to their ranks. Nonetheless, a world threatened
by terrorists who have proven invulnerable to deterrence and
the proliferation of devastating weaponry demands a response.
Anticipatory self-defense in the form of preemptive military action
is justified on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an attack
is imminent. Likewise, the nation can justify preventative military
action, if there exists a high probability that an enemy attack will
inflict unacceptable damage to the United States or American
citizens, and if no other action is feasible. Only time and historical
hindsight will reveal if the President’s chosen course is correct.
The President may order anticipatory defense, in the form of
preemptive or preventive military action, to protect the United
States from terrorism and rogue states. This strategy is one line of
operations in a more holistic strategy in the war on terror. Thus
the ends achieved by preemptive measures will not, in themselves,
bring about victory. They can only contribute to the overall ends.
Despite the publicity surrounding the announcement of the
strategy, anticipatory self-defense will occur infrequently, and
only when risks are too significant to do otherwise. While this
doctrine does little to alter the fundamental ends of the nation’s
military strategy, it does add a page to the armed forces playbook.
This course of action or “way” will manifest itself as signaled,
unannounced, or clandestine military action. DoD has the means to
execute these ways. The just war framework is a start point for the
creation of decision criteria. DoD should develop such criteria and
refine plans and tactics that optimize employment of its very capable
means. The recommendations of this chapter are one small step in
that direction.
In a far broader sense the President’s new strategy created
two enormous implications for the DoD. The first implication is
the requirement for unprecedented speed and agility. To preempt
imminent threats DoD will have to possess the capability to strike
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distant targets with unparalleled precision on extremely short
notice. This is a new style of fighting that demands a break from all
previously held paradigms of rapid response. Recent examples of
American force projection in Afghanistan in 2001, Kosovo in 1999,
and Iraq in 1990 demonstrate the point. Impressive victories in all
three of these endeavors, while rapid by traditional measures, would
have been too slow, if the threat had been truly imminent. There is
an inherent interagency component to speed as well. U.S. military
transformation with nested initiatives in rapid decisive operations
(RDO), network centric warfare, precision attack and interagency
coordination represents major steps in the right direction. However,
the enemy always gets a vote and his potential capabilities will
challenge the speed of America’s current preemptive capability.
The second implication is a subtle yet significant requirement.
That requirement is a need for a change in U.S. military culture.
The officers and enlisted personnel of America’s armed forces have
never failed the nation. They will follow orders and execute their
assigned missions with dedication and elan. However, the idea of
striking before a clearly defined provocation occurs is foreign to the
U.S. military’s fundamental ethos. Attacking al Qaeda preemptively,
or executing a preventative war on Iraq is one thing, but striking
first, when to the executer, the threat is not so evident or the target
appears benign, is another thing. Anticipatory defense requires the
U.S. armed forces to adopt a more aggressive posture and ethos at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If the United States fails
to preempt a single threat attack and if that attack is consummated
with WMD, the results could dramatically change the country and
the world.
The empty blocks on Manhattan’s Lower West Side testify that
the world is indeed a dangerous place. Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks
did not destroy the United States, but they did have a tumultuous
impact on America’s psyche and economy. How many more attacks
can the United States absorb before the consequences are more
disastrous? Anticipatory self-defense is one strategy to stop the
wanton destructiveness of an unprecedented form of aggression
before it reaches American shores. The armed forces of the United
States must meet the challenges of a new strategy.
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CHAPTER 4
U.S. ARMY EUROPE 2010:
HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF NATO ENLARGEMENT
Colonel Peter R. Mansoor
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) enlargement
in the post-Cold War era has altered fundamentally the political and
military realities of a security structure that kept peace in Europe
for over half-a-century. The inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic in 1999 and the upcoming inclusion of seven new
members in 2004 have both created new challenges and increased the
opportunities for U.S. policy in the region. More nebulous objectives,
including protection of human rights through peace operations in
the Balkans, combating terrorism, ensuring peace and stability in
the newly democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe, and
preparing expeditionary forces for use outside of NATO territory,
have replaced the raison d’etre of the alliance before 1989, to deter the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, NATO consensus in any given crisis is
problematical, as recent alliance disunity over policy towards Iraq
has demonstrated. In response, the United States has had to adapt its
strategy to shifting political realities engendered by the collapse of
the Soviet Union, NATO’s expansion, and the ongoing war against
terrorism.
The stationing of the bulk of U.S. ground forces in Germany,
once mandated by the Soviet threat, is no longer a military necessity.
Indeed, there are compelling reasons to move U.S. ground forces
into Eastern Europe: to help local military forces reach NATO
interoperability standards, stabilize new democracies, gain better
access to potential areas of instability, and acquire improved
training areas, among others. Spreading American units among
several European states is also an important hedge against risk
should a host nation deny the use of its infrastructure to prevent
U.S. forces stationed on its territory from deploying out-of-area.
Although the United States should not transfer all its ground forces
out of Germany, one division would be sufficient to support U.S.
policy in Western Europe.1 America’s objectives have evolved
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considerably from the early days of the alliance, when they were,
according to Hastings Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary-General,
“To keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans
down.” As a logical extension of NATO enlargement, the United
States should station ground forces in Eastern Europe to serve better
the needs of U.S. policy in the region. Poland’s situation makes it
the best choice to accept U.S. units immediately; Romania would be
a potential candidate to receive American forces in the longer term.
Such a restructuring would position the U.S. Army in Europe for
more effective engagement in the area of greatest need for decades
to come.
NATO Enlargement―A Political Imperative.
NATO enlargement has led to a defining moment in American
foreign policy. The Clinton administration initiated NATO’s first
post-Cold War expansion, which brought Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic into the alliance under the national security strategy
of Engagement and Enlargement.2 The Bush administration’s
recently released national security strategy maintains the policy of
expanding NATO to include the newly democratized nations of
east and southeast Europe.3 NATO extended invitations to join the
alliance to a second round of seven nations (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania) at the Prague summit in
November 2002. The necessities of the war on terrorism and evolving
political, economic, and military structures in Europe, however,
have created conditions for the exploration of other options. If U.S.
policy must rest on assembling coalitions of the willing and able as
circumstances dictate, then one alternative would be the withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Europe and the handover of European security
matters to the members of the European Union under the auspices
of the European Security and Defense Policy.4 On the other hand,
the United States could embrace a multitude of overlapping regional
organizations in Europe with a view towards their rapid and broad
expansion. Never before in alliance history have the choices been
more varied, or the ramifications more important for the future
security policy of the United States.
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The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 potentially signaled
NATO’s final chapter. With the Warsaw Pact’s dissolution, NATO’s
founding purpose―to contain the Soviet Union―no longer existed.
To maintain the alliance in these altered circumstances, the Clinton
administration sought to expand NATO. In 1997, the North Atlantic
Council extended offers of membership to Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic. The U.S. Department of State promulgated four
justifications for that initiative:
• Enlargement would make NATO stronger and better able to
achieve collective defense since more states would share the
burden.
• Enlargement would increase the alliance’s military
capabilities by the addition of 200,000 Polish, Czech, and
Hungarian troops.
• Enlargement would bolster stability and democracy in
Central Europe.
• It would erase the Cold War’s artificial dividing line.5
In fact, the resources necessary to defend NATO’s new members,
should that become necessary, would dwarf any military potential
they might have brought into the alliance. Their armed forces largely
consist of conscripts, possessing outdated Soviet equipment and
little, if any, expeditionary capabilities. As one authority on NATO
has remarked, “Until interoperability and modernization problems
are improved, new members’ value to collective defense and the new
missions will remain dubious for some time. Increased membership
does not equate to increased combat effectiveness, and a collection of
disparate units does not make a cohesive force.”6 One must conclude
that ultimately the reasons for NATO enlargement have always been
political: to strengthen the newly democratic states of Central and
Eastern Europe and demolish the Iron Curtain.7
In defense of the Clinton administration’s policies, these political
objectives still apply and, given the current military and economic
weakness of Russia as well as its lack of territorial ambition, are
obtainable with minimal additional U.S. military commitment.
NATO enlargement has kept the alliance viable by making it
relevant to European security in the post-Cold War era. As a proven
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commodity, NATO remains a force for stability. It also possesses
the ability to adapt to the post-Cold War world more quickly than
other organizations such as the European Union (EU). “Extending
the EU will help integrate the entire European continent, but EU
enlargement also requires current and new members to make vast
and complex adjustments in their regulatory regimes,” the U.S.
Department of State contends. “If NATO enlargement can proceed
more quickly, why wait to further integrate Europe until tomato
farmers in Central Europe start using the right kind of pesticide?”8
What is left unspoken in such an argument, however, is key. The
United States has the strongest voice in NATO, while it has none
inside the European Union. Support for NATO enlargement and the
continued vitality of the Euro-Atlantic alliance ensures America an
enduring, preeminent role in European affairs.
The terrorist attacks of 2001 on the United States fundamentally
altered America’s conceptions of security in the 21st century. In the
new environment, NATO must contribute to the war on terrorism,
or Americans will increasingly see it as irrelevant to their security. In
the wake of the attacks of 9/11, the North Atlantic Council invoked
Article V of the Washington Treaty to underline that the terrorist
assault was an attack on all alliance members. Nevertheless, in
the resulting campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, NATO
(somewhat reluctantly) stood on the sidelines. This was America’s
choice, since the operations envisioned in that distant country were
hardly conducive to the participation of NATO allies that had done
little to modernize their forces in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s
collapse. Moreover, turning the campaign in Afghanistan over to
NATO would have required the achievement of consensus among
18 disparate allies, a process that might have required months to
resolve―as was the case with the intense discussions before the start
of the recent war with Iraq. These decisions have called into question
NATO’s enduring role and, barring steps by leaders on both sides of
the Atlantic to transform the alliance, raised serious concerns about
its future.9
America’s preeminent role in the world provides it the choice
of either acting unilaterally or with coalitions of the “willing and
able,” as it has already done in the war on terrorism.10 Although
it currently has the political, military, and economic power to go
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it alone, alliances and coalitions greatly enhance America’s ability
to achieve its objectives by extending legitimacy, providing crucial
resources such as basing and overflight rights, and sending the
message that the free world remains united. NATO is the most
successful alliance in history, one that has kept the peace for over
half-a-century in an area vital to America’ national interest. Only
recently, it has brought stability to the turbulent Balkans and reached
out to promote military cooperation with partners in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia. Moreover, NATO provides the United States
with the strongest voice in European security affairs. Consequently,
it would be unwise to allow the alliance to wither for a fleeting
grasp at global hegemony. Indeed, the United States has a vested
interest in ensuring NATO retains its role as the preeminent security
organization in Europe, while taking care not to unnecessarily
antagonize Russia. Yet the relationship with Russia, though delicate,
is manageable, as the Prague summit and the mutual cooperation in
the war on terrorism have underscored.11
Europeans have embraced the multitude of regional organizations
that currently exist in order to achieve continued peace through
enhanced collective security.12 NATO enlargement in this context
builds on a web of cooperative political, economic, and security
arrangements and institutions, to include the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO’s Partnership for Peace
(PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the European Union,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and
the Council of Europe. NATO itself sees this cooperative approach
as its core vision. Its landmark 1995 study of enlargement issues
stated, “A strengthened Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, an enlarged NATO, an active North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (the precursor to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council)
and PfP would, together with other fora, form complementary parts
of a broad, inclusive European security architecture, supporting the
objective of an undivided Europe.”13 If handled properly, collective
security arrangements can maintain security and stability at a
reduced cost, compared to what individual states would have to
bear in acting alone. The disadvantage of enlarging NATO across the
European expanse, however, is vesting decisionmaking authority
in an increasing number of states, potentially making consensus105

building more difficult, especially for controversial out-of-area
operations.
Victory in the Cold War has given the West a brief window of
opportunity to ensure the expansion of freedom across Europe.
The addition of the Baltic States, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and
Romania into NATO brings the alliance to the edges of Ukraine and
the Russian Federation. The Ukraine has stated its desire to join
NATO in the future, without Russian objections, although it has far
to go before its aspiration would represent a serious possibility.14
These are extraordinary accomplishments deserving continued
American support. Consensus for action may be harder to reach in an
enlarged NATO, but the new members will likely look to the United
States as their benefactor, and thus would be more liable to support
American goals within the alliance.15 Expansion eastward brings
NATO forces closer to potential hot spots in critical areas such as
Central Asia and the Caspian basin, while expansion in the Balkans
has created strategic deployment options by rail to the borders of
the Middle East. The security that NATO provides will help to
ensure the stability of the newly democratic states of Central and
Eastern Europe. The restructuring undertaken in these areas since
1989―political and institutional reform, economic modernization,
respect for human rights, and military transformation―will take
decades, perhaps generations, to become permanent. An enlarged
NATO, with the United States as its indispensable leader, will be a
positive force for freedom in an undivided and democratic Europe―
an enduring legacy of Allied victory in the Cold War.
The Impact of Russia and the Conventional Forces Agreement.
Although Russia has appeared ambivalent to NATO’s expansion
eastward, it has at times vigorously opposed enlargement, albeit
powerless to prevent it.16 NATO has attempted to placate the Russians
through membership in the PfP and the creation of a Permanent Joint
Council, which has given them, in the words of former President
Bill Clinton, “a voice, if not a veto,” in alliance affairs.17 In the crisis
over human rights violations in Kosovo and the resulting NATO air
campaign against Serbia in 1999, however, the Russians suspended
their participation in the Permanent Joint Council.18 The events of
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September 11, 2001, and the resulting cooperation of Russia and
the United States in the war on terrorism, however, have gone far
to reviving the strategic relationship between the two powers. As a
result, the Permanent Joint Council has the potential to become an
active forum for the discussion of mutual issues such as the war on
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and peace
enforcement operations in Central Asia and the Balkans.
As a result of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
limitations, the permanent stationing of U.S. forces in the former
areas of the Warsaw Pact would require Russian acquiescence. The
CFE Treaty, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990, set strict numerical
limits on five categories of conventional armaments―tanks, armored
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters―in
the area between the Atlantic and the Urals. The express purpose
was to prevent a surprise attack by either the Warsaw Pact or NATO
on each other’s territories.19 The original treaty, however, assumed
that the treaty states would remain allies. The dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact and NATO’s enlargement invalidated that assumption
and nullified the balancing mechanism of the treaty.
As a consequence, Russia threatened to withdraw from the treaty
when NATO expanded.20 To address this issue, the thirty signatories
signed an adaptation agreement in Istanbul on 18 November
1999. This agreement limits the positioning of ground forces by
setting national and territorial ceilings, rather than group limits, on
conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals.21 The agreement,
however, has yet to come into force due to Russia’s violations of the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Flank Agreement of 1996,
which set limits on forces in territory belonging to Russia, Norway,
Iceland, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey,
Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. Russia’s positioning of forces in
what it terms “the near abroad” and its continuing war in Chechnya
will most likely prevent it from complying with its treaty obligations
in the near future. For its part, NATO has been unwilling to pressure
the Russians into compliance, most likely to maintain Russia’s
connection to the treaty and thus its military forces at least under
ostensible constraints.

107

Under the provisions of the adaptation agreement, the national
and territorial ceilings for 20 countries, including Russia and NATO’s
newest members, are one and the same. In effect, this requires the
size of a country’s armed forces to be lower than its national ceilings,
if foreign forces are stationed within its borders. For Russia, longopposed to NATO expansion, this constitutes an important limit on
the ground forces and weapons NATO can deploy in former Warsaw
Pact areas. Unless the new NATO members destroy tanks, armored
personnel carriers, and artillery pieces in their national forces, the
treaty prohibits NATO from stationing other ground forces on their
territory, except for temporary deployments associated with training
or crisis response.22 Likewise, the NATO-Russia Founding Act of
1997 committed NATO to the collective defense of new alliance
members “by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration,
and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent
stationing of substantial combat forces.”23
For the United States to move forces permanently from Germany
to these countries, therefore, would require either a reduction in
their defense structure, which, given their bloated inventories
of obsolete Soviet equipment, is likely, or a renegotiation of the
adaptation agreement with Russia. The latter is also possible, if
NATO displayed flexibility on Russian armaments in the southern
flank region. Such a quid pro quo would have considerable political
and strategic implications. In essence, NATO would trade greater
stability in Central and Eastern Europe for a freer Russian hand
on its own territory. Since, of the other treaty signatories, only the
Ukraine has restrictions on the positioning of its own forces within
its borders, allowing Russia to move forces within its national
territory would merely recognize its rights as a sovereign state.
Accommodation of the stationing of U.S. forces in Central and
Eastern Europe might not be as difficult as it seems. Given their
historical baggage, both Germany and Russia share an interest in
stabilizing the intervening region.24 Basing U.S. forces in Poland
is the surest way of accomplishing such a goal. In any case, the
stationing of U.S. forces in Central and Eastern Europe would
require extensive negotiations between the United States and Russia
to prevent damage to their critical strategic relationship.

108

The Military Implications of NATO Enlargement.
Under Article V of the Washington Treaty, NATO members must
treat an attack on one member state as an attack on all. Enlargement
of the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe, therefore, adds to
alliance responsibilities without necessarily adding to its capabilities.
Given the current benign regional security environment, such a
burden is acceptable in the short term. In the longer run, however,
the creation of effective military capabilities in new member states is
essential to the alliance’s continued functioning. As NATO’s mission
and force structure evolve to encompass expeditionary warfare,
military forces of the new allies must modernize in order to enable
their participation in out-of-area operations. The new members must
be net contributors to alliance defense, not merely recipients of a
security windfall.
NATO instituted its PfP program in 1994 to develop relations
with non-NATO members of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including prospective NATO
allies. PfP played an important role in preparing the OSCE states
to conduct cooperative peace enforcement and humanitarian
military activities in the Balkans in the late 1990s. It strengthened
the development of interoperable forces by involving partner
states in planning and carrying out joint peacekeeping operations
and familiarizing them with alliance structures and procedures.25
The PfP planning and review process provides a forum for the
development of military restructuring plans for individual member
states. The results, incorporated in partner defense plans, reflect
member state individual partnership programs, which demonstrate
their capabilities for potential NATO membership.26 Operations
in both Bosnia and Kosovo have shown the potential for effective
interoperability among NATO members, new and old, and their
PfP associates. The deployment of the Implementation Force in
1996 required the establishment of reception facilities in Hungary,
while forces in Bosnia included Russian, Polish, and Czech combat
battalions, Hungarian and Romanian engineer battalions, and
smaller contingents from the Baltic states and elsewhere.27
As a result of lessons learned from the initial round of NATO
enlargement, the allies agreed upon a Membership Action Plan
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(MAP) at the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999. The MAP
defined for NATO aspirants the requirements they would need to
accomplish, prior to acceptance in the alliance. It refined criteria first
specified by NATO’s landmark 1995 study on enlargement issues.
Its purpose was to prepare new members to be net contributors to
the alliance’s security upon entry.28 Significantly, NATO accepted all
but two of the states committed to the MAP at the Prague summit in
November 2002.
NATO also recognized the possible need to station its forces
on the territory of new member states, one of many alternatives
explored in its 1995 study. Other than permanent stationing, options
included prepositioning of equipment, routine and frequent rotation
of forces for training, and the dual basing of air assets. “Decisions
on the stationing of Allies’ conventional forces on the territory of
new members,” the report concluded, “will have to be taken by
the Alliance in the light of the benefits both to the Alliance as a
whole and to particular new members, the military advantages
of such a presence, the Alliance’s military capacity for rapid and
effective reinforcement, the views of the new members concerned,
the cost of possible military options, and the wider political and
strategic impact.”29 Given the costs associated with other options, in
practice the alliance has relied on occasional multinational training
and exercises to familiarize NATO forces with the terrain and
operating conditions on the territory of new members. As a result,
the achievement of true interoperability has suffered and the forces
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have had difficulty
integrating into the military structure of NATO. These three NATO
members must address inadequate field training, lack of English
language proficiency, and the doctrinal legacy of the Warsaw Pact
before their armed forces can function as full alliance partners.30
In assessing the costs of NATO enlargement, the Department
of Defense examined both initial required capabilities in the new
member states and longer-term improvements in their force
structures to ensure that they were postured to meet NATO military
commitments. Initial capabilities focused on low-cost, high payoff
enhancements to improve interoperability, particularly in command
and control networks and air control and logistics capabilities.
Mature capabilities included enhanced interoperability, creation
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of transportation and logistics networks to accommodate NATO
reinforcements, replacement of aging equipment, and restructuring
of armed forces to enable them to deploy and operate in the full
range of alliance missions.31 The creation of modernized, deployable
forces in new member states would increase NATO’s relevance in an
uncertain world by enhancing force-projection capabilities for crisis
management, peacemaking, and the war on terrorism. Regrettably,
once the ink was dry on the agreement to expand the alliance, the
motivation of new member states to expend the resources necessary
to restructure their armed forces to achieve these goals lessened
dramatically.32 If these states are to become full functioning military
members of NATO in a broad array of missions to include out-ofarea deployments, they will need assistance in education, training,
and restructuring their forces for the future. These are precisely the
areas in which the U.S. European Command, with forward stationed
forces in Western Europe, is postured―albeit imperfectly―to assist.
Theater Security Cooperation in USEUCOM.
Given the political imperative of alliance enlargement, how can
U.S. European Command best posture its permanently stationed
ground forces to foster stability and security in the new NATO?
The admission of the vast majority of Central and Eastern European
nations into NATO has extended American military commitments
up to the borders of the now-defunct Soviet Union, an expansion as
serious in scope as the commitment of U.S. forces to the defense of
Western Europe in 1951. U.S. ground forces are the most powerful
tool at the disposal of the President to assure allies, deter conflict, and
show the resolve of the United States to sustain its commitments to
its NATO partners. Overseas bases also give temporarily deployed
U.S. forces access to infrastructure in critical regions of the world
and can enhance power projection in crises.33 U.S. National Military
Strategy also calls for the evolution of Theater Security Cooperation
to ensure that the United States remains fully engaged overseas to
promote interoperability with allies and coalition partners, assure
access to critical strategic regions, enhance the development of
professional civil-military relationships in emerging democracies,
and create regional environments more conducive to U.S. interests.34
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The accomplishment of these tasks is important to the achievement
of U.S. long-term interests in the European region.
U.S. European Command devised its strategy of Readiness
and Engagement to attain U.S. military objectives in its area of
responsibility.35 The primary concern of U.S. European Command is
to maintain the readiness of its military forces to project force when
and where needed. Beyond this imperative, however, U.S. European
Command uses its military forces to engage in theater security
cooperation activities with other NATO and PfP forces to enhance
interoperability, ensure access to critical infrastructure in key areas
such as Hungary (the Balkans) and Turkey (the Middle East), create
a condition of transparency in military affairs on the European
continent, and demonstrate to newly emerging democracies the
role of armed forces in a free society. Theater Security Cooperation
covers a broad array of activities to include training exercises,
conferences, and exchanges, but common to all is the imperative
of face-to-face, personal interaction among participants. The recent
inclusion of the Russian Federation in the U.S. European Command
area of responsibility has significant implications for theater security
cooperation. European security will be imperfect lacking Russian
involvement in continental affairs, as the important contributions of
Russian units to stability in Bosnia and Kosovo have demonstrated.
As a result of the expansion of the area of responsibility, the demands
on U.S. European Command forces to participate in engagement
activities with the Russian military will increase in the near future,
which will result in even more time away from home station for
soldiers and units involved.
Interoperability has been an increasingly difficult problem for
NATO as U.S. forces transform, while European military capabilities
have stagnated due to lack of funding since the end of the Cold War.
Only half of NATO member states currently achieve the alliance
benchmark of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) allocated to
defense spending, and only the defense budgets of Turkey, Greece,
Poland, and the United States exceed 3 percent of GDP.36 The problem
is particularly acute in the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact,
many of which are either now part of or will soon join the alliance.
Theoretically, years of participation by prospective allies in the PfP
and NATO’s Membership Action Plan―designed specifically to
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bring future members up to Western military standards―should
have alleviated the greatest concerns about the capabilities of their
armed forces and potential to strengthen the alliance. In fact, all of
the new NATO allies are unprepared in varying degrees to conduct
modern military operations in conjunction with U.S. and Western
European forces.37 “What is needed,” writes General Frederick W.
Kroesen, a former commander of the United States Army in Europe,
“primarily, is recognition and support for a long-term program that
will address and reconcile the dilemmas of coalition operations to
assure NATO compatibility of all the forces of all of the nations of
the alliance.”38 Given the infrequent opportunities for the new NATO
partners to train with Western forces, interoperability problems are
likely to persist in the future as the militaries of Central and Eastern
Europe proceed slowly on the course of modernization and full
integration into NATO structures.
Aside from episodic out-of-area deployments for contingency
operations, the likely missions for U.S. forces in Europe over
the next two decades will consist of shaping the environment
through the integration of new NATO members and PfP states,
providing humanitarian assistance in the region, and participation
in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.39 Beyond these
tasks, combined training is critical to prepare the rest of NATO
for expeditionary warfare. U.S. European Command must take the
lead now to ensure that NATO militaries are capable of cooperating
with U.S. forces in the contemporary operating environment of the
future.
These military objectives are only partially served with the
current disposition of ground forces in Europe. In the absence
of permanently stationed forces in the recently opened areas of
Central and Eastern Europe, U.S. forces must temporarily deploy
into these regions to conduct routine bilateral and multilateral
exercises. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, readiness
training in U.S. Army Europe has been hampered by increasingly
restrictive policies in Germany, based entirely on environmental and
political considerations rather than military necessity. Restrictions
on maneuver and gunnery exercises in local training areas and at
the more extensive complexes in Hohenfels and Grafenwöhr have
hampered the readiness training of U.S. units since the end of the
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Cold War. Such restrictions are growing tighter. Basing units on the
territory of the new allies would alleviate these drawbacks of current
force locations, with minimal downside in terms of readiness. Under
an expeditionary posture, geographic locations such as Germany are
not as important as the capability (airports and seaports) to deploy
quickly. In fact, having units separated geographically can enhance
deployment timelines by reducing bottlenecks.
Efficient Basing Initiatives in U.S. Army Europe.
A decade after the end of the Cold War, U.S. European Command
continues to endeavor to close and consolidate installations
throughout its theater. Simply put, the poor facilities in much of
Germany, many of World War II vintage, are not cost effective.
Furthermore, while modern U.S. forces languish in dilapidated bases
that struggle to meet basic needs (such as paved motor pools with
adequate heating, lighting, and overhead lift), the host nation forces
of the Bundeswehr enjoy contemporary facilities. If the United States
is to remain engaged in Europe over the long haul, new facilities are
essential. Building new facilities is less expensive in the long run than
continually renovating outdated, dilapidated structures. Given this
imperative, movement to the territory of the new NATO members is
no more expensive than building new bases in Germany, and may
be less expensive given low-priced labor and materials available in
Eastern Europe. Furthermore, if the United States builds its new
bases contiguous to available maneuver areas and gunnery ranges,
rail transportation costs will significantly decline.
U.S. Army Europe developed its current Efficient Basing Initiatives
with many of the above considerations in mind. These initiatives
seek to consolidate brigade-sized forces at Grafenwöhr, Germany,
and Vincenza, Italy―locations with excellent training facilities
and which are well-postured for current and emerging threats in
Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. United States
Army Europe’s Efficient Basing South initiative consists of adding a
second airborne battalion to the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy by
2004, which will provide the command with enhanced capabilities,
increase flexibility, and address the requirement for additional
rapid-deployment forces in the region. The Efficient Basing East
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initiative is currently in the design phase, with $25 million already
appropriated by Congress in the FY ‘00 Supplemental. Efficient
Basing East represents an initiative to enhance readiness and gain
efficiencies by consolidating a brigade combat team from thirteen
installations to a single location in Grafenwöhr, Germany. Doing so
will facilitate command and control, lower transportation costs by
eliminating the need to use rail transportation for routine gunnery
qualification, improve access to training areas, and reduce annual
base operations costs by over $39 million.40
U.S. European Command can apply efficient basing concepts
to the transfer of U.S. forces to Central and Eastern Europe as well.
While retaining U.S. forces in Germany at the excellent training
facilities in Vilseck, Grafenwöhr, and Hohenfels, the command
could station brigade combat teams in Central and Eastern Europe
at consolidated locations to ease command and control, increase
access to first-rate training areas, improve cost efficiencies, and
enhance quality of life for soldiers and their families. The Army has
already announced the rotation of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team
to Baumholder, Germany, in 2007. This would be an ideal time to
consider moving it instead to a base further east―to Poland.
Basing U.S. Forces in Central and Eastern Europe.
Two major military reasons to base American ground forces in
Central and Eastern Europe are to improve the interoperability of
the military forces among the newest NATO allies and to increase
the readiness of U.S. forces by taking advantage of the extensive
training facilities in the area. Alliance forces achieve interoperability
primarily through joint participation in field training exercises,
which familiarizes participants with NATO planning procedures
and command and control processes, while exposing individual
soldiers to Western concepts such as a strong noncommissioned
officer corps. The former militaries of the Warsaw Pact are not
familiar with Western concepts such as the military decisionmaking
process, five-paragraph field order, or troop leading procedures.41
Individual classroom training will not suffice to ingrain these
concepts into these armed forces. Practical application in a field
environment must be part of the training regimen. The continuous
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physical presence of Western military forces in the area will allow
frequent interaction among leaders and soldiers, who must overcome
significant interoperability challenges before the new allies can have
a substantial role in NATO operations.
Another obstacle to interoperability is the lack of English
language training among the militaries of the new NATO allies.
Stationing U.S. forces in Central and Eastern Europe would increase
the exposure of regional military forces to English through daily
personal contacts and mass media such as the Armed Forces
Network. A by-product of such immersion would be the example
set by American military personnel as to the role of the military in
a free society and the importance of the safeguarding of democratic
values.42
U.S. forces based in Central and Eastern Europe can take
advantage of the large training areas in the region to maintain
readiness. As weapons ranges increase and forces disperse to protect
themselves against massed firepower and attacks by precision
weapons, the corresponding need to train across vast distances will
also intensify. Existing NATO training facilities in Germany in many
cases cannot accommodate such requirements. Accordingly, the
pressure to use areas in Central and Eastern Europe for training will
only increase over time, as increasingly severe restrictions limit the
utility of existing training areas in Western Europe. While providing
good stewardship of the environment, U.S. forces can still garner
extensive training benefits from the use of these facilities compared to
the limitations in force in Germany. Efforts to utilize the vast training
areas of the former Warsaw Pact nations are already underway. The
massive Drawsko-Pomorskie ranges in Poland have hosted brigadelevel NATO exercises for 6 years.43 U.S. forces permanently stationed
in the country could use these areas on a routine basis, greatly
enhancing their readiness while improving the interoperability
of the Polish Army through combined training exercises. Host
countries would not only benefit from increased opportunities for
interoperability training; Western armies have paid handsomely for
the privilege of using such training facilities―an infusion of muchneeded hard currency for the struggling economies of the region.44
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Strategic Assessment of the New NATO Allies.
Given the limited assets of U.S. Army Europe, Russian and
allied sensitivities, and the varying military potential and facilities
of the ten new NATO members, the selection of a new host nation or
nations in which to station American forces is a complicated matter.
Criteria for selection should include access to airports and seaports
for strategic mobility, the military potential of the host nation armed
forces, quality of host nation facilities (training areas, motor pools,
barracks, housing, etc.), and access to areas of strategic concern
(Balkans, Middle East, Caspian basin, and the Mediterranean
littoral). Of paramount concern, of course, is the host nation’s attitude
towards the stationing of American troops on its territory―critical to
ensuring public support for any potential out-of-area deployments.
U.S. forces based in Central and Eastern Europe would require
airports and seaports to ensure their availability for out-of-area
contingency operations. Ideally, airports need to be capable of
handling the largest U.S. airlifter, the C-5 Galaxy, with its fullyloaded take-off distance of 3,720 meters. Poland has international
airports at Warsaw (Okecie airport) and Krakow (Balice airport) that
meet the needs of the C-5, along with major seaports on the Baltic at
Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin.45 Romania has a large international
airport (Otopeni airport) at Bucharest that meets the needs of the C5, along with seaports along the Black Sea at Constanta, Mangalia,
and Sulina.46 In Hungary, Budapest (Ferihegy airport) also meets the
needs of the C-5, although forces would have to travel by road or rail
outside the country to ocean-going ports; travel down the Danube
River by barge is possible. However, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic States have no airports capable of
meeting the needs of the C-5.
Of the new NATO allies, Poland has by far the largest and most
useful training areas. It possesses two large training areas of 109,000
acres at Drawsko-Pomorskie and Zagan, each of which can easily
accommodate brigade-level forces.47 The Polish government has
been forthcoming in allowing NATO forces to use these facilities to
conduct training not possible in the more crowded and controlled
conditions of Western Europe. Furthermore, Polish forces already
routinely train with American and Western European militaries in
large-scale exercises such as “Victory Strike.”
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There is a vast difference in the military potential among the ten
new members of NATO. Only half of these states currently meet the
NATO defense spending benchmark of 2 percent of GDP, although
to be fair, many current NATO allies also fail to meet the standard as
well. Table 1 details the defense expenditures of the new allies, along
with the strength of their armed forces and inventory of armored
vehicles and artillery (figures current as of 2000).48 Clearly, basing
an American brigade in the Baltic States or Slovenia would dwarf
the capabilities of those counties militarily. On the other hand, such
a unit stationed in Poland, Romania, or Bulgaria could be of great
value in assisting the armed forces of those nations to meet NATO
interoperability standards through frequent training exercises and
other interaction.
Defense
Expenditure
(U.S. $Million)

Expenditure
as percent
of GDP

Armed Forces
Strength

Armored
Vehicles

Artillery

Bulgaria

324

2.65

75,900

5,458

1,858

Czech Rep.

1270

1.99

58,200

2,289

675

Estonia

84

1.60

4,800

39

19

Hungary

698

1.49

55,757

2,001

613

Latvia

170

1.05

3,360

15

26

Lithuania

183

1.70

10,771

105

0

Poland

3600

3.60

240,650

4,583

1,350

Romania

707

2.10

172,000

2,775

1,031

Slovakia

311

2.06

42,880

1,452

363

Slovenia

300

1.55

9,820

178

66

Table 1. Military Strength of New NATO Member States.
The second round of NATO expansion has created an alliance
“land bridge” to Turkey and the Middle East, along with greater
access to the Balkans and the Caspian basin. The inclusion of
Romania and Bulgaria postures NATO for increased access to these
areas. Although economic problems and the difficulties of defense
reform will prevent these two nations from realizing an adequate
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(by NATO standards) military potential in this decade, in the longer
term they may be of great value to alliance activities along NATO’s
southern rim.49 Given its strategic position, large military force, and
useful strategic transportation nodes, Romania would be a logical
country in which to base a U.S. brigade in the more distant future.
Of the new NATO allies, Poland exhibits by far the most consistent
support for its military forces. Despite universal conscription for all
males and heavy defense expenditures to replace outdated Warsaw
Pact equipment, opinion polls show the Polish armed forces regularly
enjoying more popularity than even the Catholic church.50 U.S.
forces based in Poland would receive a large degree of support given
the importance that the Polish people place on defense issues and
their role in NATO, not to mention the economic boost that would
naturally follow the infusion of American currency into the Polish
economy. One recent poll asked the Polish people to name countries
they consider as “friends.” Fully 50 percent put the United States at
the top of the list.51 As for their acceptance of the idea of stationing
U.S. forces in Poland, one poll showed a 72 percent approval rating,
another an impressive 89 percent.52
The Argument for Poland.
Given the size of its armed forces, government support for
military spending and reform, and its central position between
Germany and Russia, Poland is the most important of the new
NATO members. While similar in size to Spain, Poland will soon
dwarf most other NATO allies (new or old) in strategic importance
and military contributions to the alliance. In 1997 Poland embarked
on a 15-year modernization plan, focused on improving personnel
and equipment earmarked for NATO’s rapid reaction forces. The
plan consisted of reducing army strength from 220,000 to 180,000
soldiers, shortening conscription to 12 months, and providing a
stable defense budget pegged at 2.4 percent of GDP.53 That same
year Poland was the single largest contributor to United Nations
Peacekeeping forces worldwide. 54 One commentator concludes:
Few experts doubt Poland’s ability and determination to become
a valuable and salient member of the Alliance, given also the
very high level of Polish public support and readiness to bear
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increased defense spending. The Czech Republic and Hungary
are in a different league―further behind the NATO targets, with a
weaker public support and shakier government determination to
reach the targets of military modernization.55

Given increased U.S. assistance in the form of a useful and visible
presence in the country, Poland has the capability of becoming one of
America’s most valuable allies in operations not just in Europe, but,
given its demonstrated commitment to peacekeeping operations,
worldwide as well.
There is much work to be done, however. The intellectual
legacies of Soviet rule provide intractable barriers to military reform,
a struggle that may take generations to resolve.56 One of the major
weaknesses of Central and East European militaries, for instance, is
a lack of a credible noncommissioned officer corps. The new NATO
allies require Western assistance to develop noncommissioned
training and education systems. Although all Central and Eastern
European countries have leveraged PfP training to improve their
militaries, proficiency has not yet reached NATO standards. Even
the most competent military organizations have barely adequate
capabilities to operate in conjunction with NATO forces at both
unit level and in higher level staffs.57 Poland, for instance, keeps its
forces earmarked for NATO at higher readiness to facilitate their
participation in exercises, peacekeeping, and operations only by
stripping resources from the remainder of its forces.
David Glantz, one of the foremost experts on the capabilities of
Central and Eastern Europe militaries, concludes, “The most critical
training need is for greater U.S.-partner training cooperation aimed
at promoting greater interoperability between [sic] NATO, U.S., and
partner country forces.”58 Exercises are the most valuable dimension
of U.S. training assistance to the new NATO allies, but lack of units
and increased operating tempo for contingency operations have
limited the number conducted in recent years. “It is clear that the
U.S. will have to increase exercise program resources if the program
is to satisfy its full potential,” Glantz concludes. “If not, the program
will shrink, and the U.S. will have lost the benefits of one of its
premier and most valuable engagement tools.”59
President Bush and President Aleksander Kwasniewski of Poland
have begun the process of fostering closer military ties between their
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two countries. In a recent state visit in June 2002, the two leaders
launched an American-Polish military cooperation initiative. The
initiative reflects the strategic importance of the Polish-American
relationship and recognizes the critical role the United States
must play in shaping Polish military transformation. A Military
Cooperation Working Group is currently assessing options, which
will include enhanced unit partnerships between U.S. Army Europe
units and selected Polish units, among other potential projects.60 This
forum provides an opportunity to discuss what could become the
most valuable military cooperation project in Eastern Europe―the
stationing of a U.S. brigade in Poland.
While an expensive proposition, the United States would
not have to pay the entire cost of relocating a ground brigade
in Poland. NATO’s infrastructure budget, known as the NATO
Security Investment Program, allows the alliance to underwrite the
cost of support facilities. The NATO Security Investment Program
funds operational facilities in the fulfillment NATO commitments
that exceed a country’s national defense requirements. All U.S.
operational facilities in Europe are part of the American contribution
to NATO; therefore, they are all eligible for NATO Security
Investment Program funding. The U.S. share of these costs is 25
percent.61 To reduce costs, the U.S. Army could implement a unit
rotation system to its Polish base, which would eliminate the need to
build family housing and support facilities in the area. This option is
contingent upon a larger reform of the U.S. Army personnel system,
however, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Conclusion.
In the strategic landscape of post-Cold War Europe, the
inclusion of ten new nations of Central and Eastern Europe in
NATO is a watershed event that has critical political and security
implications for the future of the alliance. As NATO’s mission and
center of gravity have shifted, so must U.S. forces in Europe adapt
their engagement strategy to take into account the shifting political
realities on the continent. A vital need is for the United States
and its Western European allies to assist new NATO members in
becoming significant partners in a military sense to match current
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political rhetoric that has so far been the sole justification for
alliance expansion. To this end, stationing U.S. ground brigades in
Central and Eastern Europe would help bring local military forces
up to NATO training and interoperability standards, stabilize still
fragile democracies, provide an economic boost to nascent market
economies, position U.S. forces in proximity to potential areas of
instability, and provide access to excellent training areas. In the next
decade, Poland is the logical choice to accept the stationing of a U.S.
brigade due to its strategic position between Germany and Russia,
excellent training facilities, air and sea ports, military significance,
and public support for defense. In the longer term, Romania might
be a candidate for stationing of an additional U.S. brigade, provided
its defense reforms proceed apace. Both of these nations would view
a U.S. presence on their territory as a valuable symbol of solidarity,
one that will reap dividends in the future as the United States seeks
reliable partners for operations around the world.
A revised basing plan, built on the Efficient Basing Initiatives
already in progress, would position U.S. Army Europe for effective
engagement in Europe for decades to come. To make this imperative
a reality, the following recommendations are necessary:
• U.S. European Command should work through the Joint
Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense to convene an
Interagency Policy Coordination Committee to design a
politico-military plan to address issues concerning basing
of U.S. forces in Eastern Europe. The result should be
a diplomatic plan to convince NATO of the benefits of
stationing a U.S. brigade in Poland, while alleviating Russian
concerns.
• U.S. European Command, under the auspices of the State
Department and Department of Defense, should coordinate
with the Polish government to survey potential areas in
which to station a U.S. brigade, to include air and sea ports
available for use during contingency operations, with a
follow-on study to be conducted in Romania.
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• Commander, U.S. European Command should work
through the Office of the Secretary of Defense to submit
testimony to Congress regarding the benefits and long-term
cost-effectiveness of basing a U.S. brigade in Poland. This
is crucial since Congress must approve any funding for the
facilities necessary to make such a move a reality.
• U.S. European Command, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Department of the Army should leverage
the movement of a Stryker brigade to Europe in 2007 to
convince Congress to approve funding now for construction
of new facilities in Poland, rather than stationing the brigade
in the currently planned location (Baumholder).
The stationing of a U.S. brigade in Poland would enhance NATO
and U.S. military readiness, while providing greater stability to
Central and Eastern Europe. It is a project worth pursuing today for
the dividends it will pay well into the future.
Europe is at peace today, but one should not be under any
illusion that the condition is permanent. The power and influence of
the United States in European affairs has suppressed national rivalry
and hostilities, but absent American involvement, great power
competition would sooner or later resume in unchecked fashion.
The enlargement of NATO has brought more nations than ever
before into a common security alliance that has provided a forum
for resolving disagreements and fashioning a mutual defense policy
to keep the continent at peace. To remain a functioning alliance,
however, NATO must adapt to the security needs of the 21st
century, or it will be seen as irrelevant and wither into insignificance.
NATO must ensure that its new members become net contributors
to alliance needs, not just consumers of a free security umbrella.
Either the United States and its European allies assist the new NATO
allies in becoming militarily relevant, or they will watch the alliance
atrophy into a genteel club where talk is more important that action.
Stationing of U.S. forces on the territory of the new allies is a key
move that will prevent degradation of the alliance. Failure to act will
result in a squandered opportunity to solidify the victory won at so
great a cost during the Cold War.
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CHAPTER 5
CREATING STRATEGIC AGILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan B. Hunter
Preparing for the future will require new ways of thinking,
and the development of forces and capabilities that can adapt
quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances. The
ability to adapt will be critical in a world defined by surprise and
uncertainty.
Donald H. Rumsfield1

Introduction.
Fifty-two years ago the United States deployed combat forces to
the Republic of Korea (ROK) to defend that country from an invasion
by North Korea. Today over 37,000 U.S. troops remain deployed
in Korea to deter North Korean aggression.2 Although the U.S.
commitment to the defense of Korea has not changed in 50 years,
Northeast Asia has changed dramatically. The region has increased
in strategic significance to the United States, and the future stability of
this region is a vital interest of the United States. Despite the regional
changes, the American military presence in Korea has focused solely
on defending South Korea. The only other U.S. military presence in
the region is in Japan and has focused primarily on defense of Japan.
America’s defense structures in the region have not evolved to meet
the development and associated emerging strategic challenges.
Meanwhile, there is a growing resentment of this military presence
in the region. The U.S. commitment is unquestioned. However, it
appears the United States may be confronting a strategic policy
and military strategy disconnect in Northeast Asia. The strategic
challenges in the region demand more regional strategic agility than
exists with the current U.S. military force structure in Northeast
Asia. Thus, a change in organization, roles, and missions of U.S.
forces in South Korea is the most suitable, feasible, and acceptable
way for the U.S. to address these new challenges.
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Regional Overview.
Northeast Asia comprises five nations: Japan, South Korea, North
Korea, China, and the eastern portions of Russia.3 The Northeast
Asia region encompasses the majority of the economic and military
power of Asia, and the future stability of this region is a vital interest
of the United States.4
South Korea lies at the geographic center of the region and has
long been a cultural crossroads in Asia. It represents a historic land
bridge from Japan to China. It is largely this geographic position
that elevates its strategic importance5. In less than 50 years, it has
overcome the devastation of war to become a world economic
power, ranking 13th in world gross domestic product.6 Strong and
continuous U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military support has
bolstered this success. Today South Korea remains well-positioned
to continue its economic growth.7 Korean goods are competitive on
the world market, and internal fiscal policies make Korea attractive
to international investment.8 South Korea appears to aim at
becoming the facilitator of a Northeast Asian economic community
that, if successful, would dwarf the European Union.9 Nevertheless,
the economy faces potential threats; an attack from the North, the
impact on the South of an internal collapse in North Korea, and
the potential economic fallout from Chinese/Japanese economic
competition. These scenarios have implications for the U.S. economy
as well.
The Korean/U.S. alliance remains instrumental to the nation’s
economic and democratic success, and is the most significant
deterrent to North Korea. For many years the South Koreans viewed
North Korea as a direct threat to their nation, and thus they fielded
the world’s sixth largest military force to defend their nation.10 The
Koreans accepted the impact of a large American military presence
as a necessary price of maintaining their freedom. Today, however,
there is a growing anti-American sentiment in Korea. Many Koreans
consider the United States to be domineering and paternalistic.
The new South Korean President, Roh Moo-Hyun, campaigned on
an anti-American platform and promised that Korea would never
“kowtow” to the United States. Moreover, he commented that the
50-year-old alliance needed to “mature and advance.”11
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The present anti-American sentiment rests on a combination of
the Asian philosophy of self reliance, the perception of their being
treated as the junior partner in the alliance, and the maturation of
South Korea’s defense capabilities. There is also great resentment of
America’s hard line approach toward North Korea that appears at
odds with South Koreas policy of engagement toward North Korea
known as the “Sunshine Policy.” Many in the South perceive the
recent provocative actions by the North as resulting from this U.S.
hard-line policy.12 South Korean strategic objectives are the peaceful
renunciation of the peninsula, economic prosperity in the south, and
increased independent political influence in the region. While South
Korea’s pride envisions a self-sufficient Korea that will not rely on
U.S. forces, at least for the near term, U.S. military forces in Korea are
essential to South Korea’s defense.
North Korea, on the other hand, represents the classic example of
a failed economy, with a political system characterized by a bizarre
personality cult, reinforced by brainwashing and brutal repression
by a fanatical military.13 It is the antithesis of the other nations of
Northeast Asia. The despotic government focuses the nation’s
efforts on a military first policy, while its citizens starve. Kim Chong
Il is a reclusive, unpredictable, frightening dictator, who remains
one of the world’s most significant threats to peace and stability.14 A
recent Japanese assessment describes him as “shrewd and intelligent
enough to outwit and outmaneuver the opponent.”15
North Korea retains an ambition of becoming a world power and
has not given up on its ambition to dominate the Korean Peninsula.
In the midst of economic collapse, it still fields the world’s fifth largest
military force.16 This force is still very capable, with 70 percent of its
army deployed within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone, which
separates North and South Korea.17 Most threatening are the artillery
forces deployed within range of Seoul. Analysts estimate North
Korean artillery units can fire up to 500,000 rounds per hour against
South Korea, which would result in tremendous civilian casualties,
especially in the densely populated Seoul area. 18 Moreover, North
Korea claims to possess at least two nuclear weapons and has
announced its withdrawal from the international nonproliferation
treaty. Its long range missile program is also aggressive with proven
capability to range any of the Northeast Asian nations and even
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the United States.19 North Korea also possesses a robust chemical
weapons stockpile and most likely a biological weapons program as
well.
Diplomatic overtures to South Korea in 2000 gave optimists hope
that North Korea had abandoned its long-stated goal of reunifying
Korea under North Korea. Whether this goal remains is a subject
of great debate. Although Kim has indicated that he might perhaps
accept U.S. Force presence during the initial stages of reunification,
he will eventually demand withdrawal of all U.S. forces to facilitate
his long term objectives.20 Nevertheless, North Korea blames the
United States for its internal challenges, and international isolation.
The future of North Korea has great strategic implications for the
United States. An attack by the North would immediately embroil
the United States in a major conflict. An internal collapse in the North
would require massive humanitarian support and create economic
conditions that would threaten the South Korean economy. Kim
Chong Il’s relationship with China and Russia continues to represent
a challenge for the United States in the region as well.
China is emerging as a superpower with the economic, military,
and manpower potential to become a peer competitor of the United
States. The Chinese field the world’s largest military force, are a
nuclear power, and posses the world’s sixth largest gross domestic
product. They seek to create hegemony and regional leadership in
Northeast Asia, one challenged only by the United States. Some
academics believe conflict between the United States and China is
inevitable as each pursue their strategic goals in the region.21
China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner, providing
aid in excess of $470 million annually. It also provides over 70 percent
of North Koreas fuel imports and a third of all grain imports.22
Despite this, China’s commitment to North Korea is waning. The
Chinese have a growing diplomatic and economic relationship with
South Korea, one threatened by North Korea’s strategic ambitions.
Moreover, China has grown increasingly frustrated with the internal
situation within North Korea, one that has resulted in a refugee flow
across the Yalu into its already troubled northeastern border region.
Aid to North Korea is an economic burden as well. Most troubling
to China is the potential of war on the Korean peninsula. Such a war
would eventually result in a U.S.-supported South Korean victory,
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closer ties between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, and
continued U.S. military presence in the region―exactly what the
Chinese want to avoid. Additionally the development of nuclear
weapons by North Korea disrupts the balance of power in the region
and risks igniting a nuclear arms race. It could also push Japan into
developing nuclear weapons―something the Chinese desperately
want to avoid.
Stability on the Korean peninsula benefits Chinese long-term
national goals. Perhaps more importantly, China sees U.S. military
presence as a balance that keeps Japan from expanding its military
capability beyond the present self-defense capabilities. On the other
hand, the North Korean situation does give China strategic leverage,
and serves as a subtle foil against the United States over the Taiwan
issue. China may prefer a more stable North Korea, but the continued
existence of a separate North Korean nation, nonaligned with the
west, as a limiting force to external influences on the peninsula,
represents a strategic advantage for China.23
Japan is one of the world’s leading economic powers. Despite
recent setbacks, it still has the world’s second largest gross domestic
product, behind that of the United States.24 The two nations’
economies are inextricably entwined. Militarily Japan has begun
to move beyond its post-World War II self-imposed limitation of
military power. It is seeking an evolving security role in Northeast
Asia, while actively involving itself in a long standing regional land
dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands.25
Japanese strategic goals focus around the need to maintain its
position as a global player with significant influence. While it has
influence today, there are internal challenges that may threaten its
position in the future. Japan’s economic power has been singularly
responsible for its global position and influence, but that power
has displayed some weaknesses in recent years.26 The effect is felt
outside Japan as well, with the weakness of the yen impacting the
global financial markets. Japanese efforts to battle deflation led to
a weak yen, which could lead to competitive depreciation in the
region, eventually forcing China and South Korea to cheapen their
currencies to remain competitive in the export market.27 These moves
have caused serious repercussions for the American economy.
Even with a strong Japanese economy, China and South Korea are
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potential challengers to Japanese regional economic hegemony.
Japan has limited its military power to only self-defense
capabilities, relying on its relationship with the United States to
ensure the nation’s defense. Today the Japanese are wrestling with
this approach, and many are concerned with the lack of a legitimate
national military element of power. If Japanese economic influence
becomes threatened, there may be a greater need for military power.
With a possible Korean reunification on the horizon, the Japanese
remain worried about the future of U.S. forces in the region. A
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea would present a significant
threat. The Japanese are asking, “What should a nation do to ensure
the security of its citizens? In light of world peace and stability to the
security and prosperity of Japan . . . what concrete measure should
be taken to further strengthen our contribution to international
efforts to resolve conflicts?”28 This is a call for greater Japanese
military participation in regional and international efforts at
resolving conflicts. Prime Minister Koizumi has urged modification
of the Self-Defense Forces charter so they can perform “territorial
security missions” and participate in international crisis response
actions.29 However, such a shift from self-defense, and the associated
perception of a rearming Japan, may only add to the regional
tensions.
Too many overlook Russia as a Northeast Asian nation, but,
in fact, it remains an influential regional power with strategic
ambitions. Russia borders China, North Korea, and Japan’s islands.
Although challenged economically, it still ranks tenth in gross
domestic product, fields the world’s third largest military, and has
the world’s largest nuclear force.30 During the Cold War, the Soviet
Union was a key supporter of North Korea, and it still maintains
close ties. North Korea has often played China and Russia against
each other to achieve its objectives. In the immediate aftermath of
the fall of the Soviet regime, the new Russian government ignored
its interests in Northeast Asia. Today, Russia realizes the strategic
importance of this region, especially its economic potential. It seems
to be focusing much strategic effort on maintaining a powerful voice
in the region.
Within Northeast Asia, the Russians view China as their peer
competitor militarily. China, Japan, and South Korea all threaten
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Russia economically. There are regional land disputes with Japan
over the Kurile Islands, while Russia remains concerned about the
balance of power in the region, especially the uncertain influence
of the United States and China following a reunification of the two
Koreas. Russia’s immediate strategy in Northeast Asia includes
four characteristics: greater integration into the world economy,
aggressive diplomacy emphasizing multilateral approaches to
problem solving, recognizing the distinct interest and orientation of
Russia’s regions that face the Pacific, and an integrated and dynamic
pursuit of economic and strategic objectives.31
Therefore, within this region there are economic rivalries among
China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. There is political and military
rivalry between North Korea and South Korea, while the former
is a rogue state with ambitions empowered by a large military
force and nuclear weapons. There are territorial land disputes
involving China, Russia, and Japan. And there are internal economic
challenges for all five states. All of the above have repercussions
directly or indirectly on the United States and its strategic policies.
Compounding an already complex situation is the growing demand
within South Korea and Japan for the removal of U.S. forces. Given
this convergence of competing economies, large military capabilities,
competing regional objectives, and the uncertainty of a well armed
rogue state, the future of the region is far from certain, and of great
strategic importance to the United States. Continued U.S. military
presence is an essential element of overall U.S. strategy in this
troubled region.
U.S. Military Presence in the Region.
Approximately 90,000 U.S. military personnel serve in Northeast
Asia, assigned to bases in South Korea and Japan. U.S. Forces Korea
(USFK) totals 37,000 personnel, with 47,000 assigned to U.S. Forces
Japan (USFJ).32 This may appear a formidable military presence,
but the singular mission focus of most of these forces, along with a
paucity of actual combat forces, results in limited available combat
power. This limited combat power creates strategic risk for the
United States in the region.
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The U.S. military presence in South Korea has been the
stabilizing force in the region for the last 50 years. U.S. Forces Korea
is a subunified command of Pacific Command.33 Its mission remains
the same since the armistice ending the war: deter aggression against
South Korea, and, should deterrence fail, defeat the aggressor. It is
a “ready to fight tonight” organization. Forces assigned to U.S.
Forces Korea, combined with South Korea’s forces, remain sufficient
for deterrence, and, if necessary, defeat of a North Korean attack.
Subsequent offensive operations, however, require follow-on forces
from the United States.
The air component of USFK comprises a numbered Air Force
(Seventh Air Force) with two fighter wings. These two wings
combined have three fighter squadrons with F-16s and one squadron
of A-10 aircraft.34 There are no naval or Marine forces permanently
assigned in South Korea, although each has a small headquarters
element; U.S. Naval Forces Korea (USNFK) and U.S. Marine Forces
Korea (MARFOR-K). The Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III
MEF) in Okinawa and the Seventh Fleet, home-ported at Sasebo,
Japan, become the designated marine and naval forces of U.S. Forces
Korea upon commencement of hostilities. Eighth Army is the major
U.S. ground combat force in Korea, and serves as the Army Service
Component Command. It has a large theater army headquarters and
several major subordinate commands with combat forces.
Eighth Army’s air cavalry brigade contains two AH-64 attack
helicopter battalions. Its general support aviation brigade has one
lift battalion (UH-60) and one medium lift battalion (CH-47). It also
has a Patriot Missile Battalion deployed in Korea defending critical
facilities from air/missile attack. Although not considered combat
forces, critical combat multipliers in Korea include the theater
intelligence brigade and signal brigade deployed in support of U.S.
Forces Korea. These two brigades fulfill the unique role of theater
intelligence and theater C4I and provide a critical capability.
The largest ground combat force is an infantry division (Second
Infantry Division). This division has an organization unique in
the U.S. Army that provides capabilities in certain areas, although
shortfalls in others. The division has only two ground maneuver
brigades, (one armor and one infantry), vice the standard three.35
The Aviation brigade has a lift battalion (UH-60s) and an air cavalry
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squadron (OH-58D-KW), but limited attack capability with only
an AH-64 battalion. The division’s artillery Brigade (DIVARTY)
possesses the majority of the firepower. The DIVARTY contains two
155mm self-propelled howitzer battalions and the unique addition
of two multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battalions.36 This is a
specific design to support the theater counterfire fight against North
Korean artillery.
Unique to Korea is the command arrangement under which
these forces operate. During peacetime U.S. Forces Korea is under
operational control of Pacific Command. However, upon declaration
of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, or as directed, these forces
fall under the operational control of Combined Forces Command.
Combined Forces Command is a combined defense organization of
South Korean and U.S. forces, with the responsibility for prosecuting
a war on the peninsula, should one occur. All training and planning of
U.S. forces in Korea focuses on supporting this mission. Additionally,
since assigned to Combined Forces Command, the U.S. forces in
Korea must meet requirements concerning force availability, and are
not generally available for deployment outside of South Korea. This
restriction creates further limits on U.S. regional agility.
U.S. Forces Japan, like U.S. Forces Korea, is a subunified command
of Pacific Command. This command numbers approximately 47,000
personnel with a Theater Army (U.S. Army Japan) as the army’s
component, a numbered air force (Fifth Air Force), a Marine
Expeditionary Force (III MEF), and the Seventh Fleet as naval
component. Upon a closer look, what is within these organizations
does not represent a robust combat force.
Fifth Air Force, based at Yakota, Japan, is the air component. It
consists of two fighter wings and an airlift wing. There are presently
two squadrons of F-15s in the fighter wings, primarily for airto-air combat. The remaining two fighter squadrons are F-16C/J
“Wild Weasel” aircraft, specially configured for the suppression of
enemy air defense mission.37 These forces train both for the Japanese
defense missions and other missions in the Pacific region. They are
more readily available than forces in Korea to support regional
contingencies. However, they are critical for the defense of Korea,
should hostilities occur.

137

A final key element of the Air Force in Japan is the 353d Special
Operations Group. This group provides air support to special
operations forces and flies the MC-130 Combat Talons and MC-130P
Combat Shadow aircraft. Of note, this force provides the fixed wing
insertion capability for the special operations elements of the Korean
Army. This capability represents a critical role, should hostilities
commence in Korea, because the South Koreans posses no such
capability.
The U.S. Army headquarters in Japan is a skeleton organization
designed to maintain a logistics/support infrastructure for missions
supporting operations in Japan or Korea. It centers around a theater
support command that provides a robust theater level logistics
infrastructure. The only deployed army combat force in Japan is a
Special Forces battalion from First Special Forces Group.
The Marine Expeditionary Force in Japan also consists mostly
of headquarters and staff elements. The Marine combat elements,
located on Okinawa, include a Marine Division headquarters, a
Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC), and a Marine Air Wing. However, there are few actual combat
units within these units. The Marine division has only a regimental
headquarters element permanently deployed on Okinawa. Its
three subordinate battalions are part of unit deployment program
(UDP) and rotate to Okinawa for 6-month training rotations.38 The
supporting artillery forces on Okinawa are also unit deployment
program battalions, with only one or two batteries deployed in
Okinawa at any given time. This unit-based rotation to a forward
presence mission is unique within the Marine Corps. The Marine
expeditionary unit consists of a reinforced infantry battalion with
fires, aviation, and support element. Although based in Japan,
this element embarks with its amphibious ready group and can
be anywhere in the PACOM area doing a variety of missions at
any time. It may or may not be available to support a combat
requirement in Northeast Asia. Finally, the Marines have a Marine
Air Wing permanently deployed to Okinawa in support of the
Marine Expeditionary Force. This wing includes three FA-18 C/D
squadrons, with helicopter support.
The most powerful combat force in Japan is the Seventh Fleet.
Although the Seventh Fleet is home-ported in Japan, it is actually a
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subordinate of the Pacific Fleet. Seventh Fleet can comprise a number
of ships, but primarily consists of the Kitty Hawk Carrier Battle
Group. The missions of Seventh Fleet are unique, as it has a forward
presence mission in the Western Pacific region that frequently takes
it outside the Northeast Asia area. In addition to a role in defense
of Japan and Taiwan, the Seventh Fleet also serves as the U.S. Navy
element in defense of Korea. Commander Seventh Fleet serves as
the Commander Combined Naval Forces Korea upon activation.
Even with its mission for the defense of Japan and Korea, the Kitty
Hawk battle group often deploys outside the region, including stints
in the Indian Ocean in support of the war against terrorism. As this
chapter is being written, the Kitty Hawk has deployed to the Central
Command area of operations for operations against Iraq. These
situations further restrict U.S. agility in Northeast Asia.
In sum, on any given day in Japan, the Marines may have only one
to two infantry battalion equivalents available to provide immediate
support to a regional contingency. If the Marine Expeditionary Unit
is committed in Southeast Asia or somewhere such as Timor, there
is only one Marine Infantry battalion available in theater. The only
other ground force in Japan is the Special Forces Battalion which is
a highly specialized unit with limited capabilities. The Carrier Battle
Group is tremendous capability, but lacks any type land power other
than what Marine forces in Okinawa may be available. The battle
group’s area of operations is the entire Pacific Command area, and it
to can easily be 5-7 days away. Even if at port in Japan, if “steam is
not up,” it may take 2-5 days to deploy the group.
In summary, given the sole defense focus of forces in Korea, if
an immediate crisis developed in Northeast Asia outside Korea and
the National Command Authority required a response involving
ground presence within 48 hours, the only forces that the U.S.
military leadership could guarantee would be available, trained,
and ready in theater is a little more than one infantry battalion. One
infantry battalion out of a regional presence of over 90,000 does not
provide U.S. decisionmakers strategic agility in an area of such vital
interest.
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A Review of Options.
The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States lists
the following objectives, each of which is directly applicable to
America’s strategic objectives in Northeast Asia.
• Champion aspirations for human dignity.
• Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to
prevent attacks against us and our friends.
• Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
• Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our
friends with weapons of mass destruction.
• Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free
markets and free trade.
• Expand the circle of development by opening societies and
building the infrastructure of development.
• Transform America’s National Security Institutions to meet
the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.
The National Security Strategy further states,
The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces
and their forward presence has maintained the peace in some of
the world’s most strategically vital regions . . . The presence of
American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of
the US commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness
to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the
United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of
power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to
meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will
require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe
and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for
the long-distance deployment of US Forces.39

These requirements mandate a capable military presence in
Northeast Asia. Unfortunately, the current presence focuses on past,
not future requirements. The volatility of the region justifies the need
for greater strategic agility. However, the internal pressures over U.S.
force presence both in Japan and Korea make any increase in either
of these countries unlikely. Both Korea and Japan have considerable
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trouble with the impact of current force levels. These negative
impacts include space, training area requirements, the environment,
and the dollar amount of burden-sharing costs borne by the host
nation. Notable incidents such as the recent rape of a Japanese
woman by a U.S. Marine and the deaths of two Korean school-girls
run over by an armored vehicle have further exasperated an already
difficult situation. Keeping the current level of forces is a daily battle,
not only with South Korea and Japan, but also with forces within the
Department of Defense and Congress; the idea of adding forces is a
nonstarter. Establishing a U.S. presence in China or Russia, at least in
the near future, is also not an option. Japan based U.S. forces already
have a mission covering the entire PACOM area.
However, there are opportunities to develop greater strategic
agility within the structure of U.S. Forces Korea. But there are calls
coming not only from North Korea and an ever growing percentage
of the South Koreans, but also from the United States Congress and
the U.S. Department of Defense for an American withdrawal. Many
argue that the United States should withdraw its forces from Korea
and, if necessary, move them to Japan. Those who advocate such a
policy hold a number of assumptions, unfortunately mostly false.
Some believe South Korea is not at risk from the North and therefore
maintaining a force presence in that country is no longer a vital
interest of the United States. North Korean capabilities and intent
counters this argument. South Korea acknowledges that the U.S.
presence and capability is the principle deterrent to North Korea.
Even with the eroding conventional capabilities of North Korea, the
long range missile threat coupled with the threat of weapons of mass
destruction assure that, even if South Korea did eventually defeat
the North, the expected devastation and casualties from artillery and
missile attacks against South Korean infrastructure and population
centers are unacceptable.
Others argue that although North Korea still presents a legitimate
threat to the security and perhaps survival of South Korea, the U.S
presence in Japan is enough to handle any Korean contingency
and provides sufficient regional presence. The above analysis
indicates that the available combat power in Japan under the best of
circumstances is the equivalent of two infantry battalions, three to
four fighter squadrons, and the two fighter squadrons equivalents of
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the Kitty Hawk Battle Group (if not deployed outside the area). The
problem becomes a time/space challenge. If U.S. forces withdraw
from Korea, they will possess only limited access for a return to
South Korea. The range limitations associated with operations from
Japanese bases impacts the sortie generation capability, delaying
response times. Operations from Japan would require Japanese
approval. A lesson from today’s buildup in the Persian Gulf is that
there is never a guarantee of political approval of allies. However,
negative impact on the command and control integration with South
Korean defense forces is perhaps the greatest disadvantage if U.S.
forces moved to Japan.
Perhaps the most important justification for remaining in Korea
is the fundamental nature of Combined Forces Command, the
alliance’s warfighting command. This force leverages the combined
capabilities brought by the United States and South Korea. Its
effectiveness rests on the synergy gained from the relationship,
and the resultant asymmetric advantages created as compared with
North Korea. For example, the South Koreans provide the majority
of the defensive forces in manpower, over 600,000 daily, in defense
of South Korea. But South Korea lacks many of the modern precision
engagement weapons and other combat multipliers. The United
States brings the intelligence, command and control, precision attack,
theater missile defense, SOF infiltration capabilities, and much more.
This complementary effect is what creates the combat power capable
of defeating a North Korean attack, while protecting Seoul.
There is also a budget issue. The Korean Defense budget is
$14 Billion for 2003.40 However, there is little available to invest in
developing organic systems to replace the systems the US brings
to the fight. This year Korean defense development priorities are a
MLRS type system and a destroyer project for the Navy. The costs
of these weapons systems prevented Korea from pursuing a Patriot
type Theater Ballistic Missile capability as well as other needed
defense improvements. The U.S. military commitment to South
Korea provides large economic savings for the Korean Government,
allowing it to invest these savings in other critical domestic and
foreign programs. The cost of the U.S. presence in Korea to the
U.S. budget is $1.3 Billion, which does not include the investment
and procurement costs of the systems themselves, such as attack
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helicopters or the extensive space system necessary to support
Korea’s defense.41 If the United States were to withdraw its military
from South Korea, it would take South Korea a number of years to
attain such capabilities, thus providing a window of opportunity to
North Korea.
Some still argue American force projection capabilities from
Alaska, Hawaii, and the west coast of United States could easily
substitute for forces in the region. The deployment time is again
the critical factor. Under best cases, one could expect to deploy a
brigade or perhaps air elements to Korea within 96 hours. Over the
years the unambiguous warning time of impending North Korean
attack has declined from 10 days to as little as 72 hours.42 Forces off
the peninsula simply cannot get there in time. Additionally with the
world-wide demands on U.S. forces, especially as the United States
is engaged in war with Iraq, those forces apportioned to support
Pacific Command will out of necessity deploy elsewhere and not be
available.
Accepting that Korea is at risk should America withdraw forces,
even to Japan, some still argue that the ingratitude and mass antiAmerican sentiment justifies leaving Korea to deal with its own
problems. Admittedly, there are tensions resulting from U.S presence
in South Korea. Incidents such as violent crime by American service
members and tragic accidents certainly enflame these tensions.
However, on the whole, both government officials and the citizens
of South Korea generally accept the necessity of a U.S. presence as a
vital interest of their country.43
Finally, some argue that a U.S. withdrawal from South Korea
will lead to greater regional stability, since the regional states,
especially China and Japan, will likely take a more active regional
role. Although certainly this might occur, the result could well be
counter to America’s strategic objectives in Northeast Asia with
an arms race, even a nuclear arms race in the region. Such a state
of affairs would threaten U.S. vital interests and would definitely
limit U.S. influence. The fact is that the U.S. military presence in
Korea has been a stabilizing force in the region that prevents such
an occurrence.
While the above makes a case for retaining U.S. forces in South
Korea, the present unsatisfactory situation demands change. There
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are negative aspects and false assumptions about the role and
significance of current U.S. forces in Korea. The first consideration
addresses the question of deterrence. Just how much U.S. military
presence is required to deter North Korea? The two components of
deterrence are capability and intent. For North Korea, the calculation
boils down to: Does the United States have the capability to defend
South Korea and the intent to become involved in a major theater
war? The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea is a strong indicator
of such intent. These forces inextricably link an attack on Korea as
a direct attack against the United States, justifying U.S. retaliation
with all its might on North Korea. The United States must keep
soldiers on the ground to maintain this strategic deterrence against
North Korea. However, does the same deterrence exist with 25,000
U.S. forces in South Korea? What about 10,000? Strategic deterrence
is the result not only of deployed forces, but also a combination of
all the elements of U.S. power and a coherent strategy toward North
Korea. U.S. boots on the ground in forward defense represents
a considerable political statement and a legitimate tripwire that
commits the United States. As long as U.S. forces of some sort remain
associated with forward defense, this tripwire exists, and thus the
intent portion of deterrence remains unambiguous. The numbers are
not so important.
The second component of deterrence is capability, and, on this
point, numbers and the capabilities of those forces matter. U.S.
forces represent a critical element of South Korea’s capability to
defeat a North Korean attack. The United States brings asymmetric
advantage and technological overmatch to South Korea’s defense
capabilities. These capabilities force the North Koreans to confront
the probability of their defeat, if they choose to go to war. Without
U.S. capabilities a North Korean attack is unlikely to succeed but
the extent of the threat by itself could gain considerable political
concessions from South Korea. U.S. forces in South Korea ensure
deterrence.
This leads to the faulty assumption that U.S. ground combat
presence in South Korea is the principle force on which deterrence
rests. This is not the case. South Korea provides approximately 50
divisions for defense of the nation. The United States provides one
division. America’s most significant contributions to the defense of
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South Korea lie the areas of command and control, intelligence, and
precision attack (both airpower and long range fires), and theater
missile defense. These asymmetric capabilities significantly enhance
South Korea’s military capabilities.
Despite these advantages, U.S. forces in South Korea cause
great stress on South Koreans. American bases, in many cases
operationally malpositioned, take valuable land needed to support
a growing population.44 The cost to support U.S. forces in Korea is
quite large. Moreover, the decay of U.S. facilities in Korea results
in a significant commitment of service budgets to improve quality
of life, including building new barracks and housing facilities. This
expansion of U.S presence further inflames the South Koreans,
who see these efforts as evidence of long term increased American
presence and not a path toward reducing pressures. The “center of
gravity” of U.S. forces remains in the capital, on what is perhaps
the most valuable real estate in Seoul, similar to the Koreans having
a large military post in Central Park in New York. In addition, the
current presence represents a significant challenge to the services,
considering other worldwide commitments. Since most Korean
assignments are a 1-year remote tour, a large percentage of the force
is either preparing for a Korean tour, serving in Korea, or recovering
from a recently completed tour.
There is serious tension between Korea and the United States in
the defense relationship. America brings the asymmetric capabilities
and technological overmatch, but also the extensive requirements
to train and exercise those forces to U.S. standards and well as meet
the associated U.S. quality of life standards for the troops. This,
along with a U.S policy that South Koreans perceive as counter to
their “sunshine policy” further exasperates the pressures on them.
These pressures contribute to the perception that the United States
is domineering and parental in its defense relationship with South
Korea. For example Combined Forces Command, the defense
organization which controls all U.S. and Korean forces in defense
of South Korea, comprises approximately 50 divisions. There is
only one U.S. division, yet the United States insists on an American
General in command. While there are valid reasons, this demand
represents a vivid example of the friction points that strain the
relationships. Clearly from the regional assessment and review
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of military presence in the region there is little argument that U.S.
forces need to be in South Korea. However, if the force presence is
itself a source of some of the strategic friction between the United
States and South Korea, is there a way to maximize capabilities,
while minimizing the associated challenges?
A Recommended Strategy.
Improvement will require not only technological solutions,
but also cultural change; a willingness to challenge standard
practices, and question current organizational patterns and
command processes.
General Richard B. Myers, CJCS45

Given that U.S. forces in Korea are necessary to defend South
Korea and that Japan is not likely to accept additional forces,
modifications to the U.S. force structure in Korea must meet two
conditions. First, the U.S. military force presence in South Korea
must ensure the defense of South Korea. Second, the forces must be
capable of meeting U.S. regional strategic objectives. Based on the
assumption that any future plan must ensure no overall strategic
risk to the defense of Korea and that there will be no additional
forces available and “less is better,” the United States should
consider the possibilities of reorganizing current forces, focusing on
maximizing the essential capabilities provided to defense of Korea,
while simultaneously developing a regional response capability
with available forces.
The evolution of the South Korean military provides insight
into possible areas where U.S force presence can change. Following
the Korean War, the defense of Korea was solely dependent on U.S
forces. Over time the South Koreans developed a large and capable
military force. Today many analysts believe South Korean ground
forces could successfully defend South Korea against North Korean
ground attack. However, it is what the U.S. Forces bring to the
fight that ensures a rapid victory, as well as the protection of key
infrastructure. The value of the U.S. contribution is not the ground
maneuver forces, but rather the technological combat multipliers
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and resultant asymmetric advantages. The U.S. multiple launch
rocket systems, long-range canon systems, and precision all-weather
air force attack capabilities are essential to defeat a North Korean
attack. U.S. intelligence systems bring unmatched situational
awareness to the South Koreans. Early warning of a North Korean
attack is not possible without these capabilities. Coordinating the
various South Korean and U.S. forces and directing this million man
combined force requires the U.S. command and control capabilities
and advanced technologies that American forces integrate into the
command structure. The Patriot systems are also vital for key target
defense.
Given these capabilities essential for defense of Korea, it leaves
a significant amount of the U.S military presence Korea that is not
so essential for deterrence or a successful defense. Specifically
other than counterfire and associated counterfire support units
of the Second Infantry Division, the rest of the division is not
essential. However, since there is limited U.S. capability to respond
to contingencies in the Northeast Asia region, it seems more
prudent to explore options to utilize better these noncritical forces
to satisfy U.S. regional requirements. There are many advantages
to restructuring the current presence in Korea to an organization
that maximizes the capabilities essential to defeat a North Korean
attack, while simultaneously creating a regional joint task force. This
task force would focus primarily on regional contingencies, with a
reinforcement mission in Korea.
A possible course of action to meet the two requirements of
defense and regional agility is to reduce the 2nd Infantry Division
from a full division to a smaller, functionally focused force. It would
be a “fires based” combat command construct with associated
intelligence, security, aviation support, and a large logistics force.
This would be a fires-based element designed largely to provide
long-range operational fires to defeat a North Korean attack, in other
words a counterfire task force. This would maintain the U.S. boots
on the ground for deterrence, and the essential U.S. contributions
to forward defense of South Korea. The headquarters element of
the counterfire task force (recommended one star general officer
commanding) would include a small operations and planning staff,
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a small logistics coordination staff, and much of the near real time
targeting capability of the current division’s intelligence staff. The
goal would be to gain at least a 60 percent or larger reduction in the
current headquarters.
The actual fires task force would be built from the two Multiple
Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalions, two self-propelled
artillery battalions, a small aviation element with C2, lift, and scout
capabilities, intelligence, signal, air defense capabilities, and, most
importantly, a tailored logistics unit approximating the size of a
main support battalion. A South Korean infantry battalion could
serve as a security force for this task force.
Such a functional based fires organization is not unprecedented
in the U.S. Army. The former 56th Field Artillery Command
(Pershing) is a historic model for such a force.46 That unit formed up
in the mid 1980s as a command responsible for providing general
support nuclear fires in support of the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe. Its construct applied in Korea would restructure the forces
in 2nd Infantry Division to a command optimized to perform the
division’s most critical mission; providing responsive long-range
fires. A possible organization is shown in Figure 1.

Fires Task
Force

X

AVN
2 MLRS BN
2 155 BN (SP)

MI

SECURITY BN
(ROK ARMY)

1 UH-60 CO(LIFT)
UH-60 DET (C2)
2 RECON CO

SIGNAL

HHC

SUPPORT
I ENGR BN

CHEM

Figure 1. Proposed Fires Task Force.
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The second element in the reorganization plan would be to create
additional U.S. strategic agility in Northeast Asia by developing a
standing, rapidly deployable joint task force from available elements
in theater, with no reduction in the capability to defend South Korea.
This task force would primarily focus externally on Northeast Asia,
but would retain the capability to respond within South Korea in event
of hostilities. Such a force would meet the emerging goals espoused
in recent Department of Defense documents, which identify several
operational themes needed to maintain U.S. military preeminence
in the 21st century. One specific requirement for future forces is “to
develop tailored combat forces that are joint and expeditionary in
character, rapidly deployable and immediately employable from
a forward posture to assure U.S. allies and partners, or dissuade,
deter, or defeat an adversary when necessary.”47 Core capabilities for
this force would include not only combat, but capabilities for show
of force, force enhancements, military to military contact, peace
operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and humanitarian
assistance. This force could be the Pacific Command’s executive
agent for theater engagement strategy in Northeast Asia. The first
step of creation of this “Joint Task Force Northeast Asia” would be to
reorganize the elements of 2nd Infantry Division no longer necessary
to support the fires mission. Elements of these forces would form the
nucleus of a provisional joint task force.
The first and foremost requirement for such a Joint Task Force
would be to establish a permanent standing headquarters. This
would not be a joint task force “core” or “plug,” as currently
planned by Joint Forces Command, but a fully functional standing,
“warfighting” headquarters with permanently assigned personnel
capable of operationally employing joint forces in a variety of roles
anywhere in Northeast Asia. A large portion of this headquarters
could initially form up from elements in the current infantry division
headquarters. The present two-star commander could initially
become the unit’s commander, but the billet could easily, and
should, rotate between services. Initially, with the preponderance of
force coming from what was the 2nd Infantry Division, the division’s
staff would establish the initial headquarters, but over time these
billets should evolve into a truly joint headquarters. This could
occur in a relatively short time with the personnel available already
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in Pacific Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Forces Japan. The
end goal would be no net increase in personnel in Korea, but, in fact,
a reduction. The Joint Task Force should be a subordinate of Pacific
Command, even though located in South Korea. This is necessary
because of its regional focus outside of South Korea. U.S. Forces
Korea requires administrative control (ADCON) to facilitate routine
issues, with Pacific Command retaining operational command
(OPCOM).
The units comprising the Joint Task Force would be built
around functional elements. It should include an assigned ground
maneuver element, maneuver support element, and a protection
element. Initially the ground maneuver element would consist of
the two light infantry battalions of the 2nd Infantry Division, but
these would be placeholders for a Stryker brigade combat team, the
ideal army element for this Joint Task Force. Habitual relationships
should occur with air and Marine elements.
The air component of the joint task force could consist of one
fighter squadron from Kunsan which would train with the joint task
force. In the event of its employment, this fighter squadron would
serve as the primary air element. This would be an on order OPCON
type relationship. However, the JTF could function equally as well
with any air asset assigned, including forces out of Hawaii or Alaska
depending on the mission. Specialized aircraft in Japan such as F-15s
and F-16 SEAD aircraft would also train with the JTF to establish
relationships. The Marine Expeditionary Unit in Japan would
remain a separate force not assigned to Joint Task Force Northeast
Asia. However, the joint task force would be capable of adding the
MEU as a MAGTF operating under its headquarters if the situation
warranted. As such, sufficient Marine representation must form part
of the staff. A proposed model for the initial joint task force is shown
at Figure 2.
The location of this joint task force is extremely important. It
must be near airbases and ports capable of power projection. Kunsan
Air Base is one such location―and that location would remove the
headquarters and troops from the heavily congested areas of Seoul
and Pyongtek. It would also remove the joint task force from North
Korean artillery range and prove its nonoffensive nature following
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Figure 2. Proposed Joint Task Force.
reconciliation. A relocation of these forces would also ease the internal
tensions. The units assigned could rotate in and out in unit sets. For
example, an infantry battalion would do a 6-month rotation to the
joint task force, similar to Marine unit deployment rotations in Japan.
Since the vision is for such a force to spend much time off peninsula
in theater engagement missions, the task force would be a family
restricted tour, which would reduce the associated infrastructure
costs. Adopting the proposed force structure potentially would
provide an immediate reduction of forces in Korea of approximately
3,000 personnel within 2nd Infantry Division, as well as reduce the
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footprint of U.S. forces north of Seoul by almost 50 percent.48 This
would represent a substantial political statement to both North
Korea and South Korea.
The final element would address a sensitivity issue. As discussed,
Combined Forces Command, a predominately South Korean force,
still possesses a U.S four-star general as commander with a South
Korean four-star deputy. It is time to look closely at the benefits of
this command arrangement. The position of commander in chief and
deputy commander in chief should rotate between the United States
and South Korea. At the end of each 2-year term the positions would
switch between a U.S. commander in chief and South Korean deputy
to a South Korean commander in chief with a U.S. deputy. The issue
of the UN Command complicates this, but it could still be done. This
would do much to repair the perceptions of Korea being the junior
partner in the alliance.
In summary, this plan would reduce combat forces assigned
to U.S. Forces Korea to the critical capabilities for defense, create
a standing, rapidly deployable joint task force with a regional
mission, and provide opportunity for significant force reductions,
and significantly improve relations with South Korea.
This proposed phase one reorganization of US forces in Korea
provides these advantages over current force structure:
• Better satisfies regional objectives stated in the National
Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review.49
• Offers greater strategic agility for the U.S. in the region.
• Potentially could be packaged as a “reduction in threat” in
negotiations with the North in support of reconciliation or
disarmament.
• Allows more tailored training and packaging for the current
regional forces in Japan that today respond to many nations
within the PACOM area of responsibility.
• Sets the conditions for enduring U.S. military regional
capability within Korea post-reconciliation or reunification.
• Supports the creation of a Partnership for Peace type
organization in Northeast Asia to improve regional military
to military engagement, potentially involving China, Russia
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and perhaps even North Korea.
• Adds significant regional capability with no increase in force
structure.
• Sets the groundwork for a combined regional peacekeeping/
humanitarian force that could include Korean and/or
Japanese elements, i.e., U.S. forces with strategic lift provided
by Korea or Japan that would appeal to both Nation’s desires
for greater regional security roles.
• Would continue to give South Koreans more responsibility
for defense of their nation, which matches their own desires
of Chu’che (self-reliance).
• Finally, most significantly, all Northeast Asian states and
other Asian nations have their military power built around
land power (army forces). A regionally focused army ground
force with staying power is greatly needed.50
Following a reconciliation or reunification of the two Koreas,
the United States will undoubtedly need to make additional major
changes to its regional defense structure. As part of reunification
one can expect a rise in nationalism, and demands for an American
withdrawal from Korea. Assuming confidence-building measures
and conditions for reunification results in reduction of the North
Korean threat, especially artillery and weapons of mass destruction,
a fires-based combat force could be withdrawn from theater. The
removal of U.S. Forces Korea may be part of reunification conditions.
However, the Joint Task Force with a regional focus, and by then
credibility established through theater security engagement actions,
should not become part of such a withdrawal.
At that point, U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Force Japan could
restructure in a single command, perhaps a Northeast Asia
Command. This would remain a subordinate unified command
of Pacific Command, but would be a focus for employment of
U.S. military forces in Northeast Asia. Joint Task Force Northeast
Asia would remain a standing major subordinate command and
could evolve to a robust joint task force with additional roles and
missions.
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Conclusion.
The conventional threat from North Korea has deteriorated to the
point where the U.S. ground maneuver forces are no longer critical
for either deterrence or actively defending South Korea. Meanwhile,
the United States has too few options in theater to react elsewhere
in Northeast Asia. At the same time, Northeast Asia is rapidly
becoming a region that impacts many vital American interests. In
order to maintain strategic relevance and capabilities in Northeast
Asia, it is essential that the United States modify the force structure
and mission focus of forces assigned to the defense of Korea. By so
doing, it would provide a capability for more regional military-tomilitary engagement, and greater regional response. This option
fully supports the goals of the Quadrennial Defense Review and
National Security Strategy and may in fact help in reducing tensions
on the Korean Peninsula, including the growing demand for removal
of U.S. forces. Most importantly, following reunification there will
undoubtedly be calls for the United States to leave Korea. Adopting
the proposed model would provide a wider range of strategic
options for the United States. For example, it could withdraw the
proposed counterfire task force following reunification and bill it as
“the last US combat division leaving Korea,” a significant political
statement. Meanwhile the Joint Task Force would remain and
provide a significant, politically acceptable, U.S. regional capability
in this vital area. Cooperation with Korea, Japan, and perhaps China
and Russia, could bring enough combined capabilities to this task
force, and satisfy enough of their own regional security aspirations
that they would welcome, or at least accept, the presence of such a
force following Korean reconciliation or reunification.
There are risks, but increasing sales and fielding of U.S. systems
such as MLRS and missile defense systems to South Korea can
mitigate many of these. Since the standing joint task force remains
based on the peninsula with a reinforcing mission to U.S. Forces
Korea there would be little change in the combat capability available
to defend South Korea.
Setting the conditions for U.S. strategic presence in Northeast
Asia must occur today. The proposed model represents a much
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needed force construct adjustment, with no increased forces, and
positions the United States to be more strategically responsive and
relevant in Northeast Asia tomorrow.
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CHAPTER 6
THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN:
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Colonel G. K. Herring
The formulation of national strategy is critically important.
In essence, the process of strategic decisionmaking defines how a
nation will direct and coordinate the elements of national power to
achieve its goals. In times of conflict, strategy determines the nation’s
approach to conflict and defines the ends, ways, and means used to
prosecute war. Ultimately, it determines success or failure in war.1
Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the United
States found itself at war with al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden’s
international terrorist organization. In response to the terrorist
attacks, President George W. Bush’s administration formulated a
national strategy for the war in Afghanistan.2 What, then, was the
U.S. strategy for this war? And, more importantly, did it represent
an effective national strategy that will enable the United States to
achieve its goals?
What follows is a strategic analysis of the war in Afghanistan.
This chapter’s intent, first and foremost, is to articulate the strategic
objectives of the war, the approaches taken to achieve those
objectives, and the resources employed in each approach. In other
words, its primary purpose is to identify the ends, ways, and means
of American strategy. After describing what the United States has
been trying to accomplish in Afghanistan and how it has pursued
those objectives, this chapter will provide an assessment of U.S.
strategy by focusing primarily on whether or not the United States
has achieved its strategic objectives. It will conclude the analysis by
discussing implications for the future.
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush
administration established a national policy to guide America’s
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response to the attacks. In essence, its policy was to find those
responsible and bring them to justice.3 In doing so, the United
States would disable the terrorist organization in Afghanistan and
prevent the terrorists from mounting further attacks against the
United States. In his first televised speech following the attacks,
President Bush expanded the policy to include not only the terrorist
perpetrators, but those nations that harbor them, as well.4 In essence,
his policy made elimination of terrorist sanctuaries and support
systems as important as elimination of the terrorists themselves.
The Bush administration elected to focus initial efforts on
fighting the al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan.5 The al
Qaeda network, an organization with global reach, included terrorist
cells in nations around the world. However, its network thrived
in Afghanistan, where it enjoyed the support of the Taliban. In
addition, many key leaders of the al Qaeda network not only lived in
Afghanistan, but had directed attacks against the United States from
locations inside that country. Although other terrorist organizations
represented a threat to the United States, the administration decided
to pursue those organizations later, in a broader war on terrorism.
For the president and his national security advisors, the first order
of business was the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. As a result, in
the days and weeks immediately following the events of September
11, the administration focused on formulating a strategy for the war
against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters.6
The Ends.
The administration developed six strategic objectives for
operations in Afghanistan. The primary objective was to disrupt,
and if possible destroy, the al Qaeda network in that country. Osama
bin Laden and many of his key leaders had relocated to Afghanistan
from Sudan in 1996.7 They established headquarters and training
camps in the country and began orchestrating operations from there.
Following the attacks on September 11, the administration designed
military operations that would inflict real pain on the terrorists and
destroy the al Qaeda network, at least in Afghanistan.8
The United States also sought to convince, and if necessary
compel, the Taliban to cease support for terrorist organizations, al
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Qaeda’s in particular. In referring to the September 11 attacks, the
president declared, “We will not only deal with those who dare
attack America, we will deal with those who harbor them and feed
them and house them.”9 Statements from administration officials
made it clear that they saw little distinction between al Qaeda, who
had planned and executed the terrorist attacks, and the Taliban,
who supported the terrorists’ activities.10 Ultimately, the objective
of the Bush administration was to deny al Qaeda the sanctuary and
support it enjoyed in Afghanistan.
In addition, the Bush administration sought to demonstrate
that the United States was not at war with the Afghan people or
the Islamic religion. The administration sought to define the conflict
carefully in terms of terrorism, and narrow the scope of the conflict
to al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters. In doing so, it hoped to avoid
implications that the United States had embarked on a crusade
against Islam or was engaging in a fight against innocent Afghans.11
The administration also sought to demonstrate American resolve
in this war on terrorism. Bush and his top national security advisors
believed the Clinton administration’s response to bin Laden and
international terrorism had been, “so weak as to be provocative; a
virtual invitation to hit the United States again.”12 The objective now
was to convey, as forcefully as possible, the nation’s commitment.
In addition, many in the Bush administration felt that a perceived
aversion to casualties had emboldened terrorists to attack the
United States or U.S. interests around the world.13 To overcome
that perception, the administration intended to demonstrate total
commitment to the fight, to include a willingness to accept the risk
of casualties.
The strategy also included the objective of building international
support for the war in Afghanistan. The Bush administration
believed it would need broad international support for the war.14
Support from Afghanistan’s regional neighbors, in particular, would
provide the United States with the basing, access, and over-flight
rights necessary to prosecute a military campaign in Afghanistan.
Support from other nations would provide an added degree of
legitimacy and could lessen the burden of war on the United States.
Accordingly, the administration sought to involve as many nations
as possible.15
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The final objective was to stabilize Afghanistan following
the fighting. The intent was to avoid creating a vacuum in a
notoriously turbulent, unstable nation.16 When the fighting was
over, the administration wanted to establish conditions that would
foster security and stability. Moreover, it aimed at eliminating the
conditions that had promoted terrorism and support for terrorism.
In essence, the strategic intent was to prevent the reemergence of al
Qaeda in Afghanistan and the use of that country as a sanctuary for
terrorist organizations.
The Ways.
The United States adopted a variety of approaches to accomplish
its strategic objectives. It sought, first and foremost, to disrupt or
destroy the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. To do so, it mounted
an effort to kill or capture key terrorist leaders. In essence, the
president wanted to, “take out bin Laden and his top lieutenants.”17
In addition, the United States sought to kill or capture al Qaeda
fighters and destroy the terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan, such
as training camps, safe houses, and meeting places for al Qaeda
operatives.18 The United States also sought to freeze the financial
assets of the terror network to deny the terrorists the resources they
needed to finance their activities.19 And, while conducting operations
against al Qaeda, the United States sought to gain intelligence
on the terrorist network. Intelligence gleaned from searches and
interrogations would provide important leads in the fight against
al Qaeda. As the war unfolded, some in the administration feared
that key terrorist leaders would flee Afghanistan and escape to Iran,
Pakistan, or Somalia, where they would be much harder to catch.
As a result, the United States also sought to prevent the escape of al
Qaeda leaders.20
The United States adopted a variety of approaches to convince or
compel the Taliban to cease supporting al Qaeda. Initially, it issued
demands that the Taliban hand over terrorist leaders and cease
their support for al Qaeda. President Bush issued an ultimatum
demanding that the Taliban turn over bin Laden and his associates
or suffer the consequences of a U.S. attack.21 The immediate goal of
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the administration was not to destroy the Taliban, but the president
and his advisors were willing to do so, if the Taliban failed to
cooperate.22
When it became evident the Taliban would not agree to support
U.S. objectives, the effort shifted toward destruction of the Taliban
regime. Accordingly, U.S. strategy included efforts to kill, or capture
key Taliban leaders. Foremost among them was Mullah Omar, the
spiritual leader of the Taliban.23 The United States also sought to
destroy the regime’s hard core, committed Taliban fighters, who
kept the regime in power. Ultimately, U.S. policymakers sought to
replace the regime with one more supportive of their objectives in
the war on terrorism.24
The administration found a variety of ways to demonstrate
support for the Afghan people. It conducted humanitarian assistance
operations to provide the Afghans with food, clothing, medical
assistance, and other basic necessities. In addition, the United States
assisted private organizations in their efforts to aid the Afghan
populace. Military forces also endeavored to minimize collateral
damage.25 Coalition forces hoped to avoid alienating the Afghans by
limiting civilian casualties and damage to the civilian infrastructure.26
In addition, the United States initiated an extensive demining
program to eliminate the threat that mines posed to Afghans, as well
as coalition forces.27 And finally, its agents attempted to address the
plight of women and children in Afghanistan by improving their
living conditions, educational opportunities, and status in society.
As a critical component of this support, the United States also
attempted to convey a sense of religious sensibility to avoid the
impression that it was engaged in a war on Islam. Specifically, it
avoided damaging mosques, openly debated whether or not to
conduct military operations during the Ramadan religious holiday,28
limited military operations during the Muslim Sabbath, and even
changed the name of the military operation to avoid alienating
Muslims.29 In addition, the United States sought to gain support
from Muslim states for the war in Afghanistan.
The administration also adopted several approaches to
demonstrate its resolve. First and foremost, it was intent on executing
a meaningful military response to the terrorist attacks. The view of
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many in the administration was that recent terrorist attacks had not
elicited a meaningful U.S. response. In 1998, al Qaeda bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had killed more than
200 people. At that time, the Clinton administration responded by
directing the U.S. military to launch a cruise missile attack against
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan. While
making a political statement, the attacks had minimal impact on bin
Laden and his terrorists.30 To many in the Bush administration, that
operation, and its failure to serve as a deterrent, was indicative of
the U.S. response to terrorist attacks during the eight years of the
previous administration. The Bush administration, by contrast, was
eager to conduct a more meaningful military response; one that
would clearly demonstrate U.S. resolve in the war against al Qaeda
and its Taliban supporters, and thus deter future attacks.31
The administration frequently stressed its commitment to
winning the war in Afghanistan. In an address to a joint session
of Congress and the American people, President Bush promised
the United States would use all of its resources in fighting the
war in Afghanistan. He also vowed that, “we will be patient, we
will be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination.”32
The administration intended for the themes expressed in public
statements to demonstrate its resolve. In part, these public statements
also intended to dispel the notion that the United States was averse
to taking risks and unwilling to accept casualties.
The U.S. Government was also intent on gaining and maintaining
international support for the war in Afghanistan. To do so, it worked
with existing international organizations to build support. Moreover,
it required access, basing, and over-flight rights to conduct military
operations in Afghanistan. Support from a variety of regional
nations was essential in that regard. Accordingly, the United States
sought cooperation from nations in southern and central Asia to
support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan and Uzbekistan were
two of the most important of those regional nations. The United
States also sought to build a coalition to conduct military operations
in Afghanistan. Coalition nations participated in a variety of ways,
from providing ships, airplanes, and ground combat forces to
supporting humanitarian assistance operations.
The United States adopted a number of approaches to prevent
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the re-emergence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the future use
of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations. To
do so, it worked to establish security and stability throughout
the war-torn nation. After the fall of the Taliban, these efforts
included establishment of a new Afghan government, creation of
an Afghan police force, and development of an Afghan national
army. The United States also began initiatives to support economic
development. In addition, it initiated an extensive effort to rid
Afghanistan of the vast quantities of weapons and munitions strewn
throughout the country. This approach primarily aimed at denying
remnant al Qaeda and Taliban fighters continued access to weapons
and munitions. And finally, the United States sought to address the
repressive social and religious conditions enforced for years by the
ruling Taliban. In essence, the administration initiated a peacekeeping
and nation building effort in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
The Means.
To implement the various approaches in its strategy, the United
States employed all the elements of national power. As President
Bush explained, “This war will be fought on many fronts, including
the intelligence side, the financial side, the diplomatic side, as well
as the military side.”33 Accordingly, the United States employed
every traditional element of national power, diplomatic, economic,
informational, and military, to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban,
support the Afghan people, demonstrate resolve, build international
support, and prevent the reemergence of terrorist organizations in
Afghanistan.
Diplomatically, the United States worked to obtain support for
operations against al Qaeda from international organizations and
states. In this effort, it used diplomatic means to garner support from
the United Nations and approval of a Security Council resolution.
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 1373 condemned
all support for terrorism and called on member states to cooperate
in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, it called on member nations
to prevent the financing of terrorist acts and freeze the assets of
terrorists and terrorist organizations. The United States also received

167

unprecedented support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). On September 12, 2001, NATO invoked Article 5,
demonstrating that its member nations viewed the terrorist attack
against the United States as an attack against all member nations.
Initially, the United States attempted to apply diplomatic
pressure on the Taliban to cooperate in the fight against terrorism.34
This effort aimed at exerting pressure on the Taliban to cooperate with
the United States and break off support for al Qaeda. Eventually, the
United States employed diplomatic leverage to isolate the Taliban
and overthrow the regime. Following the defeat of the Taliban,
it used diplomatic means to gain international support for a new
government in Afghanistan.
The United States also engaged a variety of international
and private organizations to lend their support to the Afghans.
International organizations like the U.N., the World Health
Organization, and the Red Crescent, continued to provide support
to the Afghan people. A variety of private relief organizations
also remained involved in Afghanistan. The United States relied
primarily on diplomatic means to build and maintain international
support. The administration mounted a concerted diplomatic
effort to enlist international organizations, such as the U.N., the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and others. It was especially
intent on gaining support for its efforts from Muslim organizations.
Without that support, the United States could not conduct military
operations in Afghanistan.35 The territory of Pakistan and Uzbekistan
was especially important in isolating and attacking al Qaeda and
Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.36 The United States also worked with
other regional nations, such as Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, to close
borders and prevent al Qaeda or Taliban fighters from escaping.37
To prevent the reemergence of terrorist organizations in
Afghanistan, the United States again employed diplomatic power. It
mounted a diplomatic effort to assist in the establishment of a new
government in that country. The Department of State was instrumental
in setting conditions for the Loya Jirga, an ancient Afghan process in
which local representatives are selected and assembled to resolve
broad political issues. Once the Loya Jirga process was complete, the
State Department worked with international organizations to assist
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the Afghans in establishing a new national government. In addition,
it re-established the U.S. embassy in Kabul and provided diplomatic
recognition for the new government, as soon feasible.
The United States used economic means to freeze the financial
assets of the al Qaeda organization and deny al Qaeda access to other
financial resources.38 The Treasury Department froze the financial
assets of terrorist organizations, terrorist leaders, front companies,
and some nonprofit organizations that support terrorist groups. In
addition, the United States used economic power to pressure foreign
banks and financial institutions to cooperate in this effort. Although it
could not directly influence foreign banks and financial institutions,
Treasury could prohibit them from conducting transactions in the
United States. It used this leverage to gain cooperation of a number
of overseas banks and financial institutions.39
The United States employed economic means to support
reconstruction and promote economic development in Afghanistan.
Combining diplomatic and economic means, it was instrumental
in setting up and conducting a conference in Germany for nations
willing to donate funds for reconstruction.40 Economic means also
helped support establishment of the new Afghan government.
The administration used the media to convey support for the
new Afghan government. It incorporated key themes in public
statements to emphasize that the war in Afghanistan was not
directed against Afghans.41 Statements from the administration
highlighted U.S. support for the Afghan people during the Soviet
occupation in the 1980s and emphasized that the United States had
no territorial desires or plans for permanent bases in the region.42
In addition, during the process of establishing of new government,
administration rhetoric avoided any suggestion that the United
States was trying to determine who would run Afghanistan.43
Likewise, the United States employed information as a means to
demonstrate the war in Afghanistan was not against Islam. It used
public statements to counter any suggestion that it was involved
in a “crusade” or engaged in a war against the Islamic religion.44
It also conveyed support for Afghanistan by working to improve
educational opportunities, addressing human rights issues, and
improving access to information in Afghanistan.
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The United States also employed information to demonstrate its
resolve. By mobilizing the government, the administration intended
to convey a willingness to use every means at its disposal.45 In
essence, all of the diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts
employed to accomplish other objectives also served to demonstrate
commitment to the war in Afghanistan.
The most visible means employed by the United States involved
military power. U.S. military forces conducted both conventional
operations and unconventional warfare against al Qaeda. The
United States employed air power to attack terrorist targets and
destroy terrorist infrastructure. It relied heavily on special operating
forces to conduct direct action against high payoff targets, special
reconnaissance to gain intelligence on al Qaeda’s network and key
terrorist leaders, and unconventional warfare to gain the support of
opposition forces and the Afghans. U.S. conventional ground forces
searched for and destroyed al Qaeda fighters. In addition, naval
forces conducted “leadership interdiction operations” in the North
Arabian Sea to prevent the escape of al Qaeda leaders to safe havens
in Somalia or Yemen.46
Other nations’ military forces and paramilitary forces
contributed to efforts against al Qaeda. The United States employed
Taliban opposition forces, such as the Northern Alliance, as proxy
forces to accomplish its objectives. Although these opposition forces
normally engaged al Qaeda fighters in concert with U.S. military
forces, they were a major component of the strategy, nonetheless.
Coalition forces also participated in disrupting and destroying the
al Qaeda network and conducted many of the same missions as U.S.
forces, including conventional and unconventional operations. In
particular, the United States relied heavily on Pakistani troops, who
patrolled the border with Afghanistan, while operating against al
Qaeda from inside Pakistan.47
The Central Intelligence Agency participated directly in
disrupting and destroying the al Qaeda network. Agency paramilitary
operatives coordinated with opposition forces, distributed large
sums of money to buy arms, clothing, and supplies for those forces,
and worked directly with coalition military forces to disrupt and
destroy bin Laden’s network.48 Information also played an important
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role in disrupting or destroying the network. The Central Intelligence
Agency, foreign intelligence services, and a variety of military
organizations worked to gather information, and share intelligence.49
Military efforts included interrogation of detained terrorists, as well
as operations conducted to gather intelligence from caves, training
camps, safe houses, and meeting places. In addition, the Agency
established a reward program, offering vast sums of money for
intelligence on key al Qaeda leaders.
The United States employed the same military means against the
Taliban as it employed against al Qaeda. U.S. forces conducted many
of the same operational missions, including, air attacks, direct action,
special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and conventional
ground operations. Naval forces conducted leadership interdiction
operations in the North Arabian Sea to prevent the escape of key
Taliban leaders. Other military and paramilitary forces participated
in the fight against the Taliban, just as they did in the fight against al
Qaeda. Afghan opposition forces were an important element in the
fight. Military forces from coalition partners also played a significant
role. Paramilitary forces from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
also participated in fighting the Taliban, much as they did in fighting
al Qaeda. CIA operatives focused primarily on intelligence collection
efforts, but they also established liaison with leaders of the opposition
forces and facilitated unconventional warfare operations.
To demonstrate support for the Afghans, the United States
employed military means to conduct stability and support operations
and provide assistance to Afghan civil authorities. Support from
military forces included extensive humanitarian assistance, the
opening of roads and airfields to facilitate those operations, escorts
for humanitarian assistance convoys, and providing a degree of
security for private organizations to operate effectively.
Military forces also employed rules of engagement and weapon
systems that would minimize collateral damage. The rules of
engagement prevented indiscriminate fires and often required
collateral damage determinations before a target could be attacked.
Moreover, by employing large numbers of precision guided
munitions, U.S. and coalition forces could attack targets, while
minimizing the chances of civilian casualties or damage to civilian
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infrastructure. In essence, the United States used military forces
to convey, in a variety of ways, that it had committed its forces
to improving conditions in Afghanistan and helping the Afghan
people.
To demonstrate resolve, the United States employed a variety
of military means. It employed military forces in direct ground
combat in Afghanistan. This employment of military forces included
conventional forces, as well as special operating forces, to take the
fight directly to the enemy. It inserted special forces early in the
operation to begin the unconventional warfare effort. Other special
operations forces conducted a daring raid on the compound of Mullah
Omar, the leader of the Taliban. By mid-October, Marine forces had
deployed into Afghanistan and were conducting operations in and
around Kandahar. Army troops were soon deployed to continue
the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Each of these actions
served to demonstrate resolve by directly involving U.S. forces in
combat. In assuming the risks associated with ground combat, the
administration hoped to dispel the notion that Americans were risk
averse and unwilling to accept casualties. Overall, the United States
employed air, ground, and maritime forces as a demonstration of
U.S. commitment.50
The United States also used military means to build and
maintain international support. A variety of military activities
served to promote coalition building and support for the war in
Afghanistan. The United States sought military contributions from
nations around the world, integrated coalition troops, ships, and
air forces, and employed coalition forces as part of a coordinated
military campaign. These activities served to establish and maintain
coalition support for the war in Afghanistan.
To prevent the reemergence of terrorist organizations in
Afghanistan, the United States employed military means to provide
security and stability. In addition, it used military forces to provide
a safe and secure environment for the Loya Jirga process. Combining
both diplomatic and military means, it supported establishment
of the International Security Assistance Force, which provided
security and stability around the capital in Kabul. A safe and secure
environment facilitated the restoration of civil administration
throughout Afghanistan. Finally, the United States used military
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means to help establish a police force and army for the fledgling
Afghan government. Thus, the United States used every element of
national power to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban, support the Afghan
people, demonstrate resolve, build international support, and
prevent the re-emergence of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan.
ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGY FOR THE WAR
IN AFGHANISTAN
More than a year after the terrorist attacks, the United States
remains at war in Afghanistan. It continues to execute the national
strategy formulated by the administration in the days and weeks
following the attacks. Although the United States has enjoyed
considerable success against al Qaeda and the Taliban, it has not
realized its strategic objectives. The campaign in Afghanistan is
still underway, and so far the United States has not been entirely
successful in achieving its strategic ends.
The Fight against Al Qaeda.
The United States disrupted the al Qaeda network to a
considerable degree, but has certainly not destroyed it. The
administration wanted Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders
killed, captured, or on the run, so they would be unable to plan and
execute additional terrorist attacks.51 To date, the United States has
been successful in killing or capturing a number of key al Qaeda
leaders, and in so doing, it has undoubtedly disrupted the al Qaeda
network in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world. Moreover, the
war in Afghanistan has forced the leadership of that organization
farther under ground, prompted many to run for cover, and has
undoubtedly made their roles more difficult to perform.
However, many key leaders remain at large―their whereabouts
unknown. Although the operation did not focus on bin Laden, the
spiritual leader of al Qaeda remains on the loose.52 Despite claims
to the effect that bin Laden’s capture was not a primary goal of the
American effort, his ability to elude capture does have significance.
As one commentator noted, “Any perception that bin Laden is

173

beyond America’s reach is dangerous; it will only encourage other
terrorists to emulate him.”53 Consequently, coalition troops and
covert operatives continue to search in the mountains of eastern
Afghanistan and western Pakistan hoping to discover bin Laden or
other key al Qaeda leaders. In that sense, the United States has not
been successful. While it may have initially disrupted the network,
the organization remains a threat and continues to possess the
capability to plan and execute attacks against the United States and
its allies and friends throughout the world.
The administration also wanted to kill or capture low-level
al Qaeda fighters. Again, the United States has been successful in
killing or capturing many. During combat operations, the United
States virtually destroyed the al Qaeda irregular forces, consisting
primarily of the 5,000-man 55th Brigade.54 In addition, its military
forces captured thousands of al Qaeda fighters, many of whom
remain incarcerated as detainees at Guantanamo Bay. In either case,
the United States significantly disrupted the al Qaeda network by
killing and capturing many al Qaeda fighters.
The United States was also successful in destroying infrastructure,
freezing financial assets, and gaining information on the al Qaeda
network. Its military forces destroyed terrorist training camps, safe
houses, and other facilities used by the terrorists in Afghanistan. The
administration saw the disruption of al Qaeda’s financial network
as an important aspect of the war against terrorism.55 Although the
exact impact is difficult to ascertain, efforts to deny the terrorists
access to funds has made it more difficult for them to mount
additional attacks. The United States used intelligence gleaned from
searches and interrogations to further disable the terrorist network
inside Afghanistan and facilitate other anti-terrorist operations
outside Afghanistan.56 All of these efforts disrupted the al Qaeda
organization, and by employing the elements of national power and
adopting a variety of approaches, the Bush administration increased
the chances for success.
On the other hand, the United States may have missed an
opportunity to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan completely.
During the battle in the mountains and caves of Tora Bora, many
of its fighters slipped away and escaped across the border into
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Pakistan. In addition, others appear to have blended back into the
local population and remain active in Afghanistan. Again, despite
success in disrupting the network, al Qaeda remains a threat inside
Afghanistan.
The United States has achieved limited success in fighting al
Qaeda. That limited success is a reflection of two factors. First, the
strategic objective may not have been achievable. While it may be
reasonable to expect the United States to disable its network in
Afghanistan, it may be too much to expect that al Qaeda could be
destroyed. The nature of the al Qaeda network makes it difficult to
find, engage, and ultimately destroy. In addition, Afghanistan and
its neighbors, such as Pakistan, provide al Qaeda an abundance of
hiding places, escape routes, and popular support. With respect to
al Qaeda, the U.S. strategy should have included a more achievable
objective.
Second, the military means employed against al Qaeda were not
and are still not entirely appropriate. The military means employed
in Afghanistan have not enabled the Coalition to surround al Qaeda,
cut off the escape routes, destroy the hiding places, or obtain the
actionable intelligence required to capture or kill al Qaeda leaders
and fighters. To be completely successful, the U.S. strategy needed
to include a better match between ends and means.
The Fight against the Taliban.
Similarly, the United States forced the Taliban from power in
Afghanistan, but may not have compelled its members to cease their
support for terrorist organizations. The United States was successful
in removing the Taliban from power and denied terrorists sanctuary
in Afghanistan, as well as the open support they received from
the Taliban. In addition, it was successful in killing or capturing
many Taliban leaders and fighters. However, many leaders of the
movement remain at large and continue to support bin Laden.
Mullah Omar, for example, remains in hiding in the rugged Afghan
interior and continues to provide tacit support for his al Qaeda
friends. In addition, Taliban fighters, who survived combat and
avoided capture, have blended back into the population, where they
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continue to threaten security and stability. These Taliban fighters
have mounted a number of attacks against coalition forces and
the new Afghan government. In the final analysis, military efforts
against the Taliban were successful to some degree, but did not
achieve everything for which the administration had aimed.
Diplomatic efforts produced similar results. The ultimatum
issued by the administration did not convince the Taliban to
cooperate with the United States. Its leaders refused to turn over bin
Laden and his associates, and the Taliban refused to cease support
for al Qaeda. Despite this fact, the ultimatum was an important
diplomatic success. By issuing a public demarche, the United States
gained a degree of legitimacy and international support in its fight
against the Taliban.
Conspicuously absent in the Bush administration’s strategy was
a concerted effort to employ economic means in the fight. However,
the impact of economic sanctions would have been limited in war
ravaged and economically depressed Afghanistan. Moreover,
the Afghan people would have suffered the consequences of
economic sanctions, and this would have negatively impacted the
administration’s desire to avoid any impression that the United
States was at war with the Afghan people.
Thus far, the United States has achieved only limited success
against the Taliban. That limited success reflects the United States’
inability to win the hearts and minds of the Taliban and its al Qaeda
supporters in Afghanistan. Although the U.S. strategy included
elements to address the issue, the United States has not been
successful in convincing the Taliban to cease support for al Qaeda.
It may never achieve that objective until it eliminates the causes of
radical Islamic fundamentalism and the support it engenders in the
Muslim world.
Demonstrating Support for the Afghan People.
The United States appears to have been more successful in
demonstrating that the war in Afghanistan was not against the Afghan
people or the Islamic religion. The humanitarian assistance effort
was particularly successful in that regard. President Bush insisted
on conducting a humanitarian assistance effort in conjunction with
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military action.57 As a result, military forces integrated humanitarian
assistance from the outset of operations in Afghanistan.58 Moreover,
the humanitarian assistance effort limited the impact of war on the
Afghan people and conveyed a sense of U.S. support. The inclusion
of a humanitarian approach in the strategy worked to America’s
advantage.
However, the effort by coalition forces to limit collateral damage
was somewhat less successful. Although the employment of
precision guided munitions was essential in reducing the potential
for collateral damage, military forces committed a number of highly
publicized incidents of fratricide. Civilian casualties and damage to
civilian infrastructure did occur. In one case, an Afghan wedding
party may have been the unintended target of coalition fires. The
United States was unable to sufficiently minimize collateral damage,
which hindered its ability to obtain the full support of the local
populace.
Demonstrating that the war in Afghanistan was not against
Islam was another significant goal. The administration tried to
demonstrate, in both words and deeds, that the United States was
fighting a war against terrorists and terrorist supporters, not against
Islam. Public statements, coupled with U.S. actions, helped convey
that purpose for the war in Afghanistan.
Demonstrating Resolve.
Public statements and military actions also helped demonstrate
America’s resolve for the war and a willingness to accept casualties,
if necessary to win the war. The administration elected not to limit
its initial response to ineffective cruise missile attacks. Instead, the
president selected the most robust military option, one that included
commitment of U.S. troops to ground combat.59 The United States
employed special operations forces to work with the opposition forces
early in the military campaign. Later, it employed conventional forces
in combat operations. These employments demonstrated America’s
resolve by putting ground forces in Afghanistan to fight al Qaeda
and the Taliban. In addition, the employment of U.S. forces placed
American troops at risk, thus demonstrating the administration’s
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willingness to accept casualties. The United States may not realize
the impact of this aspect of U.S. strategy for some time to come. It
stands to reason, however, that this approach clearly demonstrated
the administration’s resolve and may provide a degree of deterrence
against future attacks on the United States.
Gaining International Support.
The United States also was effective in gaining international
support and assembling a coalition of nations willing to fight the
war on terrorism. Ultimately, the administration’s strategy achieved
considerable international support, regional cooperation, and
coalition participation. The U.N. Security Council, for example,
passed a unanimous resolution condemning the terrorist attacks
against the United States. In addition, NATO invoked Article 5,
demonstrating that NATO viewed the terrorist attacks against the
United States as an attack against all its members. Perhaps most
telling was the strongly worded statement from the Organization
of the Islamic Conference, a group representing 57 Muslim nations,
which also condemned the attacks against the United States.60
Equally important was the Coalition’s operational involvement in
support of post-conflict, nation building efforts in Afghanistan. The
overall effect of this aspect of strategy was to provide legitimacy for
the war in Afghanistan and lessen the burden of war on the United
States.
Preventing the Reemergence of Terrorist Organizations.
The effort to prevent the re-emergence of terrorist organizations
in Afghanistan is well underway, but not complete. Nation-building
efforts continue, and military forces remain involved in providing
security and stability. What is evident is that diplomatic efforts
have overcome significant obstacles in establishing a viable central
government in Afghanistan. In addition, the U.S. strategy included
provisions for creation of an embryonic Afghan police force and
army. Efforts to rid Afghanistan of mines, weapons, and munitions,
as well as attempts to improve living conditions in Afghanistan, may
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also contribute to ultimate success.
U.S. efforts will have been in vain unless the United States
succeeds in establishing conditions that will prevent the reemergence
of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, and the use of Afghanistan
as a terrorist sanctuary. In that sense, the last objective for the war
in Afghanistan may be the most important. To achieve ultimate
success in Afghanistan, the United States must ensure its strategy
includes viable approaches and sufficient means to accomplishing
this objective.
AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF U.S. STRATEGY
The ultimate goal of any strategy is to achieve its political
objectives. In the final analysis, it appears the U.S. strategy for war
in Afghanistan has been marginally successful. The strategy enabled
the United States to disrupt the al Qaeda network and eliminate the
sanctuary provided by the Taliban. Moreover, the strategy enabled
the United States to focus the war on the terrorist organization
and its supporters, demonstrate U.S. resolve in the war against
terrorism, and gain broad international support. On the other hand,
the strategy did not enable the United States to rid Afghanistan fully
of al Qaeda or its Taliban support. More importantly, the strategy
has not enabled the United States to restore a sense of security and
stability to Afghanistan. Ultimately, success of the U.S. strategy will
only occur when conditions in Afghanistan are no longer conducive
for terrorist organizations to recruit new personnel, develop
infrastructure, and plan and train for operations.
The great strengths of the current strategy, however, are that
it includes a wide variety of ways and means and recognizes the
many dimensions of the problem in Afghanistan. In formulating
and executing the national strategy, the administration included
several approaches to accomplish each objective. It did not limit the
strategy to any single approach or rely solely on any single concept
to achieve an objective. In addition, it incorporated every element
of national power in its strategy and applied several elements
of power to achieve each objective. In other words, U.S. strategy
employed a variety of means in a variety of ways to achieve the
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strategic objectives. This multi-faceted approach greatly increased
chances for attaining the strategic objectives and may yet combine to
produce ultimate success.
The multi-faceted strategy also reflected a recognition that
success in Afghanistan would require more than just attacking al
Qaeda and the Taliban. Accordingly, the strategy included other
objectives, such as gaining international support and demonstrating
U.S. resolve. Most importantly, the strategy included efforts to
prevent the reemergence of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan
and the continued use of that country as a sanctuary for terrorists.
Any success against al Qaeda and the Taliban would only be
temporary, unless the United States addressed the conditions that
had allowed terrorists to thrive. In essence, the multiple dimensions
of U.S. strategy enabled the United States to tear down the terrorist
network, while building up a more stable Afghanistan. Ultimately,
America can only succeed in Afghanistan by addressing both aspects
of the problem.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Despite the successes of U.S. strategy, the implications of the
war in Afghanistan do not bode well for the future. First, the war
demonstrates how difficult it is to actually destroy terrorist networks.
Although the United States showed it was capable of disabling the al
Qaeda network, it was unable to destroy the organization. Al Qaeda
fighters and many leaders still remain in Afghanistan. Although
they may not enjoy the support of a state sponsor, they maintain
the ability to continue their fight against the United States, as well
as U.S. interests in Afghanistan. Many others in the organization
appear to have escaped. Once outside of Afghanistan, they will be
much harder to target and will likely continue their fight against
the United States from other nations. Moreover, the organization
includes cells in nations around the world. Even if the United States
could destroy the network in Afghanistan, al Qaeda would remain
a global threat. The war in Afghanistan may also teach terrorist
organizations valuable lessons that will make U.S. efforts less
effective in the future. Terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda,
will likely attempt to exploit asymmetric advantages by learning
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from U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and adapting to U.S. strengths,
while exploiting its weaknesses. In the final analysis, the war in
Afghanistan demonstrates that the United States may be able to
disrupt terrorist networks, but will find it difficult, if not impossible,
to destroy them completely.
Similarly, the war in Afghanistan also demonstrates how
difficult it is to eliminate nonstate support for terrorist organizations.
Although the United States showed it can defeat a state sponsor
such as the Taliban, it has not entirely eliminated support in
Afghanistan for terrorist organizations. In fact, Taliban fighters
remain active in Afghanistan and continue to work in concert with
al Qaeda. Moreover, terrorist organizations enjoy varying degrees
of support in friendly states, as well as states that actually sponsor
terrorism. This is a problem that will be difficult to overcome until
the world, including the United States, addresses and eliminates the
fundamental causes of terrorism. These causes include a diverse
array of issues, from poverty and repression in authoritarian
regimes, to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The third major implication of the war in Afghanistan is the need
for a multidimensional strategy for fighting terrorism. The United
States will need to formulate and execute holistic strategies that
incorporate a variety of ends, ways, and means, much as it did for the
war in Afghanistan. By doing so, the United States can employ all of
the elements of national power and increase its chances for success.
It will not be enough for America to defeat terrorist organizations.
U.S. strategy must also include efforts to address the fundamental
causes of terrorism. To be successful in the long term, the United
States and its allies must overcome the conditions that spawned
the acceptance and growth of terrorism. That implies the need for a
nation building aspect to U.S. strategy. In nation states that serve as
terrorist sanctuaries, the United States will need to conduct nationbuilding efforts to permanently eliminate such sanctuaries.
A final implication involves the need to address national resolve
and cost. The costs of fighting terrorist organizations, coupled with
nation-building efforts, will be very expensive for the United States.
Although the Bush administration demonstrated considerable
resolve for the war in Afghanistan, America must be willing to

181

expend additional resources in the long-term fight against terrorism,
in order to achieve long-term solutions. Moreover, fighting terrorist
organizations and conducting nation-building will require an
extended effort. America must also be ready for a protracted, global
war against terrorism.

CONCLUSION
Following the terrorist attacks against the United States in
September 2001, the Bush administration formulated strategic
objectives for war in Afghanistan, developed a number of approaches
to achieve each objective, and employed a variety of resources
in executing each approach. The resulting strategy has only been
marginally successful. As one commentator noted, “We have not
failed in Afghanistan, but neither have we succeeded.”61 Although
the United States continues its efforts in Afghanistan, there are
already major implications for the broader war on terrorism. The
war in Afghanistan demonstrates some of the difficulties in the fight
against terrorism, to include the need for a holistic approach to the
fight.
It remains to be seen whether American strategy for war in
Afghanistan will ultimately succeed, as well as what the implications
of the war will be for future conflict. It does appear certain that the
United States must be prepared for a protracted, global war that
addresses the fundamental causes of terrorism. As one commentator
suggests, there may be no final triumph in the War on Terrorism,
just as there will be no final triumph in the war on drugs, the war on
crime, or the war on poverty.62
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CHAPTER 7
ADAPTABILITY:
A NEW PRINCIPLE OF WAR
Lieutenant Colonel Brian Dickerson
Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and
develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly
to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. An ability to
adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty
are the defining characteristics of our new security environment.
A culture of change, flexibility, and adaptability is more important
to transforming the military than simply having new hardware.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

“The ultimate goal of our military force is to accomplish the
objectives directed by the National Command Authorities.”1
Supporting the National Security Strategy and the National
Military Strategy, these objectives delineate a spectrum of military
operations from major war to military operations other than war.
“Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020)” provides a guide for the transformation
of America’s Armed Forces in areas as diverse as experimentation,
technologies, leadership, military education, operational concepts,
and organizations.
It is clear that the United States aims at pursuing its global
interests and responsibilities along a wide front. The U.S. military
must win wars and contribute to peace.2 Its forces will routinely
shape the international security environment. “The joint force,
because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to
operational success in the future.”3 That future force will need to be
integrated intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally,
and technically.
“JV 2020” highlights the requirement for a force that can adapt
to changes in the strategic environment, leverage new technologies,
and confront potential enemies, who will eventually adapt to U.S.
strengths and weaknesses.4 A key attribute of future American warfighting competence, leadership, and attitude must be an ability to
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deal with uncertainty and change, defining characteristic of future
environments.
The organization of the American military, its individual services
and the individual military members, does not change quickly or
easily. But the confluence of transformation, the rise in the threat of
terrorism, exponential rates of technological change, a complex and
unknown future, adaptable and asymmetric threats, a continuing
move towards jointness and diverse missions compel the U.S.
military to reevaluate itself. Any of these external forces individually
would have brought about significant new challenges in their wake.
Together, their impact is significant. Dogmas and paradigms, from
service culture to operational concepts, from weapon systems
acquisition to organizations, from strategy to tactics demand a new
look. Many areas will require modification to maximize capability
and efficiency in a world of fiscal constraints. No sacred cows should
escape reassessment, including the “Principles of War.” There are
nine traditional principles of war: The Objective, The Offensive,
Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security,
Surprise, and Simplicity.5 Nevertheless, the U.S. military should add
one more―Adaptability.
This chapter will not examine the standing principles as
appropriate, necessary, nor even correct.6 Instead, the current nine
Joint principles form a base from which to depart. Thus, the chapter
will seek to show that the principle of adaptability represents a
valuable guide at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of
war and that its addition will aid the U.S. military across a wide
spectrum of other activities. Finally, it will argue that the principle
of adaptability could change the military’s strategic culture in a
positive fashion.
Adaptability, in the past, has been a largely unacknowledged
component of military effectiveness. It also has been a significant
factor in the success of great military leaders. In the future
environment, adaptability will become a more significant keystone
to future military operations. It has affected in the past, and continues
to affect, American doctrine, strategies, deliberate and contingency
planning, the acquisition process, operational concepts, training,
and much more.
An examination of the history of the principles of war and how
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they have impacted military organizations, strategic culture, doctrine,
and strategy provides the background. Next, this chapter will turn to
a definition of adaptability and differentiate it from flexibility, which
is a key component in the definition of “maneuver.” An examination
of the major external forces acting upon the U.S. military, including
transformation, will provide evidence as to why adaptability needs
to be a principle of war. Finally, this chapter will provide a definition
for adaptability.
HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPLES7
Principle: 1. beginning, original or initial state; 2. that from which
something takes its rise, originates or is derived; a source; the
root; 3. a fundamental truth or proposition on which many others
depend; 4. a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or
assumption.
The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition

What are the principles of war? In short, they represent neither a
recipe nor a checklist for success. One cannot use them in isolation,
and they demand a healthy dose of historical perspective.8 They are,
in essence, a theory of war, a model that attempts to bring some order
to war’s chaos. However, they are much more than just a theory;
they provide a bridge between theory and application. They “guide
warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels” and are
the “enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.”9 They are timetested principles that guide the employment of forces and shape the
way that U.S. armed forces think about the use and employment of
military power.10 They are “guidelines that commanders can use to
form and select a course of action.”11 The wisdom gained from study
of the basic principles underscores that war is not a business for
managers with checklists; it is the art of leaders.12 “The principles of
war guide and instruct commanders as they combine the elements
of combat power. The principles reflect the distillation of [Army]
experience into a set of time-tested guidelines.”13 They are part and
parcel to a unique American military strategic culture, which is the
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lens through which the U.S. military sees the world, its adversaries,
and itself. They are the foundations for the way the American
military fights.
The search for comprehensive and fundamental laws to
understand war are at least as old as Sun Tzu. In their current
Joint form, they evolved from the 1921 U.S. Army Field Training
Regulation No. 10-5. The modern U.S. military has come to accept
the current principles of war, not as laws that guarantee victory,
but as considerations for the actions involved in the application of
military power.
There have been innumerable examinations, modifications,
additions, and deletions over the years. Many of these changes are
often associated with technological improvements.14 The constant
examination of the relevance of these principles is a healthy and
necessary activity, encourages intellectual discussion, and ensures
that military organizations do not become bogged down in dogma.
Air Marshal David Evans, Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Australian
Air Force has noted; “[A]s with all other areas of conventional
wisdom, of past values, past doctrine, the principles of war are to be
questioned, to be tested and their continuing relevance verified.”15
In their own ways, each of the great theorists of war has wrestled
with the concept of principles. The U.S. principles of war in their
present form have been the exception, versus the norm, in the
history of principles. Other terms have been used in the past (law,
rule, maxim, and axiom, to name a few) and have generally been
long and drawn out rather than short aphorisms. However, the basic
premise of “a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or
assumption” is present in most of great theoretical works on war.16
Dead Guys and Principles.
In the opening of his The Art of War
War, Sun Tzu states that “[W]ar is
a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death;
the road to survival or ruin. Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five
fundamental factors and make comparisons of the seven elements.”
Sun Tzu recommended keeping only those generals who would
follow his strategy and firing those who would not. He believed
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he could predict winners and losers in any war on the basis of who
followed his precepts.17 These five fundamental factors and seven
elements became the basis for his version for the path to success in
war.
During his writing of Arte della Guerra (The Art of War),
published in 1521, Niccolo Machiavelli discovered that there were
certain fundamentals common and unchanging in previous writings
on war. He included a set of general rules to guide a commander’s
actions in his work.18 Many of the current nine principles can be seen
in his rules and one in particular, implying the value of adaptability,
suggests “nothing is of greater importance in time of war, than to
know how to make the best use of a fair opportunity when it is
offered.”19
Historians most often associate the modern concept of principles
of war with Antoine-Henri Jomini. The Swiss theorist argued that the
principles were relatively few in number, but readily identifiable, and
that these principles should guide a commander’s actions in war.20
In December 1807, he published a paper bringing together a list of
ten paragraphs of “general truths whose application contributes to
success in war.” John Algers argues that Jomini’s list represents the
prototype of the modern principles of war.21
Some commentators also associate Carl von Clausewitz with
the modern concept of principles,22 but others point out that “he
specifically rejected the notion that there could be any well-defined
body of particular rules or principles that universally dictated one
form of behavior rather than another.”23 Nonetheless, he did write
a memorandum to the Prussian Crown Prince entitled The Most
Important Principles for the Conduct of War. Not surprisingly, he starts
the memorandum with a qualifier:
These principles, though the result of long thought and continuous
study of the history of war, have none the less been drawn up
hastily, and thus will not stand severe criticism in regard to form.
In addition, only the most important subjects have been picked
from a great number, since a certain brevity was necessary. These
principles, therefore, will not so much give complete instruction
to Your Royal Highness, as they will stimulate and serve as a
guide for your own reflections.24
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The memorandum does list general, offensive, and defensive
principles. In spite of Clausewitz’s own warning, it is not difficult
to find all nine of the modern principles of war in his memorandum
and in On War. Again, one gains considerable insight when looking
at how Clausewitz defines a principle. In fact, it is similar to how the
modern U.S. military uses the term.25
Principle is also a law for action, but not in its formal, definitive
meaning; it represents only the spirit and the sense of the law; in
cases where the diversity of the real world cannot be contained
within the rigid form of law, the application of principle allows
for a greater latitude of judgment. Cases to which principle
cannot be applied must be settled by judgment; principle thus
becomes essentially a support, or lodestar, to the man responsible
for the action.26

Clausewitz goes on to argue that principles are indispensable
concepts for that portion of a theory of war that leads to positive
doctrines.27
Modern Times and Principles.
There have been a number of modern theorists and writers
arguing both for and against the principles of war, in the 20th century.
They include Marshal Foch, A.T. Mahan, B.H. Liddell Hart, J. F. C.
Fuller, and Bernard Brodie. But, the first official U.S. acceptance of
principles appeared in the 1921 U.S. Army Field Training Regulation
10-5. The list is surprisingly similar to the current official list over 80
years later (Table 1). Nevertheless, the list disappeared entirely from
the next version of the Army’s regulations. Although not officially
listed as principles, they were included in subsequent regulations,
modified by additions and deletions, over the next 28 years. In 1949,
the present list again appeared and has remained roughly the same
through to today.
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1921 US Army
Field Training Regulation 10-5

2002 Joint Publication 3-0

The Principle of the Objective

Objective

The Principle of the Offensive

Offensive

The Principle of Mass

Mass

The Principle of Economy of Force

Economy of Force

The Principle of Movement

Maneuver

The Principle of Surprise

Surprise

The Principle of Security

Security

The Principle of Simplicity

Simplicity

The Principle of Cooperation

Unity of Command

Table 1. U.S. Principles of War, 1921 versus 2002.
Between 1921 and 1949, a debate among military theorists
centered on the format, value, number, and absoluteness of a set of
principles of war.28 The 1923 Field Training Regulation that deleted
the principles, nonetheless, continued to refer to them. It did speak
of the “concept” of principles.
While the fundamental principles of war are neither very
numerous nor complex, their application may be difficult and
must not be limited by set rules. Departure from prescribed
methods is at times necessary. A thorough knowledge of the
principles of war and their application enables the leader to
decide when such departures should be made and determine
what methods should bring success.29

In 1934, Major E. S. Johnson of the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College noted “[T]he importance of evolving for our
professional use a set of correct, simple, practical basic principles
of war can hardly be exaggerated at this time. We live in a critical
transitory stage. Great war seems to loom on the horizon―war
perhaps much different, as to form and appearance, from our last
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war.”30 Johnson also highlighted the “[J]ustification for principles of
war as an inventory system . . . for the baggage of experience and
professional study each warrior has.”31
The debate over the past 80 years has been both healthy and
necessary. Each of the U.S. services eventually accepted the same
principles of war. The actual principles that each service lists have
had minor variations over the last 3 decades. While there have been
some differences in definitions, the current joint and service basic
doctrine manuals each present the same nine principles.
PRINCIPLES IMPACT ON THE U.S. MILITARY
The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of
U.S. military doctrine.
Joint Pub 3-0

The influence of the principles of war on the American military
is pervasive. Their effect is both obvious and subtle. The principles
are obvious when officers talk about doctrine, plan operational
campaigns, or execute tactical maneuvers. There effects are not as
readily apparent in discussions about strategy or envisioning future
military forces. From the beginning to the end of an officer’s career,
the principles are present through formal and informal education
and training. The officer corps makes choices and influences
decisions, which have significant impact in areas such as tactics and
operations development, theater strategic and operational planning,
envisioning future military capabilities and concepts, technological
research and development, organizing the military, training
warriors, educating leaders, identifying requirements, allocating
resources, acquiring material, and much more.
Principles and Strategic Culture.
Sun Tzu commented, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in
a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”32 To know itself, the
American military must know the existence and impacts of strategic
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culture. Strategic culture is complex. The nation’s geography,
history, traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits,
achievements, particular ways of adapting to the environment, and
solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force are the
ingredients of strategic culture.33 Each element combines to create or
modify the American strategic culture. Strategic culture is the why,
when, and how the nation and its military fight wars. It is a reflection
of the nation’s moral and idealistic values, traditions of exploration,
and attitudes toward technological solutions. The principles of war
represent an important element in the American strategic culture.
It is not easy to find something military that strategic culture, and
through it the principles of war, do not influence in one form or
another.
Military officers receive mission objectives. They formulate plans
to accomplishment those objectives. They use their experiences of past
successes and failures, recommendations from others based on their
experiences, their education, their professional background, service
and joint doctrine, and the principles of war to develop plans. Each
input can be clouded by strategic culture.34 The American strategic
culture has a tendency to superimpose its values on other cultures.
Americans assume the things important to them are important to
others, and that the rest of the world sees the problems, solutions,
and benefits in the same way. One commentator has noted that it is
“dangerous for the West in general, and for Americans in particular,
to believe that others view strategy and the nature and uses of force
through an Anglo-American lens.”35
The principles of war represent more than just the foundation
of doctrine or a tie between theory and application. They are the
lessons from past conflicts. They have become the foundation for
how the American military employs force. They are an important
part of the American strategic culture. Moreover, through strategic
culture, the principles have become the basis, whether conscious
or subconscious, for many of the decisions the American military
makes. Strategic culture and the principles affect and will continue
to influence the purchase of combat equipment. The military buys
tanks, aircraft, and ships because they support the belief that these
weapons are the most successful way to accomplish war as expressed
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in the principles. Stealth aircraft, for example, embody the principles
of maneuver, surprise, and maintaining the offensive.
Strategic culture and the principles even filter future operational
concepts. “JV 2020” lists four operational concepts for the military;
Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics,
and Full Dimensional Protection; all support the overarching
concept of Full Spectrum Dominance.36 The descriptions of these
concepts contain numerous references to the principles of war. The
operational concept of dominant maneuver uses “unmatched speed
and agility in positioning and repositioning tailored forces from
widely dispersed locations to achieve operational objectives quickly
and decisively.”37 Within that relatively short statement are at least
five of the principles of war; maneuver, surprise, security, objective,
and offensive. Thus, the U.S. military sees the future (and everything
else) through filters from the past.
Principles and Strategy and Doctrine.
The principles of war influence military strategy through filters
developed by strategic culture and historical experience. In the
introduction to The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War
War, the
authors describe the strategy process and “its constant adaptation
to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance,
uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.”38
Historical experience creates preconceptions about the nature
of war and politics and may generate irresistible strategic
imperatives. And ideology and culture shape the course of
decision-makers and their societies in both conscious and
unconscious ways. Not only may ideology and culture generate
threats where a different perspective would see none, but their
influence usually shapes perceptions about alternatives.39

The principles also influence doctrine. “Military doctrine
presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of
forces.”40 It represents an accumulation of knowledge, reflecting
combat and training experiences, experimentation, and analysis of
theory. It is basically a guide to the best way to prepare and employ
U.S. military forces.41 The principles have provided the basics of joint
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warfare and the foundation of joint and individual service doctrine.
Clausewitz tells us that the nature of war is universal. But, the
application of war is a cultural phenomenon and therefore heavily
influenced by strategic culture. Geography, politics, historical
context, and social norms all affect the application of force. The
Roman empire and its warrior state, Mao Tse-Tung’s support of a
guerrilla style of warfare, and the American dependence on power
projection and technology, all reflect unique sets of circumstances
and very different strategic cultures.
The historical basis of the principles of war supports the
Clausewitzian ideal of developing theory, strategy, and doctrine by
examining the historical record.42 Lieutenant Commander Dudley
W. Knox, USN, identified the relationship between the principles of
war and doctrine when he wrote in 1915 that “military doctrine are
beliefs or teachings which have been reasoned from principles; that is
they flow from principles as a source. They are intended to be general
guides to the application (emphasis in original) of mutually accepted
principles, and thus furnish a practical basis for coordination under
the extremely difficult conditions governing contact between hostile
forces.”43 He went on to discuss the increased number of possible
solutions to situations involving the application of several different
principles and doctrines, which implies the value of the concept of
adaptability as a principle and as a means to avoid inflexibility and
dogma.44
Principles and Joint Warfare.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates joint warfare. At the basic
level, joint warfare is, or should be, one of the core competencies
of the U.S. armed forces. Fighting the joint fight is the wave of the
now and the future. Regardless of the nature of the battle or the
composition of the force, the military will fight a joint fight . . . “the
days of single service warfare are gone forever.”45 The nature of war
has not changed. It is still an interaction between living, thinking,
reacting humans. However, the increased quantity of information
and the complexity of the battlefield place a greater weight on the
value of adaptability.

197

War is a human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic
rules. Indeed, the rapid advance of technology and the diversity
of threats to national interests have accelerated and amplified the
effects of the traditional obstacles to military operations of friction
chance, and uncertainty. The cumulative effect of these obstacles
is often described as “the fog of war” and places a burden on the
commander to remain responsive, versatile, and able to adjust in
real time to seize opportunities and reduce vulnerabilities. This is
the art of war.46

The principles’ influence on Joint warfare is crucial. They are
universally accepted by all of the services. The principles provide a
common starting point for warfighting discussions. They also form
the launching platform for planning the military’s future. Table 2
Current Joint Doctrine Principles of War, Principles for MOOTW,
and Fundamentals of Joint Warfare
Principles of War
(JP 1-0 & 3-0)
•Objective

Principles for
MOOTW
(JP 3-0 & 3-07)

Fundamentals of Joint
Warfare (JP 1-0)

•Objective

•End State
•Initiative

•Offensive

Freedom of Action

•Mass

•Concentra-tion

•Economy of Force

•Restraint

Evolving Fundamentals of
21st Century Joint Warfare
and Crisis Resolution

•Extension

•Initiative
•Application of
Combat Power
•Joint Maneuver

•Maneuver

•Tempo

•Unity of Command

•Unity of Effort

•Security

•Security

•Unity of Effort

•Unity of Effort
•Safeguarding the Force

•Surprise

•Shock
•Clarity

•Simplicity

•Knowledge
•Perseverance

•Understanding
•Will

•Legitimacy

•Legitimacy
•Sustainment

•Sustainability

•Agility

•Adaptability

Table 2. Evolving Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution
Fundamentals.49
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depicts a common joint warfighting perspective approved by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council. These evolving fundamentals
will guide the emerging American way of joint warfare and crisis
resolution. They provide direction and are the continuity needed for
future fighting force development.47 These thirteen ‘new’ aphorisms
may eventually replace the current principles of war.48
DEFINITION OF ADAPTABILITY VERSUS FLEXIBILITY
Adapt: 1. To fit (a person or thing to another, to or for a purpose),
to suit or make suitable; 2. To alter or modify so as to fit for a new
use. 3. To undergo modification so as to fit for a new use.
The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition
Flexible: 1. Capable of being bent, admitting of change in figure
without breaking; yielding to pressure, pliable, pliant; 2. Willing
or disposed to yield to influence or persuasion; capable of being
guided, easily led, impressionable, manageable, tractable.
The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition

Adaptability is fundamentally different from flexibility.50
Flexibility is reactive or defensive by its nature. From the definition,
flexible suggests bending, but not breaking, to an enemy or external
force. However, the implication is that the enemy is driving
the change. Conversely, adaptability has an active or offensive
perception, which the U.S. Marines emphasize in their Fleet Marine
Field Manual 1-0, Leading Marines.
Adaptability has long been our key to overcoming the effects of
frictions and its components. Although it is synonymous with
flexibility, adaptability also embraces the spirit of innovation.
Marines constantly seek to adapt new tactics, organization, and
procedures to the realities of the environment. Deficiencies in
existing practices are identified, outdated structure discarded,
and modifications made to maintain function and utility. The
ability to adapt enables Marines to be comfortable within an
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environment dominated by friction. Experience, common sense,
and the critical application of judgment all help marine leaders
persevere.51

Adaptability is associated with initiative, ingenuity, imagination,
agility, and innovation. Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC
(Ret) once commented, “Most often, the ingredients of victory are
initiative, resourcefulness, adroitness, and improvisation . . . another
way of describing adaptability, long a way of life for Marines.”52
Adaptability implies multiplicity in uses for the basic framework of
doctrine, equipment, or personnel all of which should be adaptable
to multiple situations, threats, or environments. This is important
considering the uncertainty of the future threat and environment,
the expansion of missions, the long lead times for hardware
development and the increasing expense of weapons systems.
WHY ADAPTABILITY? . . . WHY NOW? . . . WHAT HAS
CHANGED?

Our challenge in this new century is a difficult one. It’s really to
prepare to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain
and what we have to understand will be the unexpected. That
may seem on the face of it an impossible task, but it is not. But
to accomplish it, we have to put aside the comfortable ways of
thinking and planning, take risks and try new things so that we
can prepare our forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have
not yet emerged to challenges.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

The convergence of several factors now and in the near term
stresses the need to include adaptability as a principle of war. First
is the uncertainty of the future environment. Increasing operations
tempo and diversity of missions, rapid and increasing rates of
change in technologies, especially information technologies, and
adaptable adversaries will blur future force requirements. Second
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is the significant rise in the nature and scope of the terrorism threat.
Last is transformation and the continuing move towards jointness.
Uncertainty of the Future.
[T]he focus . . . is the third element of our strategic approach―the
need to prepare for an uncertain future.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020

The future environment is a major element in determining the
shape, size, and capabilities of the U.S. military. Three “Joint Vision
2020” factors guide the American military force-planning effort.
First, the United States will continue to be globally engaged with
various world and regional actors. Security and economic interests
and political and social values will drive U.S. policy, while the
military instrument will continue to remain a viable element of
national power. There is no indication that war or the threat of war
will cease to exist in the future. An ever-widening transportation
and communications net and rapidly expanding information
technologies will increase world interdependence and provide the
inertia to continued globalization.53
Next, the expanding availability of the Internet and other
information technologies will tend to “level the playing field” with
respect to access to new and developing technologies at relatively
low costs. Globalization will spread access to a commercial industrial
database. This will give potential adversaries access to much of the
same technology as the U.S. military.54 Finally, America’s adversaries
will modify their strategies and operational and tactical capabilities
in an attempt to reduce U.S. technological advantages. Other state
and nonstate actors will challenge current U.S. military dominance
in a variety of innovative and asymmetric ways.55 They will not
remain static in the face of American capabilities. They will adapt. 56
The future environment requires the current military to
transform. A key challenge to successful transformation is the pace
of technological change and its impact on the strategic environment.
The U.S. military must “place a premium on our ability to foster
innovation in our people and organizations across the entire range
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of joint operations.”57 In the context of a military organization
that is resistant to change, adaptability is the key to success in an
uncertain future. Adaptability as a principle of war, and thus part
of strategic culture, will link the American military’s current and
future forces. Strong core capabilities derived from current force
structure and legacy systems will continue to deter conflict and
when that fails, win wars. Transformation will combine developing
technologies with new doctrine and concepts implemented through
new organizations that maximize the future American military’s
capabilities. Adaptability is the bridge that will allow the U.S.
military to modify existing core competencies to meet the future
mid-term strategic realities.58
The Rise in Terrorism.
In the few months it took to topple the Taliban regime, U.S.
forces proved highly adaptable. They went to war in Afghanistan
without an on-the-shelf plan in a very difficult environment. They
showed ingenuity in tackling the challenges of operating half way
around the world in some of the most forbidding terrain on the
planet. And the fact that a key breakthrough at Mazar-i Sharif was
secured by the first American cavalry charge of the 21st century
merely underscores the point. This capacity for adaptation is a
precious commodity. It will be essential not only in the ensuing
phases of the war against terrorism but also in transforming the
Armed Forces to cope with the very different challenges that will
emerge in the future.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

The September 11, 2001, the attack on the United States changed
the focus of the American government, people, and military.
Terrorism is not new. Nevertheless, it has not been a driving factor
in U.S. military planning or thought. Terrorism is a “tool of the
weak,” with potential dramatic strategic effects.59 Yet, it is now a
major feature in the future environment and is a major factor driving
the requirement for adaptability in the military.
The Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as: “the
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to
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intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”60
Terrorism traces back to the Ancient Greek and Roman Republics.
According to the U.S. Code’s definition, the assassination of Julius
Caesar on the Ides of March in 44 B.C. was an act of terrorism.61 In
the first century, Jewish religious nationalists known as The ZealotsSicarii (dagger-wielders) “carried out terrorist attacks on Roman
officials and Jews considered to be Roman collaborators.”62 For over
200 years between 1047 and 1296, the Hashishim (the Assassins)
prosecuted a campaign of terrorism in northern Iran.63 And one
of the best illustrations of the impact terrorism can have was the
assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, an act
that precipitated the First World War and 4 years of carnage.64
A modern view of future terrorism divides terrorists and their
organizations into four different categories; individual terrorists,
national liberation movements, state sponsored terrorists, and
millenarian terrorists. The millenarian terrorist presents the greatest
danger to the United States. The millenarian terrorist’s vision of the
future does not include anything Americans would call civilization.
They would be “willing to use any means of violence, including
weapons of mass destruction” in the pursuit of those goals.65
Stealthy movements across international borders, secure operations,
and extreme procedures against penetration from outsiders will
characterize their organizations. They will plan and coordinate
operations by combining old fashion couriers and new technology
communications systems. Increasing globalization provides the
cover from which they will operate.66 “But above all, the terrorist of
the 21st century will prove adaptable to the environment in which
they chose to fight.”67
Such an opponent is not greatly affected by diplomacy or the
traditional use of the military instrument of power. Nevertheless,
the military will be called and must prevail in this war. This fight is
for the survival of the United States and its ideals and freedoms.68
“The key is to adapt with changing times and a different enemy.”69
Adaptability, ingenuity, innovation, these must be the attributes of a
military that will face and defeat terrorism.
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Transformation.
One of the things that we don’t want to leave behind as we move
toward tomorrow is the ability to think, the ability to adapt, the
ability to do things that the Soviet Union was not able to do and
is no more.
General Tom Franks

Transformation in the military is the most important reason to
add adaptability to the principles of war. On the future battlefield,
adaptability provides another guide to the conduct of war. As part of
the strategic culture, it will allow the military to excel in the uncertain
future. Transformation requires adaptability and innovation to get
to the future. The Department of Defense defines transformation as:
a process of change that involves developing new operational
concepts, experimenting to determine which ones work and
which do not, and implementing those that do. Transformation
deals with changes in the way military forces are organized,
trained, and equipped; changes in the doctrine, tactics, techniques,
and procedures that determine how they are employed; changes
in the way they are led; and changes in the way they interact
with one another to produce effects in battles and campaigns.
The objective of the transformation process is to realize military
capabilities that can deal effectively with the new demands
of a changing security environment. Transformation involves
preserving current U.S. strengths, meeting new threats and
environments, and exploiting new opportunities. To some extent,
transformation means accelerating the development and fielding
of capabilities that we know we need. But it also means exploring
capabilities that are less well understood, and correcting the
course we are on, as necessary, to ensure that those needed new
capabilities are realized.70

Large organizations have a difficult time with major changes of
direction.71 But for the American military, transformation is a basic
requirement. In his 2002 report to the President and the Congress,
Secretary Rumsfeld reported “transforming the U.S. Armed Forces
is necessary because the challenges presented by this new century
are vastly different from those of the last century.”72
Transformation has three dimensions; conceptual, cultural,
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and technological. Technology alone has never been the answer to
transformation.73 It is only a small part of the answer. It represents
an enabler that allows the military to explore new ways of fighting.74
Transformational gains in the U.S. military require changes in
how war is conceptualized, in how the military is organized, and
in its strategic culture. The attack on Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan
provided the first cavalry attack of the 21st century and showed
“that a revolution in military affairs is about more than building
new high tech weapons . . . it’s also about new ways of thinking, and
new ways of fighting.”75
The most significant of the three dimensions of transformation
is strategic culture. “Values and culture are a vital institutional
counterweight to the innate conservatism of military hierarchies and
the inertia of large bureaucracies.”76 For successful transformation,
the most important cultural characteristic is adaptability. Identifying
adaptability as a principle of war would provide impetus to change
the American military strategic culture.
Four factors influence innovation and transformation;
development of a balanced and operational realistic vision,
bureaucratic acceptance, institutional processes for testing and
refining concepts, and chance.77 Strategic culture can affect each of
these factors. A strategic culture that encourages innovation and
adaptation is essential to successful transformation. The culture must
encourage leaders and subordinates to assess and reassess situations
critically and adapt, if necessary, to the current circumstances.
“Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and
develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly
to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. An ability to
adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty are
the defining characteristics of our new security environment.”78
ADAPTABILITY IN WAR
Its [war’s] violence is not of the kind that explodes in a single
discharge, but is the effect of forces that do not always develop
in exactly the same manner or to the same degree. At times they
will expand sufficiently to overcome the resistance of inertia or
friction; at others they are too weak to have any effect. War is a
pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable
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in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy.
War moves on its goal with varying speeds; but it always lasts
long enough for influence to be exerted on the goal and of its own
course to be changed in one way or another; long enough, in other
words, to remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War

Clausewitz refers to military warriors and leaders who not
only must survive in the chaos of war but must also operate and
accomplish missions successfully in accordance with the bigger
picture. His concept is that the nature of war changes war itself, as
it occurs, and that these changes are unpredictable. The events in
war represent nonlinear interactions between living, thinking, and
reacting humans. Clausewitz’s chance, fog, and friction combine
to make war unpredictable and in a constant state of change. The
continuous interaction and feedback process fundamental to war
is itself an agent forcing uncertainty and change in the character of
any war. In other words, war changes itself. Such an environment
demands adaptability to account for unplanned, unpredictable, and
unforeseeable opportunities and setbacks.
Fog, friction, and chance permeate the battlefield. The
complexity found in war is a reflection of its nonlinear nature.
Nonlinearity guarantees no two wars will ever be the same and that
even within the same war, the structure may prove unstable. War is
so complex that imperceptibly small events can lead to significant
and massive changes in the system. The production of unchanging
laws or principles can lead to defeat. “Adaptability is as important in
doctrine as on the battlefield.”79
In War and Planning.
Military planning has long known the value of adaptability.
The U.S. Army anticipates that operations “never proceed exactly
as planned” and places a premium on adaptability in plans.80 Using
branches and sequels to account for contingencies, unanticipated
events, opportunities, successes, failures, and stalemates, Army
planning reflects the American military’s sense of the importance
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of adaptability.81 B. H. Liddell Hart argued for adaptable plans,
when he suggested “[T]o be practical, any plan must take account
of the enemy’s power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming
such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the
circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping
the initiative, the best way to operate is along a line which offers
alternative objectives.”82 Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke
described war’s complex environment and argued for commanders
to use genius, experience, education, and adaptability.
The material and moral consequences of any larger encounter are,
however, so far-reaching that through them a completely different
situation is created, which then becomes the basis for new
measures. No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond
the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy (emphasis added).
The commander is compelled during the whole campaign to reach
decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted.
All consecutive acts of war are, therefore, not executions of a
premeditated plan, but spontaneous actions, directed by military
tact. The problem is to grasp, in innumerable special cases, the
actual situation which is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to
appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements,
to reach a decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully and
relentlessly . . . . It is obvious that theoretical knowledge will not
suffice, but that here the qualities of mind and character come
to a free, practical and artistic expression, although schooled by
military training and led by experiences from military history or
from life itself.83

The campaign against Iraq’s ballistic missile forces during the
Persian Gulf War provides a glimpse at how pre-war expectations did
not match actual wartime conditions and the how American military
forces then adapted. The DESERT STORM air plan contained four
key phases; the strategic air campaign, air supremacy in the Kuwaiti
theater of operations, battlefield preparation, and support of the
ground offensive.84 In August 1990, Central Command planners
did not include Iraq’s ballistic missile capability in their target sets,
but by December 1990, 13 SCUD facilities were on the strategic air
campaign target list. Planners knew that some number of mobile
launchers would escape destruction. The leaders and planners
regarded the missiles “chiefly as nuisance weapons that might cause
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political difficulties” and “as posing little tactical or operational
threat to the Coalition.” 85 Their plan reduced the offensive threat
by attacking “fixed launch sites, support bases, production facilities,
potential hide sites, and support facilities for mobile launchers, but
not the launchers themselves.”86 The planners mirror-imaged the
Soviet employment doctrine on the Iraqi military. This resulted in
over-confidence in their ability to find, fix, target, and destroy the
ballistic missile threat. No one in Central Command “devised, before
the war, a search-and-destroy scheme for dealing with them [mobile
SCUD launchers].”87
SCUD launches into Israel and Saudi Arabia highlighted the
failures in initial planning. Sorties dedicated to SCUD hunting
increased, as planners adapted to the current realities. However,
more telling than the increase in dedicated sorties was the scope
of the overall search for a solution to a problem that would not
be solved by the war’s end.88 The search for an answer included
previously untried uses and combinations of American military
power. Space-based assets, intelligence annalists, Patriot surfaceto-air missiles, ATACMS, E-8 Joint STARS, F-15E, Tornado, F-16C,
B-52, F-117, A-10, Tomahawks, and American and British SOF all
contributed to attempts at solving the SCUD problem. While these
efforts may have failed in a tactical sense, the continuous adaptation
was strategically significant in that it kept Israel from engaging with
its own military.89
In Policies and Strategies.
The interactions of conflict affect even the highest levels of war.
The political aim and the strategies to attain that aim are not exempt
from war’s effects. “It [the political aim] must adapt itself to its
chosen means, a process which can radically change it.”90 Therefore,
strategy must adapt if the political aim changes. History suggests
that strategic assessment and re-assessment is a common theme in
victory. Changes in the nature of the conflict caused by a thinking
and reactive adversary drive strategic adaptation. Failure to adapt
can be fatal. “The great failure of the generation of military leaders
in World War I was their refusal (with notable exceptions) to adapt
quickly to change.”91
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In the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans adapted their strategic
framework better than the Athenians over the course of the 30-year
war. Eventually, the Spartans, a traditional land power, learned
how to fight the Athenians, a traditional naval power, “on the sea
well enough to win.”92 The Corinthians described the Athenians to
the Spartans before the war as “swift, aggressive, and innovative.”
However, in the end the “slow, traditional, unimaginative Spartans”
were better able to adjust and adapt to the changes brought about by
the course of the war.93
The near fatal disasters of the Second Punic War 150 years later
would precede the rise of the Roman Empire. Hannibal’s victories
forced the Romans to adapt their strategic framework. A brutal
warrior state, Roman warmaking was primarily one that went for
the kill; it was ruthless and free of any competing political demands.
A retreating, defensive, attrition strategy failed to fit that paradigm.94
Nevertheless, confronted with Hannibal’s operational military
genius and his victories at Trebbia, Trasimene, and Cannae, that
threatened the very existence of the Republic, Roman dictator Fabius
modified Roman strategy.95 The adapted strategy refused battle and
harassed the enemy’s army.96 It substituted “practical discretion for
traditional valor and retreat before the enemy in order to avoid a
fourth, possibly fatal defeat.”97 Rome was able to modify and adapt
its previously successful military strategy to survive. A century later,
Polybius would highlight one of the Romans’ strengths as the ability
to adapt customs, weapons, and tactics to “emulate what they see is
better done by others.”98
In Operational Art.
One of the turning points and key battles of the American
Civil War was the Vicksburg campaign.99 Union General Ulysses
S. Grant adapted his operational plans to reflect the reality of the
actual situation. The strategic context, battle failures and successes,
terrain, logistics, resources, and the enemy’s actions and reactions all
forced changes in his 6-month campaign. However, he always kept
the strategic context of the campaign as a primary and unwavering
factor in his plans.100
Grant’s initial plan attacked along traditional lines of
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communications from his bases in Tennessee south towards
Vicksburg.101 He used railroads and roads to maintain lines of supply.
The plan failed when Confederate cavalry attacked his supply depots
and “demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of
road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy’s
country.”102 Grant abandoned that line of attack. Next, he used the
previous attack routes as a deception to support the primary attack
from the Chickasaw Bayou.103 The plan called for the use of the
Union controlled Mississippi River as the “line over which to draw
supplies.”104 Although, the Mississippi River would provide Grant a
secure line of supply, the Confederate defenses along the Vicksburg
cliffs proved to be insurmountable obstacles to Union attacks. Again,
Grant looked for another way.
Still using the Mississippi River as the primary route, Grant
changed his plans. In an attempt to bypass the Chickasaw Bayou, his
forces maneuvered through the secondary creeks, rivers, and bayous
to arrive north of Vicksburg.105 This plan also failed. Continuing to
look for a solution to the problem of defeating the Confederate
forces, Grant modified his plans again. The resulting plan used an
indirect approach and eventually led to victory.
Grant would adapt the final version of his campaign in May 1863.
An amphibious landing near Grand Gulf established a beachhead
south of Vicksburg, while major diversions held the enemy’s
attention. Grant planned to use Grand Gulf as a base of supply. The
west bank of the Mississippi River provided a secure, albeit long,
supply route. A change in the status of Union forces finalized Grant’s
last and most radical adaptation to his plan. 106 In order to continue
to maneuver and maintain pressure on the enemy, Grant decided to
“cut loose from my base” and supply the entire Army off the land.107
This was a risky move since “it had not been demonstrated that an
army could operate in an enemy’s territory depending upon the
country for supplies.”108 Ultimately, this allowed Grant to position
his army for the successful siege of Vicksburg.
ADAPTABILITY IN THE MILITARY
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the
character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves
after they occur.
General Giulio Douhet
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The American military values adaptability as a warfighting
attribute. Throughout recorded history, theorists have argued for
adaptability. Sun Tzu underlined the need for armies and leaders to
adapt to the current environment: “As water has no constant form,
there are in war no constant conditions. And as water shapes its flow
in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in
accordance with the situation of the enemy.”109
The U.S. Army values doctrine that is “rooted in time-tested
principles but is forward-looking and adaptable to changing
technologies, threats, and missions. Army doctrine is detailed enough
to guide operations, yet flexible enough to allow commanders to
exercise initiative when dealing with specific tactical and operational
situations.”110 The Army recognizes
the ambiguous nature of the operational environment requires
Army leaders who are self-aware and adaptive. Self-aware leaders
understand their operational environment, can assess their own
capabilities, determine their own strengths and weaknesses,
and actively learn to overcome their weaknesses. Adaptive
leaders must first be self-aware - then have the additional ability
to recognize change in their operating environment, identify
those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new
environment.”111

The Army has successfully adapted to changing conditions,
new technologies and emerging threats in the past. The American
soldier’s ingenuity and innovation will continue to serve America
during this period of transformation.112
The U.S. Navy identifies five core competencies and four key
attributes of its sea-based expeditionary force. The first on the list of
competencies and attributes is adaptability. Naval forces are “capable
of adapting to a variety of situations … and can support the many
challenges facing our theater Combatant Commanders.”113 Forwarddeployed naval forces provide the nation with an organically
supported, combined arms force that “can adapt at a moment’s
notice to emergent needs.”114 Those forward deployed forces require
exceptional leaders. The “unique and unforgiving nature of the sea
has demanded that naval forces and their leaders have not only
a clear sense of purpose and extensive levels of training, but the
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flexibility to adapt to a changing enemy/environment in order to be
victorious.”115
The U.S. Marines are the epitome of adaptability. They even
describe war as a “process of continuous mutual adaptation, of
give and take, move and countermove.”116 They argue that success
follows the ability to adapt, to proactively shape the environment
as well as react to changing conditions. Proactive shaping includes
the identification and creation of opportunities instead of “adhering
insistently to predetermined plans.”117 They embrace what
adaptability brings to the acknowledged chaos and uncertainty
that characterize the battlefield. Marines believe that adaptability is
a key to overcoming the effects of friction and its components and
that the ability to adapt enables Marines to be comfortable in this
environment.118
“Flexibility is the key to air power” has been associated with
the beliefs of the U.S. Air Force long before it became a separate
service. It remains a tenet of air power today. The combat air forces
organize themselves by Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. This
adaptable concept allows the Air Force to provide tailor-made air
power packages to fit the combatant commander’s requirements.
The Air Force’s approach to transformation is through innovation
and adaptation. Airmen “were born of change and it remains a part
of their character.”119
The Future Joint Force.
The future of the U.S. military is joint. The creation of the
future joint force and the capabilities needed to achieve full
spectrum dominance will require adaptation and flexibility. The
transformation of the current force to a force more joint in nature
will require common frames of reference for concepts, capabilities,
requirements, modularization, and service unique core capabilities.
The joint perspective envisions a future joint war fighting force
able to use an “adaptive blend of attrition and maneuver warfare”
in the ever-changing strategic and operational environments the
American military will face.120 The joint force will combine adaptive
service capabilities to accomplish assigned missions (see Figure 1).
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This synergistic approach will apply the right force at the right time
in the right place. These adaptive capabilities, leaders, warriors,
and systems are foundational to the future joint force. “Having
the ability to recognize, adapt and tailor the inherent ‘multi-use’
capabilities of the future joint force across the range of military
operations will permit exploitation of those resources to resolve a
crisis situation.”121

Figure 1. Joint Requirements Oversight Council Adaptability
Context.122
An adaptive joint force will find it easier to integrate new
technologies, overcome challenges from adapting adversaries, and
succeed in the chaotic battlefield than today’s military. Information
technology will continue to grow and be a major enabler of the
future joint force. “During the last two decades of the twentieth
century, previously unimaginable tools for handling and using
information have become widespread . . . these tools bring great
potential advantages, but they also bring a need for both cultural
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adaptation and perhaps for more insightful leadership practices.”123
The applicability and effectiveness of the U.S. military in
future roles will depend on unique combinations of organizations,
capabilities, equipment, and people. Adaptability in multiple
situations comes from combining the core competencies of the
services into a joint team. These teams will depend on “welleducated, motivated and competent people who can adapt to the
many demands of future joint missions.”124 The crucial element in
the future force will always be the people. “The emerging capabilities
required for future joint operations calls for a new culture that
emphasizes adaptability in its personnel.”125 This joint force will
require a cultural change that openly emphasizes an expeditionary
and joint team mindset. Individual energy, innovation, imagination,
and diversity must merge with traditional military standards
of motivation, discipline, dedication, integrity, teamwork, and
professionalism. In the future environments “U.S. joint forces
must be capable of adapting their warfighting capabilities to crisis
resolution situations without loss of operational effectiveness.”126
Developing and educating people who embrace adaptability
and who can effectively apply the joint forces across the entire
range of military operations is crucial, but the joint team will also
require global power projection capabilities. The starting point
will be expeditionary forces that are modular in nature. Joint
Commanders must be able to tailor forces to the immediate needs
of the mission. These service elements will have a common basis
from which to operate―joint concepts, known capabilities, and
integrated architectures. They will be able to immediately integrate
into the joint command structure, provide operational and tactical
competences to the fight, and do so regardless of the make up of the
rest of the joint force.127
Transformation to this future joint force will bring new
challenges to all areas of the military. Dogmas, from individual
service prejudices to joint “everybody must play” mentalities,
from weapon systems acquisition to peacetime and wartime
organizations, from strategy to tactics, should be examined and
modified to maximize the benefits of transformation. The road to
transformation and the future joint force is through adaptability. It
is time to include adaptability in the principles of war where it will
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positively influence American warfighting capability, future joint
forces, and the military’s cultures.
PROPOSED JOINT DEFINITION
The following proposed joint definition for adaptability is
presented in the format of the current Joint Publication 1, Joint
Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States for principles of
war.128
Adaptability
a. The purpose of adaptability is to actively endorse necessary
altering or modifying combat operations, which aggressively
find, force, and/or exploit opportunities, in reaction to localized
conditions, at all levels on the battlefield.
b. Adaptability requires that military personnel at all levels
understand the strategic, operational, and tactical objectives
supporting the commander’s intent. Adaptability acknowledges
the nature of war, characterized by chaos, volatility, violence,
chance, friction, and fog, on achieving those goals. It encourages
alteration and modification of planned actions in light of the
current combat situations to accomplish the mission efficiently
and effectively and support the commander’s intent. It is
applicable to all other principles of war except the Objective.
Adaptability represents ingenuity, resourcefulness, innovation,
and imagination of an individual and the group. It is both mental
and physical, as well as the mental ability to find, identify, and
exploit non-linear patterns in the strategic, operational, or tactical
environment. It depends on the physical ability to act upon those
patterns or force new ones more rapidly than the enemy and to
do this with only the forces and capabilities on hand. Adaptability
is a culture, a state of mind, and a characteristic of the American
joint fighting force.

CONCLUSION
The principles of war are an accepted tool to assist warfighters.
They attempt to model those aspects of war the U.S. military
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feels important to consider when planning for war or executing a
campaign. The principles consciously and unconsciously influence
the U.S. military establishment across a wide spectrum outside
of war. These include, but are by no means limited to, visioning
the future military, weapons development and acquisition, and
education of American military leadership.
The military has always respected adaptability as a hallmark of
its warriors.
There are numerous self-aware and adaptive leaders in our
history—Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore in the Ia Drang Valley;
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur at Inchon; General
Matthew Ridgeway taking command of Eighth Army in Korea;
Major General William Sherman in the March to the Sea; and
Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant’s relentless assault on the
Army of Northern Virginia.129

It has identified adaptability in axioms such as “no plan survives
first contact with the enemy” and called it by other names such as
“initiative” or “ingenuity.” The ability to take the commander’s
intent and plans and then adapt them to the current situation and
environment in order to accomplish the mission is one of the traits of
U.S. military fighting men and women and is arguably a trademark
of American culture.
The principles of war influence American military officers at
every level of professional military education and throughout their
careers. They represent the doctrinal foundations from which the
American military builds unmatched global military capabilities in
order to defend the nation, its people, and its interests. Incorporating
adaptability in the principles will emphasize an attitude, mental
ability, and physical characteristic that is already valued by all the
military services.
Service
and
Joint
writings
(publications,
manuals,
memorandums, etc.) contain numerous references to the value
of adaptability as a leadership and warrior attribute. They argue
for the value of adaptability in the effective integration of joint,
multinational, and interagency organizations. The goal then is a
military, joint in nature, proficient in the application of power across
the spectrum of conflict, educated in military history and doctrine,
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well led with technologically advanced tools, and with the ability
to adapt to the combatant commander’s unique requirements. With
the continuing complexity of the battlefield, the blurring of lines
between strategic, operational, and tactical events and outcomes,
and the increased range of military operations, the adoption of
adaptability as a principle of war represents an opportunity to
influence the continuation of U.S. military dominance.
Adding adaptability to the principles of war will also encourage a
strategic culture that allows exploration and experimentation. When
combined with critical thinking, a solid historical foundation, and
technical competence, adaptability will provide the continuing basis
for a military able to meet and defeat any threat the United States will
confront over the foreseeable future. It will create an environment
in which “out of the box” thinking flourishes. Adaptability is
an imperative when matched with the uncertainty of the future,
diverse and adaptive threats, joint warfare, and the expanding use
of the military. The U.S. military sees the value of adaptability in
history, uses it in current operations, seeks it out, and encourages it.
It is needed for the future warfighting force. Raise adaptability to its
proper place, codify it and make it a principle of war.
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CHAPTER 8
DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Colonel Richard C. Longo
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy
present… As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act
anew.
Abraham Lincoln
Message to Congress
December 1, 1862.1

The recent termination of the Crusader program, coupled with
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s May 2002 testimony before
Congress on his belief that the future lies with air-delivered precision
munitions, has called into question the future of the Field Artillery
as a branch and the delivery of ground-based fires as a function.
The Crusader itself has come to represent the branch―heavy, slow,
lethargic, and, although maybe technologically sophisticated,
somehow out of touch with how the U.S. military currently fights
and how it will fight in the future.
The purpose for this chapter is to demonstrate that the thinking
described in the previous paragraph is wrong. A technologically
sophisticated Crusader or a Crusader-like system, coupled with
advanced munitions and target detection and location capabilities,
is not only relevant, but represents a transformation in how the
Army could fight and win America’s future wars. A Crusader–like
cannon, supported by 21st century targeting, digitized sensor to
shooter links, global positioning system, and laser-enabled brilliant
munitions could provide the United States a capability to fight in a
fashion that military organizations heretofore have only dreamed
of.
The real time digital fusion of sensor, shooter, and munitions
provides the artillery of tomorrow direct fire effects with what used
to be indirect fire weapons. The opportunity to engage an enemy
from stand-off distances, without having to mass systems in order
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to mass effects, and deliver killing blows through the use of either
global-positioning or laser-designated brilliant munitions will
allow, or possibly demand, the Army to transform the way it fights,
organizes, and maneuvers.
The U.S. Army has reached the point where it should consider
artillery another ground maneuver system equal, if not superior,
to the armor and infantry as maneuver arms. It should give the
artillery missions, battle space, and responsibilities commensurate
with that newfound status. It must also consider the fundamental
reorganization of its maneuver and fires branches and combine them
into a new branch identified simply as “combat arms.”
In this chapter, the author will describe the potential offered
by marrying a weapon with Crusader-like capabilities to brilliant
precision munitions and sophisticated targeting techniques. This
coupling would provide direct fire-like effects over what have been
traditionally indirect fire distances without the risks of direct fire
engagements and without the necessity for massing systems that
direct fire engagements require. By leveraging this combination
of capabilities, the U.S. Army would fight a line-of-sight fight,
sometimes virtually, out to distances that at one time were referred
to as the “deep battle.” Finally, this chapter will address some of the
doctrinal and organizational changes required by such a new way of
thinking and fighting.
THE WEAPON
Crusader has been a transformational Army system from the
beginning of its initial concept development. The capabilities that
it will bring to the battlefield transcend legacy, interim, and even
Objective Force concepts of operations. It presents an opportunity to
fight in new ways. Senator Carl Levin, quoting former Army Chief
of Staff Gordon Sullivan, described Crusader’s capability succinctly
during Secretary Rumsfeld’s testimony before Congress in May
2002:
The Crusader was designed from the ground up to fight in
the digital-network-centered battlefield, to exploit information
dominance. Its advanced robotic operations and automated
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ammunition-handling systems allow the crew, enclosed in a
protected cockpit, to exploit information instead of straining
muscles. The advanced composite hull, liquid-cooled gun and
mobility of the system elevate the effectiveness of our forces by 50
percent, with a corresponding reduction in resources. Crusader
covers an area 77 percent greater than current systems and has a
3-1 advantage in rate of fire.2

Unfortunately, the Army initially designed Crusader to fight
a Cold War threat on the Western European battlefield. It did not
create Crusader with “projecting military force” in mind. Thus, its
designers did not face the Objective Force constraint of fitting inside
(and within the weight limitations of) a U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules.
Both the artillery branch and the Army as a whole were slow to
react to the new operational environment and attempted to draw
attention to what this weapon could do instead of acknowledging
what it could not. A last minute weight reduction from 70 tons to
approximately 40 tons was not enough to save the “white elephant”
that then candidate George Bush had targeted for cancellation at his
famous Citadel speech.
A comparison with the Army’s 40-year-old M109 howitzer
system―currently in the “A6” version or “Paladin”―is useful. This
comparison is important, because without the Crusader, it is the
Paladin that will serve as the Army’s heavy artillery for the next 30
years.
Mobility.
The Paladin has lagged behind the maneuver forces in its ability
to transit the battlefield since the arrival of the Abrams tank and
the Bradley fighting vehicle. This has affected the employment of
the system, as tactical and operational commanders have had to
“echelon” or piecemeal their artillery instead of massing it to keep
some fires in the fight. The Crusader would have used the same
turbine engine that the Abrams tank will use as a result of its system
enhancement program. This would have given the Crusader a 67
kilometer-per-hour road speed, with between 39 and 48 kilometersper-hour cross-country speed of maneuver. This ability to maneuver
on equal terms with the Abrams (as well as out-maneuvering any
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other tank system in the world) represented a dramatic increase in
capability and could have resulted in significantly new employment
concepts discussed later in this chapter.3
Deployability.
The lack of strategic deployability has been a common and
misguided complaint about the Crusader system. At its current
weight of 38 to 42 tons, one C-17 can deliver two Crusader systems
at strategic distances. This ability would give the gaining combatant
commander much greater firepower than he could get with
equivalent lift assets devoted to Paladin artillery systems.
Lethality and Responsiveness.
Advanced targeting and fire control systems in the Crusader
would have made it roughly three times more accurate than the
Paladin howitzer. Such accuracy would have occurred with the
current suite of “dumb” munitions. Couple this accuracy with the
precision available in newer munitions, and the accuracy of the
Crusader would approach that of direct fire systems. Another factor
that would have served to increase Crusader lethality was its liquidcooled gun tube. That may sound like cannon-cocker gibberish,
but the reality is that a Crusader could maintain a sustained rate of
fire of up to ten rounds per minute, while a Paladin can only shoot
three rounds in the same time. This would enable killing versus
suppressive missions. The Crusader’s robotic handling system
enabled it to shoot its own “time on target” mission, as one weapon
could deliver up to eight rounds that land at the same point within
four seconds. The ramifications are significant.
The common criticism of the Crusader has been the operational
mobility of the system. This criticism rests on the lift limitations of
the almost 50-year-old C-130 Hercules, which cannot carry either a
Paladin (which the Army will maintain for the next 30 years) or a
Crusader. However, two Crusaders can fit into a C-17, the U.S. Air
Force’s strategic and operational workhorse, and with that one lift,
the combatant commander will have the equivalent capability of
two batteries of Paladin―which require six C-17s to deliver.4
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Two additional capabilities give the Crusader a potential as
yet untapped. First, because each system has onboard technical
fire direction and self-locating capability, there no longer exists a
requirement for massing systems or bringing several guns together
in a battery. Crusader–like systems would enable Army artillery
to mass effects without massing systems. Such a transformational
capability would enable artillery to maneuver in the same manner
that tanks and Bradleys maneuver, with even greater tactical
dispersion.
This potential of operating in dispersed fashion was available
with the Paladin, but for a variety of reasons the artillery branch
chose not to leverage that capability. Artillery and maneuver
commanders were not comfortable with artillery systems roaming
the battlefield. Both preferred to keep them in boxes, or, as doctrine
came to call them, “position areas for artillery.” Although this
improved the ability to leverage new capabilities, it did it in a
suboptimal way. At times in National Training Center rotations,
the scheme of maneuver focused more on how to keep the artillery
“out of the way,” than in taking advantage of the system’s maneuver
capability. Imagine a battalion’s worth of Crusaders, operating in
one- and two-gun sections, dispersed throughout the brigade battle
space. The size of an avenue of approach is no longer relevant and
the enemy intelligence preparation of the battlefield process just
became exponentially more difficult.
At Battle Command Training Program Warfighter exercises,
some forward looking maneuver commanders have used artillery
better than ever before; nevertheless, they still confined their artillery
systems into battery- or at best platoon-sized elements. Some would
say that that is more a function of icon management and simulation
limitations, but those are exercise controller issues that the Army
can fix. Instead, commanders continually missed the opportunities
to take advantage of the potential available.
Survivability.
Several features on the Crusader make it more survivable than
its predecessor. Its cross-country mobility is one facet, but its ability
to dash 750 meters in 90 seconds is an equally significant advantage.
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Although this is hardly Abrams-equivalent mobility, it speaks to an
ability to get in and out of trouble (the close fight) a little quicker
than artillery has in the past. Improved exterior ballistic and nonballistic protection coupled with a compartmentalized ammunition
storage system, enhance passive defense for the crew dramatically.
Such units would be less vulnerable to enemy artillery and air due to
the dispersion of systems.
The Crusader’s ability to link immediately into the theater
common operating picture on arrival improves its defensive
capability as well. This represents a level of situational awareness
that is unprecedented in artillery. The improved situational
understanding would have allowed the Crusader to operate in
environments that were previously considered unsafe for artillery.
Active defensive measures include the ability to fire the mounted
machine gun or grenade launcher from inside the vehicle. The added
features of a self-contained nuclear, biological, and chemical defense
capability, coupled with the fact that the crew never has to leave the
cab to conduct resupply of any kind, would significantly improve
the survivability of the three-man team (one-third the size of the
Paladin crew) in battle.
Sensor to Shooter Linkages.
Today, the standard electronic chain which connects an observer
to a weapon is through eight different intervention points, each
with the capability to delay the call for fire.5 With its state of the art
communications systems, Crusader can link directly with sensors
and eliminate the latency of today’s indirect fires command and
control systems. Dispersed enemy weapons that also attempt to
mass effects instead of massing systems will define the future
battlefield. DESERT STORM demonstrated the error of massing
systems against the U.S. military. The contrary effectiveness of
dispersing systems against American combat power appeared not
by mistake in Kosovo. Thus, the ability to support simultaneous
mutual engagements directed by separate shooters with long-range
artillery fires will be more important in the future than the National
Training Center’s massed fire requirement of “you have to shoot
fifty-four rounds to kill one tank.”
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The Field Artillery Journal noted the sensor to shooter capabilities
of the Crusader in March 2002. “Crusader will be able to link directly
with a Comanche helicopter, an unmanned aerial vehicle, an M1A2
SEP, or other target acquisition source and immediately bring
effective fires. One sensor will be able to direct the fires of up to a
battery of howitzers.”6
These combinations of Crusader capabilities would, by
themselves, change the way the U.S. Army thinks and describes
maneuver warfare in the future. Couple this new delivery
system with new, more capable munitions, and one would get
transformational capabilities. Tie in those combined capabilities
with a new organizational architecture, and the Army will arrive at
the point where it must rethink current doctrine, as well as entirely
recast how it plans to fight this thing called the “Objective Force.”
The term indirect fire describes a delivery system in which the
“shooter” cannot see the target. He must rely on an observer to see
the target and direct his fires onto that target. The term “indirect”
has also come to incorrectly imply a pejorative lack of accuracy.
Field artillery projectiles of the past have relied on massed area fires
to provide the effects necessary to “destroy, neutralize or suppress”
the target. New munitions, however, are making that concept as
irrelevant in the artillery today as the Norden site is to the F-16.
MUNITIONS
Artillery munitions that are capable of “one shot, one kill” are
presently under development all over the world. Such munitions
depend on either global positioning systems, laser designating of
the target or, at the top end, brilliant munitions. Brilliant munitions
are munitions able to loiter above a target area and, with great
discrimination, independently decide which target is the “right”
target, based on preprogrammed target signatures.
The U.S. Army has lived with the laser designated Copperhead
round for 2 decades. Although this has generally been given a 90
percent chance of first round hit, the Copperhead remains a high
maintenance weapon, in which firers have to consider its limited
range (16 kilometers) as well as such artillery specific problems as
“angle T,” which is a confusing way of describing the relationship
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between the shooter, the laser designator, and the target. When
planned and executed correctly, this munition could have an
enormous effect on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the consistently
limited returns led maneuver commanders and shooters alike to
default to the area attack of hardened targets.
Most advanced countries have a laser targeting capability similar
to or greater than the Copperhead. The Russian-made “Krasnopol”
possesses a slightly longer-range munition that has already
proliferated around the world.7 The shortcoming of such weapons,
of course, is the necessity of the laser designator to expose himself.
Nevertheless, the accuracy achieved generally serves to make the
risk acceptable. Given well-conceived tactical positioning and the
absence in most adversaries’ kit bag of laser warning devices, such
weapons remain an effective tool.
Other capabilities to destroy hardened point targets exist in
numerous countries at present and are being developed with a postCrusader sense of urgency in the United States. Raytheon, in recent
collaboration with the Swedish company, Bofors, is developing the
Excalibur family of munitions.8 Excalibur is a jam resistant global
positioning system-enabled munition, compatible with virtually all
digitized artillery systems. This program has received considerable
momentum over the last 6 months, as it seems to have captured the
fascination of the current Secretary of Defense. Compared to the
paltry 16-kilometer range of the Copperhead, Excalibur can attack
targets at ranges of up to 40 kilometers with the Paladin howitzer
and 50 kilometers with a larger gun tube similar to that of the
Crusader.
Excalibur is actually the name for a common delivery projectile
that has three variants―a dual-purpose improved conventional
munition choice, an armor destroying choice, and a unitary
explosive choice. The Army is currently only pursuing the unitary
choice for budgetary reasons, but concept development for getting
the projectile to the target is the main effort. Once developers have
demonstrated proof of concept, expansion into the full suite of
munitions would follow.9
The Rheinmetall Weapons and Munitions Company has taken
this capability one step further. It has developed a “Sensor Fused
Munition for Artillery-155” (SMART155) which combines the sub234

20 meter accuracy of the Excalibur with a sensored fuse to enable
discriminating attack in the target area.10 This brilliant capability
means the munition can selectively engage the proper enemy system
in the target area with no additional action by the firer or observer.
The ramifications of this capability are significant. Armies can now
depend on collateral damage reduction at dramatic levels and engage
heretofore unattackable targets. Enemy tactics such as blending into
populated areas to deter attacks on their weapons systems will no
longer represent a viable course of action. This extremely accurate
munition could select between a school bus, for example, and the
multiple rocket launcher parked next to it. At present, the British
Army has a major Indirect Fire Precision Attack program, in which
its developers are leveraging the Raytheon Excalibur capability with
a terminally guided warhead. This would couple global positioning
accuracy with laser designation.11
The ideal munition for the future fight would be munitions
similar to Excalibur (call it Excalibur+) that had the three variants―
dual purpose improved conventional, armor destroying and
unitary munitions―that were sensor fused, brilliant, and laser
capable. This would provide all weather, all situation munitions
that would have devastating and transformational effects. The two
most significant benefits would be a precipitous decrease in the
volume of ammunition required for the same effect and the ability
to attack targets accurately that were previously unavailable. Couple
this munition with a Crusader-like cannon, and the Army would
approach what one might term a revolution in military affairs.
Complement this with new acquisition capabilities, and the new
systems would represent a true transformation in the “American
Way of War” that would rival the development of the rifle, the tank,
the aircraft carrier, and the helicopter.
The author’s experience in participating in numerous Training
and Doctrine Command’s “Seminar War Games” is the basis for
the three choices for munitions variant. In seven separate exercises
during the last year and with numerous battlefield vignettes
and simulations, various planners and senior ranking operators
attempted to defeat a projected enemy with the “Objective Force.”
What came to the fore, time and again, was the fact that the most
dangerous target set on the battlefield for the Future Combat
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System-equipped Objective Force was that of small dismounted
regular infantry forces and similarly sized special operations forces
or paramilitaries.
Assume a small, well-trained light infantry force is operating in
a hit-and-run fashion, covering itself in stealth, much like the U.S.
military’s special operators in Afghanistan. A precision delivered
dual purpose improved conventional munition is the perfect system
to attack such a critical target. The charter members of the “axis of
evil” (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) each maintain inventories of over
3,000 tanks and other armored vehicles. Brilliant or terminally guided
tank killing munitions continue to be the weapons of choice for that
target set. Lastly, as enemies seek sanctuary in cities and bunkers,
the Army needs to have the option of a unitary munition that can
precisely attack these target sets with limited collateral damage.
TARGETING SYSTEMS
The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle system has been the major
targeting development over the last two years. Although the U.S.
Navy has more than 23,000 hours of flight time on its Pioneer
unmanned aerial vehicles, it has really been the recent experiences
in Afghanistan and Yemen that have brought this capability to the
front page.12 The U.S. military has developed unmanned aerial
vehicles that can loiter over targets for days at a time, provide real
time accurate target location, and immediately assess the effects
of fires on targets to assist in reattack decisions. There are over 22
companies in the United States working on the various unmanned
aerial vehicles, and the military has benefited from the competition.
Choices are available in how long such vehicles can stay in the air,
how far they can fly, how high they can fly, how much payload they
can carry, the types of acquisition devices on board, and whether
the unmanned aerial vehicle needs to be capable of attacking targets
itself.13 Fielding plans in the Objective Force are not complete, but
discussions include making available unmanned aerial vehicles at
levels down to individual Future Combat System platforms and
certainly at the platoon level for local security.
The effect of this observation capability on a Crusader unit is not
only that it would make the system more lethal, but it would also
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make it more survivable in a high threat environment. Objective
Force plans also include a plethora of unmanned ground systems
capable of passing targeting data directly to the shooter, while
simultaneously populating the common operating picture. Some of
these will be small enough to throw out by the handful, while others
are larger and sturdier. The reason for including the information
about unmanned aerial and ground systems is to acknowledge that
the Army has already committed to this capability. Leveraging it in
new ways by tying it directly to a shooter represents the way of the
future.
Another capability that the Army’s success in Afghanistan has
highlighted is that of a well-positioned light infantryman or special
operator using a laser designator to assist in precisely attacking
certain targets. This capability is not new and was used extensively
in DESERT STORM with little fanfare. This on-the–ground capability
can augment the collection and targeting by unmanned systems and
give the ability for more discreet target discrimination.
Finally, the U.S. military has been developing Tactical
Exploitation of National Capabilities since before it came up with the
acronym TENCAP. It was not until DESERT STORM however, that
the Army got serious about the “tactical” part. The Objective Force
will be dependent on this tactical exploitation, and the leveraging
of targetable data, if not just the improved situational awareness,
will make artillery systems even more lethal. Even if the national
capabilities are not at sufficient resolution to produce targetable
data, commanders can certainly use the information to cross-cue
sensors that do provide sufficient resolution for target attack.
NEW WAY OF FIGHTING
These advancements in weapons system, munitions, and
acquisitions systems will do no more good than French tanks
along the Meuse River in May 1940 unless there is a corresponding
systematic change in how the Army fights. This author suggests
looking at this notion of change under the rubric of the Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Leaders, Materiel, and Soldiers to examine
the ramifications.
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Doctrine.
It is time to give the artillery commander a maneuver-like
mission and his own battle space (zone or sector as appropriate).
He could deploy his sensors and then maneuver his weapons in
order to have the greatest effect on the enemy. What this suggests is
doing away with the close battle, when possible, or the “short knife
fight,” as the Army’s Chief of Staff describes it. With the situational
awareness provided by the multitude of sensors in the future force,
and with the acquisition systems described earlier, the U.S. Army
has the capability to attack targets accurately at much greater
ranges, truly exhibiting standoff advantage. Army artillery–based
units could have direct fire effects (one round, one kill) at traditional
indirect-fire distances. This amounts to “virtual” line of sight combat,
combining the accuracy advantage of direct fires systems with the
standoff advantage of indirect fire systems. In fact, with Excalibur
armor destruction variant, the Army can get to “one round, multiple
kills.” The Brilliant Anti-tank Munitions Program sponsored by the
artillery branch demonstrated this technology which is currently
on hold due to budgetary constraints. The traditional sanctuary of
reverse slopes, intervisibility lines, and urban areas would no longer
be available to the enemy. The artillery maneuver commander
would have the ability to mass systems on a given target or establish
digital sensor to shooter links with individual sensors and weapon
systems in order to ensure responsiveness while not sacrificing
any lethality. By giving the artillery commander his own zone or
sector, the superior commander gets away from the problems of
conflicting battle space management that tries to deconflict terrain
(and therefore suboptimizes capabilities) instead of integrating and
maximizing effects.
Organization.
The necessary organizational changes could follow the models
used in the maneuver community for years. Artillery units need to
be imbedded as brigade-sized elements in traditional divisions and
be capable of cross attachment, as maneuver forces have operated
since the advent of the tank. There will be missions and enemy
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situations where the division commander would want to employ a
task organized unit of cannons and tanks, or cannons and Bradleys.
There will be other times when he will want to employ each of
them in a “pure” form. Units need to be trained to easily attach and
detach. This requires modular organizations that leave their parent
units with the necessary augmentation to accomplish missions
independently of parent unit support. The common engine that the
Crusader and the M1A2 Abrams would have shared would have
been a step in the direction of making the logistic support much
easier.
Training.
The mandate to train as a team is self-evident. This includes
likely cross-attachment tactics, techniques, and procedures as well
as training regularly with the full variety of sensors, shooters, and
munitions. It also means leveraging combat system imbedded
training built into the Crusader and should be basic to all Objective
Force Future Combat Systems. This would enable the crew to train
in a realistic environment at greatly reduced costs, using on board
training simulators and scenario drivers. In the perfect world, the
simulation would be invisible to the crew as they run through their
gamut of operational tasks.
Leaders.
Leaders in the future force may not have the luxury of being
armor, artillery or infantry, or any other branch for that matter. It
is time to train combat arms leaders. Whether the leader’s unit has
a weapon system that has direct fire effects out to 8 kilometers or 40
kilometers, his tasks will not be that different. The artillery branch
has trained junior leaders for years to operate everything from a
105-millimeter howitzer, to a 155-millimeter howitzer, to a multiple
launch rocket system, and even to Lance or Pershing missiles. After
their basic course of instruction, artillery officers usually receive
another 2-3 weeks of weapon specific training. Learning this wide
range of delivery systems and specific tactics, techniques, and
procedures greatly exceeds that which one would expect in the
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maneuver force of the future.
The rank structure may have to be reexamined, however. More
study on this is necessary, and it is not included in the purview
of this chapter. But the question must be answered―is lieutenant
the right rank for a platoon leader? How big should a platoon be?
If a platoon is capable of providing battery-like effects, should a
captain command it? If lieutenant is not the right rank, what are the
developmental jobs to prepare a junior officer for future leadership
positions?
Soldiers.
Some of the same questions need to be asked about soldiers
as were asked about leaders. Are soldier tasks at the weapon
level specific enough to demand separate military operational
specialties? The answers to these questions are not clear, but the
Army will obviously need a much more capable soldier, one who
is digitally competent, while simultaneously possessing a “head out
of the cupola” like situational awareness. There will be no room for
nonwarriors in these units as there will be reduced requirements for
headquarters button pushers, coordinators, and other troops.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL IMPACT
This would give combatant commanders a new way to fight
and solve some of the traditional problems they face when phasing
the entry of forces in theater in the event of a crisis. Today, the
commander must choose whether he wants to bring in force
protection assets such as long range fires to deny the enemy the
use of his anti-access system, or get a “combat maneuver” force on
the ground. With this new capability, he can have both. The lift cost
of getting two Crusader–like systems on the ground is the same as
getting two Paladin batteries on the ground. In return however, the
combatant commander would get a weapon system that ties directly
into his theater sensor grid, receives common operating picture
input, has operational ranges, and is capable of denying the enemy
the ability to influence the arrival of follow on forces. Additionally,
this new “maneuver force” would be able to dominate greater battle
240

space while not exposing itself to the risk normally associated with
expanded terrain responsibility.
JOINT VISION 2020
“Joint Visions 2010” and “2020” both describe the full spectrum
dominance achieved through dominant maneuver, precision
engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.14
This new way of fighting is directly in line with this new joint vision.
Dominant maneuver does not mandate a close fight. It describes
a situation where the joint force commander combines precise
maneuver and fires to bring his forces to a position of advantage in
relation to the enemy. This concept of using sensors, shooters, and
munitions in a real time, integrated way leads the Army right down
the path to the Objective Force goal of seeing first, understanding
first, acting first, and finishing decisively.
OTHER CHOICES
Before investing in this capability, a fair question to ask is “do we
already have that capability?” Is another service or branch already
farther down the road to possessing the same effect? The three
most likely competing ideas of how to dominate operational and
tactical battle space are the use of rockets, the use of air delivered
precision munitions, and the delivery of those same munitions from
unmanned aerial vehicles.
Rockets.
Rockets have massing capabilities that far outweigh those
of cannons, but that is not the fight being described here. There
are some target sets that are appropriately attacked by rockets,
specifically those cases when the commander needs long-range
massed area fires against targets for which he does not have accurate
(precise may be a better word) target locations. But the maneuver
fight in a dispersed environment does not lend itself to massed fires.
There are currently no munitions programs being developed in the
U.S. military that would provide the precision described above. The
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other disadvantage of the rocket system is its lack of tactical agility.
A cannon system can change munitions in a matter of seconds. The
variety of rounds available, plus the minimal time it takes to change
from one munition to another is more consistent with a close fight that
is normally being timed in seconds and minutes.15 Even if a variety
of munitions were available in rocket launchers today, it still takes
approximately 20 minutes to download one type of ammunition
and load another and the inherent inefficiencies in making “variety
packs” of rocket pods has heretofore precluded their development.
Technology may speed this up, but the time necessary will still be
unsatisfactory to meet close fight requirements.
Air Power.
The use of air power has certainly become a given in the new
“American Way of War.” The effectiveness of the world’s greatest
air force gives the United States asymmetrical advantages that create
strategic, operational, and tactical opportunities that this nation
leverages to great success. Unfortunately, if doctrine demands that
ground forces fight in all weather, 24 hours a day, then doctrine
must ensure that they have fires in those same conditions.
Lessons learned from the air war over Kosovo reinforce these
thoughts. Benjamin Lambeth, in a Rand study for the Air Force, notes
that “While the Serb pillaging of Kosovo was unfolding on the ground,
NATO air attacks continued to be hampered by bad weather, enemy
dispersal tactics, and air defenses that were proving to be far more
robust than expected.”16 Naturally, weather will remain beyond the
military’s ability to control, but air defenses become a nonproblem in
the artillery-centric maneuver fight described here. General Wesley
Clark, the overall combatant commander for the War in Kosovo,
lamented on several nights of bad weather when “most of the air
strikes were cancelled.” It was not always the delivery of munitions
that was the problem, but the avoidance of enemy air defenses. “The
weather in southern Serbia and over Kosovo prevented manned
aircraft from flying with enough visibility to be safe if engaged
by enemy missiles or to deliver weapons accurately.”17 Again,
the capability of the U.S. Air Force is unarguable, but in Kosovo,
even with ultra-modern aircraft flying in conditions of virtual air
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supremacy, the Air Force was still not able to provide the necessary
effects on the ground in a continuous manner.
So, was this weather a European phenomenon? Nothing like that
could ever happen in say, Southwest Asia, right? Lambeth offers the
analogy of “much like DESERT STORM, adverse weather at the fiveweek point had forced the cancellation or failure of more than half of
all scheduled bombing sorties on twenty of the first thirty-five days
of air attacks.” 18
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
Operations in Afghanistan and Yemen have recently
demonstrated the dramatic capability of an armed unmanned aerial
vehicle for all the world to see. The well-publicized results of the
attack of the sport utility vehicle on the road in Yemen demonstrated
a capability that is transformational in and of itself. Nevertheless, this
capability does not serve as a substitute for the force described in this
chapter for two reasons. First, unmanned aerial vehicles experience
many of the same weather related problems that manned aerial
vehicles confront. Secondly, payload restrictions limit the amount
of munitions on board. The largest currently fielded unmanned
aerial vehicle has a maximum payload of 1,980 pounds. Generally
that means it must rearm after firing two missiles such as the ones
used in Yemen. There is no doubt that this represents another
tremendous asymmetrical capability possessed by the United States.
Armed unmanned aerial vehicles need to be fielded and continually
developed to take advantage of technological breakthroughs. They
are not, however, adequate to serve as the single deliverer of fires for
the close fight.
CONCLUSION
The potential exists for a new way of fighting with fires that
takes advantage of the capabilities that are currently or soon to be
available. First, the delivery system has to be Crusader–like. This
means it must have comparable mobility to the currently fielded
tank and infantry-fighting vehicle. It must have on board technical
fire direction computing and self-locating ability to negate the
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requirement to mass as a battery or platoon. It must be capable of
firing single system time-on-target missions as well as maintain a
ten-round-per-minute sustained rate of fire. It must be survivable in
terms of quickness and both active and passive protection systems.
Finally, and maybe most importantly, it must be capable of digital
sensor to shooter linkages directly to the individual weapon.
Second, the munitions used must be as described as Excalibur+.
This means they would be global positioning system enabled,
sensor fused, brilliant munitions with at least a 40-kilometer range.
They must be capable of terminal guidance using a laser when
appropriate. And such munitions must provide dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions, armor destroying munitions,
and a unitary munition.
Third, the acquisition system must be accurate, survivable, and
persistent/loitering. It must have the ability to respond to terminal
guidance provided by a laser and capable of digital connection
directly to the weapon system, and potentially, to the round in
flight. The current suite of unmanned aerial vehicles provides this
capability, as do Special Operating Forces using digital radios and
laser designators. Both of these capabilities were demonstrated in
operational environments over the last 2 years.
The final requirement to implement this system would be a
willingness to change the way the Army trains its leaders and
soldiers, organizes its units, and looks at ground maneuver
problems. Future combat will distinguish itself by paralleling the
technological advancements that will be present in society. Some
of these advancements enable the military to keep doing the same
things it has been doing in the present, only better, faster, and more
accurately. When these multitudes of single system improvements
are taken individually, they lead to an evolution in the way the U.S.
Army fights. It does, in fact, get better, faster, and more accurate. The
purpose of this essay is to suggest that by taking each of the individual
improvements and using them together to create a systemic and
doctrinal improvement, there is a chance for a true revolution in how
this nation’s military conducts the business of war. The opportunity
to couple new weapons, munitions, acquisition systems, and maybe
most importantly, the electronic links among them all, presents the
Army with the potential to fight in a truly transformational way.
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Having direct fire effects from indirect fire distances provides the
U.S. military the opportunity to organize its forces to maximum
advantage. Now is the time to drop the distinction between armor,
infantry, and artillery and simply call these forces “combat arms.”
Now is the time to drop the distinction between the “line of sight”
fight and the “virtual line of sight” fight. There should be no such
thing as “indirect fires” any more; all fires are direct. Such dramatic
changes demand new ways of conducting warfare. The Army must
seize these new ways, organize itself to take advantage, and thus
be in position to maintain its status as the world’s premier ground
force.
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CHAPTER 9
MARITIME PREPOSITIONING:
YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW
Colonel Carl D. Matter
The U.S. Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Force represents
a transformational force multiplier that provides the Marine Corps
and the United States with the crisis response/power projection
capability demanded by the current National Security Strategy.
Maritime prepositioning represents a concept developed by the
Marine Corps that has supported the National Defense Strategy and
the concepts of deterring forward, strategic power projection, and
forward presence since its development in the early 1980s. Maritime
prepositioning has evolved over the years into the current Maritime
Prepositioning Force capability. It will continue its evolutionary
development in support of the National Military Strategy as
directed by future Quadrennial Defense Reports and the Secretary of
Defense. The future Maritime Prepostioning Force concept embraces
the Department of Defense (DoD) directed military transformation
described in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Report and will support
the envisioned transformed Navy-Marine Corps Team of the
future.
On September 11, 2001, terrorists launched a vicious surprise
attack against the United States. Thousands of Americans and others
died on U.S. soil, not combatants but, rather, innocent victims of a
war that took America by surprise.1 Shortly thereafter, the Secretary
of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, published the Quadrennial Defense
Report on September 30, 2001. That report, published only days
after the September 11 attacks, was the product of a lengthy process
of examining subtle and dramatic changes in the world order. It
represents a recognition of emerging asymmetric threats from rogue
nations, regional instabilities, religious fanaticism, and terrorists as
the major threat confronting the nation. In the Quadrennial Defense
Report the Bush Administration and senior defense leaders correctly
identified new and different emerging threats to national security
and therefore indicated an intent to establish a new strategy for
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America’s defense. That strategy charts a strategic roadmap for
addressing uncertainty and surprise; it recognizes that America’s
defense and safety at home depends upon its ability to counter
threats abroad.
The Quadrennial Defense Report acknowledges that the United
States has important geopolitical interests around the world, interests
challenged by anti-access and area denial threats. It recognizes the
requirement for immediately employable forces, forward deployed
as well as those projected from outside the theater of operations. The
Quadrennial Defense Report specifically argues “transforming the
U.S. global military posture begins with the development of new
ways to deter conflict. Deterrence in the future will continue to
depend heavily upon the capabilities resident in forward stationed
and forward deployed forces, along with the rapidly employable
capabilities the U.S. military possesses throughout the globe.”2
The National Security Strategy provides broad-based guidance
concerning the desired capabilities for U.S. forces and the need
to project power in response to crisis, or preempt threatening or
potentially hostile action against either the United States or its
interests both at home and abroad. The National Security Strategy
describes “the presence of American forces overseas as one of the
most profound symbols of U.S. commitments to allies and friends.”3
The strategy also recognizes the unparalleled strength of U.S. armed
forces and the vital peacekeeping role of forward presence. In
addition, it calls for transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces
that “round-out” America’s ability to defend the homeland, conduct
information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and
protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space.4
The strategy set forth in the National Security Strategy clearly
recognizes that “the United States will not use force in all cases to
preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as
a pretext for aggression.”5 However, the strategy recognizes that
“in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively
seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States
cannot remain idle while dangers gather.”6 As a consequence of this
recognition, “the United States will continue to transform its military
forces to ensure the ability to conduct rapid and precise operations
to achieve decisive results.”7
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America’s strategy is broad enough to facilitate a transformational
approach to crisis response and power projection. However, it
specifically requires overseas and forward presence of U.S. forces,
as well as maneuver and expeditionary forces capable of rapidly
responding to crisis and countering threats. The strategy allows the
U.S. military the opportunity to determine how it will transform,
configure, and employ its resources to provide the required crisis
response capability and project power.
THE MARITIME PREPOSTIONING FORCE (MPF) PROGRAM
The purpose of the Maritime Prepositioning Force program is
to enable the rapid deployment and establishment of a Marine AirGround Task Force (MAGTF) in support of the National Security
Strategy. A key feature of the Maritime Prepositioning Force is its
inherent ability to respond to a variety of contingencies, ranging
from humanitarian assistance to major theater war. Maritime
Prepositioning Force command relationships rest on joint doctrine
and focus on incorporating maritime prepositioning into naval,
joint, and multinational operations with a flexible command and
control structure.8
History.
In 1977, Presidential Review Directive 18, 1977, signed by
President Jimmie Carter, created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force to fill a gap that existed in forward presence in the Persian
Gulf. In 1980 the Marine Corps loaded equipment and supplies
aboard Military Sealift Command chartered vessels as part of an
interim prepositioning and forward presence capability, known as
the Near Term Prepositioning Force. That effort consisted of seven
ships: three (USNS Mercury, Jupiter, and Meteor) loaded with rolling
stock to support the 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade; two (SS
American Champion and American Courier) transported ammunition,
medical supplies, and material to support Army and Air Force units
attached to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force; two (USNS
Sealift Pacific and MV Patriot) carried fuel and potable water. The
cargo ships loaded up in Wilmington, North Carolina, in July 1980
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and the Near Term Prepositioning Force became fully operational in
1981. The Near Term Prepositioning Force conducted its equipment
and ship maintenance in Naha, Okinawa and Subic Bay Naval Base,
Republic of the Philippines.9
Between 1981 and 1986, Military Sealift Command chartered
and converted newly-built commercial vessels with Maersk Line,
Waterman Steamship Corporation, and American Overseas Marine
Corporation to meet Marine Corps operational requirements.
By 1983, the Marine Corps Logistics Base at Albany, Georgia,
had attained sufficient equipment and supplies for three Marine
Amphibious Brigades with sufficient sustainment for 30 days, later
loaded aboard the leased ships for long-term storage. These ships
possess the capability to conduct roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) and
lift-on/lift-off (LO/LO) operations, provide self-sufficient offload
operations from either in-stream or a port facility, transfer bulk
liquids while off-shore, and maintain temperature and humidity
controlled spaces to protect equipment.10
The Maritime Prepositioning Force formed into three
squadrons, strategically placed at locations across the globe.
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron-1, established in 1984 on the
east coast, supported 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade, and then
later relocated to the Mediterranean to establish a forward presence
in the Europe theater after Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM. Maritime Prepositioning Squadron-2 replaced the Near
Term Prepositioning ships in Diego Garcia in 1985 and continued to
support 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade based at Camp Pendleton,
California. Maritime Prepositioning Squadron-3 formed up in
Guam and Tinian (later replaced by Saipan) in 1986 and supported
1st Marine Amphibious Brigade deployments from Hawaii. The
first two squadrons loaded up at Wilmington (1984-85). The third
squadron loaded at Panama City, Florida (1986). The ammunition
for all three squadrons up-loaded at the Military Ocean Terminal,
Sunny Point, North Carolina (known as MOTSU).11
Prior to August 1990, Maritime Prepositioning Force operations
had only been tested in exercises. Operations DESERT SHIELD/
DESERT STORM validated the Maritime Prepositioning Force
concept, where the Maritime Prepositioning Force provided the
first truly capable force in northern Saudi Arabia. In fact, the
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first battalion of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade occupied
its defensive positions within four days of arrival. The first nine
Maritime Prepositioning Force ships, off-loaded by the first week
of September 1990, provided the equipment and thirty days of
sustainment for two-thirds of the Marine Corps forces ashore, as
well as supporting some U.S. Army units.12 During the ramp up
to the Gulf War, the Marine Corps off-loaded the equipment and
supplies from all three Maritime Prepositioning Force squadrons to
provide the bulk of the combat power required during the first 30
days of force closure and crisis response.
In June 1991 the Marine Corps employed Maritime Prepositioning
assets as part of Operation FIERY VIGIL to assist the Republic of the
Philippines, when Mount Pinatubo erupted, burying whole cities and
forcing the evacuation of Clark Air Base. Also, from December 1992
through May 1993, Maritime Prepositioning Force ships supported
Marines conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance in
Somalia during Operation RESTORE HOPE.13
Maritime Prepositioning Force Today.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Enhanced) is today’s Maritime
Prepositioning Force. The original Maritime Prepositioning Force
consisted of 13 ships in three forward-deployed squadrons. Those
ships are privately owned, operated by three companies (Maritime
Sealift Command chartered) and leased to the DoD. They possess
the ability to conduct roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) and lift-on/lift-off
(LO/LO) operations, provide self-sufficient offload operations from
either in-stream or a port facility, transfer bulk liquids while offshore, and maintain temperature and humidity controlled spaces to
protect equipment.14 They are also capable of container operations.
Each squadron supports a force of approximately 17,000 Marines.
The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Enhanced) program provides
an additional ship to each Maritime Prepositioning Squadron by
embarking Naval Mobile Construction Battalion assets, a Navy Fleet
Hospital, and an Expeditionary Airfield. Two of the three Maritime
Prepositioning Squadrons enhancement packages are already on
station,15 and the projected delivery date for the third ship, USNS
Wheat, is March 03.16
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MARITIME PREPOSTIONING FORCE HOMEPORT/
MAINTENANCE
The Marine Corps believes that it requires a dedicated facility
from which to homeport, maintain, and sustain its vital Maritime
Prepositioning Force assets. That facility is Blount Island Command
located in Jacksonville, Florida. Blount Island is, in fact, a manmade island located near the mouth of the St. Johns River. It has
proven to be ideally suited for Maritime Prepositioning offloads,
maintenance cycle operations, backloads, and strategic throughput
(“throughput” pertains to Blount Island’s capability of receiving
strategic-level equipment and materiel from numerous, disparate
origins, organizing it, and forwarding it to the appropriate requesting
agencies in a timely manner).17
At present, Blount Island is a privately owned island leased to
the Marine Corps for approximately $11.4M per year. Its current
operating lease expires in 2004. Upon lease expiration, the Marine
Corps plans to buy it. The Marine Corps shares the island with a
half-dozen active commercial tenants to include Jacksonville Port
Authority, Jacksonville Electric Authority, B. F. Goodrich, and
GATE Maritime Properties.18
Upon initiating the Maritime Prepositioning Force program, the
Marine Corps identified a requirement for a Maritime Prepositioning
Force support facility. In 1985 the Marine Corps considered some
60 locations deemed as potential Maritime Prepositioning Force
homeporting/maintenance locations. However, all but five were
unsuitable due to limitations such as water depth, overhead
clearance, acreage, available facilities (cost to build or upgrade), and
ammunition safety requirements. The Marine Corps then surveyed
the five remaining ports (Blount Island; Davisville, Rhode Island;
Panama City; Port Everglades, Florida; and Wilmington) and
eliminated all but Blount Island as viable Maritime Prepositioning
Force support facilities due to the reasons cited above or factors such
as annual weather patterns.19
Soon after occupying Blount Island, the Marine Corps considered
purchasing the island and therefore permanently establishing it as the
dedicated Maritime Prepositioning Force homeport/maintenance
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and sustainment facility. A significant aspect of the process of
permanently establishing it as a dedicated Maritime Prepositioning
Force facility involved verifying it as the best location. To confirm
Blount Island, the DoD and the Marine Corps began exploring
alternative locations/facilities to satisfy facility requirements. Since
occupying Blount Island, DoD has conducted four major studies
of potential Maritime Prepositioning Force maintenance sites/
facilities. All of these studies identify Blount Island as the best site.20
In addition, in 1999, the Marine Corps conducted a Naval Weapons
Station Charleston, South Carolina, site survey to update its own
previously conducted in-house assessment of Naval Weapons Station
Charleston as a viable and cost efficient alternative and revalidate a
1998 Joint Staff directed cost and operational effectiveness analysis.
The Joint Staff analysis examined collocating the Army’s afloat
prepositioning and Marine Corps’ prepositioning maintenance sites
at Charleston or Blount Island. The Joint Staff study concluded that
the Marine Corps should keep Blount Island. The 1999 Marine Corps
site survey supported that conclusion.21
In the late 1990s, the unified combatant commanders indicated
support for retaining and purchasing Blount Island through
Integrated Priority List (IPL) language that highlighted the Maritime
Prepositioning Force and purchase of Blount Island as a priority.
In Central Command’s Integrated Priority List, the Combatant
Commander stated, “The requirements for prepositioning, lift, and
improved logistical systems are integral to Central Command’s
theater strategy . . .”22
U.S. Transportation Command also supported purchasing
Blount Island and indicated its support through its integrated
priority list, where the Combatant Commander reported, “Plan,
program and budget for improvements to the rail loop at Blount
Island, and also for the purchase of the entire island.” In addition,
the previous Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James
Jones, regularly addressed Congress on the issue and importance of
purchasing Blount Island. Headquarters Marine Corps subsequently
teamed with Naval Facilities Engineering Command and developed
a two-phased Blount Island acquisition strategy.23
In the first phase of the Blount Island acquisition, the Marine
Corps will acquire property or easements to property owned by
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three different Blount Island commercial tenants located in the
the island’s explosive safety zone. In addition, the Marine Corps
will acquire undeveloped property and property being used
for commercial purposes (approximately 137 acres) as well as
easements on property presently occupied by commercial activities
(approximately 209 acres). The easements will preclude current
owners and occupants from further developing the property and
minimize personnel allowed in the explosive safety zone during
ammunition handling.24
In terms of safety aspects associated with ammunition handling,
Blount Island handles ammunition approximately eleven times a
year. During these operations, portions of the island within the
explosive safety zone must be evacuated. The facility normally
conducts ammunition operations from 1900 Friday evening through
completion at approximately 1200 Saturday morning. Although it
conducts ammunition handling during what many consider as offpeak hours, ammunition handling does interrupt and inconvenience
other Blount Island tenants. 25
Congress appropriated full phase 1 funding in the FY00 and
FY01 budget. The Corps expects to fund the second phase of the
Blount Island acquisition in FY04. In phase 2, the Marine Corps
plans to acquire Gate Petroleum’s property of approximately
765 acres as well as a 300-acre permitted spoils area consisting of
dredged harbor/river material. It has completed the Blount Island
environmental assessment (April 01), metes/bounds survey (June
02), title search (June 01), updated property appraisals (September
01), and has begun the phase 1 negotiating process.26
Through the acquisition of Blount Island, the Marine Corps
envisions enhancing current operations as well as expanding Blount
Island’s future strategic value. To do so, Blount Island Command
developed a proposed business plan that focuses on a widely
expanded prepositioning logistics mission capable of supporting
other DoD organizations and agencies. Examples of envisioned
business opportunities include:27
• Layberthing additional military vessels
§ Maritime Sealift Command currently leases a ship berth
from Blount Island’s current landlord.
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• Supporting joint training/exercises for active and reserve
units
§ All four services conduct exercises on Blount Island.
• Establishing a formal prepositioning program/school
§ Maritime Prepositioning Force ship maintenance cycle
envisioned as providing hands-on download and
throughput opportunity (live training aids).
• Mobilization initiatives
§ Constructed rail loop removes island rail transportation
bottleneck.
• U.S. Navy:
§ Cargo handling operations
§ Aircraft equipment storage
§ Fleet hospital operations
§ Expeditionary airfield initiatives
§ Marine terminal operations.
• U.S. Army:
§ International Standard Organization (ISO) container
repair
§ Bridge boat refurbishment (currently under contract)
§ Prepositioning assistance (overflow for Army
Prepositioning Force, etc.)
§ Marine terminal operations
§ Port services activities during mobilization
• U.S. Air Force:
§ Storage activities
§ Prepostitioning assistance for air expeditionary forces
• Tenants:
§ U.S. Navy Cargo Handling Battalion-11
§ Military Sealift Command
§ Military Traffic Management Command
§ U.S. Coast Guard
• Leasing opportunities:
§ Automobile parking with Jacksonville Port Authority
§ Marine terminal operations
§ Restaurant/cafeteria and requisite commercial vendors
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Blount Island Command and the Marine Corps view these
envisioned business opportunities as win-win situations for all
concerned―the Corps, Blount Island Command, Blount Island
Command’s contracted work force, and those organizations opting
to take advantage of Blount Island Command’s business proposal.
Blount Island Command envisions revenues and benefits from its
expanded business as capable of offsetting Maritime Prepositioning
Force/Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade program
expenses by reducing overhead costs and possibly providing
workload stabilization for a work force cyclically oriented on
the Maritime Prepositioning Force maintenance cycle schedule/
requirements. Blount Island Command also envisions enhancing its
prepositioning capabilities and reinforcing its status as the DoD’s
premier prepositioning facility as well as its reputation as the
“Center of Prepositioning Excellence.”28
As the Maritime Prepositioning Force support facility, Blount
Island provides the following: close proximity to Marine Corps
Logistics Base, Albany; access to a large industrial base and Navy’s
support structure available in Jacksonville; a fully operational
facility; a well-developed road and rail network; a private slipway,
located only seven miles from the sea buoy with no encumbrances to
maritime prepositioning ship transiting to the slipway; ready access
to commercial and military strategic airlift facility; a contiguous,
efficient facility with a dedicated pier; ample staging area proximate
to the 1,000-foot pier and maintenance facilities; a dedicated and
highly skilled workforce; and an established public and private
community support base.
The mission of Blount Island Command, under the overall
direction of the Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Albany,
is to plan, coordinate, and execute the logistics efforts in support
of Maritime Prepositioning Ship and Norway Prepositioning
Programs. The Marine Corps strategically deploys three Maritime
Prepositioning Ship forward, each capable of supporting an airlifted
or amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade of approximately
17,000 personnel. The Norway Prepositioning Program supports the
Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade of approximately
13,000 personnel―a slightly smaller footprint than the maritime
brigades. The readiness of equipment and supplies embarked
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aboard any of the 15 Maritime Prepositioning Force ships (soon to
be 16), or stored in the Norwegian caves, is critical to the success
of the Maritime Prepositioning Force and the Norway brigade.
Thus, once a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) embarks or
airlifts to marry up with prepositioned equipment and supplies,
that equipment must be ready immediately for employment and the
supplies/sustainment must be capable of appropriately sustaining
the force. It is relative to Maritime Prepositioning Force and Norway
Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade equipment and supply
readiness that Blount Island Command finds itself involved in all
aspects of the Marine Corps’ prepositioning programs.
In 1986, the Marine Corps formed Biennial Maintenance
Command in Jacksonville. Under the initial concept, that organization
provided a nucleus command structure, operating under the
operational control of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade, whose
squadron was rotating through Blount Island’s maintenance cycle.
Under the prepositioning ship maintenance cycles, each Maritime
Prepositioning Squadron rotates through Blount Island every 3
years. The work at the island takes 60 days per ship to complete.
In 1989, the Marine Corps established Blount Island Command as a
subordinate command of Marine Corps Logistics Bases. Therefore,
Blount Island Command no longer operates under the control of a
given Marine Expeditionary Brigade as its Maritime Prepositioning
Force equipment rotates; rather, Blount Island Command has
responsibility for planning, coordinating, and executing the logistics
efforts in support of Maritime Prepositioning Force and the Norway
prepositioning programs.29
Every 60 days a ship from one of the three squadrons enters
the mouth of the St. Johns River from the Atlantic Ocean guided by
river pilots, and travels seven miles up river to dock in a slipway
serving the Marine Corps side of Blount Island. With 15 ships in the
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron program and another scheduled
for delivery this year, the rotation cycle for any one of the 16 ships
will be once every 36 months. Thus, the equipment and supplies on
the ships will remain at sea or in anchorage for nearly 3 years before
returning to Blount Island for maintenance cycle operations.
Once the stern ramp lowers on the slipway pier head, over 650
wheeled vehicles, 375 general cargo containers, and 165 ammunition
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containers off-load. In addition, shipboard cranes lift 13 pieces of
Navy lighterage off the ship’s weather deck and place them in the
slipway. Blount Island forwards the equipment and general cargo
containers to the prime contractors (Honeywell Corporation and
DynCorp). The 13 pieces of lighterage, consisting of powered and
nonpowered causeway sections, side loadable warping tugs, and
mechanized landing craft, float down the St. Johns River to Atlantic
Dry Dock Corporation. The ammunition containers are placed
on flatcars and railed to the appropriate Naval Weapons Station.
Once the ship off-loads, it sails to a Norfolk shipyard for required
maintenance and repairs.
Within 60 days Honeywell Corporation performs cycle
maintenance on all equipment while unloading all containers,
inspecting and inventorying the contents, rotating stocks as
required, then restuffing the containers. DynCorp conducts the same
process on the aviation support equipment and aviation associated
containers. At the same time, Atlantic Dry Dock inspects and repairs
the thirteen pieces of Navy lighterage. Under the direction of Marine
Corps Systems Command, containerized ammunition moves to
specific Naval Weapon Stations, which inspect, rotate, and rework
the ammunition as necessary, and then return it to Blount Island for
backloading. Blount Island Command oversees the entire Maritime
Prepositioning Force maintenance cycle process, and at the end of
the 60-day maintenance period, it ensures the ship’s equipment and
supplies are operationally ready, and backloaded appropriately, and
that the ship is ready to get underway to return to its designated
strategic location.30
Blount Island Command, under the overall direction of the
Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Albany, is responsible
for planning, coordinating, and executing the logistics efforts in
support of the Norway prepositioning program.31 The Marine Corps
established the Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Prepositioning Program in the early 1980s to reinforce northern
Norway. Although that need has substantially diminished with the
ending of the Cold War, the Marine Corps and the DoD view the
Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade Prepositioning
Program as strategically important, because it provides the United
States with a uniquely flexible capability of a brigade’s worth of
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equipment and supplies, strategically prepositioned in Norwegian
caves, and ready for immediate employment anywhere in Europe.
Selected assets from the Norway brigade directly supported
Operation DESERT STORM and more recently, Operation NOBLE
ANVIL (the Bosnian air campaign).32
The Government of Norway provides six geographically
separated sites to store the equipment, supplies, and ammunition
associated with the brigade. Those sites are caves that the
Norwegians carved in the sides of mountains. They are well-lighted,
temperature-controlled, ventilated, and possess cement floors,
canvassed walls, and ceilings. They are not musty, damp, dark or
dirty, as one might imagine. Moreover, Norwegians store aviation
support equipment in dehumidified storage buildings at several
Norwegian air stations.33
The United States established a memorandum of understanding
with Norway, whereby that nation’s military accepted responsibility
for the prepositioning program equipment, supply, and ammunition
maintenance, care, and storage. Through a process similar to the one
Blount Island Command employs in Maritime Prepositioning Force
maintenance, the Norwegian military employs civilian technicians
to conduct regularly scheduled maintenance on all aviation and
ground equipment, and care in storage of supplies and ammunition.
Marine Corps logistics oversight of the Norwegian effort resides
within a number of commands. Under the direction of Commander,
Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Blount Island’s commander serves
as executive agent for administrative control, accountability, and
logistics support for prepositioned assets in Norway, less ammunition
and aviation support equipment. The Commander, Marine Corps
Systems Command, is responsible for ground ammunition oversight,
while the Commander, U.S. Navy Europe has responsibility for
aviation ammunition. The Commanding General, 2nd Marine
Aircraft Wing manages the aviation support equipment packages.
The Commander, Marine Forces Europe also plays an important role
in overseeing and coordinating many activities associated with the
Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade prepositioning
program.34
For over 15 years, the Marine Corps has home based its two
global prepositioning programs at Blount Island Command. Thus,
259

the command is an essential element of Maritime Prepositioning
Force and will support future global prepositioning programs
as they evolve and transform to keep pace with the dynamics of
world order, an evolving national security strategy, derivative
military strategies, and required crisis response/power projection
capabilities.
NAVY/MARINE CORPS VISION
The Marine Corps’ Maritime Prepositioning Force program
planning is in step with the Quadrennial Defense Report directed
military transformation and the most recent National Security
Strategy shaping the Corps’ future warfighting capabilities, its
ability to respond to crises, and its capability of projecting military
power. The Navy’s strategic vision, articulated in “Naval Power 21,”
provides the general framework for that transformation.
The Naval Transformational Roadmap, recently approved,
describes how naval forces will realize nine new or drastically
improved transformational warfighting capabilities and organize
conceptually to optimize/maximize unique naval capabilities. The
Transformational Roadmap prescribes jointness in every aspect of
the Navy/Marine Corps transformational effort.35
Seapower 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21 define the Navy and
Marine Corps current and future Service strategies. The Navy and
Marine Corps strategies also provide clarity and direction in defining
operating concepts, identifying requisite resource requirements and
charting “the way ahead” for a Navy/Marine Corps Team that will
operate as a joint team and in many situations, as part of a larger
joint force.36
In applying energy and resources to implementing its strategy,
the Marine Corps developed and is now employing the concept
of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW). Naval Power 21 defines
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare as “a capstone concept that is the
union of the Marine Corps’ core competencies; maneuver warfare
philosophy; expeditionary heritage; sea basing; and integrating,
operational, and functional concepts by which the Marine Corps
will organize, deploy, and employ forces today and in the future.”37
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare is more than a capstone concept―
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it is the overarching concept from which the Marine Corps will
deploy and employ Marine expeditionary forces now and for the
foreseeable future. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare also provides
the conceptual framework for developing and implementing its
future maritime prepositioning capability.
It is important to note that Seapower 21 defines a Navy with three
fundamental concepts critical and complimentary to Marine Corps
Strategy 21’s implementation and future. Seapower 21’s concepts are
Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing, enabled by FORCEnet. According
to Naval Power 21, these three concepts “enhance America’s ability
to project offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational
independence around the globe.”38 Seapower 21 defines these three
concepts as follows:
• Sea Strike is a broadened concept for naval power
projection that leverages enhanced command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaisance (C4ISR), precision, stealth, and
endurance to increase operational tempo, reach, and
effectiveness―”the ability to project precise and persistent
offensive power from the sea.”
• Sea Shield develops naval capabilities related to
homeland defense, sea control, assured access, and
projecting defense overland. By doing so, it reassures
allies, strengthens deterrence, and protects the joint
force―”defensive assurance throughout the world.”
• Sea Basing projects the sovereignty of the United States
globally while providing Joint Force Commanders
with vital command and control, fire support, and
logistics from the sea, thereby minimizing vulnerable
assets ashore―”enhances operational independence and
support for the joint forces.”
Understanding Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare’s role
relative to “Seapower 21” concepts as well as the envisioned
contributions expected of the future Maritime Prepositioning Force
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in expeditionary maneuver warfare, demands a more expanded
conceptual understanding of the Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea
Basing. Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, Jr., and Vice Admiral
Dennis V. McGinn provided an excellent overview of these concepts
in their essay titled “Power and Access . . . From the Sea.” In their
article, the authors describe Sea Strike as: “capitalizing on the strategic
agility, operational maneuverability, precise weapons employment,
and indefinite sustainment of naval forces, Sea Strike is a broadened
naval concept for projecting dominant and decisive offensive power
from the sea in support of joint objectives, with reduced dependence
on tactical land bases.” The authors indicate that “Sea Strike will also
provide fully integrated naval aviation force options that include
both Marine squadrons embarked on carriers and amphibious ships
and Navy squadrons operating from expeditionary shore bases”―
something the Navy/Marine Corps Team is already doing. General
Hanlon and Admiral McGinn also describe four transformational
capabilities being pursued within the overall Sea Strike concept.
Those capabilities are (1) persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR); (2) time-sensitive strike; (3) information
operations; and (4) ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM).39
While all four capabilities are relevant to the Sea Strike concept,
the first three are not, however, necessarily germane to this
discussion on Maritime Prepositioning Force. The fourth capability
of ship-to-objective maneuver is, however, crucial to any discussion
of Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), considering the impact it
will have as an essential enabler in seabasing and future operational
maneuver from the sea. The concept of ship-to-objective maneuver is
a force multiplier that will enable future Marine expeditionary forces
to increase operational tempo, thus keeping the enemy off balance
and forcing him to operate at a pace difficult to sustain.
At the same time, ship-to-objective maneuver facilitates flexibility
by enabling Marine expeditionary forces to maneuver directly
against objectives deeper inland without establishing intermediate
staging bases or establishing a foothold on the beach as Marine
forces have done in the past. (It is in this role that the Marine Corps
envisions Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) as a key player―
equipping, provisioning and sustaining the force from a sea-based
platform.) The Navy and Marine Corps view Operational Maneuver
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from the Sea and Ship-to-objective Maneuver as “transformational.”
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare capabilities will provide the joint
force commander with flexible crisis response/power projection
capabilities for employment the moment Marine expeditionary
forces arrive in theater, and the capability to maneuver against key
objectives from sea-based platforms using sea space as a maneuver
area.40 Sea Shield exploits network-centric control of the seas and
forward-deployed defensive capabilities to defeat area-denial
strategies. It enables joint forces to project and sustain power.
Sea Basing is not necessarily about platforms, logistics, or
technology. Sea basing is about maneuver and options. In fact, Task
Force 58 (TF 58) demonstrated this during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM, when it conducted a 400-mile ship-to-objective
maneuver from the ships of the Peleliu Amphibious Readiness
Group into Afghanistan’s “landlocked” Objective RHINO. During
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, TF 58 demonstrated that sea
basing is about boldly maneuvering a Marine expeditionary force
from amphibious ships (the seabase) to a chosen objective, thus
dictating the time and location the maneuver force confronts the
enemy―a “textbook” example of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare,
the cornerstone of naval transformation, and an example of naval
forces’ potential contribution to the joint fight.
In the future, the Navy and Marine Corps envision Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) as a critical enabler and facilitator for
Marine expeditionary forces operating against objectives from sea
bases, such as amphibious ships or mobile amphibious platforms
serving as sea bases located in the maneuver space offshore.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)’s envisioned contribution
to sea basing and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare lies in its ability
to provide combatant commanders with phased at-sea force arrival
and assembly, selective offload, sustainment, and reconstitution of a
Marine expeditionary brigade-sized force―all from seaspace.41
MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE, FUTURE (MPF(F))
The Navy/Marine Corps team envisions replacing the current
Maritime Prepositioning Force program with a now-developing
concept. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) concept
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includes improved and innovative platforms designed to support
new maritime concepts such as Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare,
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective
Maneuver (STOM) and sea basing. Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) is in the early stages of its concept development process
where the Marine Corps is exploring new technology areas such
as selective onload/offload, internal ships systems (i.e., automated
warehousing, item/pallet/container operations, RO/RO systems,
and flow patterns), external ship systems (i.e., ramps, lighterage, and
other craft interfaces), modular system/subsystem concepts, and
aircraft interface technologies. The Marine Corps envisions its fleet
of Maritime Prepositioning Force vessels as integral elements of the
sea basing concept, designed and configured to enhance Maritime
Prepositioning Force capabilities and operations supporting a wide
range of envisioned combat and noncombat operations.42
Over the next 2 decades, the Marine Corps intends to replace
today’s Maritime Prepositioning Force ships, concepts and doctrine,
and capabilities with new ships, new employment concepts
and more importantly, transformational capabilities specifically
designed to compliment and support the evolving Expeditionary
Maneuver Warfare and the Navy’s capstone concepts spelled out in
“Naval Power 21.”43
Maritime Prepositioning Force 2010 and beyond is the
concept by which the Marine Corps envisions its next-generation
prepositioning forces as enhancing forward presence and
power projection capabilities. The Marine Corps envisions this
prepositioning force as a force multiplier with expanded functions
increasing its ability to support expeditionary operations across an
increased range of contingencies. These are reflected in the pillars
of future prepositioning operations―force closure, amphibious
task force integration, indefinite sustainment, and reconstitution/
redeployment.44
Pillars of Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) enables sea-based force
closure by facilitating the arrival and assembly process at sea, thus
eliminating the requirement for access to secure ports and airfields.
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The concept’s goal is to enable Marines to deploy by a combination
of surface mobility and strategic, theater, and tactical airlift to meet
maritime prepositioning platforms already underway or en route
to an objective area. The Marine Corps envisions these platforms as
capable of billeting units while they complete mission preparation,
and are designed to facilitate an easy and efficient equipment and
mission preparation process. Thus, elements of expeditionary force
will arrive in the objective area mission ready.45
The Marine Corps envisions developing this capability to
support Operational Maneuver from the Sea by selectively offloading
mission specific equipment and supplies for the amphibious force
assault echelon from a sea-based platform and then sustaining the
force throughout its mission from that same sea-based platform.
The prepositioning vision includes multi-purpose ships capable
of providing facilities for assault support aircraft, surface assault
craft, advanced amphibious assault vehicles, and organic lighterage
capable of operating in sea-state conditions up to sea-state three.
To ensure a prepositioning force capable of anticipating the needs
of the engaged amphibious force, the Marine Corps envisions
equipping prepositioning ships with the communications
assets essential to integrating the prepositioning force with the
amphibious force and including prepositioning ships in the tactical
communications architecture. The Marine Corps does not envision
future prepositioning ships as capable of forcible entry, but rather
as a capability to compliment and reinforce the striking power of an
amphibious force projecting power from the sea.46
The Marine Corps envisions its Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future) as capable of sustaining the amphibious force indefinitely
from sea-based platforms. It will represent an element of the supply
pipeline, capable of drawing sustainment from the supply source
and ultimately supporting the engaged warfighter via the sea base.
Essentially, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) will become
the warfighters’ supply system. Finally, the Marine Corps also
envisions prepositioning force as capable of conducting in-theater
reconstitution and redeployment, thus negating the requirement
to conduct extensive reconstitution efforts at strategic sustainment
bases, such as Blount Island Command, Guam, Okinawa or Diego
Garcia, and therefore providing the joint force commander with a
265

Maritime Prepositioning Force Marine Air Ground Task Force ready
for a follow-on mission.47
CONCLUSION
The Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning program is an
evolutionary program and combat multiplier initiated to enhance
the Marine Corps’ ability to project combat power and military
capability rapidly in response to a crisis anywhere in the world.
In August 1990, its employment in Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM validated the Maritime Prepositioning Force
concept by enabling the first battalion of the 7th Marine Amphibious
Brigade to occupy defensive positions within 4 days of arriving in
Saudi Arabia. Since DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the
Marine Corps has revalidated the maritime prepositioning concept
by successfully employing the force assets in contingency operations
such as Operation FIERY VIGIL (in support of the disaster relief
effort in the Philippines in June 1991 when Mount Pinatubo erupted)
and Operation RESTORE HOPE (in support of the peacekeeping and
humanitarian relief effort in Somalia).48 Moreover, as this chapter is
being written, the Maritime Prepositioning Force is supporting the
America’s force build up in Kuwait, as the United States prepares
to engage Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military in the event the
United States attacks Iraq.
The Marine Corps views its Maritime Prepositioning Force
of the future as a key transformational capability that is in step
with the DoD’s program of military transformation and the U.S.
Navy’s “Naval Transformational Roadmap.” The Marine Corps’
envisioned future maritime prepositioning concept fully supports
“Joint Vision 2020” and the Navy/Marine Corps concept of Naval
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Since the inception of the
Maritime Prepositioning Force, the Marine Corps has improved
the program by incorporating innovative ideas, concepts, and
technological advancements into the program, thus mainaining
its focus of providing the Marine expeditionary brigade and other
expeditionary forces with more responsive capabilities.
Sea basing is the centerpiece of the Navy/Marine Corps
transformational vision for the future. The Maritime Prepositioning
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Force (Future) is a key concept supporting that vision. The Marine
Corps envisions its Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) as an
even more effective force multiplier with significantly expanded
operational flexibility and capability essential in today’s uncertain
environment.
Blount Island Command is the Maritime Prepositioning Force’s
homeport and center for equipment/supply maintenance and
sustainment. The Marine Corps currently leases its Blount Island
property on a man-made island located near the mouth of the
St. Johns River in Jacksonville. The Marine Corps has a validated
requirement for a Maritime Prepositioning Force maintenance facility
such as Blount Island Command. Numerous studies recommend
and support the Marine Corps’ intention of buying the island as a
long-term cost saver, vice leasing it, as is currently the case. Blount
Island also supports another premier Marine Corps prepositioning
capability located in Norway and is a world class prepositioning
support facility, postured to support the Maritime Prepositioning
Force of the future.
While the day-to-day maintenance cycles that depend on places
like Blount Island may not appear as sexy or as important to national
security as sophisticated new equipment or expensive modern
technology, Blount Island is a force multiplier as well as a critical
element in military transformation. The Marine Corps’ Maritime
Prepositioning Force, Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary
Brigade Prepositioning program, and Blount Island Command are
national strategic assets well suited for supporting the National
Military Strategy, and capable of enhancing America’s current and
future power projection and crisis response capabilities.
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CHAPTER 10
HOMELAND SECURITY:
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
AND CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel M. Klippstein
We look forward to working with the newly proposed
organization to do everything possible to provide for our
country’s national defense.
Donald Rumsfeld, June 2002

INTRODUCTION
Today, Americans consider themselves “a nation at war.”
Though the United States has experienced war, both total and
limited, the nature of this particular war is one with which it has
had little experience. Some have defined this conflict as a “War
on Terrorism,” a war whose duration will extend for many years
and whose battlefields will be simultaneously abroad and within
national borders. As a nation, Americans now confront the unique
and unenviable task of having to conduct both strategic defensive
and offensive operations. Success will depend on how well they can
sustain the strategic defensive, while enduring the uncertainty of
prolonged offensive actions as the U.S. military seeks to “. . . bring
our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies.”1
The prosecution of this war has followed the traditional
American pattern of waging war―absorb the first attack, mobilize
national will, apply the necessary resources, and conduct offensive
operations. America’s strategy is simple―seek out and annihilate
the enemy. The political and military end state is not one of limited
objectives, but one consistent with total war. This war will end
only when the enemy no longer has the capability or will to fight.
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America’s strategic, operational, and tactical actions seek to gain
and retain the initiative―to take the fight to the enemy―regardless
of where he lives or operates.
Executing decisive offensive operations relies upon both national
will and the ability to project power from the protected borders of
the United States. Yet, as Americans have discovered, their borders
do not provide the necessary physical protection they have taken for
granted over the past two centuries. Thus, America left a strategic
center of gravity―the national will―open to attack. 2 For the first
time since World War II, Americans must focus part of their national
efforts on conducting strategic defensive operations.
Strategic defensive operations serve a two-fold purpose: first,
to protect U.S. centers of gravity from (further) attack; second, they
facilitate the uninhibited conduct of power projection in support
of decisive operations. One can also term this strategic defensive
“homeland security.”. Viewed within the context of current joint
doctrine, homeland security represents a critical capability.3
Today, herculean federal efforts are underway to improve the
nation’s homeland security by attempting to combine the efforts
of a myriad of bureaucratic departments and agencies. Key to the
focusing of these efforts is the relationship between the Department
of Defense (DoD) and the newly formed Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). This relationship represents a critical requirement,
since its effectiveness is a condition that directly supports the
success of homeland security and sustainment of the national will.4
Any seams or friction within this relationship represent a critical
vulnerability that terrorist can exploit to affect future attacks.5
Therefore, a strong relationship between the DoD and the DHS
reduces that vulnerability to America’s homeland security and
ensures the successful prosecution of the war on terrorism.
This chapter identifies several key issues that, if improperly
addressed, could lead to critical vulnerabilities, since the DoD’s
and the DHS’s relationship is not yet wholly functional. To identify
potential vulnerabilities, it is first essential to address homeland
security as a concept; provide an overview of the evolving roles of
both departments in relation to homeland security; and relate their
roles to current national strategies and statutory requirements. From
this perspective, one can identify potential critical vulnerabilities
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and provide recommendations to deny enemy identification
and exploitation. Such recommendations require interagency
coordination and approval through either the National Security
Council or the Homeland Security Council. Choosing between these
fora has implications for the DoD and the DHS and influences how
each department will seek to reduce the identified vulnerability.
Nevertheless, both departments have an obligation to the American
people to identify and resolve critical vulnerabilities. The elimination
of these vulnerabilities protects the United States through an effective
strategic defense and enables the conduct of decisive operations in
the war on terrorism.
HOMELAND SECURITY―THE WAKE-UP CALL
Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the concept of
homeland security had gained only limited attention of the federal
bureaucracy. A number of studies, including those conducted by
RAND, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
and the Hart-Rudman Commission, warned of the growing threat
to the homeland and recommended steps to strengthen the nation’s
ability to prevent and recover from a terrorist attack. A consistent
theme was that the nation had not organized itself to defend against
increasing levels of terrorist threats. More pointedly, it was not a
question of “if” terrorist would attack the United States, but rather
“when.”6 The mid-morning hours of September 11, 2001, bore out
such concerns. In the wake of 9/11, Americans confronted the fact
that the studies had been correct; as a nation, the United States
was unprepared and vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Americans
discovered that over 100 federal agencies―including DoD―shared
responsibility for “homeland security,” yet effective interagency
coordination was lacking. A coherent strategic defense of the
nation’s homeland was found wanting because “the country has
never had a comprehensive and shared vision of how best to achieve
this goal.”7 Efforts to address this failure are generating significant
requirements for the DoD.

273

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

In July 2002, nearly 10 months after the September 11 attacks, the
Bush administration developed and published the National Strategy
for Homeland Security (NSHS). This strategy statement, the first
ever promulgated by a U.S. President, aimed at providing a coherent
national effort to improve the security of the American homeland. Its
stated objectives are: (1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States; (2) reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and (3)
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.8
Establishment of critical mission areas that support the
accomplishment of the above objectives is key to the strategy’s
execution. The NSHS establishes six critical mission areas as
a framework to focus the nation’s efforts: (1) intelligence and
warning; (2) border and transportation security; (3) domestic
counter terrorism; (4) protecting critical infrastructure, (5) defending
against catastrophic terrorism; and (6) emergency preparedness
and response.9 This strategy further defines specific objectives and
goals for federal, state and local agencies that are vital to a cohesive
strategic defense and the security of the homeland. Executing
the NSHS requires a new cabinet level department with overall
authority and responsibility for accomplishing these objectives. The
agency designed for this end, the Department of Homeland Security,
has the responsibility of unifying national efforts for executing this
strategy.
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (HSA) and thereby established the DHS. This
act represents the most sweeping reorganization of the federal
government since the National Security Act of 1947 established
the DoD. While arguments continue over the necessity for a new
department, the fact remains that consolidating responsibility for
homeland security into a single agency, responsible to the president,
congress and the nation, represents a significant step in creating
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a strategic defense focused on protecting the nation from future
attacks. Once operational, the DHS’s budget of approximately $36.2B,
is the eighth largest in the federal government for Fiscal Year 2004.
With over 170,000 employees, it will be the third largest department
of the 15 departmental cabinet positions within the government.
Given its mission, budget and manpower, the DHS will be one of the
most influential governmental agencies, in company with the DoD,
the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the Central
Intelligence Agency.10
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, clearly makes the DHS
responsible for the six critical mission areas of the NSHS in the
following mission statement:
(a) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (b) reduce the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and (c) minimize
the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks
that do occur within the United States; (d) carry out functions of
entities transferred to the Department [of Homeland Security],
including acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade
crises and emergency planning…; and (g) monitor connections
between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts
to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to
interdict illegal drug trafficking.11

To accomplish these missions, the new department will
consolidate over 22 agencies from across the federal government
into a new, more cohesive department. Few, if any, federal agencies
will remain untouched by the reorganization, including the DoD.
This consolidation will be no small task. One of the department’s
greatest internal challenges will be to instill organizational identity,
pride, and a common culture, while recognizing the divergent
subcultures within the existing agencies. These subcultures
will significantly influence development of intradepartmental
relationships. They will also influence interdepartmental behavior
with other agencies, including the department’s participation within
the interagency coordination process. In either case, forging a new
organizational culture to create a synergy of efforts, internally and
externally, is not achievable overnight or by the stroke of a pen. It
represents a continuous process over the course of the foreseeable
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future.
Organized similar to other federal departments, the DHS
will have a deputy secretary, four under secretaries, numerous
assistant secretaries, and directors of various subordinate agencies.
Of particular importance to DoD is the Commandant of the Coast
Guard and the four Departmental Under Secretaries: Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Science and Technology,
Border and Transportation, and Emergency Preparedness and
Response. The historical interaction of the soon-to-be-subordinate
agencies with DoD indicates that future coordination requirements
will center on these five key functional offices. Establishing direct
and effective coordination between the under secretaries and their
DoD counterparts will create the essence of the critical requirement
to support homeland security.
Despite its significant budget and manpower, the DHS does not
have sufficient dedicated assets, including equipment and specially
trained personnel, to respond independently to catastrophic events―
natural or manmade―by itself. It must rely upon state and local
government agencies to provide first responders for most events
and depend on other departments within the federal government for
specialized or unique equipment or expertise. While the Department
will have to coordinate closely with other federal departments and
agencies, its most critical relationship will be with the DoD. This
relationship will receive increasing focus within federal and public
circles, as the concept of homeland security and the role of the DHS
matures.
DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY AND DOD’S ROLE

Prior to the publication of the National Strategy for Homeland
Security, there was wide spread confusion and disagreement within
DoD and the federal government at large, regarding the concept
and definition of homeland security. In many instances, the terms
“homeland security” and “homeland defense” were mutually
interchangeable. In some circles they were synonymous with
national defense issues. However, the NSHS codifies the definition
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of homeland security and provides a common point of reference
for federal, state, and local government agencies. This definition
places the relationships among various agencies, especially the
Departments of Homeland Security and Defense, in perspective. The
National Strategy for Homeland Security defines homeland security
as: “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within
the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”12 This
definition emphasizes a national, as opposed to a federal, effort to
secure the homeland, and focuses those efforts on the prevention of
and response to terrorism.
Within this framework, DoD provides military support to the
DHS, as the lead federal agency for homeland security. However,
in extreme circumstances, DoD may become the lead federal agency
in securing the homeland. Regardless of its domestic support
requirements, DoD simultaneously contributes to homeland security
through on-going military operations overseas (e.g., Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM) and overseas forward presence. DoD’s
actions, both at home and abroad, aim at deterring, preventing,
preempting, disrupting, or destroying threats to the United States
before they can reach the nation’s shores.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld established the parameters
for the Department’s support to homeland security by dividing his
department’s roles into homeland defense and civil support mission
areas. He characterized the Department’s operational involvement
in terms of three circumstances: “extraordinary” circumstances
(homeland defense), “emergency” circumstances (military assistance
to civil authorities), and “limited scope” operations (military support
to national special security events):
First, under extraordinary circumstances that require the department
to execute traditional military missions, such as combat air
patrols and maritime defense operations. In these circumstances,
DoD would take the lead in defending people in the territory of
our country supported by other agencies. And plans for such
contingencies would be coordinated, as appropriate, with the
National Security Council and with the Department of Homeland
Security. . . . Second is the emergency circumstance of a catastrophic
nature. For example, responding to the consequences of attack,
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assisting in response, today, for example, with respect to forest
fires or floods, tornadoes and the like. In these circumstances, DoD
may be asked to act quickly to provide and supply capabilities
that other agencies simply don’t have . . . And third, our missions
or assignments that are limited in scope where other agencies have
the lead from the outset. An example of this would be security at
special events, like the recent Olympics, where DoD worked in
support of local authorities.13 (author’s emphasis)

These terms describe two critical aspects of the DoD’s functions
in support of homeland security. First is the temporal nature of
its support, based on the severity of the event or crisis to which
the Department responds. Each term implies that departmental
support or activity will be temporary―focused on addressing the
immediate needs that exceed the lead federal agency, state, or local
capabilities in stabilizing a crisis situation. Second, these categories
represent traditional areas of the Department’s activity in defending
the nation and providing military assistance to civil authorities
in times of crisis. Collectively, these terms provide a framework
within which the Department can determine and sequence its
commitments in response to crises. Additionally, by defining these
three circumstances, the Department can develop and refine specific
operational plans for the domestic employment of military assets,
across the spectrum of potential responses, always in consideration
of constitutional and legal limitations.
Despite the broad statutory authority of the Department of
Homeland Security, it does not have the authority to direct other
federal departments, including DoD, to conduct specific functions
or expend internal resources. The Secretary of Defense or the
President determines, when and where to employ DoD assets. The
commitment of DoD assets in any of the three circumstances, in
support of the NSHS, must occur within the context of the demands
of the National Security Strategy.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS)
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provides a broad strategy for how the United States, employing
the various elements of national power, will confront a complex
and increasingly dangerous strategic environment. This strategy
includes a specific focus on the war on terrorism and establishes
homeland security as a vital national interest.
DoD’s efforts, in support of the NSS, focus on identifying and
destroying threats to the nation before they can threaten U.S. borders.
However, some threats, whether conventional or asymmetrical, will
still evade detection, penetrate U.S. defenses, and strike critical
vulnerabilities. In such circumstances, though the United States
treats terrorism inside its borders as a criminal act, DoD still has a
significant role. It must execute its role in coordination with the DHS
to prevent and/or respond to a terrorist attack. A secure homeland
is fundamental to the nation’s ability to execute the requirements of
its NSS.
For DoD, the complementary requirements of the NSS and the
NSHS present a complex challenge in the balancing of homeland
and national security obligations. Concurrently, to fulfill the broad
requirements of homeland security, while “transforming” to meet
future threats, the NSS requires the Department to develop a “. . . broad
portfolio of military capabilities that must also include the ability to
defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S.
access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure
and assets in outer space.”14 Additionally, the NSS states that:
“Intelligence―and how we use it―is our first line of defense against
terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states.”15 This statement,
coupled with requirements in the NSHS, unmistakably establishes
the need for unity of effort and reinforces the requirement that:
“[I]ntelligence must be appropriately integrated with our defense
and law enforcement systems…to strengthen intelligence warning
and analysis to provide integrated threat assessments for national
and homeland security.”16 Accomplishing intelligence fusion and
sharing will require unprecedented cooperation and trust within
the federal government. Likewise, the requirement for intelligence
sharing will test the relationship between the DoD and DHS.
The NSS provides for the use of military capabilities to defeat
the threat of terrorism and to support homeland security. In doing
so, it establishes a tenuous link between the DHS and the recently
279

established combatant command, U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM).17 However, the position shared by DoD and
that of Secretary Tom Ridge, the first Secretary of Homeland
Security, is that the DHS will not have command or control over
USNORTHCOM, but will work through DoD for military support.18
The mutually supporting nature of the NSS and the NSHS is
reflected in the following subordinate national strategies: the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, the National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace,
the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets, the National Drug Control Strategy,
and the National Military Strategy. 19 Collectively, these strategies
represent the underpinnings of America’s strategic defense. Not
insignificantly, these strategies, with their increased emphasis on
improving homeland security, have begun to blur the traditional
distinctions between military and law enforcement actions and
roles. An example of this blurring was the deployment of National
Guard soldiers into airports and on the nation’s borders in the days,
weeks, and months following the September 11 attack. The purpose
of these deployments was to bolster traditional federal, state, and
local law enforcement capabilities to identify and prevent followon terrorist attacks. Additional examples include the linking of
civilian air traffic control systems with those of the North American
Air Defense Command to provide increased warning of potential
air threats, and the continued support of DoD’s Joint Task Force 6
to the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol to prevent illegal entry of
personnel and drugs along the southern border. These examples,
coupled with requirements yet to be defined, increasingly challenge
DoD as it strives to balance its warfighting requirements with
those of supporting homeland security. Defining the relationship
between the DoD and the DHS is essential to seeking this balance
and represents the formation of the critical requirement that directly
supports homeland security as a critical capability.
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THE CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
An effective, cooperative relationship between the DoD and
the DHS is a critical requirement to the securing of the homeland;
an ineffective relationship would present a critical vulnerability to
the nation’s security. Therefore, a commitment to achieving a unity
of effort is fundamental in defining this relationship. Interagency
disputes and “turf battles” are dysfunctional hallmarks of the
federal bureaucracy, especially when funding, prestige, and political
influence are at stake. Yet, executing an effective homeland security
strategy relies on clear divisions of responsibility, adaptive and
flexible supported and supporting relationships, and the sharing of
information and intelligence to create a common operating picture
among the departments. The objective, or “end,” of this strategic
relationship is the protection of the American homeland, its people,
and the national way of life. The “ways” include cooperative actions
across a spectrum of issues, both from a “vertical” perspective by
conducting interagency coordination through either the National
Security Council (NSC) or Homeland Security Council (HSC) and
from a “horizontal” perspective through direct coordination and
bilateral cooperation among departments. The “means” include
funding and mutually accepted boundaries, especially regarding
“dual-use” items, that enhance homeland security.20 In essence,
a functional and effective bridge between the DoD and the DHS
depends on breaking new bureaucratic ground to achieve this
essential unity of effort.
Creating requirements, whether in legislation or through
national strategies, for these departments to coordinate and
execute is easier said then done. Forging an effective working
relationship to achieve national and departmental objectives will
create some interdepartmental friction. However, given the current
strategic environment―highlighted by the continuing global war
on terrorism, the war with Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM),
concerns over North Korea’s nuclear intentions, and a struggling
national economy―reducing this friction is critical to addressing
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potential critical vulnerabilities. Catastrophic consequences will
result from departmental and interagency friction, if it produces
excessive parochialism or procrastination.
The DoD and the DHS (once operational) must create
organizational mechanisms to coordinate their respective efforts
to implement requirements of both national strategies. DoD, by
virtue of its traditional mission, organization, and resources, has
its own perspective, influenced by its organizational culture, on
how to support these strategies. The DHS, as a new and evolving
organization, will need to define and create its own institutional
perspectives, influenced by its emerging organizational culture.
Its overarching mission will define this perspective and how it
absorbs and integrates its 22 existing functional organizations,
their individual organizational cultures, and institutional biases
to form a cohesive department. While no small task, the DHS has
an opportunity to bring focus to previously disparate homeland
security efforts, create a distinctive organizational culture, and
forge a rejuvenated sense of cooperative relationships within the
federal bureaucracy. The emerging relationship between these two
departments can ensure security of the homeland and protection of
the nation’s strategic center of gravity.
An assessment of the evolving relationship between these two
departments suggests three critical vulnerabilities: (1) use of military
forces; (2) intelligence sharing; and (3) funding for homeland
security requirements. Each requires immediate attention. A failure
to address these potential critical vulnerabilities would leave the
nation even more vulnerable to attack.
Use of Military Forces.

As previously mentioned, the increased blurring of military and
law enforcement functions poses significant challenges to the DoD
and its emerging relationship to the DHS. Though the DHS does not
have the investigative authority vested in the Department of Justice
for broader law enforcement activities, it does have responsibility
for border, immigration, and transportation security, which confers
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its own specific law enforcement authority. To execute these
requirements, it is likely that the DHS may seek military assets,
provided either by the National Guard (in a federalized or state
active-duty status) or active duty forces, in support functions closely
resembling traditional law enforcement activities.
Section 876 of the HSA 2002 strictly prohibits the DHS from
directing or controlling military activities. That section states:
Nothing in this Act shall confer upon the Secretary [of Homeland
Security] any authority to engage in warfighting, the military
defense of the United States, or other military activities, nor shall
anything in this act limit the existing authority of DoD or the
Armed Forces to engage in warfighting, the military defense of
the United States, or other military activity.”21

Added at the specific request of DoD, this stipulation ensures
that direct control of military assets remains with the Secretary of
Defense in accordance with Title 10, Unites States Code. Military
assets include active duty forces of all four services, their National
Guard and Reserve component forces, and supporting DoD agencies.
There is one exception―the U.S. Coast Guard.
In accordance with the HSA 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard
represents an exception to the DHS’s control of a military-type
organization. The Coast Guard, a subordinate agency of the DHS
as of March 1, 2003, has a military character and culture with a
unique mission and a law enforcement capability. On a daily basis,
the Coast Guard is responsive and subordinate to the DHS; yet,
in time of declared war or if directed by the President, the Coast
Guard becomes part of the Department of the Navy under DoD. On
a daily basis, DoD relies on the Coast Guard to conduct homeland
coastal protection and maritime defense under the control of the
DHS. Yet, the Coast Guard represents a unique capability desired
by geographical combatant commanders in support of their wartime
missions. The recent deployment of eight Coast Guard vessels to
the U.S Central Command’s Area of Responsibility in support of
the war on terrorism and current military action against Iraq, places
immediate pressure on the DoD and the DHS to address potential
critical vulnerabilities cooperatively.
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Whereas the DHS cannot direct nor control military forces in
conduct of “homeland defense,” under the previously described
“extraordinary circumstances” it can request and receive military
assets to respond to either “emergency circumstances” or “limited
scope circumstances.” Similarly, DoD provides military assistance to
civil authorities in accordance with DoD Directives 3205 series,22 and
in consonance with the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act of
1878.23 Section 886 of the HSA 2002 affirms the continued restrictions
on the use of military forces as a posse comitatus to execute the laws of
the United States, unless directed by the President to restore domestic
order resulting from either an insurrection or as a consequence of an
attack by a weapon of mass destruction. An insurrection or an attack
by a weapon of mass destruction/effect represents the previously
defined “extraordinary” circumstance. DoD, by direction of the
President, may become the lead federal agency in stabilizing such
a crisis. All other federal agencies employed, including the DHS,
would be operating in a supporting role. In this extraordinary
circumstance, the Secretary of Defense would assume control of
operations based on the restriction that the HSA 2002 imposes on
the Secretary of Homeland Security. DoD would remain the lead
federal agency only long enough to bring stability to the situation,
transferring lead agency responsibility to either the DHS or some
other agency, as directed by the President.
While providing traditional military assistance to civil authorities
for emergency or limited scope operations, DoD places military
assets under the operational direction of a lead federal agency.
Consolidating the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
U.S. Border Patrol, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Immigration
and Naturalization Services under the DHS casts a wide net
across federal agencies which traditionally seek DoD assistance.
Respecting the legalities on use of federal military assets―specified
in the Posse Comitatus Act, the Stafford Act24 and the Economy
Act25―the DHS must centrally generate requests for DoD assistance.
Developing this centralized process presents challenges to the DHS,
given the experiences each subordinate activity brings with it upon
consolidation. A formal memorandum of agreement between the
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security should establish the
broad guidelines for the types of support required, the channels
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through which to request support, and metrics for determining
the degree and duration of support. Such arrangements provide
a common point of reference for both departments, increasing
responsiveness and reducing potential friction created by the “fog”
normally associated with crisis or catastrophic events.
A common error of federal agencies in seeking DoD support
for civil authorities has been undue specificity in their requests
for certain types of equipment and manpower. Such specificity
frequently leads to delayed response or unnecessary negotiations
to clarify actual requirements. The DHS should generalize the tasks
or missions and thus permit DoD the latitude to conduct mission
analysis and determine troops/equipment-to-task requirements.
Processing requests for military assistance to civil authorities
follows a well-defined path within DoD channels. DoD Directive
3025.15 articulates this process.26 However, the execution of those
requests, at times, entails a cumbersome command and control
process between the DoD and the supported federal agency. Two
actions by the DoD will streamline the support process: first, the
activation of USNORTHCOM, as the Department’s operational
command for supporting homeland security requirements; and
second, Congress’s approval of the Department’s request for
an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. This
new assistant secretary, as a senior civilian political appointee,
will provide policy direction, coordination and oversight of all
departmental efforts related to homeland security.
Within the hierarchy of DoD, this new assistant secretary is
subordinate to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This
subordination should not, however, prevent the new assistant
secretary from coordinating either internally to DoD (including with
USNORTHCOM); or externally to DoD, with respect to the DHS.
In fact, this assistant secretary should have a statutory arrangement
with USNORTHCOM similar to that which the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict has
with U.S. Special Operations Command.27 Such an arrangement
would permit a greater degree of civilian oversight and support.
Furthermore, the DoD and the DHS should establish direct links
between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and the Under Secretaries for Border and Transportation Security
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and for Emergency Preparedness and Response. Forging these links,
despite the disparity in the federal hierarchical “rank” structure,
would create an unambiguous formal connection between the
departments. This formal connection would become the foundation
for bilateral actions and interagency coordination conducted with
either the NSC or the HSC. It also would demonstrate that the
relationship between the DoD and the DHS represents a critical
requirement for the security of the U.S. homeland.
Within the context of this emerging relationship, a potential
source of friction exists over determining whether the DHS should
coordinate directly its support requests with USNORTHCOM.
Based on the preceding discussion, the simple response should
be “no.” Currently, Secretary Tom Ridge agrees that DoD should
retain control over USNORTHCOM’s actions (see endnote 17).
However, it is essential that a common perspective and channels of
communications exist among these organizations. By exchanging
liaisons officers, the DHS, the DoD, and USNORTHCOM would
facilitate coordination and understanding of departmental
capabilities, limitations, and needs. The presence of liaison officers
would also aid in identifying and resolving contentious issues before
they become critical vulnerabilities.
In sum, abiding by the legal constraints on the use and control
of military assets, developing well-thought-out memoranda of
agreement that are flexible and adaptive to current and future needs,
and exchanging liaison officers between the DHS and DoD, including
USNORTHCOM, would represent significant steps towards
effective interdepartmental cooperation and reduction of a critical
vulnerability. These recommended steps also serve as a foundation
for addressing the next two potential critical vulnerabilities.
Intelligence Sharing.
Intelligence is the bedrock for successful anticipation and
prevention of future terrorist attacks. It is neither a stand-alone
activity nor the domain of any single federal agency. Information
acquired from multiple sources―local, state, national, foreign, and
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law enforcement―must be analyzed, fused, and translated into
predictive intelligence products to permit specific actions that
prevent future terrorist attacks. The essential component in this
cycle is the sharing of both raw information and refined intelligence
products. This presents an immediate requirement for both the
DoD and the DHS to establish procedures to affect this sharing.
These procedures must satisfy statutory requirements, national
strategies, and the organizational interconnectivity of purposes of
both departments. Getting these procedures right requires a priority
of effort and a willingness to break from institutional prejudices.
DoD supports numerous organic intelligence activities―the
National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National
Imagery and Mapping Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and
individual Service Intelligence organizations. The Department both
acquires and exploits intelligence, supporting its wartime missions
and counterintelligence requirements. In the current strategic
environment, this intelligence not only supports on-going and future
military operations, but also helps identify and prevent terrorist
attacks within the homeland. The challenge within the intelligence
community, and especially for DoD, is to determine “what to share”
and “how to share.” Failure to get this right would create a clear and
indisputable critical vulnerability.
Section 201 of the HSA 2002, requires all federal agencies to
provide information and intelligence products to the DHS for
analysis in order to: “(a) identify and assess the nature and scope of
terrorist threats to the homeland; (b) detect and identify threats of
terrorism against the United States; and (c) understand such threats
in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the homeland.”
Historically, intelligence sharing among federal agencies has been
weak; it was also a significant factor in the failure to identify and
prevent the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Sharing intelligence raises three key issues: first, DoD must
determine what information is relevant to homeland security, as
opposed to other nondomestic and foreign national defense issues;
second, both departments must address the current intelligence
classification system, which hinders release of critical predictive
intelligence products; and third, both departments must establish
organizational linkages to support the intelligence sharing
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process.28
Determining the information and intelligence requirements
that support the DHS’s mission will be a continuous process. The
NSHS and the statutory requirements of the HSA 2002 provide some
direction, but the specifics require continual refinement according
to current and anticipated demands. Without further guidance,
as the DHS becomes operational, it is possible that it will possess
less information than it deems essential for mission requirements.
Without more specific guidance, DoD will most likely only share
intelligence it deems pertinent to homeland security (as opposed
to intelligence with broader national security implications), citing
sensitivity of its intelligence and the need for operational security.
The need to protect the methods and sources used to collect and
corroborate the data often restricts the distribution of intelligence
products, even for legitimate reasons. The passing of intelligence
products to a new and untested agency will require significant
safeguards to protect the information, methods and sources from
which the information was acquired.29
The expectation that intelligence, whether from DoD or other
agencies, will be readily distributed is at best, wishful thinking.
This is not to imply a deliberate effort by any agency or department
to circumvent the law. It is, however, an acknowledgement that
intradepartmental culture influences interdepartmental behavior
and contributes to distrust among agencies. This distrust, and
its intradepartmental cultural roots, represents an obstacle that
departmental leaders must reduce. For the Central Intelligence
Agency and the intelligence agencies within DoD, the inadvertent
release of sensitive information may jeopardize current or future
operations. While this may represent a reason not to share or to limit
the extent of information provided, protecting the U.S. homeland,
while combating terrorism, is a vital security interest and argues for
providing the DHS with such information.
To facilitate this sharing process, both departments should
jointly determine the types of information required―including both
raw and refined products―and from which collection platforms they
are to come. By defining parameters―which may include targeting
specific individuals and organizations outside the borders of the
nation and placing a priority of collection on those requirements―
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DoD can integrate requirements within its own collection plan,
thereby reducing duplicity and stress on the system. In the long
run, the ability of the two departments to agree on parameters and
establish their own coordination system is much preferred to having
Congress legislate such specifics. The use of a common secure
information sharing network, analysts sensitized to both national
and homeland security requirements, and the exchange of liaison
officers is critical to the rapid transfer and synthesis of information
and intelligence.
Inherent in the information determination and sharing
process is the need to address the current classification system for
relevance to homeland security. The unauthorized disclosure of
national intelligence products could cause severe and potentially
irreparable harm to the nation. This places both the DoD and the
DHS in a paradoxical situation. Predictive intelligence, essential to
implementing defensive or preventive measures, potentially may
not be distributed due its security classification and/or the lack of
security clearance of the intended recipients. Yet, one of the statutory
purposes of the DHS is to assess intelligence and provide warning
to national, state, and local agencies. To meet this requirement, the
DHS must develop the means to declassify or sanitize intelligence
effectively, making it both available and useful to those at the
appropriate implementing levels. Establishing a homeland security
classification system is critical to providing warning and vulnerability
assessments to the appropriate federal, state, or local officials.
The establishment of a homeland security classification system
for information and intelligence, discussed shortly after the standup of the Office of Homeland Security in October 2001, ended
without a viable system.30 Perhaps it is time to reassess this idea.
The necessity of passing intelligence information through the
DHS network is essential. Beyond the current Homeland Security
Advisory System, the DHS must be able to use the contents of these
predictive products, regardless of their classification, to initiate more
specific preventive homeland security measures. The cooperation of
DoD (and other affected agencies such as the CIA), must result in a
system which jointly sanitizes and assigns an appropriate homeland
security classification code to pertinent classified intelligence.
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Such a system would provide both a disciplined approach to
the amount and type of intelligence distributed, keyed to a “needto-know” requirement, and ensure protection of the most sensitive
aspects of intelligence from unauthorized disclosure. The alternative
is to continue to rely upon the current classification system. But that
would require thousands of federal, state, and local individuals
who support homeland security requirements, to undergo security
investigations in order to meet current requirements. The number
of personnel who might have a homeland security “need-to-know”
would overwhelm an already struggling Defense Investigative
Service. However, by establishing a homeland security specific
reclassification process and coordinating product contents with
the DoD, the DHS could assess threats, determine vulnerabilities,
and provide predicted targeted warning of potential attacks to the
appropriate level. The specifics of such a system and the details of
the appropriate translation of classifications are beyond the scope of
this chapter. Yet, the interagency coordination process must address
the concept of a homeland security specific classification system. The
NSC and the HSC should both approve the resulting intelligence
sharing methodology. From a strategic perspective, such an effort is
an essential step in enabling the DoD and the DHS to support both
statutory and strategy driven requirements cooperatively, while
simultaneously conducting their independent mission requirements
related to national and homeland defense.
Coordinating the requirements of determining what information
to share and how to address the classification of the information
should rest on specific organizational offices within each department.
The HSA 2002 establishes an Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, whose
responsibilities include acquisition and analysis of intelligence and
comprehensive vulnerability assessment. Additionally, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 authorized DoD’s
request for a new under secretary position: the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence. Though this act requires that the DoD define
the mission and organizational structure of this new office to Congress,
including the relationship with various internal departmental offices
and the Departments’ intelligence gathering activities, it does not
address the need for a relationship with the DHS. This oversight is
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unquestionably a strategic error, but one easily corrected. The DoD,
as part of its response to the Congressional requirement, should
address the implied, but strategically essential connection, between
the two departments’ respective under secretaries.31 Codifying
this relationship, based on the requirement to share intelligence
for homeland security, the DoD and the DHS can meet statutory
and strategy driven national and homeland security obligations
and create the conditions to eliminate a critical vulnerability. The
need for this codification further demonstrates that the relationship
between the DoD and DHS is a critical requirement for effective
homeland security. It also provides a template for addressing the
third potential critical vulnerability.
Funding of Homeland Security Related Requirements.
Having budget authority conveys significant bureaucratic power
within the federal government. In Fiscal Year 2004, the DoD projects
a budget of over $380 billion and the DHS projects approximately
$36.2 billion. Until recently, federal budgeting has been both a
finite and a “zero-sum” process; in essence, for every increase in
one department’s budget, other departments or agencies generally
experience a decrement. The funding of both departments for
homeland security requirements and corresponding technological
research and development will create friction, as each department
commits resources to support its specific programs. Despite the
Bush administration’s willingness to engage in deficit spending
to wage the war on terrorism, funding for homeland security and
national security requirements remains finite. Friction, created by
bureaucratic maneuvering to increase departmental budgets, is a
critical vulnerability that the departments must avoid.
The broad objectives and numerous ambitious programs
contained within the NSHS, and supporting statements within
the NSS, beg the obvious concern of how to fund these programs,
while simultaneously maintaining funding for other critical federal
programs, including national defense. From a macro-perspective,
this is not entirely a specific concern of the DoD. However, a closer
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examination of the interrelations among requirements indicates that
the DoD and the DHS must address such specific areas as: (1) transfer
of technology and equipment that could support homeland security;
(2) improving first responder capabilities: and (3) reimbursement for
supporting DHS specific missions (i.e., military assistance to civil
authorities). The first two areas, though implied in the NSHS, are
specifically addressed in the National Defense Authorization Act
of Fiscal Year 2003. The Stafford and Economy Acts―the legal basis
by which one federal department provides support for another and
how they are reimbursed―addresses the third area. The DoD has
significant experience under both acts of providing support to and
receiving reimbursement from various federal agencies for military
assistance to civil authorities. However, the DHS’s developing
operational structure and lack of institutional processes for
addressing reimbursement issues, notwithstanding the experiences
of its subordinate agencies before their transfer to the department,
may create friction with the DoD. The rigorous application of
the Stafford and Economy Acts and development of memoranda
of agreements will reduce or eliminate such friction. Under no
circumstances should reimbursement issues affect execution of vital
homeland security missions.
Some of the technologies being developed for improving
soldier and unit capabilities on the battlefield have direct
application―i.e., dual-use―in homeland security. These DoD
funded capabilities overlap with many of the DHS responsibilities.
Examples include chemical and biological identification technology,
protective equipment, decontamination equipment, and common
communications devices. DoD by necessity is at or near the forefront
of many of these technologies. For DoD, these technologies and
capabilities are essential to support and conduct combat operations
in environments where weapons of mass effects may exist. Although
the transfer of these and other related technologies and capabilities
would benefit the DHS and the first responder community, the DoD
should not have to cede complete control of this effort or unilaterally
fund this research and development without a cost-sharing
agreement. Though the DHS has a statutory obligation to invest in,
develop, and procure common equipment to support first responder
capabilities, the DoD must also conduct research, development, and
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acquisition of similar or identical capabilities to protect soldiers on
the battlefield. Determining exact costs and shared responsibilities
is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the DoD and the DHS
should establish a specific relationship to address these areas, assess
the associated financial costs, determine if efficiencies are possible,
and coordinate essential research, development and acquisition
requirements and strategy.
To facilitate this recommendation, the under secretaries from
each department whose primary duties include responsibility
for oversight of technology development and acquisition, should
establish a formal relationship. For the DHS, this responsibility
falls to the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, and for the
DoD, it falls to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics. It is likely that at least two other subordinate offices
within the DoD need to be involved in coordinating these activities,
the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence.
As with the sharing of intelligence and establishing boundaries for
the use of military assets, the establishment of direct organizational
links between these officials can preempt potential problems.
Though not specifically required by strategy or statute, the formal
articulation of these relationships in memoranda of agreement can
ensure a unity of effort. However, the specifics of funding may
become a significant point of friction between departments and
could ultimately require either a presidential directive (issued
through the Office of Management and Budget) or Congressional
intervention, as part of the normal budget process. Solving funding
issues either bilaterally or through the interagency process is in the
national interest, as well as each agency’s interests. Failure to resolve
these issues may foster continuous friction between the departments
and create a critical vulnerability. This vulnerability could manifest
itself in a lack of first responder or soldier preparedness to confront
the consequences of a future terrorist attack. The results would
transcend bureaucratic politics and directly affect the lives of
soldiers and first responders, particularly if use of weapons of mass
destruction/mass effects are involved.

293

The DoD and DHS must cooperatively address the potential
critical vulnerabilities presented by the use of military force, the
sharing of intelligence, and the funding of homeland security
requirements. Failure to do so, either by adopting or modifying
the recommendations presented, opens the nation to attack. If bilateral agreements cannot resolve these critical vulnerabilities, the
departments must address the vulnerability either to the NSC or the
HSC for resolution.
RESOLVING CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES:
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL VS.
THE HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL
“Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and
fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”32 This
statement reflects the fundamental aspect of the federal government’s
responsibility and underscores the DoD and the DHS’s relationship
as a critical requirement for homeland security. It also provides
an overarching means for addressing current and future critical
vulnerabilities. Both departments undoubtedly will endeavor to
do what is best for the nation; however, each department will have
differing approaches to fulfilling their portion of this commitment.
Their approaches may, as an unintended consequence, create
potential vulnerabilities.
The creation of the DHS will generate friction within the federal
bureaucracy. While some friction can be healthy to organizational
development and interorganizational relations (e.g., by ensuring
constant attention to organizational mission objectives), friction
can also, in the Clausewitizian sense, lead to less positive outcomes.
Identifying and addressing potential friction points facilitates both
departments’ prospects for mission successes, creates conditions to
eliminate critical vulnerabilities, and fosters a seamless cooperative
effort to protect the nation’s homeland and national centers of
gravity.
The NSC and HSC are the two presidential decision forums
for coordinating interagency actions and developing national
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policy. They also represent the strategic “way” to reduce the critical
vulnerabilities described in this chapter. Each Council has its own
purpose, but their scope of concerns are beginning to overlap given
the increasing interrelatedness of national and homeland security
issues.
The National Security Act of 1947 established the NSC with the
stated purpose to:
(a) . . . advise the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national
security so as to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving the national security.33

For over 50 years, this council has served as the primary conduit
of integration and interagency coordination affecting domestic and
foreign policy related to national security, including domestic security
considerations within the United States. The council’s organizational
structure is flexible, reflecting each president’s policy and decision
making style. The current administration has structured its council
around regional and functional policy coordinating committees to
provide recommendation to a Deputy’s Committee, which in turn
refines the issues for decision by the Principals Committee. Inherent
in this deliberative staffing process is the need to assess risks to
the national security and report or make recommendations to the
President accordingly.
The HSC, established by Presidential Executive Order 13228
on October 8, 2001, and provided statutory recognition in the HSA
2002, parallels the function and structures of the NSC, but with a
narrowly defined focus on homeland security and the prevention of
terrorism. The HSC:
. . . shall be responsible for advising and assisting the President
with respect to all aspects of homeland security. The Council shall
serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland
security-related activities of executive departments and agencies
and effective development and implementation of homeland
security policies. 34

The NSC has four statutory members: the President, Vice
President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State; the Chairman
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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the council’s statutory military advisor.
By contrast, the HSC has five statutory members: the President, Vice
President, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, and Secretary of
Homeland Security; it does not have a statutory military advisor.
The omission of two key personnel, the Secretary of State and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, significantly narrows the focus
of the HSC.35 The Secretary of State attends meetings only if there are
matters pertaining to his area of responsibility and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs (CJCS), initially not permitted to attend, eventually
received a standing invitation to all meetings.
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the
creation of the HSC initially frustrated DoD, vis-à-vis the traditional
role of the NSS. The department’s frustrations resulted from the
HSC’s “growing pains” as it struggled to become operational in the
midst of a national crisis. These initial growing pains revealed three
HSC shortfalls: (1) haphazard interagency coordination processes;
(2) lack of refined internal operating procedures; and (3) couching
national issues under the rubric of “homeland security” without
a clear definition of homeland security. The omission of military
representation, specifically the CJCS, as either a formal member
or advisor to the HSC, further frustrated the department. This lack
of formal military representation denied relevant military advice
to the President and the Secretary of Defense during the initial
HSC Principals Committee meetings. This military advice was
also lacking in the numerous deliberations in policy coordinating
committees and the deputy’s committee meetings. Currently, the
CJCS, or his designated representative, has a standing invitation
to all HSC meetings, including deputy and policy coordinating
committee meetings. However, there has been no amendment to the
executive order or the HSA 2002 to reflect this arrangement. This
organizational flaw is significant; it stands in stark contrast to the
NSC where the CJCS is the statutory principal military advisor to
the council. The statutory omission of the CJCS and the Secretary of
State from HSC deliberations, both critical advisors to the president,
suppresses consideration of broader national policy implications on
homeland security decisions.
It is important to note, that in accordance with Section 102 (d)
of HSA 2002, “the Secretary [of Homeland Security] may, subject to
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the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of
the National Security Council.” On the other hand, it ensures that
homeland security equities are represented during NSC discussions
and formulation of national policy. However, simultaneous
memberships by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security
on both councils, creates inevitable friction in determining how and
where to address matters related to homeland security within the
interagency process.
The creation of a separate interagency forum for addressing
homeland security issues may at first seem appropriate, particularly
given the failure of U.S. strategic defenses to detect, identify, and
prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001. However, the NSC
coordinated and responded to all national security related issues,
as defined by Presidential Executive Order 12656 (November 18,
1988), prior to the establishment of the HSC. One could reasonably
interpret these issues, termed “national security emergencies,” to
include terrorism. A national security emergency, as defined by
Executive Order 12656 is:
. . . any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack,
technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously
degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United
States. Policy for national security emergency preparedness shall
be established by the President. Pursuant to the President’s
direction, the National Security Council shall be responsible for
developing and administering such policy.36

The advantage of addressing all national security related
matters within the NSC, as defined by its the charter and within
the parameters of the executive order above, ensures an integration
of foreign and domestic considerations. Today this is especially
pertinent, given the increasing effects of globalization. Few actions,
whether domestic or foreign, occur in isolation. Actions or decisions
made in support of homeland security have both direct and indirect
impact on foreign affairs and vice versa. The creation of a parallel
structure for homeland security has potential for bifurcating both
the decision process and consideration of potential consequences.
At the very least, maintaining two distinct decision forums requires
narrowly defined, homeland security specific actions to be separated
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from those of a broader national security nature. Given the
interconnectivity of the NSS and NSHS, and the need for coordinated
efforts by the DoD and the DHS, making these clear distinctions
continues to be a difficult process. For DoD, participating at all levels
in both councils requires a constant effort to reconcile and balance
national security related actions with those of homeland security.
This effort will become even more strenuous and essential once the
DHS becomes operational. Fortunately, to date, both councils appear
to be working in tandem; however, it is too early to assess the longterm implications of maintaining parallel forums.
Within the context of these parallel forums, selecting the specific
forum for interagency coordination has implications for each
department. For DoD, the NSC offers the better strategic forum
for obtaining balanced decisions affecting its domestic and foreign
security commitments. By contrast, the DHS would most likely
prefer the HSC’s primary narrow domestic focus, with secondary
considerations for the broader foreign policy implications.
Citing specific unclassified examples explaining why the DoD
should prefer to take issues to the NSC rather than the HSC is
difficult, given the sensitivity of the specific actions and security
concerns of both forums. However, consider the following scenario:
DoD directs through its annual Contingency Planning Guidance
that each Geographic and Functional Combat Commander, using
the Deliberate Planning Process, develop specific contingency
plans, operations plans or functional plans for their specific area of
responsibility. Many of these plans require interagency coordination
to ensure national supportability. The specifics of the requested
interagency support are defined in Annex V, entitled Interagency
Coordination, of each plan.37 In compliance with the Contingency
Planning Guidance, U.S. Northern Command, as well as U.S.
Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command, both geographic
combatant commanders with responsibilities for supporting
homeland security, must develop individual plans with supporting
Annex V’s. Coordinating these annexes requires the DoD to submit
them to either the NSC or the HSC. Logic would dictate submission
to the HSC; however, the DoD is unlikely to do so. Though the
focus of each plan is to support homeland security, there are other
broader national security implications to be considered: specifically,
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the strategic impacts of designating forces (air, land and maritime,
including requests for Coast Guard assets) to respond to either
“extraordinary” or “emergency” circumstance requirements,
while simultaneously conducting or preparing to execute other
contingency operations in support of the NSS. This does not imply
that the domestic aspects of these annexes should be ignored; rather,
these annexes should be coordinated with consideration to foreign
policy concerns by the NSC. By doing so, DoD would obtain an
integrated and balanced foreign and domestic assessment to support
each combatant commander’s needs. Further, since the Secretary of
Homeland Security, is an invited member of the NSC, he would
be expected to use the Office of Homeland Security to coordinate
review and comments on these annexes. He would submit this
review, with its specific emphasis on homeland security, as his
response to the NSC staff. Using the staffing process of the NSC,
DoD insures the most comprehensive review of these annexes. As
long as America remains a nation at war, conducting simultaneous
offensive and defensive actions, the NSC is the one best forum to
conduct interagency coordination given its holistic view of foreign
and domestic strategic choices and risks.
Parallel decision forums, with overlapping memberships but
distinctly different objectives, present both departments, and the
interagency in general, with a challenging problem of balancing
domestic needs with on-going foreign commitments. The HSC, after
just over 18 months of operations, is still maturing. It has, however,
made significant strides and has become, by force of the President’s
directive, an organization that is gaining respect within the
federal bureaucracy. However, in the months since Congressional
confirmation of Secretary for Homeland Security Tom Ridge, the
President has not appointed a new Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security. Absent such an advisor to direct the Office
of Homeland Security and the day-to-day actions of the HSC, it
remains to be seen whether this council will continue as a separate
organization. It is likely, given the increased blurring of national
and homeland security matters, the inclusion of the Secretary for
Homeland Security on the NSC (at the President’s determination),
and the exclusion of the Secretary of State from the HSC (unless
invited), that the Office of Homeland Security and the functions of
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the HSC may soon become subordinate to the NSC.
In the interim, determining how and where to address
contentious issues will remain a matter of deciding relevance: Is
the issue of broader relevance to national security or is it more
focused on homeland security and preventing terrorism? The forum
provides the context from which the presidential decision is both
debated and rendered. For the DoD, this will require a case-by-case
determination; for the DHS, the matter is more clearly defined.
CONCLUSION
We have seen the problem and it is us!38

To comply with Secretary Rumsfeld’s epigraph at the beginning
of this chapter and in seeking to work with the DHS to provide for the
nation’s defense, the DoD must now put deeds behind words. As the
more established and senior partner in this strategic relationship, the
DoD must assume greater responsibility for developing an effective
relationship with the DHS. In seeking to create this relationship, both
departments must acknowledge a harsh reality of organizational
culture and behavior: “We have seen the problem and it is us.” That is,
organizations frequently place obstacles in their own path. However,
organizations also have the ability to remove those obstacles, and
this is clearly applicable to the critical vulnerabilities identified
within this chapter. These vulnerabilities are not insurmountable.
The vulnerabilities presented can be resolved by “us”―that is, the
leadership of both the DoD and the DHS.
Homeland security, as a critical capability, offers fundamental
protection to the nation. It represents a cohesive strategic defense
permitting the nation to execute its national strategies while
simultaneously prosecuting the war on terrorism. Further, there
is little doubt that an effective relationship between the DoD and
the DHS represents a critical requirement that enables homeland
security as a critical capability. More than any two other departments
within the federal government, the DHS (charged by law and the
NSHS to protect the nation’s homeland from terrorism) and the DoD
(charged by law and the NSS to not only defend this nation but to
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concurrently fight and win the nation’s wars), must achieve a unity
of effort. Anything less creates critical vulnerabilities and imperils
the nation’s center of gravity.
The emerging relationship between the DoD and the DHS requires
constant efforts to identify and defuse potential bureaucratic tensions.
DoD is still defining its roles, missions, and relationships relative to
increased homeland security requirements, as well as assessing how
it must interact with the DHS. This chapter has sought to promote
a greater understanding between departments and to help inform
the development of this relationship. The recommendations offered
may or may not reflect any ultimate decisions. The dynamics of
the current strategic environment, including DoD’s transformation
efforts and the organizational challenges of standing-up the DHS, all
serve to influence the final outcome.
Finally, a strong, cooperative relationship between the DoD and
the DHS―focusing on the protection of the American homeland,
while avoiding the types of rivalries that have traditionally
encumbered the bureaucratic process―will ensure the long-term
security of the nation. As President Bush declared on September,
2001, “ The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It
will end in a way, and an hour, of our choosing.”39
When this war on terrorism does end, it is certain that this
new focus on homeland security will endure, both as a permanent
condition for the nation and as a permanent mission for both the
DoD and the DHS. Properly nurtured, the resulting relationship will
ensure that, no matter who the enemy is or how he attempts to attack
this nation, there will be fewer critical vulnerabilities to be exploited
in the nation’s national security armor.
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CHAPTER 11
INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT:
THE ROLES OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT WITH IMPLICATIONS
FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
Captain Albert F. Lord, Jr.
The events of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new
era of threats to Americans. Terrorists struck without
warning, and brought disaster to U.S. shores in their
wake. The destruction of the World Trade Center,
significant damage to the Pentagon, and introduction of
anthrax into the U.S. Postal System demonstrated that
Americans can quickly find themselves on the front lines
of a war against terrorism. Beyond the physical damage,
Americans have experienced the considerable economic
and psychological impact of those terrorist actions.

How can America meet this new challenge and restore confidence
in the ability of government to provide for the safety and welfare of
its citizens? The war against terrorism will occur across the globe.
The U.S. Government has already mobilized military, diplomatic,
financial, and information resources to bring the perpetrators of 9/11
to justice and to establish a global security framework to prevent
a reoccurrence of such attacks. A concurrent effort needs to occur
within the United States to establish new relationships between the
levels of government in order to bring available resources to bear.
No doubt more resources are required. How can the collective efforts
of the federal, state, and local governments across the United States
work together effectively and efficiently to meet this new threat?
Integrated Emergency Management would provide the
framework to allow government and nongovernment organizations
to work together to prepare for, combat, and recover from terrorist
attacks as well as other disasters. This concept allows for the unique
competencies of each level of government to come to bear to respond
effectively to disasters.1 The federal government’s role is to provide
resources, expertise, and training to lower levels of government. The
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states will perform such critical tasks as coordinating immediate
action and providing consistent and quality response in their
jurisdictions. The local governments know their citizens and
immediate localities the best and can most effectively direct action
and resources to those most directly affected. This lowest level of
government has the most credibility with citizens and is key to
effective response and recovery.
Since September 11, the federal government has taken two major
steps to improve its ability to provide effective response to disasters.
It has established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
provide a single, unified security structure that can provide protection
against current threats, while providing sufficient flexibility to meet
the unknown threats of the future.2 Specified tasks for this new
organization include managing federal response activities and
helping to train and equip first responders. The establishment of the
DHS is the largest reorganization of the federal government in over
50 years. This action consolidates the efforts of over 100 different
government organizations under one cabinet-level secretary in order
to provide optimum prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation
of disasters in the continental United States. The second major federal
initiative has been the establishment of the Northern Command
of the Department of Defense (DoD). This new organization will
provide military assistance to civil authorities when directed by the
President, and the framework to coordinate making available the
resources and technical knowledge of the defense establishment to
local level communities when circumstances require. The challenge
at every level of government has been to integrate and coordinate the
efforts of those tasked with handling and responding to disasters. To
be effective, each level of government must understand the unique
roles and responsibilities of those charged with taking action or
providing resources to deal with domestic disasters.
Integrated Emergency Management Definition and Framework.
Americans and their forefathers have been performing the
functions of emergency management since before the founding
of their nation. The passing of the Civil Defense Act of 1950 gave
the federal government a central role in disaster management due
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to the threat raised by nuclear war. The federal government terms
the current concept of emergency management “comprehensive
emergency management.” As its name implies, this concept includes
preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery from all types of
hazards and emergencies. This represents an increased emphasis in
making the entire nation’s emergency infrastructure more responsive
to major emergencies or catastrophes.
Comprehensive Emergency Management comprises three
interrelated components3:
1. Targets all types of hazards. The nature of natural hazards
and technological threats strongly suggests many of the same
management strategies, techniques, and methods will be
effective in responding to a wide range of situations.
2. Uses an emergency management partnership. The complex
nature and potentially wide scope of modern disaster
management requires a close partnership among every
level of government and nongovernmental organizations,
including the private sector and the public.
3. Features an “emergency lifecycle.” Disasters require
management actions over time. Management actions must
match a lifecycle of occurrence. They include strategies to
mitigate hazards, prepare for and respond to emergencies,
and recover from their impact.
The characteristic of the last component of “comprehensive
emergency management” suggests the time phasing of actions to
deal with hazards. These four phases are mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery. In every phase, governmental actions need
to ensure the best possible posture to deal with the emergency.
Mitigation includes those activities which serve to eliminate or
reduce the chance of an emergency from occurring, or if it occurs,
reducing its effects. Building codes, which mandate hurricane or
tornado strength resistant materials and construction practices,
represent an example of mitigation. Preparedness includes planning
responses and allocating resources in case an emergency occurs. An
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example would be the notification of an affected population and the
provision of knowledge of those actions people need to take in order
to deal with a prospective event. Response activities take place during
or immediately after a disaster. These activities aim at the saving of
lives and property, the provision of emergency assistance, and the
reduction of the likelihood of secondary or follow-on casualties or
damage. The final phase is recovery. It continues until life returns to
normal. Restoring public services and providing financial aid would
be examples of such actions. In large disasters, the recovery phase
may extend for a considerable length of time, years perhaps.
Whereas “comprehensive emergency management” widens the
scope of government at every level to include a range of potential
emergencies, “integrated emergency management” represents
a capstone concept involving each level of government with
specific roles in disasters. The creation of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979 consolidated five federal
agencies and initiated the movement to develop an integrated
approach at maximizing disaster preparedness and response
across government levels and agencies. Of note, since the creation
of FEMA, many states have followed suit and have created similar
organizations to coordinate and consolidate disaster efforts. The
goals of the “integrated emergency management system” are:
• Fostering a full federal, state and local government partnership with provisions for flexibility at the several levels of
government in order to achieve common national goals.
• Emphasizing the implementation of emergency management
measures which are known to be effective.
• Achieving more complete integration of emergency management planning into mainstream state and local policy-making
and operational systems.
• Building on the foundation of existing emergency management plans, systems and capabilities to broaden their
applicability to the full spectrum of emergencies.4
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A key to the “integrated emergency management system”
will be the synchronization of effort among governmental and
nongovernmental agencies across the country with a role in
emergency management. The concept allows for tailoring of efforts
by each agency. Every locale in the United States has some capability
to deal with disasters. Those in Florida, for example, may focus
on the threat of hurricanes; those in California on earthquakes;
those in the Midwest on tornados and, if in a floodplain, flooding.
Large cities may have to consider the threat of civil unrest. In each
case, local measures need to be a part of an overarching plan. The
“integrated emergency management system” builds on existing
local capabilities and efforts, while providing incentives to improve
and integrate them into a national system. Communities will
have to develop or integrate their plans consistent with national
guidelines, which provide consistency across the nation but which
are sufficiently flexible to allow a focus on those areas communities
believe most critical.
The “integrated emergency management system” process begins
with a comprehensive hazard assessment prepared by the local
community. If required or requested, state and federal assistance
may assist in formulating such an assessment. Once completed,
the local authorities will analyze their capabilities to deal with
hazards and shortfalls. They then will develop operations plans
with annexes for emergency management functions and appendices
for the unique aspects of different emergencies. These appendices
will include mitigation measures, resources required, the execution
of emergency operations, and methods for evaluation. Finally, local
authorities will develop a long range plan (with yearly updates).5
Emergencies come in all shapes and sizes. One can characterize
disasters as well as the types of responses. Domestic emergencies
come in two basic categories: major disasters and civil emergencies.
Major disasters are events such as tornados, hurricanes, wildfires,
earthquakes, floods, and similar natural or man-made events,
the extent of which can overwhelm the capability of local or state
governments. In such cases, state and federal assistance is necessary.
Civil emergencies represent events such as civil disturbances, critical
worker strikes, environmental incidents, and mass immigration.
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They endanger life and property and may disrupt the normal
functioning of government.
The Role of the Federal Government.
The federal government occupies a unique position in the
hierarchy of emergency management. As a resource provider,
it can make up shortfalls in resources, conduct training at every
governmental level, and alleviate hardship in effected communities.
It plays important roles throughout the disaster lifecycle. It can
create and maintain a database of lessons learned from national
and international disasters, as well as provide best practices for
mitigation. By funding agencies and providing grants, it also
assists in the preparation for disasters. Examples of this include
the National Weather Service and the National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Administration, which provide critical warning
of possible destructive weather. In the response phase, the federal
government maintains unique capabilities for assisting state
and local governments. The Center for Disease Control and the
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force are two examples.
Perhaps the most well-known and critical capability of the federal
government lies in the funding it provides for recovery. Assistance
is available through grants or loans to state and local governments to
offset recovery costs. In addition, identical programs are available for
businesses and individuals to get back on their feet after a disaster.
Two agencies of the federal government, FEMA and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), play particular roles in assisting
state and local authorities. These roles depend on the nature of the
emergency and types of response required. There are three broad
types of response. Consequence management occurs under the
jurisdiction of the state and local governments. In the classic case of
natural or man-made disasters, FEMA is the federal agency tasked
with the responsibility for primary coordination for assistance to
local authorities. Consequence management involves measures
to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by
emergencies. It also includes measures to restore essential government
services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency
relief to affected governments, businesses and individuals. Crisis
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management occurs under the jurisdiction of the federal government
when an attack by terrorists or suspected terrorists is imminent or
has taken place. In addition to its preventive role, the FBI has the
responsibility of coordinating with local and state agencies to resolve
hostile situations and investigate and prepare cases for federal
prosecution. A third type of emergency response called technical
operations occurs when an incident happens where suspected
nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical agents are in play. In
this instance, federal technical assistance provides national-level
expertise to the authority with jurisdiction―either the FBI in crisis
management, or the local and state authorities in coordination with
FEMA in consequence management. This assistance will determine
the nature of the specific agent and provide aid in the response and
recovery processes. The Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency are among
the federal agencies which can provide assistance during technical
operations.6
The Stafford Act governs the federal role and response to
disasters.7 When the affected state governor officially declares
a state of emergency, he requests that the President declare an
emergency or major disaster for the affected region. At the same
time, the governor’s director of emergency management informs
the FEMA regional director who reports to his or her director in
Washington. Once the President declares an emergency, he appoints
a federal coordinating officer to join with the state coordinating
officer and establish a disaster field office. This office will support
the emergency response team, consisting of representatives of 26
federal agencies and the American Red Cross. This team provides
12 emergency support functions and works closely with the state
and local authorities for the duration of the response and recovery.
If enough lead time exists before the disaster strikes, the FEMA
regional operations center may establish an emergency response
team advance office.8
There are four steps in the declaration process when the President
declares a state of emergency:
(1) A joint state/FEMA preliminary damage assessment occurs.
It consists of an inspection of the affected area to establish a
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financial figure for subsequent planning, aid, and recovery
efforts. This provides the basis for the governor’s request
for assistance to the federal government.
(2) The Governor’s request for assistance then takes place. This
request, by law, must declare that local and state resources
are inadequate to deal with the emergency. The request
includes an estimate of the damage, statement of state
resources committed and description of assistance being
requested.
(3) FEMA submits its recommendation to the President
regarding the request. The request by the governor is
routed through the FEMA regional office, which endorses
the request and sends it on to its headquarters. The FEMA
Director checks for applicability under the Stafford Act and
recommends a course of action for the President’s approval.
The request then goes to the White House.
(4) The Presidential declaration. After review, the President
will decide whether or not to declare a state of emergency
and make assistance available. If approved, the president
appoints a federal coordinating officer.9
Although the process may appear time consuming, in exceptional
circumstances, the approval time may only be hours instead of days.
After the President declares a disaster, the state and FEMA draw up
an agreement which establishes the duration and types of assistance,
lists the areas eligible, states the cost sharing provisions, and other
terms and conditions.
In “integrated emergency management,” the federal government
provides resources for dealing with emergencies and disasters
beyond state and local capabilities. The primary resource is financial
assistance to pay for response and recovery efforts. Other critical
resources are personnel and equipment too scarce or expensive for
local governmental agencies to stockpile. An obvious example are
the specialized resources needed for response to a terrorist attack―
especially if the attack consists of weapons of mass destruction.
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Although not a part of response, emergency management training is
an important resource provided by the federal government. FEMA
runs the National Emergency Training Center located in Emmitsburg,
MD, which provides a variety of resident, correspondence, and online courses. FEMA can also check the completeness of state and
local emergency action plans by using the emergency management
accreditation program.
The Role of the State Government.
State officials occupy the most critical positions in the integrated
emergency management system. The federal tradition of the
United States gives primacy of place to states when dealing with
emergencies within their borders. By law the federal government
has no role unless and until the governor asks for assistance. The
governors and state agencies have the responsibility to organize,
plan for, and respond to emergencies and disasters on their
territory. The state occupies a critical juncture. Those associated
with state level emergency management must be intimately
familiar with the capabilities of the federal government and the
resources, plans, and actions of their local governments. They must
be master coordinators of plans and actions to execute effectively
and efficiently the demands of disaster management. The state is the
linchpin between the locals in need and the massive resources of the
federal government. As the state chief executive, the governor is the
focus of state preparedness, response, and recovery. He or she must
ensure the state and local governments are ready for the demands of
emergency management by establishing the organization, reporting
responsibilities, and standards of performance for agencies dealing
with emergency management. Most importantly, the governor has
the power to declare and terminate a state of emergency and thereby
request federal assistance.
During emergencies, the governor assumes extraordinary powers
and responsibilities. When a governor declares a state emergency, he
or she can mobilize state resources to provide assistance. Although
individual states vary, the governor can usually:
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• Activate the National Guard and reassign state agency
personnel.
• Direct the evacuation of the population directly affected by a
disaster.
• Prohibit certain activities within the disaster area.
• Commandeer private property.
• Suspend state statues when required.
• Authorize expenditure of emergency funds.
• Enter mutual aid arrangements with other states.
Also, the governor can sometimes impose economic controls to
provide affordable food, shelter, and other necessities.
To assist the governor in the supervision and execution of
disaster supervision, every state maintains an Office of Emergency
Response. In accordance with state law, this agency coordinates the
emergency response program and publishes the state emergency
response plan. State emergency managers control the coordination
and dispatch of state assets to localities as needed to respond to and
recover from disasters. The states vary in the selection and reporting
responsibilities of the director of emergency management. Virtually
all are appointed positions, either directly by the governor or a
cabinet-level official. Some states have the director reporting directly
to the governor, as a member of the cabinet or in the executive office
of the governor. In other states the director reports to a cabinet
official. The governor usually empowers the director of emergency
management to take action in preparation for and response to
emergencies. He or she is likely the point of contact with federal and
local authorities in emergency situations.
The state performs the coordinating function in every serious
emergency or disaster. Each develops and maintains a state
emergency response plan―similar to the federal emergency response
plan―which dictates the dispatch of resources to local areas. This
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plan sets forth the roles of the state agencies and the responsibilities
of the local governments. In addition, it provides the relationships
and linkages between state and local authorities and those of the
federal government. Given the comprehensive and integrated
nature of general disaster response, teamwork is essential, and every
state agency and department may assist in an emergency or disaster.
The state’s emergency response plan specifies the formal roles of
departments. The following are samples of the state organizations
that are likely to be involved in disaster management: the Adjutant
General’s Office, the Department of Public Safety, the State Energy
Office, the State Department of Environmental Protection, the
Transportation Department, the Attorney General’s office, the
Comptroller, the Health and Welfare Agency, the Department of
Labor, and the State Emergency Response Commission.
The National Guard occupies a special place in state organizations
which deal with disasters. The National Guard is state-based and
consists of federally trained and equipped troops available for
federal service in times of emergency or when activated by the
President. Normally, the National Guard is under the command of
the governor of its parent state, and he or she exercises command
through the state adjutant general. The governor calls up the National
Guard when the state and local civilian agencies need additional
resources to deal with natural or man-made disasters. The governor
may also use the National Guard to support law enforcement. The
cost associated with the use of the National Guard is borne by the
state until the National Guard is federalized or other specific federal
funding arrangements are made. When an emergency occurs, every
level of government―local, state and federal―as well as a variety of
volunteer organizations, will immediately respond. Legislation and
lessons learned have shaped those immediate actions.
The Role of the Local Government.
The first line of defense in virtually every case is the local
authority; it is primarily responsible for managing the response
to emergencies and disasters. The local elected officials such as
the mayor, city councils, and boards of commissioners are the
leading actors in responding to emergencies. Ideally, other levels of
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government will serve to provide technical assistance, coordination,
and additional resources to the local representatives. Especially
important are those agreements between local governments
which provide for mutual assistance. In rare cases, higher-level
governmental representatives may play a greater role when the
magnitude of the disaster renders the local authorities ineffective or
the disaster overlaps jurisdictions.
In the response phase, the local authority will receive and issue
warnings to the population which may be affected by the disaster.
In addition, the local government will carry out mitigating actions
and preparations, and if necessary, order an evacuation. A good
example is the action taken in coastal communities when a hurricane
threatens. Upon onset of the disaster, the local first responders will
proceed to the emergency site and begin to provide aid on scene.
Fire and police departments, emergency medical personnel, rescue
units, and possibly utility workers are the best known of the local
initial response personnel. The local authorities may call upon state
and national organizations for assistance. The state may call up the
National Guard, and units of the American Red Cross and U.S. Coast
Guard may be involved from the start. The local government will
attempt to ensure order and safety, provide medical services and, if
required, rescue victims. Utility companies will restore vital services
such as water, power, shelter, transportation, and communications.
Finally, the local jurisdiction will coordinate with voluntary agencies
to provide assistance for those in need.
The following factors govern the response of local authorities:
speed of onset of the disaster; need for evacuation; magnitude;
duration; and extent of the threat to the citizenry. Local governments
are responsible for responding to threats in a fashion that will contain
the emergency, protect people and property, and minimize damage.
They are also responsible for overall management and coordination
of an effective response and of conducting initial assessments of the
damage. Lastly, they are responsible for communicating to the next
higher level in the hierarchy and requesting assistance in a timely
enough manner to allow those assets to respond effectively.
A comprehensive emergency operations plan is central to
effective local emergency response. This document sets forth roles
and responsibilities for the various agencies of local government
322

when planning for and combating disasters. It is a one-stopshopping directive which addresses the disaster lifecycle of
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. In accordance with
the comprehensive nature of integrated emergency management, it
should be consistent with the state emergency management plan
and cover all types of natural and man-made hazards. Although
every emergency and disaster will be unique, this plan will form the
foundation of local actions when dealing with disasters. An effective
local emergency operations plan includes sections for administration
and information dissemination, and references applicable state
plan sections.10 The emergency operations plan starts with a
comprehensive self-assessment addressing the capabilities of the
local authorities to deal with emergencies. A valuable by-product
of this assessment is a list of additional resources required to handle
disasters; this aids in requests for state or federal funding and serves
as the basis for cooperative or collaborative local planning among
jurisdictions.
Local elected officials and appointed public administration
managers like police, fire, health care, and utility personnel
play important roles in the locality. These individuals are most
knowledgeable with the local area and have the most influence with
the affected population. These key members of the community must
be aware of the contents of the emergency operations plan and ready
to provide information to assisting state and federal authorities.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
President George W. Bush signed into law the DHS on November
25, 2002. An analysis of the events of September 11, 2001, and the
immediate aftermath, highlighted the requirement to consolidate the
efforts of the federal government to protect and defend the United
States against new security threats. The DHS combines the efforts of
over 100 different government organizations into a unified security
structure charged with defending the United States against threats
now and in the future.11
Five primary directorates make up the core of the new
department.
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The Border and Transportation Security Directorate unifies
agencies dealing with the borders of the United States,
waterways and transportation. The following agencies are
included:
§

The U.S. Customs Service;

§

The Immigration and Naturalization Service;

§

The Federal Protective Service;

§

The Transportation Security Administration;

§

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center;

§

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; and,

§

The Office for Domestic Preparedness.

The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
oversees the federal response to domestic emergencies and
disasters and the federal assistance provided to state and
local governments, including that to first responders. The
following make up this directorate:
§

FEMA;

§

The Strategic National Stockpile and the National
Disaster Medical System;

§

The Nuclear Incident Response Team;

§

Domestic Emergency Support Teams; and,

§

The National Domestic Preparedness Office.

The Science and Technology Directorate coordinates the
scientific and technological resources required and available
to keep the U.S. secure. It is composed of:
§

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures Programs;

§

The Environmental Measurements Laboratory;

§

The National Biological Warfare Defense Analysis
Center; and,

§

The Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
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•

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate analyzes information and intelligence from
other agencies that involve threats to the United States, and
evaluates dangers to the nation’s infrastructure. It includes:
§

The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office;

§

The Federal Computer Incident Response Center;

§

The National Communications System;

§

The National Infrastructure Protection Center; and,

§

The Energy Security and Assurance Program.

The Management Dirrectorate controls the overall
administration of the department including budget and
resource expenditure, human resources and personnel, and
associated infrastructure and facilities management.

In addition to the five directorates, the U.S. Coast Guard and the
United States Secret Service report directly to the Secretary. Other
important offices include a Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services, an Office of State and Local Government Coordination,
and an Office of Private Sector Liaison.12 The Directorate for
Emergency Preparedness and Response is the DHS’s agency for
dealing with integrated emergency management. FEMA remains
the foundation for federal disaster response and its core functions
remain unchanged.
President Jimmy Carter created FEMA in 1979 to consolidate
the efforts of five federal agencies, each of which had responsibility
for disaster assistance. Its headquarters is in Washington, DC, with
ten regional offices that help plan, coordinate, and manage disaster
assistance operations, including the four phases of mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery. Reporting to the DHS’s
Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response, FEMA
manages the President’s disaster relief fund, the source of most of
the federal financial resources in the wake of a disaster. The agency’s
mission is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect
institutions from all hazards by leading and supporting the nation
in a comprehensive, risk based emergency management program
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of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The following
goals drive its priorities:
• To create an emergency management partnership with other
federal agencies, state and local governments, volunteer
organizations and the private sector.
• To establish, in concert with its partners, a national emergency
management system that is comprehensive, risk based, and
all-hazards in approach.
• To make mitigation the foundation of the national emergency
management system.
• To provide a rapid and effective response to any disaster.
• To strengthen state and local emergency management.13
FEMA uses the federal response plan to coordinate the federal
response to disaster or emergency situations. This is an umbrella
plan which provides the framework and guidelines for federal
support to state and local authorities. The director may activate the
plan fully or partially, depending on the scope of the disaster and
the needs. It consists of the basic plan which lays out procedures
and planning considerations; emergency support functions
annexes which describe the functions of the agencies tasked to
support state and local activities in 12 specified areas; the recovery
function annex describes the planning considerations and necessary
assistance to allow for victims and communities to return to normal.
Support annexes describe ancillary functions of logistics and
financial management, community and public relations, donation
management, and the like. Incident annexes describe considerations
requiring a unified response with other agencies in situations which
may fall outside the provisions of the Stafford Act. The first incident
annex deals with terrorist incidents. Lastly, appendices cover terms,
definitions, and abbreviations.14
Regional supplements developed by FEMA and other federal
agency regional offices implement the federal response plan. That
plan addresses region specific issues and situations. The system
allows the development of specific operations supplements to
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support special events such as the Olympics or Presidential
inaugurations. Federal emergency managers implement the federal
response plan through specific agency instructions, directives,
regulations, or manuals.15
Managers coordinate federal assistance at national and local
levels. At the national level, FEMA headquarters in Washington
forms a catastrophic disaster response group. Chaired by the
agency’s associate director for response and recovery, it includes
representatives from those agencies with responsibilities under the
federal response plan. Supporting the catastrophic disaster response
group at the agency’s headquarters is the emergency support team
which consists of representatives from the primary and support
agencies and the headquarters staff. Its job is to support the federal
coordinating officer in the field and serves as the central source of
information at the national level regarding the status of federal
response activities. In addition, it coordinates the offers of donations
and unsolicited contributions and, if required, adjudicates disputes
between Emergency Support Function agencies.
At the regional level, the FEMA regional director establishes a
regional operations center which serves to initiate federal response
activity and coordinate actions until the establishment of a disaster
field office. The emergency response team advance element is the
spearhead for federal assistance. The leader is a region team leader
and has support staff and emergency support function agency
representatives. The team will deploy early to the state emergency
operations center and, among other duties, will assist in drafting the
initial needs assessment. The emergency response team supports the
federal coordinating officer who heads the team. Agency staff and
emergency support function agency representatives make up the
team. It provides coordination to supporting agencies in the field. In
addition, it serves as an information disseminating source to work
with local and regional media.
The President appoints the federal coordinating officer and
serves as the presidential representative to state and local authorities.
He or she coordinates federal assistance with the state governor’s
representative, the state coordinating officer; and can task federal
agencies to perform additional missions, which the federal response
plan may not address. The federal coordinating officer coordinates
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with the catastrophic disaster response group for reporting and
requesting additional resources. The disaster field office acts as
an operations center and command post to support the federal
coordinating officer, state coordinating officer, and supporting
staffs, and will have adequate security and communications to carry
out their functions.16
In certain circumstances, the use of DoD assets may be necessary
to provide required federal assistance in a disaster or emergency.
In this case, the President and the Secretary of Defense will
establish priorities and determine the extent of assistance. National
leadership considers requests on the basis of legality, lethality, risk,
cost, appropriateness, and readiness.17 Beyond the National Guard,
two types of assistance are typically available to the state and local
authorities: military assistance to civil authorities, and military
assistance for civil disturbance. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense is the DoD’s executive agent for state and
local assistance.
On October 1, 2002, the Secretary of Defense created the
Commander, Northern Command, as a unified commander to deal
with natural disasters, attacks on U.S. soil, or other civil emergencies.
He has the specific task of providing for a more coordinated military
support to civil authorities such as the FBI, FEMA, and state and
local governments. Northern Command has planning responsibility
for domestic disaster relief, civil disturbance, support to the DHS for
mass immigration, response to a radiological accident, and for an
integrated medical operations plan for the continental United States.
When required, military forces will move to Northern Command
control.
Northern Command possesses three standing headquarters to
accomplish its assigned missions.18
• Joint Force Headquarters―Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS).
Headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, it is the homeland
security organization that coordinates the land and maritime
defense of the United States. It also coordinates military
assistance to civil authorities and plans and integrates the
full spectrum of homeland defense and civil support to lead
federal agencies.
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• Joint Task Force―Civil Support (JTF-CS). Headquartered at
Fort Monroe in Hampton, Virginia, it is under the operational
control of Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security. The
mission of JTF-CS is to provide command and control for
DoD forces supporting the management of the consequences
of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield
explosive (CBRNE) incident in the United States, its territories,
and its possessions.
• Joint Task Force―6 (JTF-6). Headquartered at Biggs Army
Airfield, Fort Bliss, Texas, it provides DoD counterdrug
support to federal, regional, state, and local law enforcement
agencies throughout the continental United States.
Implications for the DHS.
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001, changed the face of Integrated Emergency
Management in fundamental ways. Before then, those concerned
with dealing with disasters focused primarily on relatively familiar
natural or environmental disasters. Perhaps the magnitude or
location would differ, but there was a history of national and
community resiliency in dealing with such situations. The nation
had become comfortable with its ability to deal with disasters. In
the wake of 9/11, Americans can no longer take for granted their
security, invulnerability, health, and safety within the borders of the
United States.
Terrorist organizations have demonstrated their ability to strike
U.S. shores, using innovative techniques and weapons. This unique
threat to public safety has the capability to counter U.S. preparations
and strike at weak points with not only mass loss of life, but also with
a loss of confidence of the American people in their public servants
and institutions. The potential use of weapons of mass destruction
by terrorists with global reach poses a new threat that is orders of
magnitude greater than ever before faced by the American people
and those charged with their protection.
National leaders and emergency managers must combat this
new threat on two levels. First, the federal government must provide
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resources to develop the national technical competence to handle
the new weapons of mass destruction. Second, local governments
with the assistance of state and federal agencies must increase local
resiliency by building capability at local jurisdictions. Emergency
managers must integrate comprehensive capabilities at every level
through training and exercises.
The strengthening of the technical capability is the responsibility
of the federal government. The design of the DHS with its Directorate
of Science and Technology indicates that agencies associated with
the development of technical countermeasures will have a close
working partnership under a common superior. Congress must
adequately fund this directorate. The experts must quickly integrate
the results of their research and development effort into the basic
techniques and procedures at the federal, state, and local levels
of government for disaster mitigation, preparation, response, and
recovery. In addition, the DHS must inform the American people
of the results and products of its research and development effort.
The psychological effects of weapons of mass destruction may far
outstrip the physical effects. An aggressive information campaign
by the federal government will help educate the American people
and mitigate the psychological effects by taking the terror out of
terrorist acts.
Local emergency management organizations are already
resilient. These organizations have a proud history and reputation
for public service by protecting their fellow citizens in emergency
situations. The new challenge is to build on that heritage and
increase local capabilities to deal with the emergent threat of
weapons of mass destruction. Congress and state legislatures must
fund improvements to the capability of local authorities. Examples of
local level required capabilities are a robust communication system,
first responder protective clothing, agent detectors, and medicines.
Not every capability need be resident in every locality. A mix of
national resources and local capability will strike a balance between
costs and availability. Disaster professionals can stage Federal and
possibly state level, high cost assets needed only in exceptional cases
for rapid transfer when and where needed. Not every locality is
equally threatened. Analysis of the threat may indicate that targets
are likely to be national landmarks or concentrated in large cities. It
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is incumbent on national political leaders to allocate resources in the
most effective manner.
Effective training backed by realistic exercises will tie together
the federal, state, and local emergency management system. The
DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination represents
a signal by senior federal leaders that this is a legitimate concern
and recognized requirement. FEMA has created an extensive
list of courses for state and local emergency managers, and the
integration of the latest technology and recommended procedures
is relatively straightforward. The challenge lies in keeping course
graduates current with recent developments in the field. The state
level emergency managers must play a central role in the continuing
education of their constituent emergency professionals. Beyond
training, exercises are the most effective method to gain experience
and, perhaps more importantly, find lessons learned and develop
best practices. Exercises may span the range from local-only limited
emergencies to national level senior leader strategic simulation.
An example of the latter is the Booz, Allen, Hamilton Port Security
wargame conducted in October 2002. Most critical are exercises
that involve every level of government. The comprehensive and
integrated nature of today’s emergency management systems must
be mirrored in exercises to be truly effective.
Conclusion.
History, tradition, and necessity have established the roles of
the federal, state, and local governments in Integrated Emergency
Management. Disasters and emergencies have frequently tested the
system in real world situations. Whether battling wildfires, dealing
with threatening hurricanes or violent storms, or protecting the
environment from hazardous material, the emergency management
professionals and volunteers at every level of government and
in nongovernment organizations have an enviable record of
achievement. The system is proven and resilient. However, new
challenges will demand even greater levels of performance. The
threat of terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction is a real
possibility and, some would say, an eventuality. Mitigating this risk
through preparedness is the single toughest challenge for national,
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state, and local emergency management professionals.
The federal government has taken a large step with the creation
of the DHS. However, simply eliminating redundant capability
and creating a cleaner organization chart will not, by itself, add
to the security of Americans. Only through creation of a common
culture of dedication, trust, and initiative, based on current technical
knowledge, fueled by sufficient resources and seasoned by realistic
exercises, will the security preparations of the United States
adequately address the challenge. Maintaining public confidence in
the system in the face of an actual attack is critical. There will not be
enough resources to prevent risk. Only through constant education
of the general public and effective training of those responding to
the disaster will government effectively deal with this new and
insidious threat.
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CHAPTER 12
IS THERE SPACE FOR THE OBJECTIVE FORCE?
Colonel Timothy R. Coffin
The ultimate goal of Army Transformation―the Objective Force―
will consist of lighter but highly lethal, mobile, and survivable
formations that arrive in an area of operations ready to fight and
fully synchronized with other elements of the joint Force. Our
successful transformation to the Objective Force will depend to
a great extent on our ability to develop and operationalize new
and improved space-based capabilities. As a space-empowered
force, the Objective Force will routinely exploit the overhead
constellation of national, commercial and military space platforms
for intelligence, focused surveillance, and area reconnaissance;
long-haul communications; early warning of missile attack;
positioning, timing, and navigation; missile defense; and access
to the Global Information Grid… What exactly the Objective
Force will look like is not yet certain. We know it will be a spaceempowered military force able to deliver precisely calibrated
effects, from taking a picture to dropping a precision munition, at
any time and anywhere on Earth.1
Lieutenant General Joseph M. Cosumano, Jr.
The Objective Force is to be more strategically responsive and
dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations
than the Legacy Force. It will provide the Nation an array of
more deployable, more agile, more versatile, more lethal, more
survivable, and more sustainable formations that are affordable
and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering
rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. These capabilities will
enable the Objective Force to win on the offense, to initiate combat
on their terms, to gain and retain the initiative, build momentum
quickly and win decisively.2
General Eric K. Shinseki

The Army has launched itself on a daring trajectory toward
the Objective Force. That force represents an innovative model of
warfare, embracing new information technologies, while leaving
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industrial-age tools behind. It will transform Army forces into
a more lethal and devastating force through the combination of
precision weapons and knowledge-based warfare. Objective Forces
will survive through information dominance, provided by a torrent
of ones and zeros sent from remote sensors and processed by on
board computers. Precision strike and information dominance
represent a quantum leap from brute force legacy systems such as
the M1A1 Abrams tank. The realties of warfare in the 21st century
will relegate the Army’s heavy forces to a more limited set of
missions. As the Army builds the Objective Force, it will attempt
to link systems from “mud to space” in order to create a synergistic
effect between the warrior and the information sphere. Information
will empower the Army’s Objective Forces. Space-based systems
will represent the foundational building blocks for the Objective
Force to achieve information dominance. Satellite communications
will enable knowledge-based battle command on the move. Thus,
the ability to link space-based capabilities to warfighting units in a
timely and relevant manner is critical for Objective Force success.
WHY THE OBJECTIVE FORCE NEEDS SPACE
Why An Objective Force?

The pace towards the Objective Force has stirred up much
controversy. For many, the need for an Objective Force is not
apparent. Their vision of future threats suggests that the status
quo with incremental improvements in legacy weapon systems is
sufficient. They point to successes enjoyed by U.S. forces over the
past decade and to the need for heavy armored forces to counter
threats by potential adversaries. Those advocating a rapid advance
towards the Objective Force have a different view of history and
the future. Led by the Army’s Chief of Staff, they see land power
as a critical tool for the nation’s defense, one now marginalized
because of its inability to address many of the nation’s needs.
Both groups envision the need to master a powerful opponent, but
those advocating the Objective Force seek new and more flexible
approaches.
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To achieve the flexibility required for a more agile and effective
force, the Army’s mass must dramatically change. One can review
the legacy force as a sumo wrestler with tremendous strength, but
requiring a commensurate amount of support and sustenance.
During the 1991 Gulf War, after taking 5 months to deploy, United
States armored divisions crushed Iraqi forces in their path. The
Army’s new vision is more like that of a samurai warrior capable of
rapid, decisive movements. While this samurai may be less than half
the size of the legacy force and looks puny in comparison, enhanced
knowledge and agility will allow him to appear unexpectedly and to
apply the right force to destroy his enemies.
Army transformation plans for space to lift a heavy load for
the Objective Force by using its capabilities to provide intelligence,
navigation, warning, and more. Nowhere is Objective Force success
more dependent than on its ability to network together enabling
information for dominant situational knowledge. This chapter will
address Army satellite communications needs to determine if current
and future space communications can provide the capabilities the
Objective Force requires to succeed. The answer requires analysis of
several major areas where space communications impact Objective
Force capabilities. First, why does the Objective Force need space
to provide the seamless communications required for information
dominance across a distributed battlefield? Second, what exists to
provide the Objective Force information from ground and spacebased sensors for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) as well as the warning required by the Objective Force to
enable the force to see first, understand first, and act first? Third,
where capability shortfalls exist in satellite communications, what
can be done to provide the robust tactical information sphere needed
to support transformational capabilities on future battlefields?
The Army Vision. See First, Understand First, Act First, and
Finish Decisively.
Army Transformation seeks a symbiotic merger between
technology, people, organizations, processes, concepts, and
doctrine in order to create the Objective Force. It aims to knit
together emerging and complementary ways, as if creating a master
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tapestry. With this symbiosis, transformation should result in a
more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and
sustainable force. The Army’s Transformation roadmap calls space
the “key enabler” to provide efficient and lethal Army forces to the
joint force commander.3 A key enabler is similar to key terrain in that
it can provide decisive advantages. Space enablers must provide the
Objective Force with such a decisive advantage. The importance of
such an advantage compels officers to clearly understand the space
linkages and how they interface with Objective Force capabilities.
The need for space capabilities permeates the Objective Force
from the actions required at home before deployment, through rapid
redeployment after a conflict. Following the space cords that weave
through the design of the Objective Force highlights the contributions
expected and required from space-based capabilities. At the most
basic level, the Objective Force requires three things from space to
realize its operational capabilities: (1) weight reduction, resulting in
increases in responsiveness and agility; (2) information dominance
to see first, understand first, and act first; and, (3) control of the space
dimension of the battlefield to ensure dominant space superiority,
when needed.
Space-based systems increase the deployability of the Objective
Force by enabling a dramatic reduction in the force’s mass. The
space segment for most operations is already available and ready to
support worldwide operations. With space forces predeployed, they
are ready to provide key intelligence, communication, navigation,
weather, and missile warning support to entry operations, where no
other infrastructure exists.
Space Impacts All
Objective Force Design Principles
Responsive
Versatile

Deployable
Lethal
Sustainable

Agile
Survivable

Figure 1. Objective Force Design Principles.
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Space is also the most efficient domain for many functions.
For example, land-based communication networks require
retransmission nodes to maintain line of sight across the battlefield.
To overcome such barriers, Army forces seize high ground to
emplace communications and observation nodes and to deny
that advantage to the enemy. Each land-based communications
node requires personnel, equipment, generators, life support, fuel,
resupply, protection, and command and control. At levels above the
deployed force more soldiers and infrastructure have to maintain
the flow of material into theater and push logistic support forward.
Space systems have already captured the high ground. Migrating
Objective Force communication networks to a space enabled
communications architecture eliminates an entire slice of legacy
support forces.
Space systems increase the lethality of the Objective Force
and reduce the number of weapons and munitions required in a
number of ways. Precise knowledge of friendly and enemy forces,
combined with precision weapon systems, represents a devastating
combination. Historically, Army forces have lacked the ability for
precision engagement beyond line of sight. To compensate for the
lack of precision, the Army has often substituted mass. For example,
during the Korean War one artillery battalion fired 14,425 rounds
in a 24-hour period of time. Units found themselves positioning the
guns based on where the rail lines were, instead of where they could
be most effective, in order to allow offloading directly from railcars
to gun positions.4 Space-based knowledge of targets combined with
weapons guided by space-based navigation provide a quantum
reduction in Objective Force mass, while increasing speed.5
Further weight reductions for the Objective Force will occur
through the use of space-based information to dissipate the fog
of war. Carl von Clausewitz coined the term “fog of war” in his
work On War to describe the uncertainties and ambiguities that
characterize the conduct of war at every level. The fog of war has
represented a barrier between the information needed and those
making decisions that impact the battle. Many of the improvements
in military technology underway today represent attempts to reduce
the barriers to a transparent battlefield. Radar represented an effort
to find where enemy ships and planes were and where they might
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strike. Night vision devices, aimed at taking away the fog of night,
and satellites were means to sense enemy actions and hint at his
intentions. In spite of new technology, the fog of war has persisted.
Even with radical improvements in satellite imagery, the use of
night-vision goggles and the Predator, technology cuts through
only some of the fog. Gigabytes and streaming video are no
guarantee that people will learn everything they want to know or
even see the same thing.6

The most deadly day for American forces in Afghanistan serves
as a reminder that fog and friction in war still exist and may be the
decisive factors during volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous
times. When asked, “What happened?” in the incident on March
4, 2002, where seven United States servicemen lost their lives in
combat, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld replied, “We may
never know.”7 High-Tech weapons and state of the art intelligence
failed to merge disparate bits of information required to understand
the battlefield while the events were occurring. While some level of
the fog of war will always persist, there are ways to reduce and deal
with uncertainty.
The traditional way of dealing with uncertainty has been to
bring more people, firepower, and supplies to provide resources to
deal with the unexpected. Unfortunately, deploying more inevitably
slows the force’s responsiveness and agility. If the commander does
not know where or how large the enemy force is, his tendency is to
bring more forces. If he does not know when he will encounter the
enemy, his moves will be cautious, and he will add more armor.
When forces are not sure when the next resupply will occur, they
order more and are reluctant to attack until the ammunition arrives.
American history from the Civil War through to the First Gulf War
is replete with opportunities lost in military campaigns due to such
factors. Space cuts through fog and uncertainty with its systems
that can, at times, reduce the need for mass to mitigate risk and
uncertainty.
Lighter combat systems, empowered by new sources of
information, provide agility and responsiveness to the Objective
Force. A responsive force masters time, distance, and momentum to
meet the challenges of tomorrow’s warfare. Space-based sensors can
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feed the Objective Force’s need for knowledge before deployment
and are key to situational awareness during forced entry and
subsequent operations. Such sensors along with space-based
communications ensure the Objective Force arrives rapidly, fully
synchronized, and ready to fight. Space increases the force’s agility
by providing information for situational understanding and the
means for its dissemination. Space systems that provide information
dominance for combat operations also provide communications
and information support for peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
and humanitarian operations, thus enhancing the Objective Force’s
versatility. Space then plays a major role in enabling the Objective
Force.
DO SPACE COMMUNICATIONS MEET OBJECTIVE FORCE
NEEDS?
“Space to mud” connectivity is more than just a bumper sticker;
it is the reality of the task required for the success of the soldier deep
in the muck of battle. Space to mud must reflect the attitude, practice,
and organization of the Objective Force.8
The Need for Speed―Knowledge Demands Increasing.
The ability to pass information has always been critical to
military forces. Nevertheless, in recent years the demand for data
has exploded. In ancient warfare, messengers carried commands,
and “state of the art” communications was a good runner.
Phidippides’ run from Marathon to Athens in 490 BC to warn the
Athenians of the approaching Persian Navy represents an example
of such communications, limited in both speed and distance. Larger
empires required more efficient means of communications. By 37
AD state of the art for the Romans was a relay system for complex
messages and a wireless digital-optical communications system to
transmit information at the speed of light. This speed of light system
used flashes of light from a polished metal mirror to send coded
messages―a simple forerunner of fiber-optic communications.
Napoleon used a similar system to pass signals from station to
station at a rate of approximately ten signals per minute. This system
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Bits per Second

could relay a single signal from Paris to Calais in about 3 minutes.
The American Civil War saw a dramatic jump in the speed of
communications with the first widespread use of the telegraph. The
most skilled operators could achieve a speed of 42 words per minute,
which would equate to the modern scale of 32 bits per second. By the
end of the Civil War, Grant was using the telegraph to control nearly
a half-a-million soldiers.
World War I saw relatively small changes in the speed of
communications. By World War II the telephone and radio had
dramatically improved voice communication, but the speed of data
transmission had only doubled from in the Civil War. The advent of
computer technology, however, changed everything as is shown by
the logarithmic rate of increase in Figure 2. By the Gulf War, single
data circuits were transmitting data as fast as 256,000 Bits (Kbs) per
second, an increase of more than 3,600 times in only 40 years.

Figure 2. Increase in Data Rates.
The need for speed has continued and bandwidth9 requirements
continue to rise. Recent conflicts have demonstrated the need
for circuit data rates in combat areas with 1.5 megabits. During
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
consumed as much as 48 Million Bits (Mbs) of bandwidth per
aircraft. Put in perspective, the amount of bandwidth consumed
by a single Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, was half the bandwidth used
during the Gulf War to support 500,000 troops. At the height of the
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war in Afghanistan, a force one-tenth of the size of the DESERT
STORM force used 600 percent more bandwidth. This increase in a
single decade equates to 6,000 percent, when adjusted for the size of
force employed.10 The increase in data flow provides key information
to legacy forces, but only begins to hint at the demands an Objective
Force will place on communications systems.

Figure 3. Bandwidth Increase between 1991-2002.
Not only has the amount of data exploded, but the number
of sites that need data has multiplied as well. During the Civil
War only commanders of armies and corps required long-range
communications to conduct military operations. In contrast, the
Objective Force requires that individual combat platforms and
soldiers have a high level of access to digital data immediately upon
entry into the battle space. These formations will fight in a more
dispersed fashion than ever before. The highly mobile platforms of
the Objective Force will require digital terrain products to provide
soldiers the knowledge of how to mask and transit the terrain
without exposure to hostile fires. While providing critical protection,
the same attributes that make this force faster, more survivable,
and lethal, also make it more difficult to communicate with other
Army entities in the force. Future forces will transmit and receive
information through a worldwide supporting communications
infrastructure known as the Global Information Grid. If disconnected
from the Global Information Grid (GIG), Objective Force elements
lose connectivity with long-range sensors as well as the enabling
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information and knowledge pushed from reach-back centers located
far from the conflict. Disconnected units will lose their ability to see
enemy forces and identify friendly forces. The result will be a force
more vulnerable to attack as well as an increased vulnerability for
friendly-fire incidents. In many cases, these forces must access spacebased communications, when unable to connect with terrestrial line
of sight communications systems.
Objective Force Concept.
The Objective Force units designed to close with and engage
enemy forces are Units of Action (UofA).11 Such brigade size units
are capable of conducting full-spectrum military operations. The
Objective Force concept calls for forces to be ready for operations
on arrival in the area of operations and to maintain information
dominance while on the move. UofA soldiers will possess a family of
innovative platforms collectively called the Future Combat System.
To reach its operational capabilities, the Future Combat System and
other systems in the UofA must function as a networked system
of systems and create high capacity mobile ad hoc networks with
antijam and low probability of detection while forces are moving.
Such a mobile network requires large increases in bandwidth in
comparison to the paucity of the spectrum available now to Army
forces, especially to units at brigade level and below.
FCS Communications, the enabler for FCS at large, is likely to
be critically dependent on the use of airborne (and space-borne)
assets due to limited LOS connectivity in complex terrain and
foliage. . . . Terrestrial communications alone will not be adequate
to support FCS; airborne and SATCOM networks will have to
become critical parts of the FCS system, rather than “opportunistic
luxuries.”12

The Objective Force will depend on space-based communications
before it deploys until it returns to home station. After alert, Objective
Force units at home station connect to the GIG via high bandwidth fiber
optic connections to obtain situational awareness and intelligence.
Space-based sensors provide near real time imagery, intelligence,
and geospatial information about the area of interest and the area
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of operations. This information is relayed to commanders and staff
by transmitting sensor data from space through ground relays to
support operational planning. Large satellite dishes at fixed locations
linked to fiber optic backbones maximize the throughput of spacebased data. While this communications architecture supports much
of today’s home station needs, it will require continued upgrades to
support the Objective Force’s deployment. Once the Objective Force
unit begins deployment, space-based communications will link
sensors, networks, and operational units in order to facilitate the
transfer of knowledge to enroute forces. That capability will allow
the commander to communicate and adapt to changing situations
in the objective area. Once the Objective Force has entered into the
area of operations, it begins to employ organic sensors to augment
the space-based capabilities which enabled its entry. Today, once
army units deploy and are in motion, their ability to receive high
bandwidth communications remains limited. The next section will
delineate military communications capabilities.
MILSATCOM.
Military satellite communications currently reside in three major
bands: Ultra High Frequency (UHF), Super High Frequency (SHF),
and Extremely High Frequency (EHF). Each frequency has unique
characteristics that suit them for different missions.13
UHF Communications. The U.S. Navy operates the UHF
constellation of satellites and provides the primary support to
mobile users. The Navy initially developed UHF communications
and launched the first generation of spacecraft called FLEETSAT to
support naval aircraft, ships, and submarines. The current generation
of satellites on orbit is called UHF Follow On (UFO). UHF signals
broadcast from such satellites penetrate weather, foliage, and other
materials such as reinforced concrete. Units can receive their signals
using relatively low-cost lightweight radios with omni-directional
antennas. These characteristics make UHF highly suited for mobile
operations. The drawbacks to UHF lie in the fact that it provides
low data rates in comparison to current needs, while the spacecraft
require large antennas with significant power. These systems
typically support data rates less than 16 Kbs. UHF communications
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are also relatively easy to jam.14
The Navy operates a fleet of UHF satellites that augment line of
sight radio systems and provide the long-range point-to-point voice
communications with low data rate connectivity that is critical in
extended operations. Each of these geosynchronous15 60-foot long
satellites has a total of 39 channels with a combined bandwidth of
555kHz.16 Each theater of operations normally has two UHF satellites
in sight. If the theater is not sharing satellites with other combatant
commanders and assuming both satellites are fully operational, there
would be 78 channels supporting a theater with a maximum total
UHF capacity of 1.1 Mbs. In actual use the capacity of the satellites
is reduced because channels dedicated to voice circuits optimize
command and control voice communications instead of data
throughput.17 In addition to supporting the Joint Force Commander,
the constellation provides support to the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marines, Special Operations Forces, State Department, National
Agencies and Presidential Communications to the theater.
Admiral Dennis Blair described the UHF situation in his theater
in his testimony before Congress in the following terms: “. . . limited
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) SATCOM capacity over this AOR (area
of responsibility), is fast becoming a factor in my ability to command
and control forces. . . . SATCOM connectivity to our highly
specialized forces is more critical than ever before.”18
Super High Frequency (SHF) Communications. SHF communications are today’s SATELLITE COMMUNICATION
workhorses for the Department of Defense (DoD). The Army operates
the payload on these satellite systems, which constitute the Defense
Satellite Communications System (DSCS). The five primary satellites
located in figure four provide global coverage with high capacity
SHF communications. A single DSCS III satellite provides nearly as
much communications capacity as the entire constellation of UHF
satellites. The first DSCS satellite, launched in June 1966 weighed
only 100 pounds and could relay only one voice, or data channel.
Only generation II and III DSCS satellites are operational today. The
first of the current generation of DSCS III satellites was launched in
1982, while the newest DSCS satellite, launched on March 10, 2003,
weighs over 60 times the weight (6,025 lbs.) of its predecessor. The
most recent satellite to launch, manufactured in 1978, as a ground
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test satellite was refurbished twice (most recently in 1995) to update
its capacity before its launch into space.19 While this satellite provides
capabilities indispensable to the health of the constellation, the DSCS
III is virtually unchanged by the needs of transformation from its
Cold War design. SHF systems nonetheless are critical to Army
forces due to their higher capacity. Disadvantages of SHF systems
include their higher cost and their need for larger ground antennas
to maximize data throughput.20

Figure 4. DSCS Prime Satellite Locations.
Antenna size is a major factor influencing data throughput in
satellite communication systems. To maximize the capacity of the
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) constellation,
primary earth stations have antennas as large as sixty feet in diameter
that are anchored in huge concrete footings for stability. When the
user is unable to use an optimally sized antenna, the amount of data
it is able to receive decreases. For example, a DSCS receiver with a
4-foot diameter dish would receive 256 Kbps, while a 7-foot antenna
would have seven-fold increase to 1.7 Mbps from the same satellite
signal strength. Conversely a vehicle-sized 18-inch antenna would
only receive a 64 Kbs data stream from the same radiated power
from the satellite.21 Increasing the power of the signal from the
satellite and using larger antennas on the space segment can provide
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additional gain to overcome some of the data rate problems mobile
users experience, but such solutions have drawbacks as well. Larger
satellite antennas are extremely costly and complex structures
that increase the cost and risk associated with the satellite launch.
Increasing satellite broadcast power for users with small antennas
decreases the power available to support other users.
Relative Capacity of UHF and EHF Satellites

Figure 5. Relative Capacities of SATCOM Bands
UHF, SHF, and EHF.
EHF Communications. EHF communications were originally
developed to transmit Emergency Action Messages (EAM) and
voice instructions for command and control of nuclear weapons.
These preformatted messages did not require a high data rate, so
that a maximum data rate of 2.4 kbs was selected.22 This small trickle
of data is mixed with a flood of up to 40 Mbs of data generated from
a secure cipher, which is so complex that the pattern will not repeat
itself for hundreds of years. The resulting transmission is a complex
waveform resistant to jamming and interruption. While this is
highly desirable for nuclear command and control, it represents a
very inefficient use of the spectrum to transmit large amounts of
data. While the two original satellites only supported low data rate
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transmissions (75 bps-2,400 bps), the final four were constructed
with a medium-data rate package that supports T1 size channels
(1.54 Mbps).23 Three of the four satellites achieved orbit on launch
and are currently supporting military operations, but MILSTAR-2 F1
was placed in a useless orbit during its launch in April 1999,24 leaving
the constellation significantly short of its anticipated capacity. EHF
communications represent the area with the most growth potential
for Army Objective Force operations due to the high data capacity
and smaller antenna sizes. EHF communications are not without
their drawbacks. EHF systems require high levels of technical
sophistication, are costly and more affected than lower frequencies
are by rain fade, which can disrupt communications during periods
of heavy rain or dust storms.25 Figures 6 and 7 provide a relative
comparison of the three spectrum military satellites operate in.

Figure 6. Differences in SATCOM Bands.
Commercial SATCOM.
When military satellite communications are unable to meet the
demands of a crisis, DoD turns to commercial communications
providers to fill the void. While fiber optic communications have
rapidly linked the digital infrastructure in the United States and
even stretched to major installations overseas, they have little utility
in reaching the last leg of the journey to soldiers and their combat
systems. Commercial satellites provide critical augmentation
to push data to forward bases and command and control hubs.
When available, most wide band commercial communications can
integrate into forward airfields and base camps to augment military
349

communications. These arrangements are generally costly as DoD
must purchase hardware, software, technical support, maintenance,
and satellite time to create a functioning communications pipeline.
To ensure success of commercial satellite business ventures
investors normally require customer contracts before the satellite is
built and launched. Businesses launch few commercial satellites on
a speculative investment model that leaves large amounts of unused
bandwidth for sale. In most cases this leaves insufficient commercial

Small Slice of Frequency Allocation Where GPS Resides
GPS

Figure 7. The Crowded Frequency Spectrum.
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capacity available on the spot market for short-term lease to meet
military’s surge requirements and longer-term shortfalls. That is not
to say that commercial systems have not provided critical support to
military operations.
Operations DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE, and ENDURING
FREEDOM all turned to commercial providers for significant
levels of support, when the theater of operation had little ground
infrastructure and military systems were fully utilized. In support of
ALLIED FORCE, the Department spent over $20 million to augment
satellite communications for the 87-day conflict. Forces supporting
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM needed 567 megabits per second
of satellite communications. Military satellites provided only 35
percent of the satellite communications needs, while commercial
sources provided 65 percent.26 With luck (that spare bandwidth
was available) and at considerable cost, the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) secured the bandwidth and over time, all
of the hardware, training, and integration engineering needed to
meet the minimum needs of U.S. forces was in place. In addition to
the cost, the use of commercial satellite communication resulted in a
significant delay required for procurement, training, and integration
of commercial systems, which were unfamiliar to the deployed
force. Soldiers fortunate enough to have Iridium phones relayed
information through units in the United States to pass messages
back to their higher headquarters, when unable to make critical
connections through dedicated DoD systems. Units that purchased
laptop-size commercial satellite communication terminals from
International Maritime Satellite Corporation (INMARSAT) could
connect at speeds up to 64Kbs to transmit orders, download small
data files, and slowly transmit imagery.
Commercial systems play a supporting role in military
communications, but have too many shortfalls to provide support to
key warfighting functions. Commercial systems are not designed to
support military operations. Satellites and ground equipment are not
universally compatible so that the equipment used on one operation
may or may not work for the next operation. Satellites are not
designed to support encryption and lack hardening and the ability
to detect enemy physical, electronic or cyber attacks. No existing
commercial systems can provide the data levels, security, global
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coverage, user terminals, and compatibility required for mobile
command of Objective Force units. Commercial augmentation can
provide support to the stationary enabling forces in support of major
contingency areas, if multiyear leases are negotiated which address
the full range of support issues that commercial augmentation
brings.
Spectrum.
Radio spectrum is a finite resource, regulated under international
law and by a United Nations body called the International Telegraphic
Union (ITU).27 Within the United States the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) controls frequency allocation.28 In recent years,
significant portions of the bandwidth used by the military have come
under attack from private industry seeking additional frequencies
for commercial activities. Attempts to reallocate military frequencies
to commercial sectors undoubtedly will become more aggressive,
as competition for this finite resource becomes more intense in an
information based economy. Today a United States Army heavy
division already has over 10,700 individual emitters that use a
portion of the frequency spectrum.29 Loss of frequency spectrum can
seriously hinder military capabilities and cost billions of dollars to
shift existing systems to other frequencies.30
The frequency bands supporting ground forces today provide
insufficient capability to transmit the large amounts of data over the
distances and terrain needed by the Objective Force. The majority of
communications systems currently resident in the division operate in
the Very High Frequency (VHF) and UHF portions of the spectrum
(30-2500 MHz) and deliver primarily voice communication and
some data exchange. VHF supports line of sight radios that have
worked well for command and control of units operating in close
proximity. However, the requirement to concentrate forces to enable
communication does not fit the Objective Force Concept. Existing
frequencies used at division and below provide the capacity for
limited data exchange and verbal command and control, while
providing good penetration of many of the environmental conditions
commonly found on the battlefield like rain smoke and foliage. These
frequencies also operate with relatively small antennas and radios,
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which are important for mobile ground forces.
Today’s SATCOM Cannot Meet the Vision for Tomorrow.
Communications Shortfalls. Shortfalls in communications
capability continue to rise in spite of increasing capacity on
MILSATCOM systems with each new generation launched. The
most recent data point in 2002 showed that military satellite
communications satisfied only 35 percent of the satellite
communications needs for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.31 By
2010 the first Objective Force units with enhanced battlefield sensors
will be collecting orders of magnitude more data to provide greater
fidelity, which will in turn require larger communication capacity.
An example from the commercial world of space imaging helps
illustrate the magnitude of the problem, compounded in national
satellite systems by higher resolution and larger data files.
To receive a single black and white photograph from space by
the commercial imaging system QuickBird requires 1,600 Mb of
data.32 While the black and white photo is useful to the warfighter,
viewing the same scene in hundreds or thousands of bands
with hyper-spectral sensors enables the warfighter to identify
camouflage, decoys, chemical agents, locations where the earth has
been disturbed, and much more. A hyper-spectral imager collects
the same amount of data for each band imaged, as was collected for
the black and white image, so a one-thousand band imager would
need to transmit 1.6 Terabits of information for the same point on
the ground.33
As Objective Force units deploy, they require continuous highbandwidth communications enroute to update threat information
and continue collaborative planning. Accurate data from spacebased sensors provide Objective Forces the agility to land out of
contact with the enemy and move directly into offensive operations.
Few deployment platforms possess the long-range communications
to support the deploying force. Mobile platforms currently equipped
with satellite communication are most likely to be equipped with
UHF satellite communications, if they have satellite communication
capability at all. The scarcity of available channels and the low data
rate of UHF make this existing capability an unlikely solution for the
Objective Force.
353

Contrast the 16Kbs data rate in an existing UHF link to the data
output from a single Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle, able
to communicate at 274 Mbs and expected to consume 1 Gigabyte of
bandwidth by 2010.34 Already the requirements for bandwidth are
huge. “During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Global Hawk
consumed five times the total bandwidth used by the entire United
States military in the Gulf War.”35 Objective Force units are not only
constrained by the total satellite communication system capacity,
but within the available bandwidth, they must compete with the
growing requirements of other services and governmental agencies.
Within an area of operations, the Combatant Commander uses his
Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer
Systems (J6) and the Regional Satellite Support Center (RSSC) to
allocate his apportioned bandwidth in accordance with theater
priorities and requests augmentation through the Joint Staff for
critical shortages. The Joint Staff may allocate additional resources
by taking bandwidth from other theaters or by directing the DSIA
to attempt procurement of additional spectrum from commercial
sources. In some situations Combatant Commanders have to choose
between systems, capabilities, and coverage areas, when insufficient
bandwidth exists for simultaneous operations.
Current needs for space-based communications are increasing
faster than the capability to provide satellite communication. The
Combatant Commander of Pacific Command noted in Congressional
testimony that “New platforms are producing an increasing flow of
data, but our ability to exploit this data has not kept pace.” He then
went on to site “insufficient communications” as one of the key
shortfalls.36 These “bit rate” shortfalls to the ground combat soldier
have a direct correlation with the ability to maintain sufficient
information dominance to keep our forces alive. For example, some
friendly force losses in Afghanistan may have been avoided if the
capability existed to fuse, process, and transmit information already
in hand to the point on the battlefield where the knowledge would
make a difference.37
For the Objective Force to maintain information dominance, data,
and, more importantly, knowledge, throughput to the deploying
force must increase. Information must be processed, synthesized,
and forwarded in real time. Smart sensors must know where to probe
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and intelligent systems must be able to extract critical information
and forward the data in a compressed format. The solution to these
problems will require a combination of increased capability, smarter
processing, and appetite suppression. Today, systems collect much
more information than they process, and they process more than
they make available to the tactical commander. Deploying Objective
Force units will not only need to reach forward to maintain
situational awareness of the operational environment, but will also
require simultaneous reach-back to supporting analysis structures at
its deployment base. An increase in wideband capability is necessary
for truly seamless information flow during the transition from home
station through deployment.
Dealing with Reality.
Current satellite communication capabilities cannot meet
the evolving Objective Force demands. A rough estimate of an
individual Future Combat Systems (FCS) communications needs
underlines the inability to provide sufficient data to Objective Force
units on the move with today’s systems.38 Vehicles separated from
line of sight communications have a host of data needs like those
shown in Table 1 that are best satisfied through overhead systems.
This data requirement alone requires 1,000Kbs circuits, while the
primary capability to provide mobile data comes from UHF systems
at 16Kbs.
The leap from today’s Army to the desired Objective Force
communication capabilities appears to be beyond the grasp of the
initial effort. The concept for the Objective Force Unit of Action
calls for the integration of communications capabilities into Future
Combat System Vehicles and its soldiers to eliminate dedicated
signal systems and associate personnel. The October 2002 Objective
Force draft approved for planning reflects a recognition that current
technology and communications capabilities cannot provide
wideband satellite communication on the move in time for the
Block 1 fielding of the Future Combat System. As a replacement
for wideband satellite communication on the move, the Unit of
Action plan grew by 48 personnel, 15 vehicles, 5 robotic vehicles,
and associated equipment.39 The addition of this signal company
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Figure 8. Combat Vehicle Cumulative Data Needs.
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Table 1. Objective Force Future Combat System Data Needs.

356

increases the logistic support required for the Unit of Action
(including medics, mechanics, fuel, food and water consumption,
etc.) and ultimately requires more airlift, while creating a drag on
its deployability and agility in the field. This initial Block I Objective
Force has a marked improvement in information capabilities, but
remains a far cry from the capabilities described in the Army Chief
of Staff’s vision.
Mud To Space: Complex Solutions For Complex Problems.
Solving the Objective Force information needs at the warfighter
level requires visionary solutions unaffected by the cultures and
biases of today’s organizations and programmatics. Solutions to this
challenge are expensive, require changes that cut across traditional
areas of responsibility, and require technologies that continue
to change at a breathtaking pace. But this should not come as a
surprise. Acquisition strategies must plan for technology insertion,
upgrades, and programmed replacements, while executing best
value purchasing policies. There is no single solution or program
office that can meet the Army’s needs. Some of the solutions will
come from the joint environment, while others must come from
other agencies. For solutions to work, they must comprehensively
address changes throughout the network of architectures that create
the system. These changes should start at the birth of data, where it
is first collected and continue to the purging or archiving of the data,
when the warfighters needs are satisfied. In addition to addressing
changes to the data itself, the systems of hardware, software,
formats, linkages, and human interfaces of the architectures must be
addressed as well.
DATA LEVEL SOLUTIONS―REDUCING DEMAND AND
ENABLING DATA INTERCHANGE
At the point of data creation the Objective Force needs a
strong set of standards and formats in order to enable rapid data
interchange between network components. An unattended ground
sensor should be able to pass its data directly to weapons platforms
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from any service without concerns about programming language,
data elements, or measurement standards. Strong enforcement
of standards across DoD will simplify network development and
data interchange. The National Space Security Architect established
a long-range plan as an outgrowth of its Mission Information
Management (MIM) Information Management Architecture (IMA)
study to bring data generating systems into a standard architecture
that would result not only in synergistic effects, but long-term cost
savings as well.40 The major problem with this plan is that it lacks a
powerful governing board to arbitrate changes to the standards, or
an enforcement mechanism to keep programs in compliance.
Once collected, data must be transmitted. Currently there is
little incentive for program developers to develop systems that
preprocess data before transmission to reduce the amount of data.
Program developers largely focus on their program or sensor cost
and not on the network-wide costs or tradeoffs, which could result
in a cascading of costs to the greater system. Incentives must exist
in program management to minimize the data stream from the
hundreds of battlefield sensors. Compression techniques or target
recognition software must use critical information requirements to
filter data collected and only forward data of interest for further
processing. Total end-to-end understanding and control of the
system being developed would enable such management decisions
and acquisition trades.
TERMINAL SOLUTIONS―PLATFORM INTEGRATION
Soldier Systems.
At the soldier’s level, the communications architecture should
work for the soldier and integrate easily into each task. The Army
has recognized the need for wireless high data rate communications
in vehicles and for wearable soldier systems. Its Short-Range High
Data Rate Wireless Communications solicitation seeks bids to
develop a wireless 100-megabyte per second network to connect
dismounted soldiers to their vehicle networks and to each other over
short distances.41 This network allows soldiers conducting operations
outside their vehicles to access onboard knowledge systems and use
the higher power communications systems on the vehicle to pass
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images, targets and threat data to and from the network.
Objective Force soldiers need a personal communications device
that stays with them at all times. During Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM, U.S. soldiers dragged around large bulky radios with
limited ranges, while Al Qaeda members purchased satellite cell
phones to connected with one of the most powerful communications
satellite on orbit. Such phones are no larger than the typical discount
cellular phone sold in this country, but can connect directly with other
phones without going through the cellular system. When outside
of direct contact with the number dialed the phones automatically
connect with the local cellular service. When no cellular service is
available the phones connect directly to a satellite to route the call.
The lead in technology innovation and application should not rest
with our adversaries. If every DoD member possessed such devices,
the individual handset cost would dramatically decline. Making
these phones a part of everyday duties would enable rapid recall
of soldiers, facilitate daily operations, increase safety, and eliminate
millions of dollars in current cell phone contracts. Off-duty personal
calls could be encouraged, with calls charged directly to the soldiers
pay account at a nominal rate to help persuade soldiers to keep the
device available at all times. Building pager and Global Positioning
System devices in the phone could solve blue force tracking issues
by providing the location of each soldier on the battlefield.42 A builtin pager could provide missile warning to those in the threat fan or
chemical warning to those in a downwind pattern.
Vehicle Systems.
Meeting the needs of Objective Force combat vehicle
communications represents a more difficult problem requiring
multi-band solutions with smart processing software. Objective
Force Future Combat Systems rolling off transport aircraft and
sealift must arrive connected to a GIG and sensor network with full
awareness of the tactical and operational situation. While in transit
to the area of operations, combat systems must update and pass data
across a network compatible with the transport aircraft. Conformal
antennas on the aircraft surface could provide connectivity enroute.
Future Combat Systems must have self-organizing and self-healing
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communication networks, which transfer data from peer to peer when
line of sight links are available and automatically search for earth,
air, and space links when other vehicles are out of sight. Conformal
phased array antennas with no moving parts, electronically steered
while on the move, provide the ability to switch seamlessly between
data sources.43 The Joint Tactical Radio System and Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical are two challenging new programs
working to design and build the hardware needed to support some
of these Objective Force needs.
BANDWIDTH SOLUTIONS―MAXIMIZING DATA PIPES TO
GET THE MESSAGE THROUGH
Internet Protocol and Packet Data.
Currently, most military communications use dedicated
communications pipes, which will become unsupportable in the
future due to their inefficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Objective Force Communications must transition most of these
systems to a smart Internet Protocol (IP) based network to allow data
to be sent as packets similar to Internet traffic.44 This packet approach
enables each communications pipeline to service many users and
allows the throughput of the channel to be maximized. Large
packetized data files are sent over multiple streams for reassembly at
destination. Encrypted packets must provide multilevel security and
smart dithering of data. Automatic dithering reduces the amount
of data passed to minimum essential elements, when the network
capability is restricted. This allows for the graceful degradation of
the system when communications nodes are operating at reduced
capability or blocked. Multi-band radios like the Joint Tactical Radio
System will provide seamless switching between jammed and open
channels. Smart dithering and prioritization of the data streams
ensure that the most critical data can always get through. This
thinning of the data becomes critical when units are on the move or
during periods of bad weather. A future combat system traveling
down a road in Bosnia could link to an EHF satellite to enable large
data transfers. As it starts to rain, EHF communications dramatically
drop off, and, as the vehicle passes into a wooded section of the
360

road, the EHF signal is lost. As the primary signal fades, the onboard
communications would automatically select a different satellite or
use the strongest of the remaining signals and continue the download
of critical packets. In this case, UHF communications, with their rain
penetrating characteristics, continue to transmit critical information
at a much reduced data rate. The systems above would prioritize
data including threats and warnings to friendly forces first.
Frequency Reuse.
The electromagnetic spectrum is key terrain for the Objective
Force. Maximizing the use of available bandwidth in the spectrum
can provide a marked advantage to the Future Combat System
when sufficient information is passed to meet the combat needs.
Unfortunately, the requirements on this fixed number of radio
frequencies continue to rise, while the available frequencies remain
fixed by the laws of physics. Given that no additional spectrum
can be created, the need for communications must be filled by
using available frequencies more efficiently and more creatively.
Frequency reuse multiplies bandwidth by using the same frequency
multiple times. Normally two satellite radios can not use the same
frequency, or they would cause interference and jam each other’s
signal. Satellite antennas that focus on a small area called a “cell”
disregard similar frequencies coming from adjacent cells, allowing
the frequency to be reused in every cell created. Figure 9 includes
an example of four frequencies being reused in multiple cells to
maximize the use of the available bandwidth. Each frequency is
used only once within a cell and is kept separate from other users
on the same frequency by the cellular pattern. Some of the newest
commercial satellites already use this technology to serve a larger
subscriber base.45
Commercial Bandwidth.
One way to deal with the lack of spectrum is to buy satellite time
from commercial providers. Commercial satellite communications
are more helpful in providing links to fixed command and control
sites like the one U.S. military forces established at the Kandahar
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Figure 9. Multiple Look Angles and Frequency Reuse.
airport in Afghanistan. This is due to several reasons. Most
commercial satellite systems are designed to support fixed locations
rather than highly mobile users and do not have the capability to
deal with challenges mobile users present. Other problems with
commercial systems include their lack of hardening from attack,
difficulty in dealing with military encryption systems, and their
need for hardware separate from that fielded to military forces.46 In
addition to these problems, there is no assurance that commercial
providers will have capacity available to sell.47 Taking several
proactive steps will mitigate these difficulties and enable commercial
communications to provide part of the answer.
Instead of relying on the communications spot market, the DISA
should purchase large blocks of frequency in areas where military
operations are likely. DISA can negotiate long-term contracts at
much lower rates to ensure communications are available when
needed. These contracted commercial satellites can provide much of
the communications needed for large headquarters and fixed sites
which are not served by fiber connections, thus leaving the military
satellites for mobile users. Agreements with commercial providers
for back up satellite command and control and satellite hardening
requirements would provide greater assurance of availability in times
of conflict. Working closely with commercial providers may enable
the military to add dedicated transponders to commercial satellites,
which have available power and space onboard the satellite bus.
These additional assets could provide redundancy and robustness to
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the overall constellation with relatively small costs. The addition of
cross-linking capabilities to new commercial satellites would enable
these commercial satellites to integrate into the global network
to provide more direct support. More importantly, new military
terminals must be built with the ability to receive and transmit on
commercial frequencies, so that new radios are not required when
the Army can augment its capabilities with commercial spectrum.
SATELLITE SOLUTIONS AND SURROGATES
Satellite Design.
At the space end of the communications problem, satellites and
satellite constellations must be designed to support the operational
needs. Satellites need onboard processors to support network
management and routing of packetized data. Such satellites would
become a space-based network computer server to push the right
packets to the right users on the right frequencies to maximize
throughput and ensure delivery. Satellites themselves must be crosslinked to form a self-managing network that reroutes traffic to avoid
congestion and blockages of the communications signal. A spacebased communications backbone could create a nearly limitless
data pipeline, using laser communications to increase bandwidth
within the network. Laser links could transmit data packets
between satellites for transmission to the ground using traditional
frequencies, and link high altitude aircraft and airships with laser
signals. Satellites must be built to maximize the number of narrow
spot beams. Spot beams increase the signal power to the user, reduce
jamming threats, and allow multiple users who are geographically
separated to use the same frequency without interference, virtually
multiplying the usable bandwidth by the number of spot beams.
Flying multiband satellites would enable ground, sea, and air-based
equipment with stabilized antenna systems to seamlessly switch on
the move from one band to the next without having to search for and
reacquire a lock on another satellite.
Multiband satellites can be single large satellites or merely
appear as a single satellite by flying clusters of micro satellites in a
precision orbit. Giant antennas in space, larger than a football field,
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would enable smaller low-power hand-held and wearable devices
to communicate via space. These complex antenna structures could
be assembled and mated in space at the International Space Station,
thus reducing the costs and risks involved with deploying the
intricate engineering structures robotically. Future satellites should
be designed for on orbit repair and upgrade. Micro satellites could
repair and refuel these large investments in national infrastructure,
similar to the way the Hubble Telescope has been repaired and
upgraded, using astronauts from the space shuttle. Geosynchronous
satellites provide limited coverage for mobile users at high latitudes,
in urban canyons, and in complex terrain due to the need of the
vehicles antenna to be able to see the satellite. One way to overcome
this “look angle” problem is to augment the geosynchronous
network with a robust low or medium earth orbit constellation that
can provide the high look angles needed to ensure data delivery. 48
Because these satellites are closer to the earth, they can transmit
more powerful signals to ground receivers and receive weaker low
power signals in return. In addition to power benefits these closer
satellites can reuse the frequency spectrum as was described in the
spot beam characteristics above. To track these satellites moving at
17,000 miles per hour, vehicle antenna systems must be extremely
agile and ideally would consist of phased arrays, electronically
steered to compensate for vehicle movement. Space systems can be
augmented by high altitude systems which appear as satellites from
the ground force prospective.
Pseudo Satellites.
Complementing the space segment of the communications
network with a suite of high altitude platforms would contribute to
the robustness of the communications architecture. One of the most
promising platforms is the High Altitude Airship. This rigid blimplike craft more than two football fields in length would operate at
altitudes over 70,000 feet for one or two years before returning to
home station. From a communication terminal’s perspective, the
airship would appear as a stationary satellite with the advantage
that the airship could be placed where needed over a theater of
operations without the limitations of orbital mechanics. Another
advantage of the High Altitude Airship is that it can return to earth
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for repair or upgrade. Data needed by the Future Combat System
would be beamed by laser from satellites to receivers on the top of
the High Altitude Airship, which would convert the data to UHF,
SHF, and EHF packages for delivery to vehicles on the ground. This
hybrid space/high-altitude design provides several advantages. It
increases the number of look angles and would allow the user to
get data blocked by terrain, vegetation, or buildings. Airships or
other high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles can be positioned at
any point over the battlefield that can be protected and can carry
additional sensors to support Objective Forces. Most importantly,
pseudo-satellites also have the capability to multiply bandwidth
available to the warfighter through frequency reuse as part of a
robust system of systems to meet Objective Force needs.
CONCLUSION
The capacity to produce relevant knowledge will meter the tempo
of theater operations. I believe the difficulty of gathering the
information needed for high tempo, large scale, multidimensional
and noncontiguous operations is largely underestimated…If
Army units are to fight off the ramp, they must have situational
understanding off the ramp. I suspect that there is an important
delta between the capability projected to be available by 2015 and
that which will be required… If our concepts depend on purpose
oriented networks and knowledge enabled organizations, we
must invest in the communications that will enable them.49

The Objective Force Concept is a visionary change in future
ground combat operations. When the vision comes to fruition, it
will provide a critical capability to the United States as it seeks to
ensure peace and security in a changing world. Pivotal to the forces’
effectiveness are the space enablers to tie together fast moving agile
forces, dispersed across the battlefield. Of the space enablers, satellite
communications play an essential role in information dominance
and success. However, existing satellite communications systems
designed and built for Cold War needs are woefully inadequate
for high technology digital warfare, while ground-based systems
cannot support the mobility, agility, and speed expected of these
forces. The growth of communications requirements needed to
support Future Combat Systems and the Objective Force requires
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complex multiechelon solutions, with fundamental changes from
the smallest data bit to the largest satellite 22,300 miles in space.
Solutions will not be easy or cheap, but require a strong hand to
ensure the multiple acquisition systems, doctrine, and requirements
processes synchronize in support of a clear objective.
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CHAPTER 13
EXPANDING NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:
DOD IMPERATIVES IN THE AFTERMATH OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton B. Reid, Jr.
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared
that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence
indicates they are doing so with determination. The United States
will not allow these effort to succeed. . . . History will judge
harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the
new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security
is the path of action.
President Bush
Report on the National Security Strategy
September 17, 2002

Senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of
Defense (DoD) routinely make difficult choices in the application of
resources appropriated by Congress. Of necessity, military leaders
structure forces to accomplish national security tasks across a wide
spectrum of conflict in concert with other executive departments,
Congress, and international bodies such as the United Nations
(U.N.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But
first, each activity must survive DoD’s force management process.
The On-Site Inspection Directorate of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, once the darlings of the Reagan-Bush administrations, now
confronts the same scrutiny imposed on other agencies and services,
as decision makers trade spaces and programs to transform DoD.
Fortunately, the Secretary of Defense’s emphasis on capabilities
force management provides the framework within which to develop
concepts and missions and structure forces to implement arms
control. Recent events, as well as President George W. Bush’s Report
on the National Security Strategy, point to weapons of mass destruction
as the major threat to U.S. national security, especially if they are in
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the hands of terrorists or rogue states.1 Thus, the existence of nuclear
stockpiles in the former Soviet Union (FSU), nuclear testing by India
and Pakistan, North Korea’s recent violation of the 1994 Agreed
Framework, Iran’s declaration of its intent to control the entire fuel
cycle, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inability to monitor
covert nuclear programs in Iraq and North Korea, and growing
concerns over the control and protection of fissile materials impose a
capability requirement on DoD. The questions then are:
• How will nuclear arms control look in the future as defined
by international trends, “Joint Vision 2020,” the latest
“Quadrennial Defense Review,” the most recent statement of
the National Security Strategy, and the first-ever “National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction”?
• What capabilities does the United States require and which
of those should reside in DoD, the Department of Energy,
the Department of State, or international bodies such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency?
• Which personnel need to be civilian, military, or contracted?
• How should the Department organize and train U.S. military
forces to accomplish required weapons of mass destruction
inspection missions?
The answers to the above questions must lead to an executable
concept within the framework of doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities of the
Joint Vision Implementation Plan, and must determine the Army’s
contribution to this crucial defense activity. This chapter restricts
its examination of the Army’s role to the Nuclear and Cooperative
Threat Reduction Branch of the On-Site Inspection Directorate.
However, the methodology is applicable to the structuring of forces
to control all weapons of mass destruction. DoD must revisit the onsite inspection paradigm, retain what has worked in the past and still
applies, discard what is no longer relevant, and add new elements
necessary to address new challenges, threats, and opportunities.
Thus, building upon past successes and adapting to encompass a
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dynamic threat environment, the Department can provide a unique
capability in advancing U.S. interests in this vital area.
THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT FOR WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s created a highly
unstable security environment shaped largely by regional instability
in the Balkans, South West Asia, and Africa. President George W.
Bush, in his 2002 State of the Union address, further identified Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea as “the world’s most dangerous proliferators”
of weapons of mass destruction: “States like these and their terrorist
allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the
world.”2
In so doing, Bush established that the chief threats to America’s
security were rogue and nonstate actors, seeking to acquire
weapons of mass destruction with which to alter the established
world order, impose radical Islamic ideology, destroy Israel and
create a Palestinian state, and destroy first world states standing
in their way. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001,
his speech captured a resolve to wage an aggressive war on terror,
which was to be the center piece of the 2002 mid-term elections.
More importantly, it elevated the prevention of rogue and nonstate
actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (later identified
as preemption in the 2002 national security strategy), as its most
important strategic objective. As a result, the establishing of control,
safeguards, verification, and transparency over existing weapons and
fissile material (along with non nuclear materials) has reemerged as
a top priority for the nation. Since Russia possesses over 95 percent
of the world’s nuclear weapons and materials outside of the United
States, cooperative, bilateral, arms control efforts also reclaimed
their standing at the nexus of Russo-American engagement.3
Russia and the Former Soviet Union.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union produced an extensive
weapons and power production complex. The lion’s share of the
production capability and strategic stockpile lay in four states:
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Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Fortunately, all of the
successor states except Russia terminated their nuclear weapons
programs, signed the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, and turned existing weapons over to Russia―a major,
unprecedented achievement. Russia then accepted responsibility
for all remaining weapons. This sequence of events established two
pressing priorities for U.S. national and world security: weapon and
fissile material accountability (the need to gain control over “loose
nukes”), and the need for effective verification.
Independent assessments vary on the amount of material still
remaining in Russia. Ashton Carter, former Assistant Secretary of
Defense during the Clinton Administration, in his testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that the Cooperative
Threat Reduction funded Mayak facility aimed at entombing “some
20,000 nuclear bomb’s worth of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium”4 resulting from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
That total constitutes only a “fraction of Russia’s huge store of fissile
material, enough for a staggering 80,000 bombs.”5 According to
the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign, “Russia still has enough
weapons material to build at least 60,000 nuclear warheads.”6 In
either case, neither of these numbers accounts for tactical nuclear
weapons, not yet subject to bilateral treaty reductions and the most
likely weapon of choice for nuclear terrorists. Additionally, Russia’s
research and power producing reactors (including a remaining
plutonium production reactor generating power in the Krasnoyarsk
region) continue to generate fissile material, which (when separated)
only adds to the materials at risk. Thus, the shear quantity of nuclear
materials poses a significant threat as a source for nuclear terrorism.
The lack of definitive accountability of existing special nuclear
materials compounds the threat posed by the quantity. The great
uncertainty associated with the accountability of nuclear weapons
and fissile material in the former Soviet Union (from production
facilities and retired weapons) has created conditions favorable
for diverting material into the hands of rogue states and terrorist
networks. The International Atomic Energy Agency evaluated the
risk of theft and diversion among the top three risks in nuclear
terrorism. Echoing the Agency’s assessment, the Nuclear Threat
Reduction Campaign’s statement cited a recent CIA report that
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faulted “the security of Russian nuclear arsenal facilities for
undetected smuggling.”7 As a consequence, Western states, led by
the United States (and especially two farsighted senators, Sam Nunn
and Dick Lugar), appropriated millions and now billions of dollars
to help Russia gain control and reduce the risk that nuclear weapons
might fall into malevolent hands. This massive undertaking has
been successful by nearly every measure. Still, after 8 years of effort,
“only 40 percent of the facilities housing nuclear materials in Russia
have received any security improvements through US assistance,” of
which half are still in progress and not yet completely secure.8
In addition to the vulnerability of nuclear materials, Russia has
also produced vast amounts of chemical and biological agents, even
more susceptible to employment by terrorists, as demonstrated by
the use of anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001 and the 1995
Sarin subway attacks in Tokyo. Russia has produced “thousands of
tons of viruses that cause anthrax, smallpox, and the plague, and at
least 40,000 tons of nerve and blister agents.”9 U.S. and other agencies
have yet to determine the full magnitude of the problem as a result of
a lack of Russian transparency in chemical and biological weapons
(as recently witnessed in the Moscow movie theater incident).
As a result, the Bush administration has delayed the start of new
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs until the Russians are more
forthcoming on chemical and biological programs, including those
dating back to the Soviet era.10
Post-September 11.
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon forever
changed the security environment and redefined the unthinkable,
as well as the lengths to which terrorists could go. Those acts
catapulted Americans from the immediate post Cold War period, in
which the United States struggled to develop a coherent, unifying
national security strategy. Led by the Clinton administration, the
United States practiced preventive measures with North Korea,
containment of Iraq, Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia,
the Oslo Accords with Israel and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, and engagement with China. The United States
led military peacekeeping operations in Bosnia Herzegovina and
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the NATO air campaign against Serbia in Kosovo. It championed
multilateral arrangements, globalization and free markets, and
assembled the North American Free Trade Agreement to counter
the formation of the European Union. What was missing, however,
to impose order, structure, priorities, and direction on U.S. foreign
policy and national security strategy, was a clear, defining threat.
Though unintended, Al Qaeda’s attacks provided the clear,
unmistakable threat to U.S. national security with the first attacks
on American soil since Pearl Harbor.11 Intelligence analysts, justice
department officials, and policymakers began to connect the dots
systematically and discovered a convergence of rogue states intent
on destroying regional stability, nonstate terrorist groups willing to
use mass destruction to accomplish their goals and willing to die in
the process, failed states in which terrorist groups could function
with little interference, and rogue and nonstate actors intent on
acquiring weapons of mass destruction through theft, diversion,
and purchase from cash-strapped smugglers. President Bush’s 2002
State of the Union address provided an unambiguous assessment
of current and future threats. Likewise, he identified three rogue
regimes that he believes embody the intent and the potential to
threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad.
The Axis of Evil.
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea constitute President Bush’s Axis of
Evil. Of the three, Iraq and North Korea occupy center stage in the
nonproliferation arena. The United Nations Security Council, led by
the United States, authorized economic sanctions, combat operations,
and weapons inspections to seize and destroy weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq with significant success until Saddam Hussein
expelled the inspectors in 1998. Iraq’s unwillingness to continue
disarmament under United Nations oversight placed it first among
equals in the America’s strategy to combat the threat of weapons
of mass destruction. However, North Korea’s recent admission that
it possessed a covert nuclear weapons (highly enriched uranium)
program―as well as provocative actions during the 1990s―makes it
the second most pressing object of U.S. foreign policy.
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In his May 6, 2002, Heritage Foundation Lecture, John R.
Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security, stated that North Korea had violated the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention. He further alleged that North Korea
has “developed and produced, and may have weaponized biological
agents in violation of the Convention.”12 Six months earlier, Bolton
had charged North Korea for its covert nuclear weapons program in
violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty:
This year, North Korea did not meet congressional certification
requirements because of its continued lack of cooperation with
the International Atomic Energy Agency, its failure to make
any progress toward implementing the North-South Joint
Denuclearization Declaration as called for under the Agreed
Framework, and for proliferating long range ballistic missiles.
Finally, we believe that North Korea has a sizeable stockpile
of chemical weapons and can manufacture all manner of CW
agents.13

Recent intelligence reports have confirmed suspicions that North
Korea has violated its obligations to the international agreements
to which it is a party. When confronted, the North Koreans
acknowledged that they have been pursuing a nuclear weapons
program for the past several years, after first vehemently denying
the charge. The executive board of the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization condemned North Korea for “pursuing
a program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons
. . .,”14 and cited its actions as “a violation of its obligations under the
Agreed Framework, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and the
Joint South-North Declaration.”15
These developments, along with the Spanish interception of
North Korean ballistic missiles en route to Yemen, underlined North
Korea’s role as a major contributor to the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.16 Its willingness to sell arms and technology as
well as a covert nuclear production program, makes it a likely source
from which rogue and nonstate actors could acquire weapons of
mass destruction. Not to be forgotten, Iran recently admitted that it
had embarked on a program to control the entire nuclear fuel cycle.
Secretary Bolton announced U.S. concerns that Iran was “seeking all
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elements of a nuclear fuel cycle, from mining uranium to enrichment
to production of reactor fuel,” at the summer 2002 Group of Eight
(G-8) summit in Canada.17 Six months later, International Atomic
Energy Agency director Mohamed El Baradei traveled to the Natanz
nuclear facility, and verified Iranian opposition group reports
that Iran was completing construction of a gas centrifuge plant
capable of producing enriched uranium. Iran’s actions, combined
with declarations that it “intends to activate a uranium conversion
facility near Isfahan . . . to produce uranium hexaflouride gas (for
use in the enrichment process),” suggest that Iran was developing
a covert nuclear program to produce uranium weapons, while the
International Atomic Energy Agency was focused on safeguarding
declared activities.18
Rogue states are but one, albeit important, source of material at
risk to terrorists seeking to use weapons of mass destruction against
the United States. Ash Carter points out that the post-September
11 environment includes materials from Pakistan and India, states
which have built nuclear arsenals to deter their neighbors, nonrogue
states from Ghana to Serbia possessing research reactors, and
other non-nuclear weapons states, including allies such as Japan
and Belgium, possessing plutonium by-products of their nuclear
power programs.19 These, along with radioactive sources used in
medicine, industry, and other peaceful pursuits, could provide
radioactive materials to terrorists just as easily. In sum, the wide
availability of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological
materials constitutes a greater threat in this post-9/11 world. Thus,
the United States requires a strategy based upon capabilities, that
addresses a multitude of threats, and that employs instruments
capable of defeating the threat of weapons of mass destruction at
their origin. Though a relatively recent development, the history of
on-site inspection demonstrates considerable potential for verifying
accountability, control, and destruction of materials and weapons of
mass destruction.
ON-SITE INSPECTION
Some government and security analysts, when contemplating
the unstable, multithreat environment which characterizes the 21st
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century, erroneously look back on the bipolar security environment
that dominated the Cold War with a sense of nostalgia. In this new
environment, weapons of mass destruction pose a great threat to
the world’s security and stability, as the Bush administration’s
recently published National Security Strategy indicates.20 Weapons
of mass destruction constitute a threat in the hands of terrorist
groups and rogue states, sources which nonproliferation policies
aimed at countering. However, the existence of weapons of mass
destruction also poses a threat from nonrogue states. These include
traditional, first-world powers as well as states seeking prestige
through the acquisition of such capabilities. Many have already
developed chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Unless reduced
and controlled, these weapons could find their way into the hands
of those willing to use them. Fortunately, on-site inspections have
proven effective in reducing the threat.
On-site inspection represents a key military instrument in
America’s national security strategy. Not withstanding the difficulties
experienced in Iraq, it remains a vital instrument and could contribute
to the combating of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
in states that recognize the threat posed by such weapons. On-site
inspections serve as the steel that strengthens treaties and builds
confidence among participants. Thus, U.S. policymakers should
retain and support on-site inspections as a viable strategic concept,
worthy of expansion to reduce the threat among states with the
added benefit of reducing stocks that might become available to
rogue states and terrorists (foreign and domestic).
Bilateral On-Site Inspections.
On December 8, 1987, Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail
Gorbechev signed the historic Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty in Washington, DC. “The treaty eliminated an entire class
of ground launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles
and their launchers and prohibited possession of such systems
thereafter.”21 According to the treaty, intermediate and shorter range
weapons were those in excess of 500 kilometers but not greater than
5,500 kilometers. It also provided “an extensive and, for the time,
unprecedented regime of on-site inspections.”22
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In conjunction with monitoring and national technical means,
the newly conceived on-site inspections became a critical component
of verification and the subsequent determination of compliance
by the treaty partners. The on-site inspection provision led to the
creation of the On-Site Inspection Agency under the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. That office was to verify compliance by the 15
successor states of the Soviet Union. Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus,
and Ukraine assumed the roles of active implementors.23 Colin
Powell, as the National Security Advisor to President Reagan,
recommended that the On-Site Inspection Agency become a part
of DoD with a uniformed director, and deputy directors from the
Departments of State (Arms Control Disarmament Agency), Energy,
and the FBI. Army and Air Force lieutenant colonels led interagency
teams consisting of weapons inspectors and experts from relevant
government agencies. Thus, the On-Site Inspection Agency, joint
and interagency in character, grew out of the National Security
Council and the interagency process.
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty’s on-site
inspection provision proved to be highly effective and included
baseline (to verify data declarations), close out, short notice,
elimination, and around the clock inspections “at any facility at
which the production or final assembly of a prohibited GroundLaunched Ballistic Missile occurred.”24 As a result of 13 years of
inspections (851 by the United States and 540 by the Soviet Union and
its successor states), the parties have confidence that both sides have
complied; the United States has eliminated 2,332 treaty limited items
and the former Soviet Union 5,439 items. Of the treaty limited items,
the inspectors verified that 846 U.S. missiles (Pershing 1A and IB,
Pershing II, and BGM-109G GLCM) and 1,846 former Soviet Union
missiles (SS-4, 5, 12, 20, 23, and SSC-X-4 GLCM) were destroyed.25
Without question, on-site inspection demonstrated considerable
utility under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty when
applied in the context of willing states who saw it in their individual
and collective interests. When combined with other verification
means, it became a powerful national security tool in eliminating the
threat presented by intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear
weapons. Risk depended in large part on the cooperation of treaty
partners and a shared interest in reducing the threat of nuclear
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annihilation, especially when confronted with the Soviet Union’s
collapse. Success also depended on a number of other verification
means, supporting and directing on-site inspection efforts. As a
result, the combined effect reduced the risk and contributed to the
growth of a highly effective inspection regime, modified and largely
replicated in subsequent treaties.
Multilateral On-Site Inspections.
In contrast to the success of on-site inspections under the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and subsequent nuclear
(Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, Strategic
Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty) and conventional (Conventional
Forces Europe) treaties, U.S. policy did not support legally binding
declarations and aggressive, robust, and short notice on-site
inspections in the class of multilateral agreements designed to
reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction.26 These include
the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Biological
Weapons Convention, for example, “forbids its 144 member states
from developing, retaining, and transferring” biological weapons.27
Crafted in 1972, it asserted that “use of biological weapons would be
repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should
be spared to minimize this risk.”28 However, the absence of on-site
inspections and tougher, legally binding provisions enabled thirteen
states (including seven member states) to violate the convention
without serious repercussions.29
Characteristic of the current Bush administration’s policies
regarding multilateral agreements prior to September 2001, the U.S.
supported weaker, less politically binding provisions and opposed
rigorously enforced declarations. Consequently, the United States
derailed international efforts mounted to strengthen the Biological
Weapons Convention. Fortunately, the events of September 11, 2001,
have altered U.S. national security strategy. The Bush administration
has emphasized the role of multilateral cooperation when it launched
the War on Terror by mobilizing a coalition of willing nations
around the world. The world observed the administration’s shift in
policy from the threat of unilateral use of force to a concerted effort
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to win international support prior to taking military action against
Iraq. President Bush challenged the United Nations to hold Iraq
accountable for failing to comply with legally binding resolutions
and won a 15-0 unanimous vote in the Security Council (which
included nations as ideologically opposed to the United States as
Syria). Accordingly, U.S. policymakers should revisit international
nonproliferation regimes and advocate rigorous on-site inspection
provisions and other verification means (e.g., legally binding
declarations) to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction
in the Biological Weapons Convention, Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, and Chemical Weapons Convention. If necessary, the United
States should engage the Conference on Disarmament to strengthen
provisions while inserting language and taking measures to protect
U.S. security and commercial interests where wanting.
In the nuclear nonproliferation arena, the United States entered
a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to stem
the production of fissile material, testing, and the flow of missile
technology and components worldwide.30 The U.S. Arms Control
Disarmament Agency, supported by the Interagency (in conjunction
with the Conference on Disarmament and other interested parties),
took the lead and laid out the road map, a comprehensive plan to
control each element of the nuclear fuels cycle necessary to build
weapons.31 The cycle consists of uranium mining, milling, and
conversion; enrichment (in the case of high and lowly-enriched
uranium [HEU/LEU]); plutonium reprocessing; pit design and
assembly; missile technology export controls; and storage of
material from weapons taken out of the stockpile. The agreements
designed to address these elements of the nuclear fuel cycle include
extant treaties such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty, and the Agreement to Shutdown Plutonium
Production Reactors. Future agreements will address the other
aspects of nonproliferation to include the Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, Enhanced Missile Technology Control Regime, and initiatives
currently grouped under the rubric of safeguards, transparency, and
irreversibility such as Strengthened International Atomic Energy
Agency Safeguards and Mayak Transparency.32 A mix of bilateral
and multilateral agreements, they represent diplomatic efforts to
serve U.S. interests by preventing nuclear proliferation.
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While the results are mixed, two things are clear: rigorous
verification and legally binding provisions are indispensable for
successful nonproliferation and arms control regimes; and the
requirement for on-site inspection will continue into the foreseeable
future. Concerns over sovereignty and other issues of interest
to Congress and others-particularly prior to September 11, had
constrained U.S. involvement in multilateral agreements. Likewise,
the administration’s appetite for time consuming international
negotiations through organs such as the United Nations and the
Conference on Disarmament was nearly nonexistent. However,
the advantages accrued in its efforts to assemble a “coalition of the
willing” and remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan should be
sufficient to convince skeptics that unilateralism works against U.S.
long-term interests in garnering international support and legitimacy.
More to the point, unilateral action will not enable the United States
to accomplish its most important objectives. Accordingly, one must
view multilateral agreements at least as a necessary evil warranting
U.S. involvement and commitment in order to ensure they serve the
national interests (e.g., define the scope and treaty limits, shape the
language, etc.).
International Atomic Energy Agency Strengths and Weaknesses.
The International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards is a vital
United Nations’ program designed to increase confidence that states
remain in compliance with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
and the peaceful uses of nuclear material. It possesses the requisite
expertise to monitor and administer programs for nonweapons
state signatories.33 Thus far, it has proven to be highly effective
when nations willingly submit to oversight of their programs.
The United States also supported the use of the International
Atomic Energy Agency as a means of gaining control of peaceful
nuclear programs around the world (with hopes of convincing
Russia that placing material under International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards would serve Russian as well as world security
interests). Unfortunately, countries such as Iraq and North Korea,
both signatories as nonweapons states, have pursued nonpeaceful
purposes and concealed their efforts without detection, while under
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the safeguards program.
The case of Iraq, in particular, raises questions about the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability to provide confidence
for the international community concerning rogue states which sign
the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with no intention of complying
fully, or which change their intention without withdrawing from
the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Before and after the Gulf War,
Iraq engaged in a series of deceptions undetected by International
Atomic Energy Agency’s monitors, while simultaneously earning
International Atomic Energy Agency praise for compliance. As an
example, “. . . only weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait, International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards director Jon Jennekens praised
Iraqi cooperation . . . as exemplary . . . a solid citizen under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.”34 After Operation DESERT STORM, the
International Atomic Energy Agency learned, along with the rest of
the world, that Iraq had continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons
under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s nose. In 1993, after
destruction of the discovered plants, International Atomic Energy
Agency Director General Hans Blix again asserted that Iraq had
changed its ways. He stated that the Iraqis had not tampered with
highly enriched uranium under International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards. Yet again, the International Atomic Energy Agency had
been unable to detect Iraqi efforts proven by the defection of Saddam
Hussein’s son-in-law, General Hussein Kamel. Kamel testified to the
United Nations Security Council that he had been the director of a
“crash program” to build a crude nuclear weapon from International
Atomic Energy Agency-safeguarded material.35 He also admitted to
cutting the ends off the highly enriched uranium rods which would
have enabled the Iraqis to assemble a SCUD mounted nuclear
warhead within a month, had they not been halted by Coalition
bombing during DESERT STORM.
Admittedly, the risk that states could violate treaty constraints
(or not fulfill all obligations) without detection exists even with
strengthened provisions. Obviously, Iraq demonstrates how the
safeguards arrangement, which worked well in most instances,
fails under conditions in which the signatory has no intention
of complying. Likewise, North Korea reinforces this important
limitation in International Atomic Energy Agency-like protocols.
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Nevertheless, the status quo is far worse, relying only on
intelligence estimates as is the case with the Biological Weapons
Convention: “With treaty violations on record and too few effective
ways to monitor compliance and legally enforce the Biological
Weapons Convention,”36 states routinely disregard requirements
to submit declarations. Thus, conventions alone will not suffice
to provide confidence that states will fulfill their obligations. To
address this shortfall, proponents of tougher inspections, broader
mandates, and legally binding declarations argue that added onsite scrutiny will deter countries from pursuing illegal programs. In
effect, tough standards provide the incentive for compliance with
international norms.
The goal of reducing and eliminating the threat of weapons
of mass destruction ranks among the top strategic objectives and
policy priorities facing the U.S. Government. The use of on-site
inspections under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
provided the rigor, incentive, and confidence to reduce the threat
of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, their absence
multiplied the threat under the Biological Weapons Convention.
As the international community grapples with the need to expand
and strengthen nonproliferation regimes in the wake of September
11, it will look to the United States for leadership in crafting
tougher provisions to provide the confidence that neither rogue nor
nonstate actors possess weapons of mass destruction. Therefore,
DoD must retain and expand on-site inspections, in conjunction
with other verification means, as an effective, confidence-building
engine toward reducing and eliminating the threat of weapons of
mass destruction. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s On-Site
Inspection Directorate (the Defense Threat Reduction Agency/OS)
is the repository of U.S. knowledge, and expertise upon which
to build a new strategic concept for combating weapons of mass
destruction.
THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE
Given the strategic environment described above, the United
States must develop and implement a coherent strategy designed
to meet a number of different threats. A number of concepts now
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compete in universities, think tanks, government bureaucracies, and
the international press for acceptance at home and abroad. Of those,
two have particular merit and suggest capability requirements for
DoD and the Interagency: the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the
Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign. Additionally, the Nuclear
Control Institute has raised important questions about International
Atomic Energy Agency verification activities that bear consideration
when evaluating new concepts.
Founded in January 2001 as a nonprofit foundation, the Nuclear
Threat Initiative exists to fill the gap between the threats from
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the global response.
Co-chaired by former Senator Sam Nunn and Ted Turner, it attempts
to foster cooperation amongst diverse people, organizations, and
governments around this common threat, and to develop a plan for
immediate action. Owing in large part to his considerable experience
in the Senate, Senator Nunn has assembled an impressive coalition
of able diplomats, scientists, policy experts, and academics. His
international Board of Directors consists of members from the
United Kingdom, Sweden, Pakistan, Japan, and Jordan to name a
few. He also boasts two sitting senators, two members of the Russian
Duma, a Nobel Prize winning economist, and a former Secretary of
Defense.37 Together, they have made a cogent argument for how the
Bush administration should proceed to win the war on terror and
deny weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and rogue states.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative proposal argues that if weapons of
mass destruction are in fact the number one threat facing U.S. national
security, then the United States should immediately appropriate
funds sufficient to reduce the vulnerability―sooner, rather than later.
The events of September 11 make it clear that no nation, regardless
of geography, economic power, or military might, is secure from or
immune to this threat. It is a shared threat and requires a shared
solution. Further, since the United States and Russia created the
majority of weapons of mass destruction during the Cold War arms
race, they should lead what the Nuclear Threat Initiative calls the
“Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism.”38
In looking for concepts which have worked in the past, Senator
Nunn had to look no further than the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program. Funded by legislation sponsored by himself and Dick Lugar
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in November 1991, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program had
been a radical experiment for reducing threats in a cooperative way.
In essence, the program tied financial assistance to treaty limited
reductions of weapons and infrastructure. It included everything
from biological weapons labs, nuclear reactors, and storage facilities
to missiles, export controls, and emergency response equipment. It
successfully bridged relations between Russia and the United States
even when the political winds shifted during Operation ALLIED
FORCE. However, more remains to be done. If expanded and shared
with other nations, the program could complete the task in Russia
and beyond in relatively short order. Thus, the Nuclear Threat
Initiative’s Global Coalition Against Terrorism poses six urgent
tasks for U.S. leadership:
• Secure all nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials
everywhere they exist in the world.
• Reduce the number of U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear
weapons, and secure and account for any that remain.
• Build a firebreak against any launch of nuclear weapons
by accident or miscalculation by taking as many nuclear
weapons as possible off hair-trigger alert in the United States
and Russia.
• Strengthen global public health systems, as well as undertake
an Apollo-scale research program into vaccines, treatments,
and the science of biology, so that medical authorities
can immediately respond to infectious disease epidemics
occurring naturally or from biological terrorism.
• Establish global norms and standards for handling and
scientific use of dangerous biological pathogens to prevent
these materials from being used by terrorists.
• Complete the destruction of U.S. and Russian chemical
weapons which together account for over 90 percent of all of
the world’s chemical weapons.39
In a related collaboration between Harvard’s Kennedy School
of Government and Stanford University, the Preventive Defense
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Project posits similar approaches to “address the lethal legacy of
Cold War weapons of mass destruction, and counter weapons of
mass destruction proliferation and potential acts of catastrophic
terrorism.”40 Ashton Carter, the co-chair of the Preventive Defense
Project, has elaborated his vision of the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s
global coalition. Patterned after President Bush’s coalition against
terror, the coalition includes every nation possessing materials that
terrorists or rogue states could use in weapons of mass destruction.
It extends the reach of every nation around the world and includes
those who share an interest in preventing terrorists from acquiring
dangerous materials, even if they do not possess an indigenous
source. Nations would:
contribute to the coalitions’ activities commensurate with [their]
capabilities and traditions, . . . cooperate to combat terror in all
phases—prevention, detection, protection, interdiction, and
cleanup . . . and agree to world-class standards for protecting
fissile material and safeguarding pathogens . . .41

Other experts have strongly endorsed the scale of effort
envisioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. They urge the United
States to lead an international effort to establish “stored weapons
standards,”42 for all nations to apply. In order for these:
. . . stringent international standards to have real teeth, there
would have to be some means to confirm, or at least to build
confidence, that the standards were being met. Measures toward
this end could include exchanges of information about nuclear
security procedures and standards, and bilateral or international
visits or reviews at selected facilities, with managed access to
protect sensitive information.43

The development and propagation of an international stored
weapons standard, in conjunction with an effort on the scale of the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, provides the “gold standard.” Having
earned certification that a nation has met the standard, the world
will begin to have fact-based confidence that materials are secure.
The Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign, a project of the
Vietnam Veteran’s of America Foundation, has a similar agenda
to the Nuclear Threat Initiative. As the only Congressionally
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chartered organization for Vietnam veterans, it has unique access
to policymakers to advance its agenda of humanitarian projects
emanating from its vision of healing war torn societies, eliminating
the threat of landmines to noncombatants, and securing justice
for military veterans. The focus of the Nuclear Threat Reduction
Campaign, however, is the control of weapons of mass destruction
at the source. The Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign seeks U.S.
leadership to secure all weapons of mass destruction in Russia by:
• Developing a comprehensive nuclear inventory in Russia
(including tactical/portable weapons) of weapons and
materials, and develop data exchanges of American and
Russian stockpiles to ensure safe storage and ultimate
elimination where appropriate.
• Passing the Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act
sponsored by senators Lugar and Biden to swap U.S. debt for
Russian investment in domestic nonproliferation activities.
• Signing a legally binding agreement with Russia to reduce
outdated stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons held by the
United States and Russia.
• Strengthening Cooperative Threat Reduction program
funding to secure and neutralize Russian nuclear weapons
and materials, and find peaceful employment for Russian
Scientists and technicians.
• Reducing the threat of bio-terrorism by expanding existing
programs and developing mechanisms to strengthen
cooperation to prevent proliferation of biological weapons,
materials, and expertise.44
In essence, the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign champions
the expansion of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation which
expands the scope and funding of the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program in Russia. Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, former Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs from August 1997 to
January 2001, serves as the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign
Senior Advisor. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
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Committee hearing on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT, a.k.a. Moscow Treaty), Ambassador Inderfurth stated
that “We simply will not rid the world of the greatest threat to
humanity until all of Russia’s nuclear weapons and material have
been accounted for and secured.”45 He also called for transparency
and verification imperatives missing from the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty. Finally, he cited Senator Nunn’s testimony and
recommended verification procedures for the 3-year gap that exists
between the 2009 expiration of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
verification provisions and the 2012 Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty expiration for which no other verification provisions currently
exist.46
Both the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Nuclear Threat Reduction
Campaign agree on the need to attack the threat of weapons of mass
destruction proliferation at the source. However, while the Nuclear
Threat Reduction Campaign constrains its policy recommendation
to a bilateral prescription, the Nuclear Threat Initiative uses bilateral
achievements to establish a worldwide, multilateral coalition
that harnesses the shared interests and vulnerability of citizens
and governments around the world. Given the early successes of
Bush’s coalition against terror, the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s global
coalition should have similar success being led by both the United
States and Russia.
From Spain’s interception of the ballistic missiles en route from
North Korea to Yemen, the participation of NATO countries in
Afghanistan, and the broad intelligence cooperation leading to the
arrest of suspected terrorist cells from Canada to the Philippines,
the shared threat of terrorism unifies nations across the political
landscape. Consistent with the international cooperation required
to make it successful, the Nuclear Threat Initiative has sought to
bolster the International Atomic Energy Agency to place extant
nuclear materials under International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards with adequate funding to accomplish the massive task.
Given International Atomic Energy Agency’s track record, however,
careful consideration should be given to ensure the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s responsibilities are limited to its areas of
demonstrated competence.
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The Nuclear Control Institute has long been a critic of the
International Atomic Energy Agency for its performance in Iraq and
North Korea. As described earlier, the International Atomic Energy
Agency repeatedly failed to detect covert activity in both cases.
Steven Dolley, the Nuclear Control Institute’s Research Director,
published an in-depth analysis of nuclear inspection in Iraq entitled
“Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues.” He described
the friction that developed between the United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq inspectors and International Atomic Energy
Agency inspectors.47 The United Nations Special Commission on
Iraq included members of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency (now
part of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency), military professionals
with extensive inspection experience. Consequently, its inspectors
approached their task in a tough, hard-nosed manner. Rolf Ekeus, the
Chief Executive Officer for the United Nations Special Commission
on Iraq in 1997, stated that his inspectors were “. . . by nature
suspicious.”48 Their approach represented an understanding that
if Iraq had in fact solved the warhead design problem, then it had
the technology to create a viable implosion weapon, a significantly
greater threat. In truth, in comparison with the IAEA, the United
Nations Special Commission on Iraq was “more confrontational,
refusing to accept Iraqi obfuscations and demanding evidence of
destroyed weapons.”49
By contrast, the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors
approached inspections from a completely different point of view.
Theirs was a cooperative, collegial approach between members
of a shared scientific community. Since both the United Nations
Special Commission on Iraq and the International Atomic Energy
Agency conducted nuclear inspections, the friction became a major
impediment to agreement on key findings and observations. After
leaving the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, Ekeus
stated that “better coordination and consultation between the
two agencies would be required if the remaining questions about
the Iraqi program are to be answered.”50 Nevertheless, the United
Nations Security Council awarded the nuclear inspection portfolio
to the International Atomic Energy Agency, with U.S. support,
to advance the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
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The conventional wisdom asserted that giving United Nations
Special Commission on Iraq the mission would have undercut the
International Atomic Energy Agency and irreparably damaged the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at a time when its survival was in
question.
To compound matters, the International Atomic Energy Agency
“seems to place an almost naïve confidence in the absence of
evidence contradicting unsubstantiated Iraqi claims” when the
presumption should be to continue investigation until evidence
mounts to positively and conclusively confirm Iraqi claims of
compliance.51 As an example, Ekeus considered it reasonable to
demand evidence confirming the destruction of nuclear components
in his 1997 statement holding the Iraqi’s accountable for providing
such proof:
Iraq produced components, so to say, elements for the nuclear
warhead. Where are the remnants of that? They can’t evaporate .
. . We feel that Iraq is still trying to protect them. And that is part
of our . . . efforts . . . to find these remnants . . . We know that they
have existed. But we doubt they have been destroyed. But we are
searching.52

Such an approach runs counter to International Atomic Energy
Agency values. As a result, the Iraqis were able to conduct covert
activities with impunity. Thus, Ekeus and Dolley correctly fault the
International Atomic Energy Agency culture for the success of Iraqi
covert activities while under safeguards, before and after DESERT
STORM. As a result, suggestions to use the International Atomic
Energy Agency under circumstances which require it to act contrary
to its nature is a flawed proposition with predictable results. The
Agency does most things well. However, conducting inspections
and monitoring safeguard programs for nations likely to pursue
covert development programs and would-be proliferators are not
among its strengths.
In contrast, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq-like
organizations does possess the requisite competence and appropriate
disposition to successfully serve U.S. interests in countries with
dubious intentions and track records. The United States should

392

retain the ability to resource the United Nations Special Commission
on Iraq-like international inspectorates to ensure its interests are
protected. [As a note, the pre-Operation IRAQI FREEDOM United
Nations Monitoring and Inspection Commission did not pass this
test. Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of the Commission, served
as the International Atomic Energy Agency Director General from
1981 to 1997, the period in question. His appointment, along with
Iraqi protests precluding the United States from contributing
inspectors that would meet the standard above, rendered the United
Nations Monitoring and Inspection Commission impotent, incapable
of accomplishing the formidable task of conducting successful
inspections 4 years after Iraq expelled inspectors in 1998.]
The policy proposals from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nuclear
Threat Reduction Campaign, Preventive Defense Project and the
Nuclear Control Institute, combined with the Bush administration’s
declared strategy, make a clear case for retention of key arms control
capabilities resident in DoD and her sister departments of State,
Energy, and Justice. Rather than relegate arms control to the past
as a Cold War relic, these proposals demand proven capabilities for
traditional verification activities through 2012.53 More importantly,
the Nuclear Threat Initiative argues the application of arms control
concepts to a broader, more pressing array of threats and scenarios.
CHANGING DIRECTIONS: MEETING THE NUCLEAR
CHALLENGE
In December 2002, the Bush Administration published its
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. It contains
the administration’s growing appreciation of the need to combat
weapons of mass destruction at the source, as well as the requirement
to respond to use against the United States and its allies. The
strategy contains three main pillars. Of the three, “Strengthening
Nonproliferation to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation” directly captures the U.S. commitment to reengage
in multilateral and bilateral arrangements with the necessary
provisions to make them effective. In addition to urging the broader
international community to prevent terrorists from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction, the administration pledges to “. . .
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enhance traditional measures―diplomacy, arms control, multilateral
agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls―that
seek to dissuade or impede proliferant states and terrorist networks .
. . and ensure compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons
Convention.”54 More significantly, the strategy commits the United
States to “support those regimes that are currently in force, and work
to improve the effectiveness of, and compliance with, those regimes
. . . and will also promote new agreements and arrangements that
serve our nonproliferation goals.”55 In the nuclear arena, U.S. goals
include:
•

Strengthening of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
International Atomic Energy Agency, including, through
ratification of an International Atomic Energy Agency
additional protocol by all Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
states parties, assurances that all states put in place full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements;
and appropriate increases in funding for the Agency;

•

Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty that advances
U.S. security interests; and

•

Strengthening the nuclear suppliers Group and Zangger
Committee.56

These measures demonstrate the administration’s recognition
that working within international frameworks constitutes an
indispensable component of U.S. strategy. Combined with
unilateral and bi-lateral commitments, they contribute to a wide
range of options from which to choose. Further, they acknowledge
that solving global problems requires U.S. leadership, enforceable
legal constructs and international norms, and a global strategy. It
includes expanding efforts such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction program and the G-8 Global Partnership Against
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction “ . . .
designed to address the proliferation threat stemming from the large
quantities of Soviet-legacy weapons of mass destruction and missile
related expertise.”57
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In sum, the Bush Administration’s shift in policy, as articulated
in both the National Security Strategy and The National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, necessarily requires a review
of Department of Defense programs and policies, joint and service
organizations, and doctrine and training to achieve the President’s
policy objectives. As a starting point, the review must begin with
the issue as to whether the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
possesses the capabilities to match the counterproliferation and
nonproliferation policies that flow from the President’s strategy.
The On-Site Inspection Directorate, the arm of the agency that
implements arms control and nonproliferation policies through onsite inspections and technical assistance, must adapt to the changing
security environment, new strategic imperatives, and the changing
face of on-site inspections.
The history of on-site inspections between the United States and
the Soviet Union (and its successor states), the widely acclaimed
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, as well as the United
Nations Special Commission to Iraq, suggests the existence of three
distinctly different classes of inspections defined by level and degree
of cooperation. Ranging from obstruction and clear opposition at
one end and cooperative partnership on the other, one can best
categorize them as adversarial, reciprocal, and cooperative on-site
inspection regimes.

Figure 1. On-Site Inspection Continuum.
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They possess different characteristics and limitations and serve
different purposes. Understanding the differences should enable
force developers and planners to size, train and equip forces
to accomplish the missions flowing from the strategy. At the
operational level, understanding the differences will enable leaders
to properly tailor on-site inspections to suit the political context
of each situation. Finally, given the defense Department’s leading
role in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,
it should immediately structure on-site inspection forces to satisfy
the peculiar requirements of all three classes of nuclear on-site
inspection regimes.
Adversarial On-Site Inspection.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United Nations Security
Council developed and implemented an on-site inspection regime
following the coalition victory over Iraqi forces in 1991. Imposed
on a militarily defeated Iraq, United Nations inspections achieved
significant, though far from complete results. Reluctantly, Iraq
submitted to inspections under duress and the threat of force.
According to Robert Gallucci, former United Nations Special
Commission Deputy Executive Director from 1990 to 1991, inspectors
enjoyed 5-6 years in which inspections were “incredibly effective.”58
He attributes their effectiveness to a unified United Nations Security
Council (particularly the permanent members), popular support in
the region, support of the international community and the United
States, and the threat of hostilities.
These conditions describe a political context in which on-site
inspection can be effective with an adversarial, noncooperative
government. Inspectors verify government declarations and
“discover” undeclared activity based on a presumption of deceit,
lies, and the existence of covert activity, materials and programs.
However, analysis of U.N. activities in Iraq suggests three factors
which will determine the effectiveness of adversarial inspections.
Adversarial inspections must be backed-up by a credible threat of
force (or equivalent sanction depending on the nature of the political
regime), time to discover hidden activity, and, most importantly,
political resolve (or strong consensus in a multilateral context).
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The discovery function, indispensable in adversarial inspections,
is inherently intrusive and depends on a credible, coercive threat
to submit to inspections. As demonstrated in fall 2002, the threat
of force under United Nations Resolution 1441 led Iraq to accept
inspections after successfully ridding themselves of inspectors in
1998. Diplomatic efforts in 1998, and others in subsequent years,
failed to convince Iraq that it was in its interest to permit inspections.
Adversarial inspections also require time. As Iraq demonstrated in
the years following the Gulf War, nations that grudgingly submit
to inspections can delay the process for years. Had Iraq been
forthcoming in its declarations, the United Nations Commission
on Iraq could have completed its work in work in far less time and
with higher confidence. Instead, adversarial on-site inspections took
years to piece together intelligence reports, interview scientists and
officials willing to trade information for security guarantees, review
documents, and investigate sources for acquiring dual purpose
technology with which to conduct their work. Consequently,
adversarial inspections are investigative in nature and require
sufficient time to investigate all potential leads.
Finally, the most important requirement for adversarial
inspections to be effective is political will, the support of government
and the people. In his unfinished work On War, Carl von Clausewitz
established that war and the use of force is an extension of policy
and exists within the framework of a trinity: the nation, its army,
and its people.59 The policy to remove weapons of mass destruction
from Iraq possessed the support of the international community and
popular support among people around the world. Consequently,
the United Nations under U.S. leadership possessed the will to
use force to back inspections, regardless of Iraqi obstructions. As a
result, the inspectors successfully discovered and destroyed many
of Iraq’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction in an
investigative approach that defined the scope and size of their efforts.
However, before completing the task of destroying Iraq’s capabilities
and all its weapons, the political will within the Security Council
dissipated, and the threat of force ceased to be credible. In the end,
Iraq successfully exhausted the will of the international community,
expelled the inspectors, and resumed its weapons programs
unfettered by the United Nations. The confidence generated by years
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of successful discovery and subsequent destruction of weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq quickly faded.
Clearly, adversarial inspections serve a unique set of conditions
among on-site inspection regimes. However, it depends upon the
synergy gained by a credible threat of force, adequate time, and
political resolve. The absence of any one will preclude success.
Above all, the often temporary nature of political consensus may
undercut the regime before it fulfills its mandate. Rogue states
intent on pursuing weapons of mass destruction will undoubtedly
resist efforts to curb their programs, especially on-site inspection.
Nevertheless, the United States and the international community
should pursue diplomacy, and if necessary force, to compel states
like Iraq to submit to on-site inspections and to remove such
weapons.
However, even when all three factors of force, time, and
resolve are present, the results only remain valid for the duration
of the inspection regime, absent a change in national goals. This is
particularly true with adversarial on-site inspections. As Gallucci has
made clear, “There is no way they can have a permanent clean bill of
health. They don’t enter a state of grace . . .”60 Therefore, adversarial
on-site inspection only provides confidence for the life of the
inspection regime. Whether resulting from diplomatic, economic, or
information elements of power, internal policy changes must occur
within the inspected state that preclude a resumption of a weapons
program. Additionally, willing submission to a strengthened
monitoring regime of any and all activities (as envisioned under
the Strengthened Safeguards protocol), connected with a weapons
program, will provide the confidence necessary to secure Gallucci’s
“clean bill of health.”
Reciprocal On-Site Inspection.
The history of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
and more recently the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, defines
reciprocal arms control regimes forged between the United States
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. President Reagan
captured the governing ethos of reciprocal inspections in the phrase,
“Trust but Verify”―the motto of the On-Site Inspection Agency.61
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Concluded between peer competitors which viewed reductions in
their mutual interest, these bilateral agreements depended upon
on-site inspections supported by intelligence reports and national
technical means. Together, they provided the requisite confidence
that both sides had complied with their treaty obligations. Aided
by Perestroika, Glasnost, and the demise of the Soviet Union, treaty
compliance verified by on-site inspections contributed to the creation
of a new security environment characterized by Russian and U. S.
security cooperation. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between
the United States and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
exemplifies the reciprocal class of on-site inspections. Each side
possesses intrusive options to verify the other’s claims, declarations,
and activities.
Reciprocal inspections, therefore, will remain an important class
of on-site inspections for the foreseeable future as Russia and the
United States continue to eliminate nuclear weapons in excess of
their deterrence needs. As weapon dismantlement continues and
requirements for transparency increase, fissile material storage and
inspections will lend themselves to reciprocal inspections. Experts
from both countries have made considerable progress in finding
ways to technically inspect pits, whose shape and composition are
protected information. They demonstrated nondestructive assay and
shape measurements which could support transparency regimes
and provide confidence without compromising classified data.
As more and more nations unveil nuclear programs and
weapons, the United States should seek access through some form
of reciprocal inspection regime. Obviously, nations that pursue
weapons for regional security such as Pakistan and India should
enter into bilateral treaty regimes with each other. The United States
should use its prestige to pass on-site inspection expertise along to
both sides via military to military programs. If successful, those
efforts could foster transparency, build confidence and security, and
decrease tensions in the region.
Cooperative On-Site Inspection.
Cooperative on-site inspection, the third class of inspections,
secured its place as a legitimate confidence building mechanism
399

with the creation of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
program. Based on a shared interest in eliminating weapons
identified in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the United States
agreed to provide financial assistance at a time when the economies
of the Soviet Union’s successor states lacked resources to accomplish
treaty reductions. After 10 years of substantial gains, the Cooperative
Threat Reduction program provides the intellectual foundation for
the larger, more aggressive Nuclear Threat Initiative. This class
of on-site inspection depends on Congressional authorizations
and commitment to finance and foster desired behaviors in cashstrapped countries. To satisfy Congressional oversight, countries
receiving U.S. assistance must permit on-site inspections (called
audits) and examinations under the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, to ensure the use of assistance as intended. The Nuclear
Threat Reduction Campaign advocates increasing investment in
Russia’s efforts to control weapons of mass destruction materials, a
commitment now embodied in the President’s strategy. The Nuclear
Threat Initiative seeks to expand this program to developing,
resource-poor countries with materials arising from the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
Cooperative on-site inspection tends to be as intrusive as
reciprocal inspections, but without the characteristic resistance.
Rooted in a shared interest in reducing the threat posed by nuclear
weapons and materials, nations (and their agents) receiving U.S.
assistance, often feel comfortable expressing gratitude and work
to ensure inspectors gain the requisite access to satisfy inspection
requirements. Even during times of enormous strain between
Washington and Moscow, the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program functioned well, since neither side was willing to
jeopardize the program. Access, therefore, is the key to satisfying
on-site inspections. In most cases, U.S. assistance is sufficient to
garner access. However, sovereign nations may choose to protect
locations and sensitive information. In those instances, the United
States must seek alternative means to formulate conclusions on
intended use. Policymakers must determine whether the alternative
methods are adequate to formulate those conclusions. If inadequate,
they must choose to either withdraw assistance in those instances,
or provide it knowing that access will not be forthcoming during
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on-site inspections. Consequently, determining access prior to
awarding assistance should occur with each project in which the
United States provides assistance to reduce the threat of weapons of
mass destruction under the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
In all three classes of on-site inspection, the United States
may determine that bilateral inspections satisfy its interests. In
most reciprocal arrangements, bilateral inspections are the only
option. Cooperative arrangements, as envisioned by the Nuclear
Threat Initiative, would quickly exceed the capacity of the United
States government to accomplish unilaterally. Consequently,
the Nuclear Threat Initiative advocates initial U.S. (and Russian
where possible) leadership to start the process. Once programs
mature and have satisfied Congressional interests, they should
move on to a multilateral regime. As the new strategy to defeat
weapons of mass destruction clearly states, the United States must
engage the international community and organizations such as
the International Atomic Energy Agency to accomplish this global
mission. Accordingly, the Nuclear Threat Initiative envisions a
transition from bilateral agreements and inspections with the United
States, to existing or adapted International Atomic Energy Agency
protocols and international monitoring.
Commensurate with the goal of securing all weapons and
materials of mass destruction, on-site inspection must encompass
a wide array of programs. Whether military or civilian, commercial
or academic, these programs must conform to standards of
accountability, security, and inspection that preclude use by
terrorists. Scientists and engineers use nuclear material in reactors to
produce commercial power, conduct medical research and treatment,
and power ships and submarines. Centrifuges and reprocessing
facilities enable governments to produce highly enriched uranium
and plutonium, respectively. States must therefore account for,
store and immobilize material from spent fuel rods, reprocessed
plutonium oxide, enriched uranium and nuclear warheads from
decommissioned weapons. Domestically, DoD, the Department of
Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission perform these
functions within their respective sectors. Nations without sufficient
resources or mature agencies will likely look to the United States
to assist them in building the capacity to deny materials from each
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sector to terrorist organizations.
Figure 2 summarizes the three types of on-site inspection
and the characteristics that define each type. The distinctions of
purpose, context, and inspector roles require capabilities within
the U.S. Government to satisfy each regime. The skills necessary to
verify whether assistance provided to secure materials is adequate,
differ from those designed to ascertain the scope and breadth
of covert weapons programs. Likewise, the mindset suited to a
political context in which nations coerce others to accept inspections
differs from the context in which nations seek both assistance and
inspections to demonstrate their participation in the global effort
to defeat terrorism. Thus, the United States should aggressively
resource the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the recommendations
of the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign, with the capabilities
necessary to execute the strategy.
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Figure 2. On-Site Inspection Regimes.
THE NUCLEAR AND COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
BRANCH
With this new direction in combating weapons of mass
destruction, DoD, in cooperation with its sister Departments of State,
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Energy, and Justice, has the ability to implement the president’s
strategy through the Nuclear and Cooperative Threat Reduction
Branch of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Reduced in size in
1998 as a result of a questionable agency strategic review, it should
now constitute the core of DoD’s efforts to respond to the President’s
renewed commitment to defeat the threat at the source.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency leverages the services and
the Interagency to provide the capabilities required by the Nuclear
and Cooperative Threat Reduction Branch to perform current
missions. The expanded on-site inspection tasks suggested by the
Nuclear Threat Initiative will increase the importance of assembling
the appropriate on-site inspection expertise:
• Intelligence expertise in state and nonstate actors analogous
to Soviet foreign area officers (e.g., “order of battle” experts
with regional [historical and cultural] expertise).
• Nuclear physics and engineering expertise in reactor
technology, weapons design and assembly, and storage
requirements sufficient to inspect production and storage
facilities.
• Missile, submarine, bomber, and customs and export control
expertise.
• Competence in the implementation of relevant nuclear
treaties and agreements, bilateral and multilateral.
• Linguists capable of consecutive interpretation and translation, and with technical and conversational ability in the
languages of treaty parties.
Personnel with capabilities identified above need not come
entirely from DoD. Instead, personnel should come from agencies
whose core competencies coincide with needed skills and expertise.
In light of growing interagency integration down to and including
combatant command staffs, DoD must increasingly leverage
interagency capabilities, as it structures the nuclear branch, while
simultaneously increasing the number of military members assigned
to sister agencies in complementary programs. As an example,
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DoD should provide officers to the Department of Energy in fissile
material physical protection, control and accountability (MPC&A)
programs that broaden the experience of nuclear specialty officers.
In the end, critical capabilities increase, cultural barriers fall, and
most importantly, the United States increases its security by denying
weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and rogue states.
The administration, Congress, and the American people look to
the Defense Department for its ability to train and develop leaders
and disciplined professionals: weaponeers, nuclear research and
foreign area officers, and linguists. Similarly, the Department
of Energy possesses the deepest technical base and should be
the primary, though not only, supplier of nuclear scientists and
engineers. The U.S. intelligence community should provide the
intelligence analysts to work alongside military foreign area officers.
Likewise, the Department of State should provide state and regional
studies experts as well as expertise in diplomacy. As a result, the
Nuclear and Cooperative Threat Reduction Branch will be a joint
and interagency organization consisting of military and civilian
government employees with the ability to incorporate contractors
where appropriate. It should remain within DoD for the same reasons
that led President Reagan to place it there in 1987: its worldwide
infrastructure to support implementation and its ability to organize,
train and lead inspection teams under often difficult and adverse
circumstances. Further, DoD’s reputation as the world leader in
treaty verification activities stems from its extensive experience with
the Soviet Union and its successor states.
Finally, as a consequence of its competence in performing
its core missions, the nuclear branch must also have the ability
to augment or parallel international inspectorates (such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency or United Nations Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission), where necessary to satisfy
U.S. interests. The branch will possess the ability to implement
verification activities across all three classes of on-site inspection
regimes. It will be able to support international arrangements and
implement a variety of instruments, bilateral and multilateral, treaty
and confidence building.
In sum, the events of September 11 have led the Bush
administration to review its strategy for combating terrorism and
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weapons of mass destruction. DoD has a leading role beginning
with defeating the threat at the source, before materials find their
way into the hands of terrorists and states intent on harming the
United States or her allies. To accomplish this task, the services
must provide quality personnel with the requisite background
and performance to implement on-site inspections in adversarial,
reciprocal, and cooperative inspection regimes to accomplish U.S.
security objectives globally.
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